Bpk brave doom. Dembel album. Service on the "Bold". The operational duty officer of the Black Sea Fleet continued to describe the situation

The Otvazhny large anti-submarine ship (bpk) was a representative of a new class of modern medium-sized surface ships, which, according to the fleet construction plan, in the 60s and 70s were to replace destroyers built in the 40s and 50s. The ship's displacement was about 4500 tons, length 144 m, width 158 m and a draft of about 5 m. Its main combat mission is anti-submarine operations in remote areas of the sea and ocean. This class of ships arose as a counterweight to submarines of foreign fleets, including, and above all, atomic ones, armed with long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons. Several dozen such ships were built in the Soviet Navy, including more than ten in the Black Sea Fleet.

The ship of this construction (project 61) had the most advanced hydroacoustic stations for detecting submarines, rocket launchers, and anti-submarine torpedo weapons in terms of that time and the level of technology. In addition, he was armed with two anti-aircraft complexes and two 76.2-mm anti-aircraft automatic artillery mounts. This is the first ship of the Navy, where the main engines were gas turbines, which significantly reduced, in comparison with steam-powered ships, the preparation time for the cruise and made it possible to develop the maximum speed in a matter of minutes. When all four turbines were running, it reached 36 knots. These driving performance gave him great advantages over destroyers, ensuring the earliest arrival in the area of the proposed location of the submarine (Fig. 50).

The ship also had an anti-submarine helicopter system: a helipad for one helicopter, reserves of depth charges, hydroacoustic buoys and aviation fuel.

By the way, when the Komsomolets Ukrainy bpk, the lead of this series on the Black Sea, and the Smart Guard bpk, first entered the Mediterranean in 1964, American sailors immediately dubbed them “singing frigates” for the characteristic sound of gas turbines operating and expressed admiration for the appearance of these ships. Indeed, the ship has streamlined contours, a solid, raised deck on the tank, pipes sloping back, which makes it look impetuous and perfect in architecture.

"Brave" entered service with the Black Sea Fleet in January 1966, sailed for nine years, annually carried out combat service in the Mediterranean -naval forces in the Mediterranean), successfully participated in all major exercises and maneuvers of the Soviet Navy, including the well-known naval maneuvers "Ocean", with the performance of rocket fire in the Atlantic Ocean and joint search operations with the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea (together with the Leningrad anti-submarine cruiser). The Brave also took part in actual hostilities - in ensuring the security of Port Said in 1968, in organizing the defense of the port of Conakry (Guinea) in 1972 at the request of President Sekou Touré.

I know this ship well. As the flagship navigator of the Black Sea Fleet, I have sailed on it several times, in addition, by the nature of my work, I had to follow all of its voyages - even from Sevastopol. I remember how this ship in the Mediterranean Sea actively and successfully performed the tasks of direct tracking of large warships of the US 6th Fleet during one of the then frequent crisis, pre-conflict situations associated with the situation in the Middle East.

In 1969, Captain 3rd Rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik, a man of high decency and responsibility, thorough and solid in decisions and actions, a true professional in naval command affairs, was appointed the commander of the "Otvazhny". I have known this officer for a long time and well, even from his senior Pomov years.

With the arrival of a new commander, the ship not only did not give up its positions, as sometimes happens, but continued to steadily increase the level of its combat readiness. For the high level of combat readiness in the same year, the ship received the title of "excellent" ship and annually confirmed it during all and numerous checks of various levels. In 1970, Otvazhny won the prize of the USSR Navy for rocket firing, which held out for another year - and this is "competition" with dozens of similar ships in the composition of not only the Black Sea, but also other fleets - the Baltic, Northern and Pacific. The ship took part in ensuring the tests of new naval equipment, for which its commander in 1972 was awarded the high and rare Order of the Red Banner for peacetime. All coursework tasks, combat exercises in 1973-1974. on the ship were performed with excellent and high performance. "Brave" took first place among the ships and was awarded the banner "The best ship of the formation". By the end of August 1974, "Otvazhny" had successfully completed the main tasks of the annual combat training plan, more than half of the ship's crew were high-level specialists - 1st and 2nd class, more than half of the combat posts and subdivisions of the ship were "excellent". On this ship, in general, there was a good environment, high commanding demands were combined with benevolence, respect for subordinates, and care for them. All this led to the skillful, truly courageous actions of the absolute majority of the crew in an emergency.

Now about the events immediately preceding the accident and death of the ship.

In June 1974, the commander of the Otvazhny bpk, Captain 2nd Rank I. Vinnik, was promoted to the post of commander of a ship formation in another garrison of the fleet, in Donuzlav, where he left, transferring command affairs and responsibilities to his senior assistant, Lieutenant Commander V. V. Balashev for their temporary execution. The new commander appointed to the "Brave" was on leave, and the situation in the new formation required I.P. Vinnik. However, at the very end of August, on the 28th, he was summoned to Sevastopol to ensure the responsible exit to the sea of "Otvazhny". On August 30, it was planned to conduct a complex combat exercise of missile boats with the implementation of practical missile firing at several targets, with an air defense exercise of the formation at sea.

"Brave" was supposed to provide control of all the security forces of the area, aviation, firing boats and small missile ships (MRK). Considering the complexity of the task, the command of the fleet decided to call on the ship an experienced old commander, Captain 2nd Rank I. Vinnik.

On August 29, in the afternoon, the ship went to sea to perform planned combat training tasks, and in the morning at 7:30 on August 30, taking on board the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Rear Admiral V.Kh. Sahakyan, the commander of the rocket ship brigade, Captain 1st Rank A.F. Komara and a number of other officers of the headquarters and management of the fleet, "Otvazhny" went to the area of the exercise. At 09:25, Otvazhny, together with firing small missile ships, entered the planned training ground. The missile boats and ships began final preparations for performing missile firing, including surveillance radars and firing stations. At 0955 hours a combat training alert was played on the "Otvazhny" to provide control of missile firing by small missile ships, radar stations were switched on. At 9 h 59 min, the senior assistant reported to the commander, who was at the Main Command Post (GKP), about the readiness of the ship for the exercise.

To understand the organization of control of the ship, the following explanations should be made. The GKP of the ship of this project is located inside it, in a specially equipped room, where all communication and control lines, both internal and external, converge. In a normal sailing situation, the commander and the officer of the watch are on the navigation bridge - a room in the upper part of the bow superstructure, from where it is possible to make not only technical, but also visual observation of the environment, where all the necessary communications are also brought out. As in the GKP, there are machine telegraphs and steering controls on the navigating bridge. On alarm, when the commander descends on the GKP, the officer of the watch remains on the navigating bridge to help the commander in controlling the ship with his reports on visual observation. The Chief of Staff of the Fleet, Rear Admiral V. Sahakyan, was on the navigating bridge with access to the sea.

At 10:02 am, Captain 2nd Rank I. Vinnik, making sure the ship was ready for training, climbed onto the navigating bridge and at that moment saw white smoke and force of fire in the area of the aft pipes. Then the first explosion occurred. The commander announced a "combat alert", transmitted over the ship broadcast about the fire on the ship and the order: "Bow and stern emergency parties to extinguish the fire."

15-20 seconds later, a second explosion occurred in the same area. The commander, with the permission of the chief of staff, went down to the GKP to manage the fight for the survivability of the ship, leaving the officer of the watch on the navigating bridge. After 20-30 seconds, there were two more explosions - the third and fourth, again in the stern of the ship. The first assumptions about the cause of the explosion were ambiguous - either the launching cylinders in the aft engine room (compressed air cylinders for starting the main engines) or missiles in the cellar of the aft anti-aircraft missile launcher explode.

An "emergency alert" was played, the commander ordered: "To the commanders of combat posts and command posts, report the presence of smoke, fire and water in their premises." Reports were received that there was no connection with the stern machine, the stern rocket store, the stern emergency party and the stern tower, as well as data on the condition of the premises located to the bow of the stern machine. The struggle for the survivability of the ship began, aimed primarily at localizing the fire that had arisen. Sent by the commander to visually assess the damage and condition of the aft part of the ship, the senior assistant reported that the aft missile cellar had been torn apart, the anti-aircraft missile launcher had been thrown into the area of the aft pipes by explosions. There is a strong fire in the cellar, the fire is moving into the stern vehicle and into the stern, in the area of the artillery installation and the artillery cellar. The commander reported the situation to the chief of staff of the fleet and, according to the established form, according to the table of established signals, to the command post of the fleet and his formation. In addition, personally through the airfield, with which direct communication was maintained, he conveyed about an explosion and a large fire, conveyed to the command post of the fleet a request to urgently deliver a foam concentrate or carbon dioxide in cylinders by helicopters to dump them into the aft cellar. One of the small missile ships, at the request of the commander, approached the aft part of the bpk, removed some of the personnel from the upper deck, and also lifted several people thrown by the explosions from the water. They did not dare to attract small rocket ships to extinguish the fire in the aft part of the ship, since they also carried combat missiles, and artillery ammunition, and fuel, and the likelihood of subsequent explosions was not excluded ...

The joint efforts of the ship and the PZhS-123 fire-fighting and rescue vessel, which approached the left side of the Otvazhny, managed to stop the spread of fire, and the fire began to subside. But, unfortunately, the reserves of the foaming agent both on the Otvazhny and PZhS-123 turned out to be clearly insufficient to extinguish a severe fire, and it began to spread again, especially in the aft part of the ship. As time has shown, water alone from the ship's fire line and even very powerful water extinguishing agents for the PZhS was not enough to cope with the fire. It was only possible to stop its spread to the bow, and the stern was almost defenseless from the increasing onset of fire. In this situation, the commander reasonably feared for the fate of the aft cellar and aviation fuel, which was also in the stern, but nevertheless did not forget to warn the rescue vessel not to pour water into the interior without calculation, which could lead to a deterioration in the stability of the ship. Prudently and in a timely manner, the commander also freed himself from combat torpedoes, when the fire of the stern pipes began to threaten the torpedo platform where the torpedoes were located.

Simultaneously with the fight against the fire, the ship was towed by the approaching destroyer "Conscious", and then by the missile ship "Bedovy". The purpose of the towing is to bring the “Otvazhny” out from great depths in shallow waters in the area of the Sevastopol roadstead. On the ship, the option of giving a move with a bow machine, which was in service, was considered, but after studying the possible consequences, they abandoned this decision: the shaft line could be deformed from an explosion, when moving, this would inevitably lead to a breach of the tightness of the shaft line corridor, to the arrival of an additional large the amount of water and to the loss of the remaining small buoyancy reserve. By the time the ships arrived for towing, three compartments had already been flooded.

