Scharnhorst. Creation, battles, campaigns and death of the German battleship. The Fuhrer Pirates. The death of the battleship Scharnhorst Battle cruiser Scharnhorst

"Scharnhorst" based

Searchlights flickered across the angry December sea. Spills of oil spills, debris, pieces of ice and more debris. Rare heads of people floundering in icy water. The explosions of the illuminating shells aided the floodlights, illuminating the surface with a deathly pale glow. The destroyers of His Royal Majesty "Scorpion" and "Matchless", earning money with machines, made their way to the recent battle site - the thrill of battle, unlike the sea, subsided. Their formidable adversary had already rested at the bottom 70 miles northeast of North Cape. Now it was possible to pick up survivors - however, they were few. The long, persistent and already annoying migraine called "Scharnhorst", which tormented the Lords of the Admiralty, finally passed.

Difficult birth

Not saying “no” in time often means a silent “yes”. This was what was guided in Germany in the 1930s, carefully, in small unhurried steps, when restoring its navy. The firstborns of its reviving core were battleships of the Deutschland class, ships that were in many ways unique and original for their time. The banks of the Thames were silent for the time being. The French neighbors, showing concern, responded by laying down the Dunkirk, a swift watchdog with 330mm guns, capable of catching up and dealing with any of the German "pocket battleships". The concept of a highly autonomous diesel raider is increasingly becoming vulnerable. The third battleship of the series "Admiral Graf Spee" was slightly modified in order to increase and strengthen its reservation, but this was a half measure. The German admirals already needed the next generation ship for work in the Atlantic - it had to maintain its speed and autonomy and at the same time not be afraid of meeting with French hunters. Fleet Commander Admiral Raeder made a proposal to further change the project "Deutschlands", two of which (battleships "D" and "E") were being prepared for laying. The idea was to install an additional, third, main-caliber turret with an increase in displacement to 15-18 thousand tons. At the beginning of 1933, the concept of the project put forward conditions: the new ships must be able to withstand the French "Dunkirk". Consideration of options began - from a displacement of 18 thousand tons and nine 283-mm guns to 26 thousand tons with six promising 330-mm guns. The latter seemed more promising, and it was he who was taken as a basis for further study.

Hitler's rise to power unexpectedly made adjustments to the development of large-scale military shipbuilding. At the beginning of his official career, the newly-made Fuhrer did not want to once again frighten the British with the construction of as much as 26,000-ton ships, the size of which was already an open mockery for the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler urged admirals to calm their ardor and appetites and build battleships "D" and "E" like "Admiral Count Spee" with even more developed armor (220 mm - belt, 70-80 mm - main armored deck). The ships "grew fat" to 19 thousand tons, but in Berlin they thought that the forbidden 19 were still more modest and invisible than those that were generally beyond the 26. On January 25, the shipyards in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel received orders for the construction of two battleships, the laying of which took place February 14 of the same year. In 1934, France, while continuing to express its concern, announced the laying of a second Dunkirk-class ship, the battle cruiser Strasbourg. The naval elite began to beg Hitler not to multiply the ships that were obviously inferior to the potential enemy, but to give the go-ahead for the revision of the project.

Given the silence that reigned on the island, the Fuhrer gave permission to increase the displacement of the new ships and add a third turret. On July 5, work on the battleships "D" and "E" was suspended, and their redesign began. At the beginning, it was decided to install the main caliber turrets in a very interesting way: one in the bow, two in the stern, thus, according to the plan of the designers, a large concentration of fire was achieved back in the event of a possible chase. At the same time, the opinion was first expressed about the possibility of re-equipping the project with guns of a larger caliber - 330 or 380 mm. Soon the defensive position of the main caliber turrets was abandoned in favor of the traditional one: two at the bow, one at the stern. The power plant of the ship has undergone major changes. Since diesel engines with the appropriate power, capable of accelerating a ship with a displacement of 26 thousand tons, existed only on paper, it was decided to use a steam turbine power plant with high-pressure boilers of the Wagner system. Only such installations could provide the new ships with a course of 30 knots. In March 1935, when the drawings and other documentation were ready, the question arose again about increasing the caliber of the guns and placing either nine 305 or 330 mm guns, or six paired 350 or 380 mm guns. The command of the fleet insisted on the maximum size, but here, still not sure of the reaction of the "peace-loving islanders", Hitler ordered to limit himself so far to the initial nine 283-mm cannons. Consolation, of course, was that these were new Krupp guns, more powerful and longer-range than those that were installed on the Deutschlands.

In an effort to calm the British and give his actions at least some kind of legal and legal framework, Hitler agreed to sign a naval agreement with Britain, emphasizing that he considers France to be the main enemy and offender. The Germans promised the British a guaranteed triple superiority of the British linear fleet over the German: 477 thousand tons of displacement against 166 thousand for Germany. The British thought about it and agreed. The Versailles restrictions finally collapsed - the Germans were able to build their fleet quite legally.

In the spring and summer of 1935, new ships, which received the names Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, significant for the German fleet, were officially re-laid down: May 3 - Gneisenau, June 16 - Scharnhorst.

The new battleships (it was decided to abandon the archaic term "battleship") were not descendants of the well-designed and built German battlecruisers of the First World War. They looked little like the further evolution of the Mackensen or Ersatz York ships. The Scharnhorst were, in fact, oversized Deutschlands, which felt the effects of various constraints and compromises. Already during the construction process, it became clear that within the allotted 26,000-ton displacement it would not be possible to keep it, and it would be significantly exceeded. This raised serious concerns about the seaworthiness, stability and survivability of the new ships. For example, the armored deck was below the waterline, and the freeboard was also insufficient. The ships were already on the stocks, and there was no way to radically change them. The stability problem could have been optimized by installing additional boules, but this solution would inevitably reduce the speed, which was considered unacceptable. Measures were taken to save weight: strict weight discipline was established, in addition, welding was widely used in construction - the hulls of both battleships, or, rather, battle cruisers, were welded. These efforts solved the problem of congestion only partially - both ships were quite "wet", being inferior in seaworthiness to many classmates.