As the subsequent diving survey of the sunken ship showed, the assumptions of the commander and commander of the BCh-5 of the ship were justified: the stern part was almost torn off and "hung on the shaft line", as the divers put it, there were large breaks in the ship's hull on both sides.

The unsinkability calculations made at the BC BCH-5 showed that the ship was in critical condition. By order of the chief of staff of the fleet, the destroyer "Conscious" approached the side, secret documentation and equipment were loaded onto it, some officers of the headquarters and part of the personnel were transferred. On this destroyer was the commander of the brigade of ships, which included "Brave", Captain 1st Rank L. Makarov, but he did not go on board the damaged ship.

Meanwhile, the fire spread to the stern, reached the aviation fuel storage - the last, fifth, explosion occurred, a large column of smoke and fire rose, similar, according to eyewitnesses, to a nuclear explosion. After that, it became clear that there was no hope of saving the ship, and the commander directed all his efforts to rescue the personnel. The commander requested permission to evacuate the crew even earlier after the fire was reinforced and in the absence of extinguishing means, but the command post of the fleet did not "give it, despite requests. This permission was given to the commander by the chief of staff of the fleet.

The commander announced over the broadcast (she, like lighting, communications, water extinguishing and drainage equipment worked until the very last minutes of the ship's life): "All personnel should leave combat posts, go to the upper deck for evacuation from the ship, put on life jackets." The personnel went to the upper deck. The senior assistant to the commander organized the abandonment of the ship: on command in groups, sailors and foremen jumped into the water, when one group sailed away, the chief officer gave the command to the other - “into the water!”. Thus, almost all personnel left the ship, after which the senior assistant reported this to the commander. The commander packed the Combat Log and the Watch Log in a plastic bag, handed them to the senior mate with the words: “Keep these documents, our future life depends on their content. Jump into the water, swim off a little and wait for me, watch me, because everything is possible, I'm tired, and the water is cold. " The first mate jumped into the water from the area of the exit to the tank, from the upper deck of the port side.

After that, the commander went into his cabin, took a party card from the safe, barely got out and climbed onto the navigating bridge, having examined his ship for the last time. By this time, the ship was sinking aft, the trim aft increased, the roll to the left side reached 30 °. On the navigating bridge I.P. Vinnik discovered two young sailors who were afraid to go down and jump overboard, as they were not swimming well. (It was not in vain that I used the expression - "almost all the personnel left the ship"). The commander ordered them to put on life jackets, handed one of them a secret map with training grounds and led the sailors down to the upper deck. The descent was very difficult, as the trim and roll increased continuously. Coming to the upper deck in the area of the tank, the commander ordered the sailors to jump into the water. They were afraid, since the tank had already risen high above the water due to the trim, but nevertheless one of them jumped off, and the second commander simply pushed lightly off the side. Both sailors were lifted by the launches of neighboring ships. They were the last to see the commander on the wrecked ship.

Subsequently, the commander reported to the members of the state commission: “When I pushed the sailors into the water, I saw that they were sailing away from the side, I decided to jump myself. He took off his shoes, looked down, it was already too high above the water, only then the thought occurred to me: "But I have two children" and resolutely jumped down "a soldier". I tried to sail away from the ship, but I was constantly attracted to the side. With great effort I broke away from the ship, and when I swam 50-60 meters away, I looked back: the ship sank completely under the water, the bow was at 60 ° upward, the ship was slowly sinking. After a while, a longboat approached me, lifted me aboard and brought me to a rescue tug, where I undressed and dried myself. "

They searched for the commander for a long time, believing that he could stay on the ship, but then they found out that he was on the rescuer.

"Brave" sank at a depth of 127 m at a distance of about 20 miles from the Chersonesos lighthouse. The towing ships managed to take it away from large depths of more than 1000 m, but they did not succeed in bringing it to shallow water, which would have made it possible to save the heavily damaged ship ...

In total, 24 people died on the ship, all as a result of explosions or its consequences. (The reader will probably pay attention to the fact that in an approximately similar critical situation with the battleship Novorossiysk, the commander of Otvazhny did not make a single mistake in controlling the ship, correctly assessing the changing real situation, taking all possible measures to combat the survivability of the ship, and when it became inevitable, he carried out an organized evacuation of personnel without losing a single person - all the losses occurred during the first explosion and fire ... By the way, the tragic example with the "Brave" confirms that in the preparation of officers and crews of ships for the fight for survivability from the sad lessons " Novorossiysk "conclusions were effective. I can confirm this not only by the example of" Brave ", but also by my service on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet for three decades after the death of" Novorossiysk. " "Komsomolets" that a number of technical problems of the safety of ships and the fight for their survivability were not resolved in high management x and design and research areas).

Analyzing the activities of officers, warrant officers, foremen and sailors of the ship during the accident, we can confidently assert (this was confirmed by the reports of all commissions) that the crew in this difficult and critical situation showed high moral and political qualities, psychological stability, good skills in the fight for the survivability of the ship, which made it possible for a long time (about 5 hours and 40 minutes) to fight for the survivability of the ship in conditions of flooding of three or more compartments, severe fires, when the metal melted and flowed like wax from a candle. By the way, after the accident, a strict and meticulous commission checked all the class specialists, of course, with partiality, and was forced to confirm their compliance with the requirements.

There are many examples of high professionalism, courage and heroism of the crew members. So, having received an order from the commander to flood the depth charges in the area of the personnel canteen, midshipman E.A. Medvedev, Petty Officer 2 Article Kozleneev and several sailors, operating in a highly smoky room, flooded the cellars with the help of fire hoses, preventing a possible explosion of about 5 tons of explosives and preventing flooding of the huge dining room, which preserved the stability of the ship. Petty officer of the 2nd article Garibyan, sailor Nikitenko, in the area of a strong fire near the aft pipes, threw overboard cylinders of acetylene and oxygen, on which the paint had already caught fire. Lieutenant A.V. Bezmeltsev, who arrived from the school in August, set a personal example for his subordinates with active and courageous actions to extinguish fires, was in the most dangerous areas of fire fighting on the upper deck (now he is the commander of a brigade of ships, captain of the 1st rank). Also a recent graduate of the school, Lieutenant V.M. Yarchuk, an artilleryman, together with midshipman Kozlov, sailor Osetrov and others, resolutely fought the fire, using all available means, created a reliable line of defense against fire and prevented it from spreading in the interior further than 164 frames to the bow. Acting commander of an electromechanical combat unit, senior lieutenant-engineer V.E. Martyanov skillfully and competently directed the actions of the personnel in the fight for survivability, timely analyzed the condition of the ship, made the necessary calculations and gave substantiated reports to the ship commander.

The commander of the hold group, Lieutenant-engineer B.N. Gul, in difficult conditions of heavily smoky premises, led the two remaining sailors out of the PES (power and survivability post), at the command of the commander, when the fire came close to this post and there was no way to stay there.

Petty Officer 2 of Article Achmiz, discovering that his subordinate, the sailor Urupa, remained in the tower, which was threatened by fire, returned for him, but another explosion occurred and he died.

After the command “to leave the ship,” Senior Lieutenant V.N. Kostin, the commander of the rocket battery, with a roll of more than 30 ° and a strong increasing differential, made his way into the officers' wardroom, carried the banner to the "Best ship of the formation" and was one of the last to leave the ship.

The highest patriotism, genuine heroism and great love for the ship were shown by the sailor Prochakovsky, a galley worker. He found himself at the moment of the next explosion in the galley, the doors and hatch were jammed, fire was approaching. An attempt to pull the sailor out through the window failed, he got stuck in it. Seeing that the fire was threatening his comrades too, the sailor Prochakovsky shouted: “Comrades, everything is clear with me! Save the ship! " The commander of the ship ordered to cut the porthole together with the sailor, but neither gas welding nor electric welding succeeded in doing this. The injured and severely burned sailor was given pain-relieving injections, but the advancing fire prevented him from continuing to rescue him ... Sailor Prochakovsky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star for his courage and heroism.

High organizational and professional qualities were shown by the senior assistant to the commander, Lieutenant-Commander V.V. Balashov. The commander sent him to the most dangerous and critical areas to clarify and assess the situation and organize work to fight fires, water, and flood cellars.

Unfortunately, during the accident, three people from the ship's crew violated combat instructions, and one of them showed cowardice. The foreman of the prelaunch preparation team, midshipman A.I. Shuportyak, being at his combat post, heard a crackling and noise and saw fire in the 8th rocket cellar, was confused, did not turn on the cellar irrigation, gave the command: "Everyone up!" and together with his subordinates left the post. The commander of the aft missile battery, senior lieutenant V.M. Pyatkin, having received a report from midshipman Shuportyak that a fire broke out in the 8th cellar from the operation of the rocket engine, did not report to the command post of the artillery warhead, leaving his command post, without giving any order to the personnel and ran to turn on the irrigation of the cellar himself, but did not have time , an explosion has already occurred. The orderly in the cockpit, hearing the rumble and rattle in cellar No. 8, did not report to the officer of the watch, but ran out of the cockpit after Midshipman Shuportiak, thereby violating the orderman’s instructions for the cockpit. Although, in fact, these violations of the instructions did not entail any additional disastrous consequences, since the proceedings and experiments carried out after the accident showed that the main engine of the rocket works for 22 seconds, and the first drops of cellar irrigation from the irrigation system appear after 50 seconds, i.e. ... irrigation, if turned on, would not have prevented the explosion, the midshipman's panicky command objectively saved the lives of three or four people - but, nevertheless, violations of the instructions were made. But another violation - the absence of five cadets-trainees of the school on alarm to their combat posts cost them their lives during the first explosions ...

From the first to the last minutes, the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral V.Kh. Sahakyan. I knew Vladimir Khristoforovich for many years, even from the squadron, where he was the commander of the missile ship "Bedovy", the first in the Black Sea Fleet and in the entire * Navy, then the commander of a formation, which included ships of 61 projects, similar to the "Brave" ... He was an experienced sailor, I had to sail with him many times in the Black and Mediterranean seas. He had a keen mind and feeling. new, was an excellent organizer, already in the position of chief of staff of the fleet did a lot to improve the combat readiness of the fleet, develop and introduce new operational and tactical techniques in the fleet, more advanced methods of training ships and crews. And again, an involuntary comparison with the situation on Novorossiysk allows us to draw a conclusion in favor of Rear Admiral V. Sahakyan: without trying to replace the ship's commander, he controlled the situation, considered and approved the commander's decisions, thereby taking responsibility for them, organized and supervised the actions of the rescue forces in the "Otvazhny" area. He left the ship a few minutes before his death. Subsequently V.Kh. Sahakyan was appointed Chief of Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy. Unfortunately, serious illness and death did not give this talented sailor the opportunity to fully reveal himself ...

With the arrival of the crew in Sevastopol, first the naval commission began to work, then the central (Ministry of Defense) commission. It was found that the main cause of the death of the ship was the explosions of anti-aircraft missiles in the aft missile cellar. There were 16 missiles, 8 in a drum, they exploded in groups. There were 6 versions of the spontaneous operation of the main engine squib, which led to the outbreak of fire, explosion and fire. The most likely were the following:

1. Guidance of currents in the squib circuit from the simultaneous operation of the ship's radar (radar station), the operation of firing complexes, surface and air surveillance radars of small rocket ships located nearby, preparing for rocket firing, and the guidance of currents from the bundles of cables of electric routes passing in the rocket cellar at a distance of 1-1.5 m from the squib chain in the rocket. The personnel interviewed confirms that the main engine has started to work, because the explosion occurred 20-25 seconds after the start of its work. In connection with this version, I recalled one episode from a long-standing, eight years before this accident, the visit of the Black Sea Fleet destroyer "Assertive" to Ethiopia, the port of Massawa. The visit was official, the ships (and the Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie invited ships of only the "great sea powers" - the USSR, the USA, England and France to the Day of the Ethiopian fleet) - illumination was arranged. At 24:00 it was turned off, after that I had a chance to go to the upper deck and, to my surprise, I saw the brightly burning lights of the ship's illumination. The first thought - "gape, did not turn it off." It turned out that information about the last day of the visit was transmitted to Moscow and Sevastopol, and such currents were induced by the operation of the transmitter that they “lit” the illumination of hundreds of light bulbs. So the ships are really oversaturated with electromagnetic fields of different origins.

The second version assumed the possibility of closing the squib circuit due to a short circuit in one of the cellars of the missile complex.

The third version is the possible spontaneous combustion of gunpowder in the rocket engine from friction of powder dust (from long-term storage, "powder tubes" could crack, and when the body was shaking, the gunpowder ignited).

Much time after the accident, it became known that an experiment carried out in the laboratory with the creation of an electronic situation, similar to the situation on August 30, 1974, confirmed the first, basic version: the rocket exploded from the induction of currents in the circuit of the squib of the main engine.

The commander of the ship (more precisely, its former commander, who was performing his old duties), Captain 2nd Rank I. Vinnik, upon arrival in Sevastopol, was summoned to the headquarters of the fleet to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov. It is noteworthy - for that time - that the commander was "delivered" to the headquarters of the fleet by the chief of the political department and the head of the special department of the formation of ships ...

The commander reported in detail the circumstances of the ship's death and the actions of the personnel. Many questions were asked. At the end of the report, the Commander-in-Chief said: “Commander, feel calm. Our state is capable of building a new ship, and you are a fine fellow for saving people. " When later one of the members of the commission suggested checking the crew on the issues of damage control, S.G. Gorshkov interrupted him with the words: "Stop mocking the personnel and injuring them, they showed within six hours that they know how to fight for survivability."

During the report, I. Vinnik asked the Commander-in-Chief not to disband the crew of the "Brave", which was done: as already mentioned, the entire personnel was assigned to the patrol ship under construction, and Lieutenant Commander V. Balashov was appointed as its commander as first officer.

In the order of the Minister of Defense on the occasion of the death of the Otvazhny missile ship, it was stated that “... the commander acted correctly in the most difficult situation, correctly defined the defense lines and organized the fight for the survivability of the ship, took the necessary measures to rescue the crew and were the last to leave the ship ...”. Nevertheless ... it was ordered: “The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank I.P. Vinnik. remove from his post ... "(motives -" complacency "and" little attention to training personnel to fight for survivability. "But simply - the ship died, people died and someone must answer. Who?

Ivan Petrovich Vinnik continued his service in the Black Sea Fleet, later became the commander of a brigade of large ships, he was awarded the rank of captain of the 1st rank, in 1987 he retired to the reserve by age, continues active, now labor activity in the Black Sea Fleet.

Every year on August 30, members of the Otvazhny crew living in Sevastopol (people from other cities also used to come ...) gather at the memorial sign in honor of the dead, at the Communards cemetery, remember their campaigns, hard naval service, commemorate their friends and comrades ...

The further fate of the "Brave": it was carefully examined by divers, due to the danger of a spontaneous explosion of the remaining ammunition on it, the ship had to be abandoned, the explosive ammunition was destroyed by specially packed charges that initiated its detonation.

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Due to the rapid development of air defense and anti-aircraft missile systems by the early 1960s. there was a need for special-built rocket ships.
The design of the ship began in 1956. According to the operational-tactical assignment, the ship's functions included air defense of ship formations from attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as anti-submarine defense.
After the approval of the main tactical and technical elements at the beginning of 1957, TsKB-53, headed by B.I.Kupensky, began to develop a draft design. The technical design (project 61) was completed and approved in 1958, after which at the plant. 61 Communards in Nikolaev On September 15, 1959 the lead ship was laid down - "Komsomolets Ukrainy". On December 31, 1960, it was launched, and on October 15, 1962, it was handed over to the Navy for state tests.
Frame
The ship's hull is welded from SHL-4 (10KhSND) steel, smooth-deck, with a characteristic rise of the upper deck to the bow and an inclined stem. To ensure high travel speed, it had very sharp contours (the ratio of length to width was 9.5). The main watertight bulkheads divided the hull into 15 compartments. The double bottom took up about 80% of the ship's length.
The ship had a 90-meter superstructure developed in length with two masts, two bases for antenna posts of the Yatagan control system and two double chimneys. The extremely large size of the pipes reduced the temperature of the exhaust gases, reducing the thermal signature of the ship, and also made it possible to replace the propulsion system through hatches located in them. To reduce the displacement and improve stability, the superstructure, masts and pipes were made of aluminum-magnesium alloys (for the first time on the ship, aluminum-magnesium alloys of the AMG-5V brand were used in a large volume, including for non-pressure bulkheads, partitions in superstructures and air ducts. The melting temperature of the first batches of alloys was 300-400 ° C, the combustion temperature was 1200 ° C. As it turned out, when extinguishing a fire with sea water, the released hydrogen interacted with magnesium and intensified the fire). Only the areas of the location of masts, launchers, antenna posts, as well as a running post were made of steel.
Propulsion system
From the very beginning, two options for the main power plant were considered - a traditional steam turbine (STU) and a gas turbine (GTU). The latter, due to its lightness and compactness (specific gravity 5.2 kg / h.p. versus 9 kg / h.p.), reduced the ship's displacement from 3600 to 3200 tons and increased efficiency. In addition, starting from a cold state took 5-10 minutes for the GTU compared to the several hours required for the STU. For these reasons, the option with gas turbine engines was adopted.
For the melodic whistle of gas turbines, the ships of the series in the fleet were dubbed "singing frigates".
The bow and stern engine rooms each occupied one compartment. Each housed an all-mode main gas turbine gear unit (GGTZA) M-3 with a capacity of 36,000 hp. produced by the "Southern Turbine Works" in Nikolaev, two gas turbine generators GTU-6 for 600 kW each and a diesel generator DG-200 / P for 200 kW.
Each GTZA consisted of two non-reversible gas turbine engines (GTE) with a capacity of 18,000 hp. with reversible pairing gearbox. Each gas turbine engine had its own gas outlet pipe. Each of the two shafts had a four-blade fixed pitch propeller.
The compartments between the compartments were occupied by auxiliary mechanisms (stabilizer, auxiliary boilers). The fuel was stored in double bottom tanks with a capacity of 940 tons, 70 tons of fresh water for the crew and 13 tons of water for auxiliary boilers were also stored there.
Armament
The armament of the new ship was innovative. For the first time in Soviet shipbuilding, it was equipped with two anti-aircraft missile systems (M-1 "Volna"). Each complex consisted of a two-boom launcher ZIF-101, a Yatagan control system and a magazine with two rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each.
Artillery armament consisted of two twin 76-mm AK-726 turret mounts (rate of fire 90 rds / min, range 13 km, reach in height 9 km, 2400 unitary rounds of ammunition) and two Turel fire control systems.
The ship had a five-tube torpedo tube PTA-53-61 for torpedoes SET-53 or 53-57 with a torpedo firing control system "Zummer", two rocket launchers RBU-6000 and RBU-1000 each (ammunition 192 RSB-60 and 48 RSB-10 respectively) with the "Tempest" control system.

The ship provided for storage for 6 tons of aviation fuel and ammunition for the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter (anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges, sonar buoys), however, due to the absence of a hangar, it was possible that there was only a temporary basing.
Mine rails with slopes in the aft part, traditional for Soviet destroyers, have been preserved. Provided for two launchers F-82-T for firing passive radar reflectors. Protection against torpedoes was provided by a towed guard BOKA-DU and a demagnetizing device.
The hydroacoustic equipment included the Titan all-round viewing station and the Vychegda firing control station located in the under-keel fairing. The detection range of the submarine was 3.5 km.
Unsinkable ship provided for the most unfavorable case of flooding of any three adjacent compartments when the ship is loaded in the range from standard to full displacement. When three adjacent compartments were flooded, the calculation provided for a steady static roll of the ship of about 13 °, a freeboard height of at least 0.6 m with a maximum wind speed of 24 m / s, maintained by the ship before capsizing.
With a normal displacement in deep water (at least 75 m), with a sea state of up to 3 points inclusive, the ship, moving at full speed, with the fairing raised, could reach a speed of 34 knots. It was envisaged to increase the speed and cruising range by supplying air to the channels of the propellers.
The crew of the ship according to the state of 1962 consisted of 266 people: 22 officers, 18 warrant officers and chief officers and 226 foremen and sailors. According to the state, since 1974, 25 officers were envisaged on the ship.
For the Soviet Navy, 20 ships of Project 61 were built.

The lead ship of the BPK series "Komsomolets Ukrainy"
The BOD "Otvazhny", to which this story is dedicated, was the seventh in this series (the ships of Project 61 were built at two shipyards in Nikolaev and Leningrad).
The large anti-submarine ship "Otvazhny" was enlisted in the lists of ships of the USSR Navy on July 3, 1963, and on August 10, 1963, laid down at the 61 Communards plant in Nikolaev. Launched on October 17, 1964, entered service on December 31, 1964 and on January 25, 1965 was included in the Black Sea Fleet.