Descent of the battleship

On October 3, 1936, the Scharnhorst was launched in a solemn ceremony, the Gneisenau would only follow on December 8, 1938. Despite the excessive weight, the Germans paid great attention to the issues of the unsinkability of ships - any waterproof compartment, with the exception of the narrowest at the ends, was, in turn, divided into additional waterproof spaces. In total, there were 21 main waterproof compartments, the flooding of two of which, regardless of location, guaranteed the ship's combat capability. The main armor belt had a thickness of 350 mm, thinning to the lower edge of up to 170 mm, and was intended primarily to protect against a potential enemy - 330-mm Dunker guns. The armor of the main caliber turrets reached a maximum thickness of 360 mm. The auxiliary caliber of battleships was developed in terms of number: 8 paired 150-mm guns, located in turrets protected by 140 mm armor, and 4 single-gun installations, covered with only 25 mm shields. The latter was a clear relic of the Deutschland heritage, besides the overload did not allow placing all the guns in the turrets. The anti-torpedo protection was designed to counter a torpedo with a warhead of at least 250 kg. After the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement, Hitler no longer objected to the rearmament of the Scharnhorst with new 380-mm guns, orders were even issued for the production of the barrels themselves - the rearmament was supposed to take place in the winter of 1940-1941, but with the outbreak of World War II it was postponed indefinitely.

On January 7, 1939, the Scharnhorst entered service, with Captain Zursee Otto Tsiliax becoming its first commander.

In Norway. Operation Weserbyung

New ships, which belonged to battle cruisers, required numerous refinements. The power plant was especially capricious. Training exits in the Baltic showed insufficient seaworthiness and freeboard. Both battleships have their nasal limbs redesigned, with clipper noses more suitable for sailing in the Atlantic. The situation in Europe became more and more tense, the new ships had no time for campaigns in order to demonstrate the flag, unlike their predecessors, the Deutschlands. Efforts were made to bring the Scharnhorst to a full-fledged combat state as soon as possible. In October, the command decided that the new battleship was already quite capable of going to sea. The fact is that by this time the British had thrown significant forces to search for and destroy the "pocket battleship" "Admiral Count Spee" in the South Atlantic, the ring of beaters around which was already shrinking. In order to reduce the pressure on the raider, it was decided to authorize the exit of a pair of battleships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" to the Atlantic in order to distract the British from their persistent hunting activities. Ironically, it was the tasks of the "pocket battleship" that disrupted communications and diverted part of the enemy's cruising forces. Now they had to attract their own heavy ships to bite the British by the tail.

On November 21, 1939, the Scharnhorst and her sister ship sailed from Wilhelmshaven for the North Atlantic. On November 23, the German ships collided with the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi, a former passenger liner with eight obsolete 152mm guns. Despite the simply overwhelming difference in armament, the commander of the British cruiser E. Kennedy bravely accepted the battle. Half an hour later, "Rawalpindi" turned into a flaming skeleton, its commander was killed, the crew lowered the boats. During the sinking of the old liner, the German battleships used up almost 120 rounds of the main caliber and more than 200 of the auxiliary. The appearance on the horizon of the cruiser Newcastle forced Vice Admiral Marshal, the commander of the operation, to issue the order to withdraw, setting up a smoke screen, as he feared the presence of larger ships. Marshal was criticized by the commanders for the enormous consumption of ammunition and indecision, but propaganda presented the sinking of the Rawalpindi as a great victory.

Both battleships spent the winter of 1939–1940 at the base and in shooting practice in the Baltic. At the same time, the propaganda department shot a special documentary called "Battleship in a Combat Campaign", where "Scharnhorst" starred as the main character. The viewers were shown a picture that the fleet was supposedly operating almost off the island of Helgoland, conducting live fires at enemy aircraft and ships. In fact, the shooting took place in the rear Baltic.

The next significant milestone in the battleship's career was participation in Operation Weserbyung-Nord, the invasion of Norway. The Weserbyung was on the brink of critical risk and consisted of a combination of amphibious and airborne assault forces. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and the destroyers, provided cover for the Narvik landing group that was seizing the important Norwegian port of Narvik. On the way, the German squadron was discovered and attacked by British bombers, which, however, did not achieve success. However, the alarmed Admiralty, which did not know the whole picture of what was happening, decided that the Germans were preparing a major raider operation in the North Atlantic, and on the evening of April 7, 1940, the Metropolitan Fleet went to sea. While the destroyers landed the rangers on the piers of Narvik, both battleships cruised to the west. At 4 hours 30 minutes on April 9, 1940, the Gneisenau radar detected a large target 25 km aft, and a combat alert was played on both ships. Rain and cloudiness severely limited visibility and did not allow full use of excellent optics. At 5 am the navigator of the Scharnhorst in the mirror of a sextant discovered a flash of large-caliber guns - the size of the fountains from the explosions confirmed the seriousness of the guest's intentions. After 5 minutes, the signalmen discovered the silhouette of a large ship - it was the battle cruiser Rhinaun, along with eight destroyers accompanying it. At first, Vice Admiral Gunter Lutyens ordered to turn on the enemy - soon the sides exchanged hits: "Gneisenau" and "Rhinaun" received two rounds each. The Germans, having fixed that the Rhinaun was not alone, feared torpedo attacks from the British destroyers, so Lutyens ordered to increase speed and break away from the enemy. In the end they succeeded, and on April 12, together with the "Admiral Hipper", the battleships returned to Wilhelmshaven. During the cruise, many design flaws of the ships were revealed. They suffered from frequent impacts of waves in the bow, because of this, frequent penetration of water into the tower of the main caliber "A" occurred, causing damage to the electrical circuits. The power plant was also unreliable. Nevertheless, immediately upon arrival at the base, both battleships began to prepare for a new campaign - there were few combat-ready units among the German heavy ships. After a short-term repair, the battleships were supposed to again reach the shores of Norway, but the explosion of the Gneisenau on a mine on May 5 and the subsequent repairs postponed the group's active actions for almost a month.