BOD "Otvazhny"
length - 144 m. width (maximum) - 15.8 m. board height: at the stem - 13.2 m, midships - 8.1 m, on the transom - 8.5 m., draft (at full displacement) - 4.6 m., displacement ( full) - 4510 t.
At the end of August 1974, a naval exercise was conducted at the Black Sea Fleet, headed by the chief of staff of the fleet. The first stage took place on 27 August. Preliminarily, on August 26, in the conference room of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, instructions were given to the ship commanders. The commander of the "Brave" was instructed by the commander of the 70th brigade
captain 1st rank Makarov and commander of the 41st separate brigade of missile boats (OBRK) captain 1st rank Komar.
It was at this time that the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet Rear Admiral Sahakyan chose the Otvazhny BOD as his flagship and command ship at the second stage of the fleet exercises, on August 30, during rocket firing by small missile ships (MRK) of the 41st OB RK and to determine the effectiveness of the air defense system "Wasp" when repelling an air enemy. On August 29, the 70th BOD brigade, with the participation of "Brave", was to carry out an anti-submarine mission and actual torpedo firing.
On August 29, the BOD "Otvazhny" under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik went to sea to perform a planned combat exercise with actual torpedo firing. The preparation of the ship for battle and cruise was carried out in full according to a two-hour schedule. The readiness of the ship to go to sea was checked by the headquarters of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.
Our last combat exercise - torpedo firing - was successfully completed on the "Brave".
In the evening of August 29 and on the night of August 30, the Otvazhny BOD together with the Bedovy BOD and the Komsomolets Ukrainy BOD took part in the anti-submarine exercise of the 70th Brigade under the command of the brigade commander, Captain 1st Rank Makarov.
The last trip
On August 30, 1974, at about 5.30 in the morning, after the end of the night exercises of the search and strike group, consisting of several ships and a submarine, it became at the Streletsky roadstead of Sevastopol.
At 0745 hours, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral V.Kh. Sahakyan with a group of officers from the headquarters of the fleet. After that, the "Brave", at 7 hours 52 minutes, again went out to sea, on its last voyage.
On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small rocket ships at the range near Cape Chersonesos.
From the crew of the ship, 258 officers, warrant officers, foremen and sailors, 16 cadets (6 from the Frunze VVMU and 10 from the Kaliningrad VVMU) and 13 seconded ones went out to sea. In total, the ship was, along with two admirals and staff officers, 287 people. The chief of staff of the fleet was the eldest at sea and in the exercises by position and rank.
At 9:55 am, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced.
The personnel took their places on alarm, some for the last time in their lives.
The foreman of the launch team, midshipman Shuportiak, arrived at the missile control post in the cellar of SAM No. 8. Senior sailors Karjakin and Daukshte, sailor Vinclovas, also came running there.
At the signal of a combat training alert, cadets Filippov, Kolyshev, Borisov, Staritsyn, Beloushko, Anikeev and Ionov did not leave the cabin No. 4, which was next to the cellar of the anti-aircraft guided missile, combat alert, although all those not scheduled for combat alert must appear in the ship's GKP.
In total, 78 people were located in the aft part of the ship from the 164th frame, in the future emergency zone, including 3 warrant officers, 13 foremen, 55 sailors and 7 cadets. According to the order given on the ship, the coca and the outfit of working on
galley. This time it was the cook-instructor, Petr Murgu, Petr Murgu, Chief Executive Officer, Idjyan Hakob, and Senior Baker, Sailor Sergei Petrukhin, as well as an outfit from BCH-3: senior miner Pyotr Bedakov, senior electrician torpedo operator Pyotr Goncharuk and torpedo operator Yaroslav Divination.
The sailor Vladimir Prochakovsky and the sailor Abrahamia from the supply service who remained in charge of the main boatswain of the ship, who delivered admirals and officers to the ship in the morning by boat and missed breakfast, had a snack in the galley.
Warrant officer Shuportiak, who was at the control panel of the missile control post in the aft cellar No. 8, in which 16 B-601 missiles were stored in 2 vertical drums in a combat state, acting in accordance with the instructions, ordered the sailors on duty at the post to connect the external power supply. After that, he turned the toggle switches on the power supply panel to the "on" position. Immediately after the last toggle switch was clicked, at 10:01 am 15 seconds (this time, and the time of subsequent explosions was established by the commission when investigating the circumstances of the explosion approx.) through the porthole, he saw a fairly strong sheaf of flame on the left drum. This was followed by another strong flash that illuminated the entire cellar (the launched main engine of the B-601 rocket ignited the starting engine, an increase in temperature and pressure initiated the operation of solid-propellant engines of other missiles). The emerging smoke began to envelop the glass of the post. As Midshipman Shuportiak later said, he seemed to be trying to report to the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Kostin, but he did not receive Shuportiak's report - the connection allegedly did not work.
Flashes of fire flashed through the enveloping anti-ship missile system and the smoke quickly filling the cellar, noise and grinding rattling increased. It was clear that there was a fire in the cellar, threatening with an explosion of rockets and fire. Shuportyak was frightened, did not, as it should have been according to the instructions, manually switch on the missile irrigation system from the anti-ship missile system and shouting: "Leave the PKS!" - rushed to run (during the experiment, when the entire crew of the "Brave", but already aboard the BOD "Resolute" was playing all the actions of the tragic morning of August 30, Shuportiak could not show where the exit of the rod of the clinkets flooding his combat post ... approx).
Jumping out into the cockpit No. 4, he ran past the cadets and the orderly in the cockpit and, without saying anything to them, ran into corridor No. 11, where the aft emergency party of warrant officer Petrikin was located. Only here he shouted: "Now there will be an explosion!" - and ran further along corridors No. 8 and 9 and further into the bow of the ship.
The commander of the emergency party stood at a loss.
Without informing anyone about the causes of the explosion, Shuportiak hid somewhere on the ship and appeared only two hours later.
The commander of the ship in the navigating post, the admirals on the bridge, the officers at the GKP and in the PEZH knew nothing about the fire that had started in cellar No. 8, which would lead the ship to disaster.
In cockpit No. 4 of BCH-3, the cadets, who were on the ship without a practice leader, continued to discuss and assign their places at combat posts during rocket firing.
A noise was heard in the adjacent compartments, and it would cut off in cellar No. 8, paint began to bubble on the bulkheads. Realizing that a dangerous situation had arisen, the sailors began to leave the compartments, but not everyone succeeded.
Columns of smoke appeared from the exhaust hatches on the deck. On the navigating bridge Rear Admiral Sahakyan, noticing smoke in the area of the aft pipe, said:
- Again the mechanics smoke the sky ...
Apparently, Sahakyan forgot that gas turbine installations do not give off the smoke that he had seen earlier on his destroyer.
In cellar No. 8, where the flames were raging and the pressure increased, the exhaust covers should have been triggered from the sensors. Did it work? Unknown. The covers are assumed to have opened. Then, from the rise in temperature, the inhibitor system was to automatically turn on in order to fill the cellar with an inert gas and prevent air from entering it. One can only speculate whether the system worked or not; if she gave a signal to the "Dozor" post, then there was no one to receive it (on the training alert, duty at the "Dozor" post was not provided approx.).
The fire in the cellar was growing. The automatic activation of the cellar irrigation was taken out of operation (due to the imperfection of the automatic extinguishing system, it periodically triggered spontaneously, flooding the ammunition storage, as a result of which the system was transferred from automatic mode to signal mode, with manual control approx.), midshipman Shuportiak did not turn it on manually from the missile control post (RCC). However, irrigation could still be turned on from corridor No. 11, it was necessary to turn on the liquid station for supplying the fire-extinguishing mixture to the drive compartment from vestibule No. 15, where this station was located. But nothing was done ...
As a result of the operation of the rocket engines, the temperature and pressure in the cellar began to rise rapidly, the fire increased, gases and flames escaped intensively through the exhaust covers. In the cellar, hull structures melted and partially collapsed.
The foremen of the 1st class Valery Vershinin and Algirdas Makshtutis were trapped in a fire trap in the aggregate and, apparently, immediately died. Both were only 21 years old.
The foreman of the 2nd class, Ivan Volodin, who was there on watch, did not get out of the line of the rampart and, apparently, immediately died. He was only 19 years old.
At 10:01 am 30 seconds, the first powerful explosion followed in cellar No. 8, the flame burst out.
In the turret compartment of the aft gun mount, the exit apparently jammed. The commander of the anti-aircraft gunnery squad Alexander Urupa remained there. He was 21 years old.
In cellar No. 8, the temperature and pressure from the working rocket and fire engines were rapidly increasing, the intensity of the emission of flames and gases through the exhaust covers increased. The sloping section of the cellar deck over the enclosure in the recession area heated up, and the hull structures adjacent to the cellar began to collapse in the KMO.
In 4-5 s after the first explosion, in cellar no. 8, a similar, but stronger explosion took place.
The explosion threw overboard, the sailors Suleimanov and Tuikin who later picked up the boat. On the navigation bridge, where the admirals and officers of the headquarters of the fleet were located, they noticed the release of smoke in the stern. Rear Admiral Sahakyan again began to scold the mechanics. At the same moment, the signalman reported: "Flame from the stern tube!" (the signalman was mistaken, the flame rose above the pipes from cellar No. 8 approx.).
At 10 h 02 min 00 sec, a third strong explosion occurred in cellar no. 8.
Petty Officer 2nd Class Adam Achmiz, who jumped out of the cockpit onto the upper deck after the first explosion, immediately after the second explosion rushed to the stern gun mount, apparently to the rescue of his comrade Alexander Urup, who was in it. He had already run up to the tower and grabbed the handrail of the door, opening it, he was thrown onto the deck by the shock wave and did not rise.
Within literally one minute, in the stern, in the compartments adjacent directly to the cellar No. 8, and on the upper deck, nine sailors died from explosions, burned alive nine sailors, and a cadet from the Kaliningrad VVMIU Alexander Ionov, two more sailors (except for two of whom the boat picked up) they were thrown overboard by the explosion, but unable to swim (possibly as a result of the resulting shell shock) they drowned.
After the second explosion, four cadets of V.I. Frunze threw themselves into the water, well prepared at the school, they confidently kept on the water. The water hammer from the third blast overtook them when they believed they had already escaped.
The third explosion, having ripped off the cover of cellar No. 8, destroyed the longitudinal and transverse bulkheads of the cellar and caused partial destruction of other structures of the hull and fuel tanks in the area of the cellar. As a result, incandescent gases and flames burst into adjacent rooms. A fire broke out in the compartments adjacent to the 8th cellar, including in the KMO, cubicles No. 3, 4, 5, corridors No. 11, 10, 9. As it turned out later, during a diving survey, there was a violation of the outer skin in the area of the 3rd the cockpit on the starboard side is about 5 m long, 3.5 m high and with a deflection boom of 0.6 m.