On June 4, under the flag of Vice Admiral Marshal Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the same Admiral Hipper and a group of destroyers, they went to sea as part of Operation Juneau, which was aimed at obstructing British shipping off the coast of Norway. After the Hipper destroyed several British ships, the Marshal sent him along with the destroyers to refuel in Trondheim, and he himself went to try his luck off the coast of Harstad. At 16 hours 48 minutes. an observer from the Scharnhorst foremars noticed smoke, and a little later the signalmen identified the large aircraft carrier. It was the British "Glories", which, accompanied by the destroyers "Ardent" and "Akasta", evacuated two squadrons of ground fighters - "Gladiators" and "Hurricanes" from Norway. For some reason, none of the Suordfish torpedo bombers, the only one effective against German battleships, was ready to take off. All the trump cards were in the hands of Marshal. The Germans approached their victim and opened fire, first with the main, and then with the auxiliary caliber. They quickly took aim, and the aircraft carrier began to receive hit after hit. The escort destroyers have shown real heroism in trying to protect their ward in an almost hopeless situation. Soon the Glories turned into a huge bonfire, and Ardent and Akasta set up a smoke screen. Under its cover, the first one went into a desperate torpedo attack, firing 4 torpedoes - the Germans noticed them in time and dodged. A barrage of shells hit the Ardent and soon sank. "Akasta" maneuvered for a long time, knocking down the enemy's sight and avoiding hits. At 19 o'clock, enveloped in flames, "Glories" went to the bottom, the courageous "Akasta" did not survive it much. Going into the attack, he fired a volley of four torpedoes - the Gneisenau dodged them, but the Scharnhorst did not escape retaliation - one torpedo hit him in the area of \u200b\u200bthe C tower. The battleship received serious damage, list to the left side and received 2500 tons of water. The Akasta, which sank to the bottom with its entire crew, sold its life dearly. Since throughout the battle the "Glories" radio station drove one dispatch after one, the Marshal after the end of the battle decided to urgently return. In addition, the state of the Scharnhorst caused some concern. The battleship could not give a speed of more than 20 knots, and therefore the Germans went to the nearest Trondheim, where, with the help of a floating repair shop, they managed to make temporary repairs. Only at the end of June, the Scharnhorst reached Kiel and underwent a major overhaul, which continued until the end of 1940.

Raid to the Atlantic

At the end of 1940, the German command decided on a major operation in the Atlantic. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were to carry out a deep raid on enemy communications, attacking, whenever possible, single ships and convoys. Operation Commander Gunther Lutiens was strictly forbidden to engage in battle with large ships. The operation received the meaningful name "Berlin". On December 28, 1940, the ships went to sea, but got into a fierce storm, in which the hulls were damaged - huge masses of water that hit the places of old wounds turned out to be very dangerous. Had to return to try again on January 22, 1941. Already on February 3, the battleships managed to slip out into the Atlantic, where they began their activities. This generally successful campaign lasted until March 22, 1941 - the German battleships frolicked enough on the English shipping lanes. Twice they had contact with enemy battleships: on March 7 with the guarding convoy "Malaya", and on March 16 - with "Rodney". Both times, thanks to their superior speed, the raiders escaped with ease. During the campaign, the Gneisenau destroyed 14, and the Scharnhorst - 8 enemy ships with a total displacement of 115 thousand tons, causing a commotion in the Admiralty.

On March 22, both battleships arrived at the German-occupied French port of Brest, where they stood up for repairs. The presence of a gang of bandits from the main road near the English Channel - soon the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, which had returned from the Atlantic, joined the battleships - greatly unnerved the British. In an effort to destroy or at least disable the German ships, the British command constantly organized air raids on the parking areas of the Brest group. The Germans pulled large air defense forces to the city, carefully camouflaging the ships, giving them the appearance of land. The decks of the battleships and cruisers were tightly hung with camouflage nets; for greater reliability, real trees and bushes were mounted on the superstructures and towers. But British intelligence, using the agents of the French Resistance, each time found out the exact parking places. Transferred to La Pallis "Scharnhorst" on July 24, 1941, was subjected to another raid by the British "Wellingtons" and received five direct hits from 227 to 454 kg bombs. The ship received 3000 tons of water, electrical equipment was seriously damaged. By the end of the year, after a series of repairs of varying degrees of complexity, both battleships were brought up to combat readiness. During this period, the center of the German fleet's efforts shifted to the North, through which the Allies escorted convoys of ships to the Soviet Union. Hitler called this region a zone of fate, and now the main task of the German surface ships was to disrupt the communications of the Allies in the North. In addition, after the sinking of the Bismarck, the Atlantic ceased to be attractive as a hunting ground for large surface ships, the number of which in Germany was very limited. It was decided to transfer the Brest squadron first to Germany, then further north, to Norway.