From the combat log of the Otvazhny BPK for 08/30/1974:
10.02. Smoke, fire and explosion appeared in the area of the aft pipe. Combat and emergency alarms announced
From the memoirs of the former senior assistant commander of the BOD "Otvazhny" Captain 1st Rank V.V. Balashov:
“At 10 hours 02 minutes there was a strong explosion. The commander gave me the command: "Come out, first mate, look." I went to the upper deck.
Flames raged in the stern to the stern tube, and there was a lot of smoke. The metal curled and melted from the high temperature.
There was a hole in the area of the aft launcher. There was a trim aft, she sank into the water along the transom. A roll of 12-13 ° to starboard appeared. The ship apparently received 1000-1200 tons of water. The fire approached cellars No. 6, 7 with anti-submarine ammunition. The rocket launcher was hanging overboard. The PES was out of order ... Before my eyes, sailor Petrukhin partially crawled out of the galley from the galley before my eyes, he was burned, the skin peeled off, and the bones were exposed. I saw how the metal melted ... ".
At the cry of Prochakovsky, only one sailor, Abrahamia, managed to run out of the galley. The third explosion jammed the door to the vestibule, threw the sailors onto the deck, boilers with boiling water overturned on them. The first to come to his senses was the sailor Petrukhin, got out into the 10th corridor, but the door from it also jammed. Choking on smoke and gases, he reached through the narrow galley porthole and got stuck in it, screaming in pain. The rest of the sailors, also scalded and slightly alive, got out into corridors 9, 10 and everyone died there (the team in the galley had the opportunity to evacuate through the elevator to the dining room, but in a stressful situation, not knowing that the doors were jammed, everyone rushed to the doors and near them suffocated from the smoke approx.).
A fire broke out in the stern of the wrecked ship. Through the destruction in the outer skin, outside water began to flow into the compartment of cellar No. 8, cellar No. 9 and into the KMO. There was a list to starboard and a trim to the stern. Filtration of water into cockpit No. 6 began.
In the navigation post, the ship's commander Vinnik, who announced a combat and then emergency alarms at 10 02 min, immediately gave the command to stop the vehicles and began to organize a fight for the ship's survivability, trying to find out the situation and the cause of the emergency. Warrant officer Shuportiak, who knew the root cause of the explosion and fire in his cellar No. 8, disappeared ... (at the time of the first explosion, the ship was making a turn, so the rudder was shifted to 350 to the left side, after the alarm was announced, the turbines were stopped, the rudder remained shifted. ship Vinnik, on alarm switched to the GKP which was inside the ship, Rear Admiral Sahakyan remained on the navigating bridge approx.).
The crew that remained in their places, and the emergency party immediately began to fight for the survivability of the ship.
Meanwhile, on the ship's navigating bridge, the confused commanders and officers of the fleet headquarters continued to discuss the cause of the fire, which, by the way, had not been clarified, for some reason the main versions of the explosion were considered the explosion of airborne cylinders.
The version of the explosion of cylinders in the KMO and the spread of the fire from there to other compartments with explosions of missiles and ammunition did not allow to correctly estimate the nature of the damage, including damage to the fuel tanks due to the deck burnout by the fire of the operating cruise and launch engines of the rockets in cellar No. 8 and their subsequent destruction by the explosion of the rockets. The fuel floating up in the compartment from the fuel tanks contributed to the increase in the fire.
What fire-fighting equipment did the ship have at that moment?
In case of a fire in cellar No. 8, it was envisaged to turn on irrigation from the PKR and corridor No. 11, but, as you know, it was not turned on; in case of a fire in KMO - liquid volumetric fire extinguishing from the ZhS system with its inclusion in corridor No. 11 of the water-spray system
in KMO. In case of a fire in cellar No. 9, the irrigation of cellar No. 9 from the turret compartment or cockpit No. 5 should have been turned on. However, due to heavy smoke, and then a fire in corridor No. 11, gases and flames burst from cellar No. 8 to KMO through the aft bulkhead that caused a fire in the KMO itself, as well as in the cockpit No. 5, these fodder fire-fighting means were not put into operation. But, possibly, the explosion damaged the fire main itself.
It was possible to use only fire barrels and portable fire-fighting equipment: air-foam barrels and portable fire extinguishers, but only to localize a fire in rooms bordering an intense fire zone.
To pump out the water entering the KMO when extinguishing a fire with seawater, two drainage pumps located in the KMO were supposed to. Due to a fire in the KMO itself and corridors No. 9 and 10, they were not put into operation.
It was possible to use the sump pumps in rooms 6, 8 and 10, but this was also not done because of the fires in the 11th corridor and the 5th cockpit. However, it is possible that these pumps were also damaged in the explosion.

It was required to immediately determine the area and volume of flooding of the compartments. This could have been done according to the indications of the signaling devices on the PEL unsinkability board, but due to the smoke and lack of lighting, the personnel left the PEL.
The PEZH, which is the command post of the BCH-5, designed to receive and evaluate information, for the direct management of the fight for the survivability of the ship, was out of order, primarily due to its location in a fire hazardous zone. In this regard, the state of the aft compartments was not monitored all the time until the death of the ship, and the bow up to the 164th frame was only visually monitored. The GKP only roughly estimated the flooded area. The spare PEZH (nasal remote control), apparently, was not used.
Means of fighting fire and water were used only from the side of the bow of the ship: the bow bulkhead of the KMO on the 164th frame became the line of defense against fire and water. This
the border remained until the moment the ship was abandoned by the personnel. However, from the aft side, the personnel could not localize the fire on their own. Electricity was lost in the stern, due to which the fire main was left without water. The combat-ready personnel in the stern were left without leadership. It turned out to be impossible to pass from the bow to the stern of the ship through the fire zone.
Due to the lack of information and the impossibility of correctly assessing the situation, measures were not taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull (in the book by B. Karzhavin "The Death of the Brave" on page 106, the following is written: “Due to the lack of information and the impossibility of correctly assessing the situation, no measures were taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull, since they knew nothing about the hole at the GKP». This is unlikely, after the third explosion, the ship received a 12-13 ° roll to starboard, here, probably, even any housewife would have guessed that most likely water penetrated into the ship's hull, i.e. the case has a crack or a hole approx.).
Meanwhile, the fire in cellar No. 8 and in adjacent compartments intensified, fuel from the damaged tanks floated to the surface of the water and maintained intense combustion, this was also facilitated by the aluminum-magnesium alloys from which the ship's superstructures were made.
5 - 10 s after a strong third explosion in the area of cellar No. 8, a series of successive explosions, similar to cannonade, were heard (missile warheads probably exploded approx.).

LARGE ANTI-WATER SHIP "BRAVE" ( I-th part)

Large anti-submarine ship "Brave"

Each ship, like a person, has its own name, its own destiny. The crew is the soul of the ship. From the first ascent of the flag to the last descent, the crew and the ship are a single living organism, performing combat missions on long campaigns and on training firing.

But the moment comes when the crew is being built for the last ceremonial lowering of the flag. This day is solemn and sad. For the last time, the sailors will bypass their combat posts, cockpits, cabins and leave it forever, as if the soul leaves the body of a decrepit dying old man.

Unfortunately, this is not always the case.

Fatal coincidences of circumstances and the human factor sometimes play an evil role in the fate of the ship and its crew.

The event, which will be discussed in this article, happened in the Black Sea Fleet on August 30, 1974, during the exercises, the large anti-submarine ship "Otvazhny" exploded and sank.

But first of all, let's start over.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAY.

On August 10, 1963, on the stocks of the Nikolaev shipbuilding plant named after 61 Communards, a large anti-submarine ship "Brave" of project 61 was laid down.

On October 17, 1964, the ship was launched, and on January 25, 1966, it was included in the USSR Black Sea Fleet. Home port is the city of Sevastopol.

The construction of ships of this type was caused by the appearance in the world of submarines with nuclear power plants, increasing their autonomy, cruising range and speed, in addition, nuclear missiles were based on them, which turned submarines into a powerful strategic weapon.

With the advent of supersonic jet aircraft, ships also needed new anti-aircraft missile systems to protect the ship from enemy air attacks.

To detect underwater and surface targets, the ship was equipped with the Titan all-round hydroacoustic station and the Vychegda fire control station. The detection range of submarines was up to 8 km. in echo direction finding mode and 18 km in noise direction finding mode. A helipad was equipped at the stern of the ship, which could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The ship also had a five-tube torpedo tube PTA-53-61 with a Zummer fire control system, two RBU-6000 and RBU-1000 rocket launchers with a Tempest control system.

To effectively protect the ship from air attacks, the ship was equipped with two M-1 Volna anti-aircraft missile systems, located in the stern and bow of the ship. Each complex consisted of two two-boom launchers ZIF-101, a Yatagan control system and a magazine with two rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles. Two twin artillery turrets 76 mm. AK-726 installations in the bow and stern of the ship. The rate of fire of each gun mount was 90 rounds per minute, the firing range was 13 km, the height reach was 9 km, the ammunition load was 2,400 unitary rounds. Each gun mount had its own turret fire control system.

Maximum speed 35 knots.

The maximum cruising range is 3500 miles.

Cruising endurance 10 days (in terms of provisions)

The crew consisted of 266 people, including 22 officers.

Placing armament BOD project 61

On June 5, 1967, an armed conflict broke out between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Algeria, on the other, the so-called Six Day War. To exercise its military presence in this region and, if necessary, to intervene in a military conflict on the side of the Arab world, the USSR government sent an operational naval squadron from the Black Sea Fleet and ships and submarines of the Northern Fleet based in Port Said to the conflict area. The squadron included the Otvazhny BPK. Visits Port Said while assisting the Egyptian Armed Forces.

In 1968-69. is undergoing current repairs in the city of Nikolaev. During the repair, the missile armament was modernized.