Jump "Cerberus"


German ships in the English Channel. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are ahead. Photo from the board of "Prince Eugen"

By the beginning of 1942, the German ships were generally ready to leave. The British raids became more and more intense. At a meeting with Hitler in the presence of the top leaders of the fleet and aviation, the final decision was made to break through from Brest by the most dangerous, but at the same time the shortest road - directly across the English Channel. The commander of the operation, Vice Admiral Otto Tsiliax, received a detailed breakthrough plan called Operation Cerberus. On February 11, 1942, the Scharnhorst (flying the Tsiliax flag), the Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, accompanied by 6 destroyers and 11 destroyers, left Brest. During the breakthrough, the Germans managed to achieve very close cooperation with the Luftwaffe - there was a liaison officer on each of the three large ships. A powerful umbrella of fighters was deployed over the breakthrough detachment. The British frankly overslept the beginning of the movement of the compound and, realizing themselves from such impudence, threw everything that was at hand to prevent the enemy. The German squadron was consistently attacked by torpedo bombers, torpedo boats and destroyers, each time successfully fighting back. The main enemy, after all, turned out to be untracked bottom mines that generously strewn the bottom of the English Channel. On February 12, on the second day of the crossing, the Scharnhorst was successively detonated off the Dutch coast by two bottom mines. The battleship received almost 1,500 tons of water, there was damage in the engine room, and the ship lost its speed. But soon the emergency parties managed to neutralize the consequences of the damage, and on February 13, the Scharnhorst followed the main forces to Wilhelmshaven. Operation Cerberus, bold and daring, was a brilliant success.

North again


Side diagram of the Scharnhorst in different years

Upon arrival, the Scharnhorst was transferred to Kiel for repairs. There was also "Gneisenau", which received its fatal bomb on the night of 27 February. A successful hit caused the charges in the main caliber tower cellar to ignite, followed by their explosion and a violent fire. The detonation of the shells was avoided by flooding the cellars, but the battleship was completely out of order. Scharnhorst has lost its old partner. A more thorough examination of it by specialists led to the conclusion about the need for more thorough, and, consequently, long-term repairs - primarily of boilers and turbines. The summer and autumn of 1942 were spent in exercises and repairs - problems with machines and boilers constantly haunted the ship. By the end of the year, Scharnhorst had finally begun preparations for a transfer to Norway. This decision was not canceled even in the light of the hysterical order of the Fuhrer on January 1, 1943 to write off all heavy ships for scrap after an unsuccessful New Year's battle off the coast of Norway.

After several unsuccessful attempts, the Scharnhorst within the framework of Operation Paderborn reached Narvik on March 14, 1943, and on March 22 dropped anchor at the main operational base of the German fleet in northern Norway - Alten Fjord, where the largest German battleship Tirpitz had long been located and heavy cruiser (former battleship) "Luttsov". April 1943 was marked by a joint campaign of two battleships together with destroyers to Bear Island. The rest of the time the German squadron spent in inactivity with rare training exits near the base, to drive the ship's rats out of the gun barrels. The lack of fuel began to affect the fleet. In the summer of 1943, the Norwegians captured a German radio station on the island of Spitsbergen, and the Kriegsmarine command began to prepare a response operation with a raid on this Arctic island. At the same time, it was necessary to prove to the Fuehrer that the surface ships of the fleet are not in vain devouring such a scarce fuel with whole trains. On September 8, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, together with 10 destroyers, approached Spitsbergen and fired at coal mines and a mining village. A thousand paratroopers landed on the shore. The battery of two old 76mm guns was destroyed by naval artillery fire. "Scharnhorst" showed such disgusting results in shooting that immediately upon returning to base was sent to the training. The response of the opposing side was more constructive and painful: on September 22, 1943, the Tirpitz stationed in the Kaa fiord was attacked by British dwarf submarines, which seriously damaged it - according to German estimates, until the spring of 1944 the battleship was disabled. The Scharnhorst escaped such an unenviable fate only because it was on anti-aircraft exercises. After the Luttsov, which had left for overhaul earlier, the Scharnhorst remained the only combat-ready German ship in the Arctic.

The last battle of the battleship "Scharnhorst"


Rear Admiral Erich Bey, Commander of the German Squadron

By the end of 1943, the situation on the Eastern Front, the main for Germany, became more and more threatening. The Allies, taking advantage of the weakening of German forces in the Arctic, resumed escorting caravans. Hitler constantly reproached the leadership of the fleet for the inactivity and uselessness of surface ships, which, according to him, could not influence the situation in any way. At a meeting with the Fuehrer on December 19–20, Karl Dönitz assured him that in the very near future the Scharnhorst and the most efficient 4 destroyers would go out to intercept the detected convoy. The temporary commander of the strike force, Rear Admiral Erich Bey (instead of the absent Kümetz), on December 22, received an order to switch to a three-hour readiness. The Scharnhorst accepted fuel and provisions for the last time. For the battleship commander Fritz Hinze, this was the first time he went to sea in his new position. There were two British convoys in the zone of relative reach. JW-55B of 19 tankers and transports guarded by 10 destroyers and 7 escort ships left Loch Yu on 20 December. Another convoy, RA-55 with security forces, was moving towards him. In the Barents Sea, both convoys were covered by the British Formation 1 of Admiral R. Burnett, which included the light cruisers Belfast, Sheffield and the heavy Norfolk, and by Formation 2, the battleship Duke of York (flag of the Metropolitan Fleet Commander Admiral Bruce Fraser ), the cruiser "Jamaica" and 4 destroyers. British convoy JW-55B was first spotted by aircraft and then by a submarine. Dönitz gave the order to start the operation. At 19:00 on December 25, 1943, in the Christmas snowfall, the German squadron left the base. Operation Ostfront began. Bey kept constant radio contact with the headquarters of the command of the German forces in Norway. On the hands, he had a very contradictory order: on the one hand, he was ordered to attack the convoy at the slightest opportunity and act energetically, on the other, he was required to immediately stop the battle when the strongest enemy appeared. The December sea was agitated, the Scharnhorst was at the head of the squadron, destroyers were breaking through the waves to the side. Soon their speed had to be reduced to 10 knots. Bey had no idea that all his negotiations with the coast were read by the British Ultra - the British knew that the old enemy had left his lair and was at sea.

In the morning at 8 o'clock, Belfast's radar spotted a German battleship 32 km from the convoy, at 09.20 it was visually identified from Sheffield. The Scharnhorst did not turn on its radars in order to maintain stealth. At 09:23 the British cruisers opened fire, first with lighting, then with armor-piercing shells - the Scharnhorst immediately responded. For 20 minutes, the opponents exchanged volleys - several shells hit the German ship, which did not cause severe damage, except for one that destroyed the radar nose antenna. The Scharnhorst went blind from the nasal angles by about 69-80 degrees. Bey decided to withdraw from the battle: the convoy was still the main goal. And he managed to throw the British off the tail. The Scharnhorst makes a roundabout maneuver and tries to approach the convoy from the other side, from the north-east. British cruisers again discover the enemy. In the ensuing skirmish, the Norfolk and Belfast are damaged, and the German battleship again withdraws from the battle. Destroyers do not participate in the battle, as they are too far away. They are running out of fuel, and Bey releases his escort to the base.

At the beginning of the second day, the German admiral decided to end the operation - it was not possible to get through to the convoy, the British know about his presence. And most of all, Bay feared the presence of a British battleship nearby. The cruisers following on the trail of the raider were aiming to intercept Admiral Fraser's Compound 2 - they had already played a combat alert on the Duke of York for a long time. The Scharnhorst went straight into the trap. The bow radar was destroyed, the stern radar was disabled. At 16.32 the radar of the English battleship detected the target, a few minutes later the raider was fired upon by lighting shells - its towers were located along the bow and stern - the Germans were taken by surprise. Nevertheless, the German ship increased its speed and began to respond. Its 283mm rounds could not penetrate the Duke of York's powerful armor. At 16.55 the first 356 mm British shell reached its target. The German raider outnumbered his opponents in speed and began to increase the distance. Fortunately for the British, the firing of Fraser's flagship was accurate that day - heavy British shells knocked out the vital components of the Scharnhorst. At 18 o'clock there was a hit in the engine room: the speed dropped to 10 knots. But after 20 minutes, the engine room reported that it was capable of giving 22 knots. All the surviving members of the battleship's crew testify to the high morale of the Scharnhorst team in its last battle - the fires were extinguished quickly, the emergency parties were filling up holes. The British battleship was constantly covered by German volleys, but there were few direct hits and they were not effective. At about 19:00, when the Scharnhorst's artillery had already stopped responding, Fraser ordered the destroyers to torpedo the enemy. The auxiliary caliber was no longer active, and torpedo hits followed one after another. The British say there were only 10 or 11 torpedo hits. The battleship sank in the water, the deck was engulfed in fire - the situation became hopeless, and Bey gave the order to leave the ship, he himself decided to share his fate. At 19.45, the Scharnhorst sank with the machines still working. British destroyers launched a rescue operation, but only 36 people were rescued from the icy water. The British paid tribute to the bravely fighting enemy: on the way back from Murmansk to Scapa Flow, passing over the place of the sinking of the Scharnhorst, Fraser ordered a wreath to be thrown into the water in memory of the German sailors who had fulfilled their duty.

On October 3, 2000, a Norwegian Navy expedition discovered a German battleship at a depth of 300 meters, 130 kilometers northeast of the North Cape. The Scharnhorst lies upside down with its keel, as if it is covering the crew that has found its last refuge.

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Withdrawn from the fleet December 26, 1943 Modern status Sunk in Battle of North Cape Options Tonnage 31,552 tons standard;
38,900 tons full Length 235.4 m total;
229.8 m waterline Width 30.0 m Draft 9.91 m - full Reservation main belt - 350 mm;
deck - 95 mm Technical details Power point 3 turbines of the company Power 161 164 HP Speed 31 knots Swimming autonomy 10,100 nautical miles at 19 knots Crew 1,968 people (60 officers, 1909 sailors) Armament Artillery 3 × 3 283 mm;
4 × 2 + 4 × 1 150mm Torpedo-mine armament 2 × 3 533 mm torpedo tubes Anti-aircraft armament 14 × 105 mm;
16 × 37 mm;
10 × 20 mm Aviation 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult

Break through the channel

While in Brest, German ships became targets of constant air raids. In July 1941 the Scharnhorst moved to the port of La Rochelle, south of Brest. Warned of the Scharnhorst's exit from the port by aerial reconnaissance and Resistance agents, the Allies were confident that this was another raid. To prevent a raid, they flew 15 heavy bomber Halifax British Air Force. The damage caused by the bombardment was severe enough to force the Scharnhorst to return to the port of Brest for repairs. Damage from the bombardment, together with those received during the raids, as well as problems with the cooling of the boilers, held the Scharnhorst in port until the end of 1941, when it was decided to send the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as well as the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen back to Germany ... Since it was very risky to try to break through the North Atlantic, on February 11-13, three large ships, accompanied by dozens of minesweepers and other support vessels, made a daring breakthrough - "Channel Break" - through the English Channel, called Operation Cerberus. The British were not ready for such a decisive and unexpected breakthrough, their coast guard was not ready to stop the breakthrough, and the jamming of British radars by the Germans did not allow an air attack. However, and Scharnhorstand Gneisenau were damaged by mines Scharnhorst two, and Gneisenau one. The fix delayed Scharnhorst at the docks until March, after which he sailed to Norway to meet with the battleship Tirpitz and other German ships to attack Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. The next few months were devoted to training and acclimatization, ending with the bombing of Spitsbergen in conjunction with Tirpitz.