Vladimir Skosyrsky. In the photo on the left

On March 16, 1969, the ship's crew suffered the first losses. In Nikolaev, in inclement weather, when an additional mooring end was put on a barrel, a sailor Site Shaipov fell into the water and began to sink. Seeing that his subordinate was in mortal danger, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanovich Skosyrsky jumped overboard and swam to help the drowning man. Broken ice floes floated in the cold water. With difficulty, the officer reached the drowning sailor, gathering his last strength, he pushed him onto the ice floe, but he no longer had the strength to save himself. An ice floe passing by covered him. For courage and courage, Senior Lieutenant V.I.Skosyrsky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

In 1969, Otvazhny was declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet.

In September 1969, Captain of the Third Rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed to the position of the ship's commander.

From April 14 to May 5, 1970, large-scale Ocean maneuvers were carried out in the USSR, covering the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The ship as part of the Black Sea Fleet ships takes part in exercises and performs rocket firing in the Atlantic Ocean. For the excellent performance of tasks, the ship's commander was awarded a memorable gift from the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Lobov, a model of a submarine in the ice.

In November 1970, in the Republic of Guinea, emigrants who were in opposition to the current President Ahmed Sek Tour, with the support of Portugal, took part in an armed invasion of the republic with the aim of overthrowing the government and defeating the bases of partisans who fought for the independence of Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). To maintain stability and order and organize the defense of the capital of Guinea, Conakry, the Otvazhny BPK was sent to this region.

The feat of the foreman of the 1st article Yu.S. Chuikin

In March 1973, 4 years after the death of Senior Lieutenant V.I. For the courage and courage shown in the fight against the fire, Petty Officer 1st Class Chuikin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

On October 6, 1973, another military conflict arose between Israel and the coalition of Arab countries over the desire of Egypt and Syria to return the lost territories. Already on October 7, the USSR began to supply weapons and equipment to Syria and Egypt by sea. To ensure the safety of Soviet ships, a detachment of Soviet warships and submarines was formed, which included the Otvazhny BPK. In addition to escorting, the ships were engaged in electronic reconnaissance.

1970 to 1974 the ship's crew performs course missions and live firing only for good and excellent marks. For excellent rocket firing in 1970, the crew was awarded the challenge prize of the Main Command of the Navy, and in 1971 they retain this prize.

During its short life, the ship also visited Cuba, Alexandria (Egypt), Split (Yugoslavia), Taranto and Messina (Italy), participated in the Yug-71 exercises.

LAST HIKE

On August 29, 1974, the large anti-submarine ship Otvazhny went to sea for the last time. About that tragic event twenty years later, the commander of the ship, Ivan Petrovich Vinnik, wrote in his essay "Notes of the Commander". The sketch is written in the second person.

The commander of the ship I.P. Vinnik

Commander's Notes

“... On August 28, by order of the NSh Black Sea Fleet of Rear Admiral V. A. Sahakyan, Captain 2nd Rank IP Vinnik was summoned from Donuzlav to Sevastopol to enter the Otvazhny BOD at sea in order to provide missile firing of MRK 1 of the 41st Brigade ... The commander of the 70th brigade, Captain 1st Rank L.A. Makarov, apparently reported to the NSh of the Black Sea Fleet that earlier the organization of rocket firing had been practiced with Commander Vinnik, and he was appointed from an artillery cruiser, so he did not go out.

Before going to sea, to maintain full combat readiness, 5 tons of fuel for the helicopters were taken. The cellar contained aerial bombs for helicopters.

On August 29 at 13:00 the ship went to sea according to the BP 2 plan. They performed torpedo firing at a surface target, at night they participated in the development of the PLZ-4 mission 3 and at 07.30 approached booms 4, where they took on board the NSh Black Sea Fleet Rear Admiral Sahakyan, the head of the Air Defense of the Navy Rear Admiral Putintsev, Deputy. the head of the 4th department of the 5th captain of the 1st rank Shibkov and the commander of the 41st brigade captain 1st rank Komar with his headquarters and, as a command ship, began to move to the BP area to participate in a special training on the performance of missile firing by the ships of the 41st OBRK.

Due to the fact that the state of the sea was 3 points, it was difficult for missile ships (MRK) to perform rocket firing. After discussing the situation and the state of the weather and forecasts, the NSh of the Black Sea Fleet decided to carry out firing.

At 09.25, the BOD entered the Combat Training Range.

The missile boats entered combat positions and began preparations for rocket firing. Were included firing radar 6 and observation stations, missile systems began preliminary preparation for the RS. 10 minutes before the rise of aviation from the Belbek airfield at 09.55, a combat training alert was played on the ship to prepare for conducting the RTU 7 materiel against air targets.

At 09.59, the commander received a report from SPK 8 about the ship's readiness for the exercise. The ship's missile systems were not prepared for firing, and it was not even conceived to feed missiles to launchers, however, on alarm, power was supplied to the distribution boards of the missile systems and to the cellars (as it should be for a combat or training alert).

At 10.02, the commander climbed from GKP 9 to the navigating bridge and saw white smoke and force of fire in the area of the aft pipes, an explosion suddenly thundered. The commander announced a combat alert and broadcast about the fire in the area of the stern vehicle, gave the command: "Bow and stern emergency parties to extinguish the fire."

After 15 - 20 seconds, a second explosion occurred. With the permission of the NSh Black Sea Fleet, the commander went down to the GKP to clarify the situation and control the fight for the survivability of the ship. On the navigating bridge left the officer of the watch - the commander of the warhead-3 10 senior lieutenant S. A. Kachinsky to monitor the external situation. After 20 - 30 sec. the third and fourth explosions occurred.

There was an assumption: either the launching cylinders in the aft engine room explode, or the missiles in the cellar.

Senior assistant Lieutenant-Commander V.V. Balashov played an emergency alarm. The commander ordered: "To the commanders of the BP (combat posts) and command post (command post), report the presence of smoke, fire and water in their premises." I received a report that there is no connection with the stern vehicle, the stern rocket store, the emergency party and the stern tower.

The commander sent the SPK to personally check the condition of the ship in the stern, passing along the upper deck. After inspection, the SPK reported that the aft missile cellar had been torn apart, and the launcher had been thrown into the area of the aft pipes. A strong fire in the cellar, moves into the stern vehicle and aft - to the area of the gun mount.

The commander made a report to the NSh of the Black Sea Fleet on the navigating bridge and, in the prescribed form - to the command post of the fleet, division and through the air defense network, he personally conveyed to the airfield about the explosions and a large fire and asked to deliver the foam concentrate or in cylinders to carbon dioxide in helicopters to pour (dump) into the aft cellar ...

The commander asked the MRK commanders to approach the aft part of the ship to remove the personnel on the poop and assist in extinguishing the fire spreading into the aft part. One MRK came up from the stern of the BPK, removed several people from the side and lifted the personnel, which was thrown overboard by a shock wave, but no one dared to extinguish the fire and stay at the side of the BPK, since both the MRK had ammunition, and missiles, and fuel, and the likelihood of further explosions was high.

The crew is fighting for the survivability of the ship

With the approach of the rescue vessel PZhK-123, on which the captain of the 2nd rank A.V. Zhbanov was, to the left side, the personnel of the BOD, together with PZhK, energetically launched an attack on the fire thanks to the foam supplied through the fire hoses inside the premises and on the upper deck. The fire began to recede and was clearly diminishing. Water was supplied by fire nozzles with PZhK and naval fire fighting equipment. Until the last minutes, power was supplied to the BOD, and drainage facilities and fire pumps worked, which contributed to the successful struggle of the personnel for the survivability of the ship. However, the PZhK and the ship had very small reserves of foaming agent, and everything was used up very quickly. The fire began to intensify again, and apart from water, there was nothing else from the fire system.

The BOD commander asked the captain of the 2nd rank Zhbanov at the PZhK to give some more foam, but received the answer: "There is nothing more," the commander asked that no water be poured into the interior without calculation, so that free surfaces would not form and water would not accumulate in the rooms above the waterline , for the ship may capsize. More than three compartments were flooded on the ship.

Calculations showed that the ship was in critical condition.

EM 11 "Conscious" approached the board, onto which secret documents, equipment and documents of SPS 12 and the combat unit were reloaded, part of the personnel and staff officers were transplanted. On board the EM was the brigade commander Captain 1st Rank L.A. Makarov.

Analyzing the activities of the officer corps, warrant officers according to the reports of the members of the state commission and the Ministry of Defense commission, we can say that the crew in this difficult and critical situation showed high moral, political and psychological qualities, high skills in the fight for the survivability of the ship, which actually allowed for 5 hours 40 minutes to fight fires and water and when more than three compartments are flooded, and in the presence of severe fires, when the metal melted and flowed like wax from a candle!

The actions of the command and personnel on the BZZH 13 are most clearly characterized by the fact that the standard options from the documentation on the unsinkability of the ship unambiguously interpret that the ship sinks when three compartments are flooded. In fact, the "Brave" remained afloat - there was good sealing of the premises and reliable lines of defense against water.

During the intensifying fire and its constant movement into the bow from the stern tubes to the torpedo platform, when the fire threatened the combat torpedoes and an explosion could occur at any moment, Lieutenant Commander Kamalov, Warrant Officer Medvedev, Petty Officer 2nd Article Selimsultanov, Slivkin, sailor Kabanov cooled the torpedoes water and by order of the commander (after the report of the NSh Black Sea Fleet about the threat of an explosion), they manually dropped two torpedoes lying on the site overboard (made room for a practical torpedo 14 for firing at an underwater target), and three - with shots from a torpedo tube (after a personal check the situation by the commander of the ship).

When the bulkhead in the dining room of the personnel from the side of the stern machine began to heat up and there was a threat of explosion of the 6th and 7th cellars with depth charges, by order of the commander (after the report of the NSh of the Black Sea Fleet and a personal check of the situation), warrant officer Medvedev and foreman 2 articles Kozleneev and others with the help of fire hoses in the smoky room of the personnel canteen, the cellars were flooded, thereby preventing the explosion of about 5 tons of explosives and improving the stability of the ship, preventing the huge room of the personnel canteen from being flooded.

Petty Officer 2, Garibyan, and sailor Nikitenko, in the area of a strong fire near the aft pipe, threw overboard cylinders of acetylene and oxygen, on which paint was already starting to burn.