The end of the Scharnhorst

  • KzS Fritz Hintze - October 13 - December 26 (deceased)

Notes

Links

  • Historic Center, US Navy Department of Official Publications (en).
  • History of the battleship Scharnhorst: professionalism versus heroism.
  • Royal Navy: World War II 1939-1945 (eng.)

Literature

  • Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970... (Doubleday and Company; Garden City, New York, 1973) (originally published in Germany under the title Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905-1970, J.F. Lehmanns, Verlag, Munchen, 1970). Contains various diagrams and drawings of the ship, how it was planned and how it was built.
  • Busch, Fritz-Otto, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. (Robert Hale, London, 1956) ISBN 0-86007-130-8. The story of the Battle of North Cape, told by a survivor with Scharnhorst
  • Claasen, A. R. A., Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945... Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. pp 228-234. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
  • Garzke, Willliam H., Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II... (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1985). Includes stories about the creation of the ship and its combat operations, information about weapons and other statistical information about Scharnhorst
  • Alf Jacobsen Battleship "Scharnhorst" \u003d Alf R. Jacobsen "SHARNHORST". - M .: Eksmo, 2005 .-- 304 p. - ISBN 5-699-14578-8

On December 26, 1943, during the Second World War, a naval battle took place in the Barents Sea near North Cape (Magerø island in northern Norway), which is considered the northernmost naval battle in history. During this battle, the German battleship Scharnhorst was sunk by the ships of the British Navy.

The battleship "Scharnhorst" was launched on October 3, 1936 and became operational on January 7, 1939. Named after the general and reformer of the Prussian army Gerhard von Scharnhorst and in memory of the World War I cruiser Scharnhorst, sunk in the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914.

As part of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine), the ship was sometimes designated as a battle cruiser due to the caliber of the guns, which did not reach the classic battleship. However, this disadvantage was compensated for by the high speed, despite the increased booking.

After the outbreak of World War II, the Scharnhorst, together with her twin brother, Gneisenau, became a real scourge for British sea communications. It was their reprisals against defenseless transports that led to the formation of the first sea convoys.

These two German battleships ensured the landing of German troops in Norway in the spring of 1940, and on June 8, 1940, in the Norwegian Sea, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the British aircraft carrier Glories and its escort, the destroyers Akasta and Ardent.

On Christmas Day 1943, the Scharnhorst and several German destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Erich Bay went to sea to attack the northern convoys JW 55B and RA 55A.

The next day, December 26, due to bad weather conditions, Bay was unable to locate the convoy and sent destroyers south to search for the convoy, leaving the Scharnhorst alone. Less than 2 hours later, the ship came across convoy cruisers Belfast, Norfolk and Sheffield.

Covering the convoy, the British approached the Scharnhorst, made eye contact and opened fire. Bay tried to obey the order and break through to the convoy's transport ships, breaking away from the advancing cruisers. These maneuvers took several hours and became fatal for the Scharnhorst - the British battleship Duke of York approached the scene of the battle.

At about 16:50, he approached the German and opened fire on him from a short distance. The Scharnhorst almost immediately lost its two main caliber turrets, as well as the speed advantage due to a shell hitting the boiler room.

Having lost speed and, having lost most of the artillery, the German battleship became vulnerable to destroyers who carried out several successful torpedo attacks. The "Duke of York" approached the pistol range, firing at the immobilized German battleship from all guns, which is called "point blank".

At 19:45, the torn apart Scharnhorst went under water. After diving from British ships, powerful underwater explosions were heard. Of the entire crew in 1968, only 36 sailors and not a single officer were saved. The survivors were picked up by British destroyers.

On October 3, 2000, the sunken Scharnhorst was discovered nearly 130 kilometers north-north-east of the North Cape and was photographed at a depth of about 300 meters by the Norwegian Navy. The battle cruiser is keel up. The bow part to the very bridge was destroyed by the explosion of the ammunition cellars. The end of the stern is also missing.

The damned battleship Scharnhorst?

The ultra-modern German battleship Scharnhorst for its time, being only half completed, for some mysterious reason overturned in a dry dock. At the same time, more than a hundred workers were crushed to death and about two hundred were seriously injured. The Scharnhorst was returned to its original position, chained and reinforced with beams. Every detail was checked by a dozen masters, but they could not avoid further troubles. Frames bent in incredible ways, beams and rigging tore off and cripple people. The leaders of the shipyard were even forced to raise the salaries of shipbuilders so that they would not run away, and those who were not seduced by high wages were forced to continue working at gunpoint.

On the day the battleship was launched, Adolf Hitler himself arrived in the harbor. In his presence, a symbolic bottle of champagne was broken on the board of the Scharnhorst, the orchestra played a bravura march, the chief engineer was already preparing to receive congratulations from the Fuhrer. And then, unexpectedly, a seven-inch cable burst, and the Scharnhorst collapsed on two coastal barges, one of which, together with the crew, immediately went to the bottom, and on the other, almost the entire crew who had gathered on the deck and watched the descent of the battleship died.

Hitler, who immensely believed in all kinds of signs, after this horrific tragedy wanted to immediately give the order to send the ill-fated ship for scrap. However, the less superstitious generals dissuaded him from such a hasty, in their opinion, decision.

Despite its excellent sailing characteristics and super armament, the Scharnhorst managed to sink only two auxiliary British ships during all the years of its short service. And secondly, he was disastrously unlucky: misfortunes continued to haunt him literally with devilish constancy.

So, during shelling from the sea of \u200b\u200bDanzig, in the bow tower of the battleship it is not clear why an explosion occurred, which killed and injured twenty people. A day later, the air supply system in the second bow tower went out of order, which caused another twelve sailors to suffocate in the powder gases.