Once in the galley and unable to leave the premises due to the jammed doors and hatch, the sailor Prochakovsky shouted through the window: “Comrades, everything is clear with me! Save the ship! " Trying to get out of the emergency room, the sailor Petrukhin got stuck in the window. The commander ordered to cut the porthole, but neither gas welding nor electric welding was able to do this. An injured and severely burned sailor was given pain-relieving injections, but the advancing fire did not allow him and the other sailors trapped in the galley to be saved ...» ... (To be continued)

1 RTOs- small rocket ship.

2 BP- combat training.

3 PLZ- anti-submarine task

4 Bon- an obstacle protecting the entrance to the harbor or fairway from enemy ships.

5 4th department- counterintelligence of the Navy

6 Radar- radar station

7 RTU- radio engineering exercises

8 SPK- senior assistant commander.

9 GKP- the main command post.

10 BCH-3- there is a mine-torpedo unit on the ship.

11 EM- destroyer.

12 THX- special communication

13 BZZH- damage control

14 Practical torpedo - a training torpedo, which differs from a full-fledged lack of a warhead.

A lot and in great detail have been written about this tragic event in the history of the Black Sea Fleet, at the end of the story I would like to add my own note. Today, August 30, it is 41 years since the explosion of the Volna-M ZRU missiles with the subsequent flooding of the compartments within 5 hours killed the Otvazhny BPK
==
In Sevastopol, on the territory of the Communards cemetery, you can find a small, modest monument. It is located between the mass grave of the crew of the battleship "Novorossiysk" and the monument to Lieutenant P. P. Schmidt. An inscription engraved on the marble monument says: "To the sailors of the Brave, who died in the line of duty in August 1974". It also contains a list of 24 names of the dead sailors.
In the USSR, they preferred not to talk about the death of this ship.

The large anti-submarine ship "Otvazhny" was included in the fleet on January 25, 1966 and during its rather short life managed to make 7 military campaigns. From 5 to 30 June 1967, the ship carried out a combat mission to provide assistance to the Egyptian armed forces and visited Port Said. In 1968-69, the Otvazhny BPK underwent current repairs at the 61st plant in Nikolaev, during which its missile armament was modernized. Since 1969, the captain of the 3rd rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed the captain of the ship.

BOD "Brave" in Messina, October 19-22, 1973

The standard displacement of ships of this type was 3500-3700 tons, the maximum displacement was 4500-4750 tons. The modernized vessels have 3950/4900 tons respectively. Hull dimensions: length - 144 m (modernized - 147 m), width - 15.8 m, draft - 4.8 m (up to 6 m). 4 gas turbines with a total capacity of 94,000 hp worked on 2 propellers, providing the ship with a maximum speed of 36-38 knots. The cruising range at a speed of 20 knots was 4,000 nautical miles. The ship could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The BOD provided for the storage of 5 tons of aviation kerosene, as well as ammunition for the helicopter (depth charges, anti-submarine torpedoes, sonar buoys). Due to the absence of a hangar on the ship, the helicopter could be placed on it only temporarily.

Helicopter Ka-25

The armament complex of the new ship could be called innovative. For the first time in the history of Soviet shipbuilding, the BOD received 2 M-1 "Volna" air defense systems. Each anti-aircraft missile system was a two-boom PU ZIF-101, a magazine with 2 rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each and a Yatagan control system.

SAM M-1 "Volna"

All ships of this project had advanced radar weapons and hydroacoustics, as well as excellent seaworthiness and maneuverability. These ships were distinguished by their remarkable appearance and architecture.

Tragedy
From 4 to 7 August 1974, the Otvazhny BPK took part in regular exercises of the fleet, and from 27 August the ship was to become the flagship control ship during the 2nd stage of the exercises. BOD "Otvazhny" was supposed to provide firing of small missile ships, as well as take part in anti-submarine exercises with torpedo firing. On August 29, 1974, the ship under the control of Captain 2nd Rank I.P. Vinnik went out to sea and successfully conducted torpedo firing. At dawn on August 30, the BOD embarked on a raid in Streletskaya Bay in order to take on board Rear Admiral V. Kh. Sahakyan, the Chief of Staff of the KChF, as well as a group of senior officers of the fleet. On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small rocket ships at the range near Cape Chersonesos. At 9:55 am, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced.

August 30, 1974 an unknown chain of events (which the commission will later write about) closed and an explosion thundered in cellar No. 8. At 9:58 am, a small shake of the ship was felt on the bridge, as if a small explosion had occurred in its stern. After that, the vehicles were immediately stopped, an emergency and combat alert was announced on the ship. 10 seconds after the first, the ship was shaken by a stronger explosion, a sheaf of flame and a clearly visible head of white smoke appeared behind the stern tube. After another 20 seconds, a third explosion occurred, which occurred in the area of the rocket cellar No. 8. A column of flame rose over the site of the explosion and poured thick black smoke. The explosion was so powerful that it tore off the cellar lid and, together with the anti-aircraft missile launchers, threw it onto the aft chimney. After that, a strong fire broke out in this area of the BOD, and the ship's personnel began to fight for unsinkability and survivability.

From the combat log of the BOD Otvazhny "for 30.08.74:
10.17. The ship is located Sh 44 ° 37, D 32 ° 56.
10.19. Report of the commander of BC-3: it is necessary to flood 6, 7 cellars.
10.20. To the commander of BC-5: flood 6, 7 cellars.
At 10 h 20 min, after the broadcast of the ship, the command was given to the personnel on the poop to jump into the water. True, they did not hear her, the sailors from the poop rushed into the water on their own. A report was received from the command post to the GKP:
- 10.21. Seven people overboard! (there were 12 people overboard, probably not all were noticed approx.).
The GKP ordered:
- Take ends and lifebuoys. Save people!
However, the roughness of the sea, the ship's heel and the wind that carried the sailors away from the ship's side apparently did not allow them to be picked up on their own, and the signalmen were ordered to transfer them to the nearest missile boat (MRK) "Zarnitsa" to pick up people from the water.
«
MRK "Zarnitsa" at the burning BOD "Otvazhny", August 30, 1974

Per-minute actions of the crew are described

At 10:54 am the destroyer "Conscious" took the "Otvazhny" BOD into tow in order to take the ship aground in the Chersonesos area, at which time the ship's roll had already reached 13 degrees. After 7 minutes, the Otvazhny began the procedure for pumping fuel from starboard to port, but this did not help to get rid of the roll.

Towing of the BOD "Otvazhny"

Soon the stern of the BOD plunged into the sea along the upper deck, and the list to starboard reached 16 degrees. Secret documents were quickly evacuated from the ship. At 11:24 am, torpedoes were dropped into the sea, and the ship's roll was reduced to 14 degrees. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and 7 were flooded with water using fire hydrants. At 11:55 am, the Komsomolets Ukrainy BPK arrived at the scene to provide assistance.

At 11.59 the fire on board the ship was localized, white smoke began to pour from the cellars. However, 7 minutes later, the towing ropes from the destroyer "Conscious" broke off, and new ropes were started from the Bedovoy. All this time, the fire in the aft engine room of the ship continued. At 12.27, the command was given to stop the supply of water to the compartment, it was decided to use only foam. A chemical fire extinguishing system was activated in the aft engine room. Towing of the ship in distress at a speed of 3 knots began again at 12:49, at which time the anti-submarine ship's roll reached 17 degrees.

At 12:55 the rescue vessel "Beshtau" arrived at the scene at 13:20 - SS-15 and SS-26, a few more minutes later the fire-decontamination vessel "Flame". Foam was supplied from these vessels on board the Otvazhny shipyard to the area of the burning cellars. At 14:30 an attempt was made to pump water out of the aft compartments, but after 17 minutes an explosion of aviation ammunition, located in cellar No. 10, occurred. Apparently, at the same time, the tank, in which 5 tons of aviation kerosene was stored, exploded. All this seriously complicated the situation, the list of the ship to starboard quickly reached 19 degrees, increasing to 25. At 15:07 it stabilized at around 27 degrees. After another 3 minutes on the ship, the power supply to the devices was cut off and the lighting was turned off. At 15:12, the personnel received an order to evacuate the ship in distress, the last BOD left by the captain.

At 15.35, the Otvazhny ship began to plunge into the Black Sea astern without capsizing, and a tug was released from the Bedovoy destroyer. After just 12 minutes, the ship completely disappeared under water. The depth at the place of its flooding was about 125 meters. In total, 5 hours and 47 minutes elapsed from the moment a fire was discovered on the ship until its sinking. As a result of internal explosions and the resulting holes in the hull, the ship took on board almost 3,600 tons of water, 6 impenetrable compartments were flooded. At the same time, after the flooding of 4 compartments located in the stern, the trim and roll were stabilized, and the BOD had positive stability. But when the water completely flooded 2 more compartments, the vessel's buoyancy was exhausted. However, even having sunk, the Otvazhny BOD demonstrated very high survivability. According to the specification, the ships of this project could remain afloat only after the flooding of 3 adjacent compartments

The death of the Otvazhny shipyard, photo taken from the Bedovy shipyard, August 30, 1974

Of the 287 people who were on board the Otvazhny BPK, including cadets undergoing practical training, 24 people (19 sailors and 5 cadets) were killed. The entire personnel of the ship during the struggle for survivability and unsinkability, as well as when extinguishing the fire, acted skillfully and showed courage. All measures were taken to save the ship, but the damage received as a result of the explosions made it impossible to rescue it.

The unfortunate ship was not left alone after this tragedy.... It was decided to raise it from the seabed. For this, from August 31 to September 10, 1974, an examination of the Otvazhny BPK lying on the ground was carried out using the NK-300 observation camera, the RK-680 working chamber, the divers of the rescue vessel and the AS-1 autonomous working projectile. As a result of the surveys, it was possible to find out the following:
- “The ship sank at point W 44 ° 44", 1 and D 33 ° 01 ", 5 at a distance of 28 miles from Sevastopol, at a depth of 130 m, with a heading of 31 ° and a roll of 43 ° to the port side.
- Stern extremity from 210 shp. as a result of the fracture, it is displaced and lies at an angle of 10-20 ° to the center plane with a roll angle of 40-50 ° to the port side.
- The left side from frame 70 to the stern cut entered the ground along the upper deck, in the bow the side rises 3-4 meters above the ground ...

The conclusions of the commission were as follows:
- rockets V-601 - 15 pcs. in the drums of cellar No. 4, when exposed to a shock wave from the detonation of anti-submarine ammunition, they become dangerous for ship lifting;
- depth charges RSL-60 in cellar No. 5 - 192 pcs., of which 24 pcs. have UDV-60 fuses inserted, they are dangerous for carrying out ship-lifting operations;
- depth charges RSL-10 in cellars No. 6 and 7, 24 pcs. in each of which 6 pcs. have UDV-60 fuses inserted, they are dangerous for ship lifting.
The danger of UDV-60 fuses was confirmed by field tests by laying them on the Otvazhny deck for a period of 12.5 months at a depth of 120 m. Subsequent tests confirmed their operability, that is, the danger of explosion of RSL-10 and RSL-60 remained.
The results of a complete study and analysis of the state of deep ammunition forced to abandon the project of lifting the main part of the ship, developed earlier by the Institute of the Navy for rescue and ship-lifting operations.