A year later, the battleship participated in the shelling of Oslo, was itself attacked and torpedoed. Following for repairs, at the wide mouth of the Elbe, he collided with the civilian transatlantic liner "Bremen", which as a result ran aground and was soon shot by British bombers.

After many months of repairs, as soon as the Scharnhorst began combat duty off the Norwegian coast, the radar on it - the eyes of any ship - went out of order. While it was being put in order, under cover of darkness, the Hitlerite battleship was surrounded by a whole squadron of British ships, which began to shoot the Scharnhorst literally point-blank.

It is striking, but true: the commander of the Scharnhorst did not accept the battle and decided to simply flee, breaking through the encirclement. But as a result of the attack of the British torpedo bombers, it lost its speed and caught fire. In just a few minutes, the fire reached the artillery cellar, and a terrifying explosion practically broke the Scharnhorst in half.

On December 26, 1943, one of the most powerful ships of the German fleet disappeared into the waves northeast of the North Cape. Of the two thousandth crew, only 36 people were saved. However, two of them died already on the shore under incredible circumstances. Deciding to make themselves lunch, they lit a primus from the emergency kit. And either they did something wrong, or the curse hanging over the Scharnhorst was still in effect, but the apparatus exploded, pouring gasoline on both sailors, and they burned to death ...

A significant part of German historians believe that the battleship Scharnhorst died due to an unfavorable combination of circumstances: codes hacked by the British, inconsistency of reconnaissance actions, successful first shots of the enemy ... and "Gneisenau" lost the battle to the veteran "Rhinaun", and later "Scharnhorst" was sunk by almost the weakest battleship of the Second World War

The decision to build the battle cruiser "Scharnhorst" and its sister cruiser "Gneisenau" is the result of the refusal of the command of the Kriegsmarine to build the fourth and fifth ships of the "Deutschland" class (in German sources they appear as battleships "D" ("Ersatz Elzass") and "E" ("Ersatz Hessen") in favor of the ship of the improved design with a standard displacement of up to 26,000 tons and an additional third three-gun artillery turret of 280 mm. The cruiser "Scharnhorst" was laid down at the Navy shipyard in Wilhelmshaven on June 15, 1935 and was named in honor of the Prussian general during the Napoleonic Wars, whose name was Gerhard von Scharnhorst.

Scharnhorst in the spring of 1939. The ship is equipped with a design stem

Specifications

The design of the new cruiser was carried out in a short time, with the expectation of maximum use of the reserve left over from the unfinished construction of the battleships "D" and "E". As a result, the ship received a traditional flat-deck hull design with an external vertical armored belt that protected the citadel from the first bow to the stern turret of the main caliber, as well as a double bottom, 79% of the total length of the ship. The set of the body was carried out along a longitudinal scheme with the massive use of electric welding. The use of advanced technologies made it possible to launch the ship on October 3, 1936.


Scheme "Scharnhorst". Below is a view of the cruiser "Gneisenau", of the same type in the modernization project

Source: Sergei Patyanin “The Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich "

When designing the cruiser, the engineers abandoned a diesel power plant in favor of an experimental turbine plant consisting of three turbo-gear units and twelve steam boilers (total capacity - 160,000 hp), located in three boiler rooms and two engine rooms, located in a linear scheme and separated compartments-cofferdams. The power plant of the ship had low reliability and provided a cruising range below the design one (7100 and 8200 miles, respectively, at a speed of 19 knots).

The reservation of the cruiser "Scharnhorst" was quite comparable to the protection of the British battleships of the type "King George V" or the German type "Bismarck", which allowed German experts to classify the "Scharnhorst" as a battleship.

The design of artillery weapons was carried out in accordance with the classic scheme for battleships of the 30s, which provided for the presence of:

  1. Main caliber artillery (356–406 mm), designed to destroy enemy battleships;
  2. Medium caliber artillery (150–203 mm) designed to destroy enemy cruisers and destroyers;
  3. Universal artillery (88–127 mm) designed to engage both weakly armored surface targets and distant air targets;
  4. Anti-aircraft guns (20-40 mm) designed to destroy high-speed air targets in the immediate vicinity of the ship.

However, in accordance with the initial project, nine 283-mm C / 34 guns, which were a modernized version of the guns installed on the Deutschland-class ships, were supposed to be used as the main artillery for the Scharnhorst cruiser. The main caliber guns were placed in three three-gun turrets, similar in design to those installed on the Deutschland (two bow and one aft turrets - respectively, “Anton”, “Bruno” and “Caesar”). Such armament for a ship with a total displacement of 37,000 tons initially seemed inadequate and already in 1935 led to the development of a project that provided for the armament of the cruiser with three 380 mm two-gun turrets. To avoid a delay in the construction of the ship, the project was postponed (there is a seemingly unlikely version that the choice of main battery guns was due to political considerations), and in 1942 it was completely abandoned.


The main caliber towers "Anton" and "Bruno" of the cruiser "Scharnhorst". Water pouring into the nose is clearly visible. Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian campaign

When choosing medium-caliber guns, German designers were forced to take into account the existing stock of 150-mm turrets made for the fourth and fifth Deutschland-class ships. As a result, the Scharnhorst received medium-caliber artillery from twelve 150-mm C / 28 guns, eight of which were installed in two-gun turrets, and four more in single-gun turrets. The long-range anti-aircraft battery consisted of fourteen 105-mm universal guns of the C / 33 model, located in seven twin LC / 31 mounts.