It would seem .. let him rest at the bottom of the sea .., but the commander-in-chief of the Navy made decisions:

a) To form, at the expense of the Black Sea Fleet, a special ship-lifting squad (SSO) consisting of: SPS "Karpaty", SS-21 (SS-26), SBS project 733S, VM project 535 (532), supply vessel killer. To appoint captain 1st rank L. Potekhin as commander of the MTR, chief of staff of captain 1st rank A.V. Zhbanova, to form the MTR Headquarters from the fleet specialists; to involve specialists from special institutes of the Navy in the work of the MTR at different stages of work.
b) BOD "Otvazhny", due to the impossibility of its restoration, as a whole, do not lift; first of all, to carry out work on lifting, from the ship, special equipment available to a potential enemy at external posts, as well as secret documents and special equipment left behind during the ship's disaster.
c) In order to ensure the safety of the ship's sinking area, detonate anti-submarine and missile ammunition located in cellars No. 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the ship. Simultaneously with the detonation of ammunition in the cellars, explode the aft end of the ship for its subsequent lifting.

Raising the top of the antenna mast

Explosion was scheduled for 10 a.m. on December 26, 1977. All those free from watch were gathered on the upper deck and bridges. Seven months at sea, seven months of difficult and dangerous work were crowned with success. In total, more than 80 tons of TNT were laid on the ship, and taking into account the ship's ammunition, more than 100 tons of TNT should have exploded. The weather was cloudy, there was a light rain, the visibility was poor. At the appointed time on the horizon, we saw an irregularly shaped two-humped fountain with a height of more than 100 m; inside it was black with red flames. A few seconds later, they felt a water hammer on the hull; there was no air blast.

As a result of the inspection, it was established that the hull of the ship from the explosion, as it were, turned around and turned into a shapeless pile of metal scattered over a large area. The question of raising any large unit could not go. The work of divers seemed very dangerous in the chaos of twisted metal with sharp edges. Therefore, in the already tested way, under the supervision of the NK-300 operator, an artillery installation, pipe fences, part of the aft superstructure and other pieces of metal were raised from the ground, which were difficult to classify. At the end of June, the command of the Navy made a decision to terminate the work. BOD "Otvazhny" ceased to exist not only as a combat unit of the fleet, but also as a physically integral object .

To the sailors of the Otvazhny anti-submarine ship. Cemetery "Communards", Sevastopol.

The gift was motivated to recall the date of the tragedy and to make this selection. Here is this photo, donated in "hard" form and later scanned by me.

In Sevastopol, on the territory of the Communards cemetery, you can find a small, modest monument. It is located between the mass grave of the crew of the battleship "Novorossiysk" and the monument to Lieutenant P. P. Schmidt. An inscription engraved on the marble monument says: "To the sailors of the Brave, who died in the line of duty in August 1974". It also contains a list of 24 names of the dead sailors. You will not be able to get more information from this monument, in the USSR they preferred not to spread much about the death of this ship.

BOD "Otvazhny"

The large anti-submarine ship "Otvazhny" was included in the fleet on January 25, 1966 and during its rather short life managed to make 7 military campaigns. From 5 to 30 June 1967, the ship carried out a combat mission to provide assistance to the Egyptian armed forces and visited Port Said. In 1968-69, the Otvazhny BPK underwent current repairs at the 61st plant in Nikolaev, during which its missile armament was modernized. Since 1969, the captain of the 3rd rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed the captain of the ship.

In 1970, the BOD was declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the Ocean maneuvers, and sailed to the shores of Cuba and the Atlantic. In 1972-1973, the ship underwent another eight-month repair at the docks of Sevastopol. As part of the detachment of ships of Rear Admiral L. Ya. Vasyukov, the Otvazhny BOD made friendly visits to the ports of Italy - Taranto and Messina. The last combat cruise of the ship in the Mediterranean Sea took place from November 10, 1973 to March 6, 1974. "Brave" was part of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.

The Otvazhny BPK belonged to the Project 61 ships of the Komsomolets Ukrainy type (NATO codification - Kashin). This was a type of large anti-submarine ships that were in service with the Soviet fleet from 1964 to 1991, and later were in service with the Russian fleet. In 2012, only 1 ship of this type remained in the Russian Black Sea Fleet - the Smetlivy TFR. He remained the only ship of 20 vessels of the project, which managed to become part of the USSR fleet from 1962 to 1973. The remaining 18 ships were decommissioned and dismantled for metal, one more - the Otvazhny BOD - sank.

The standard displacement of ships of this type was 3500-3700 tons, the maximum displacement was 4500-4750 tons. The modernized vessels have 3950/4900 tons respectively. Hull dimensions: length - 144 m (modernized - 147 m), width - 15.8 m, draft - 4.8 m (up to 6 m). 4 gas turbines with a total capacity of 94,000 hp worked on 2 propellers, providing the ship with a maximum speed of 36-38 knots. The cruising range at a speed of 20 knots was 4,000 nautical miles. The ship could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The BOD provided for the storage of 5 tons of aviation kerosene, as well as ammunition for the helicopter (depth charges, anti-submarine torpedoes, sonar buoys). Due to the absence of a hangar on the ship, the helicopter could be placed on it only temporarily.

The armament complex of the new ship could be called innovative. For the first time in Soviet shipbuilding, the BOD received 2 M-1 "Volna" air defense systems. Each anti-aircraft missile system was a two-boom PU ZIF-101, a magazine with 2 rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each and a Yatagan control system. Artillery armament included 2 paired 76-mm turret artillery mounts AK-726 (rate of fire 90 rds / min., Maximum firing range 13 km., Height reach - 9 km., Ammunition for each installation consisted of 2400 unitary shots). In addition, the ship had 2 fire control systems "Turel", the ship was equipped with a five-tube torpedo tube PTA-53-61 for torpedoes 53-57 or SET-53 and had 2 rocket launchers RBU-1000 and RBU-6000 (ammunition 48 RSL-10 and 192 RSL-60, respectively).

From 4 to 7 August 1974, the Otvazhny BPK took part in regular exercises of the fleet, and from 27 August the ship was to become the flagship control ship during the 2nd stage of the exercises. BOD "Otvazhny" was supposed to provide firing of small missile ships, as well as take part in anti-submarine exercises with torpedo firing. On August 29, 1974, the ship under the control of Captain 2nd Rank I.P. Vinnik went out to sea and successfully conducted torpedo firing. At dawn on August 30, the BOD embarked on a raid in Streletskaya Bay in order to take on board Rear Admiral V. Kh. Sahakyan, the Chief of Staff of the KChF, as well as a group of senior officers of the fleet. On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small rocket ships at the range near Cape Chersonesos. At 9:55 am, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced.

After only 3 minutes, at 9:58 am, a slight shaking of the vessel was felt on the bridge, as if a small explosion had occurred in its stern. After that, the vehicles were immediately stopped, an emergency and combat alert was announced on the ship. 10 seconds after the first, the ship was shaken by a stronger explosion, a sheaf of flame and a clearly visible head of white smoke appeared behind the stern tube. After another 20 seconds, a third explosion occurred, which occurred in the area of the rocket cellar No. 8. A column of flame rose over the site of the explosion and poured thick black smoke. The explosion was so powerful that it tore off the cellar lid and, together with the anti-aircraft missile launchers, threw it onto the aft chimney. After that, a strong fire broke out in this area of the BOD, and the ship's personnel began to fight for unsinkability and survivability.

As it was later found out, the following happened: after the announcement of the combat training alert on the ship, the midshipman, who was at the control panel of the missile control post of aft cellar No. 8, in which 15 B-601 missiles were stored in 2 vertical drums in a combat state, acting according to the instructions , ordered the sailors on duty at the post to connect the external power supply. After that, he turned the toggle switches on the power supply panel to the "on" position. Immediately after clicking the last toggle switch, he saw through the porthole a fairly strong sheaf of flame on the left drum. Without launching the fire extinguishing means, the midshipman left his combat post and rushed down the corridor to the bow of the ship, where he was overtaken by a strong explosion, the blast wave of which threw him aside.

In the course of the investigation, it was possible to establish that exactly 18 seconds elapsed from the moment the fire appeared in cellar No. 8 to the moment of a strong explosion. Subsequently, it was found that the flame in the cellar appeared due to the spontaneous activation of the main engine of one of the anti-aircraft missiles. This was followed by the launch of the rocket engine of its own launch stage, which led to the launch of the launch engines of several more missiles. All this led to a sharp jump in pressure in the cellar (about 3 atmospheres), as a result of which a force of about 2500 tons began to act on the cover of the cellar, which caused it to break. As a result of the explosion in the side skin of the ship in the area of the 8th cellar, 2 holes were formed, through which outboard water began to flow into the compartments.

At 10 o'clock a combat alert was announced on the ship, and then an emergency alert, at this time a fire was raging in cellar No. 8, in corridors 9 and 10. The BOD got a 12-degree roll to starboard. Between 10:10 and 10:20 a command was given on the ship to turn on the water protection system, irrigation and flooding of cellars No. 6, 7 and 10 began. The explosion from the ship's poop into the sea threw 7 sailors, who were picked up by the ships that approached the scene.

At 10:23 am, the Otvazhny personnel, located in the aft compartments of the ship, were ordered to evacuate from the ship. At this time, the fire on board was gaining momentum. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and No. 7 were constantly watered with water from hoses. At 10:40 am, the destroyer "Conscious" came to the aid of the BOD, and after another 12 minutes "Bedovy", from which a special rescue party was landed on the "Otvazhny". At 10:54 am the destroyer "Conscious" took the "Otvazhny" BOD into tow in order to take the ship aground in the Chersonesos area, at which time the ship's roll had already reached 13 degrees. After 7 minutes, the Otvazhny began the procedure for pumping fuel from starboard to port, but this did not help to get rid of the roll.

Sources of information:
-http: //ser-sarajkin.narod2.ru
-http: //flot.sevastopol.info/history/otvazhniy.htm
-http: //d-t-p.net/index.php? option = com_content & view = article & id = 4443: ---- qq & catid = 33: 2010-06-24-10-13-10 & Itemid = 40
-http: //ru.wikipedia.org/wiki

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