Potential capabilities of the main and medium-caliber guns of the cruiser "Scharnhorst" to destroy surface and air targets

Purpose of tools

The defeat of surface targets

The defeat of surface targets

The defeat of surface and air targets

Number of guns

Caliber, mm

Barrel length in calibers

Firing range, m

Projectile weight, kg

Rate of fire, rounds per minute

Estimated number of shells for 10 minutes of firing

Estimated mass of a 10-minute salvo, tons

The cruiser's light anti-aircraft armament consisted of sixteen 37-mm C / 30 semi-automatic machines in eight twin stabilized LC / 30 mounts and eight C / 30 anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber, which provided the so-called "two-echelon" cover of the ship from air attack: the first echelon was longer-range installations of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, the second echelon - faster-firing 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. During combat service, the number of 20-mm assault rifles increased several times (in 1939, two assault rifles were installed, in mid-1941 - six quadruple and two single assault rifles, by mid-1943 the cruiser had three quadruple and ten single 20 mm assault rifles).

The main and medium-caliber artillery fire control system included three command and rangefinder points - in the conning tower (equipped with a 6-meter stereo range finder), on the bow superstructure and in the stern (equipped with 10.5-meter stereo range finders). Initially, each main battery turret was also equipped with a 10.5-meter rangefinder, but later the rangefinder from the forward bow turret was removed due to the constant flooding of water while moving. Fire control of 105-mm guns was carried out by four stabilized posts SL-6 "type 33", equipped with 4-meter rangefinders. In 1939, the ship was equipped with the FuMO-22 radar, and by 1943 - with the FuMB-1, FuMB-3, FuMB-4 and FuMB-7 electronic intelligence stations.

Aviation

In accordance with the fashion that existed in the 30s for the use of seaplanes to arm large surface ships (it was supposed to use aircraft for anti-submarine defense, reconnaissance and fire adjustment), the Scharnhorst cruiser received an air group of three seaplanes, which were launched with the help of two catapults located on the hangar and the aft tower of the main caliber. After completing the assignment, the seaplanes landed on the water and climbed aboard by crane. In 1940, the catapult from the artillery tower was dismantled.


Seaplane "Arado" Ar-196 aboard the "Scharnhorst". Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian campaign

Source: Walter Hubach "Capture of Denmark and Norway"

Mine torpedo armament

Initially, there was no mine-torpedo armament on the cruiser, which corresponded to the existing views on the nomenclature of battleships' weapons, but in 1941, for some unknown reason, two three-tube torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber were installed on the ship, removed from the light cruiser Nuremberg.

Combat service

The cruiser "Scharnhorst" was commissioned on January 7, 1939, but in the middle of the year the ship was modernized: a new mainmast was installed on it, located closer to the stern, and the straight stem was replaced with the so-called "Atlantic" to improve seaworthiness.

Taking into account the weakness of the cruiser's artillery armament, the Scharnhorst was used only in conjunction with the same type of cruiser Gneisenau for almost the entire period of its combat service. The ships' first combat operation was to patrol the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939, during which the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi was sunk.

Later, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took an active part in the Norwegian campaign. Already the first battle of two German ships with a single outdated (entered service in 1918) British cruiser Rhinaun, which took place on April 9, 1940, confirmed the erroneousness of the choice of main battery guns and the unfortunate location of the front bow towers of the main battery. The main battery towers "Anton" on the cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were flooded with water, which led to a short circuit in the electric drive circuits for supplying ammunition and forced German ships to fight astern to the enemy for a significant part of the time in order to avoid further water entering the towers. When trying to break away from the British cruiser on the Scharnhorst, there were problems with the power plant, because of which it could not reach a speed of more than 25 knots. Ammunition consumption was: 54 283 mm rounds and 10 150 mm rounds at the Gneisenau, and 195 283 mm rounds and 91 150 mm rounds at the Scharnhorst. Despite the significant consumption of ammunition, there is no evidence of damage from German shells hitting the Rhinaun (according to some reports, there were hits, but the shells could not penetrate the armor). In turn, the cruiser Rhinaun managed to hit the Gneisenau with a 381 mm shell (the artillery command post was disabled) and two 114 mm shells (one shell destroyed the rangefinder of the front bow tower of the main caliber, another hit the superstructure deck on the left board next to the stern 105-mm anti-aircraft gun). The Scharnhorst, which had been trailing in the wake for a long time, received a hole in the stern during the pursuit (presumably from a 381 mm projectile).

The battle on June 8, 1940, despite the victory won by the Germans (the British aircraft carrier Glories and the accompanying destroyers Ardent and Akasta were sunk), only confirmed the correctness of the opinion about the design flaws of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. During the battle on the Scharnhorst, the boiler tube ruptured, causing the speed to drop to 28.5 knots. At 18:38, the Scharnhorst was torpedoed by the destroyer Akasta and got a hole in the starboard side near the aft tower of the main caliber (the length of the hole was 12 meters, the height was 4 meters). As a result of the torpedo hit, the stern turret of the main caliber, IV turret of the middle artillery on the starboard side, the ship took 2500 tons of water and received an increasing list to the starboard side. Nevertheless, the Scharnhorst managed to arrive under its own power at the Norwegian port of Trondheim (June 9 at 16:00). In the course of the battle, which ended with the sinking of the aircraft carrier and two destroyers, the Gneisenau used 175 and the Scharnhorst 212 283 mm rounds; in total, both ships fired 1448 rounds of 150 mm ammunition. Due to the damage received on June 8, the Scharnhorst was sent to drydock in Kiel, where he stayed until the end of 1940. In December 1940-March 1941, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau undertook two raids into the Atlantic. The raid in December 1940 was interrupted due to malfunctions in the Gneisenau power plant. During a raid across the Atlantic from January 22 to March 22, 1941, the Scharnhorst destroyed 8 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 48,886 grt (Gneisenau - 14 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 66,449 grt). During the raid, German cruisers avoided contact with large British ships. Thus, the attack of the convoy HX-106 was stopped after the appearance of the British battleship Ramilles, and the convoy SL-67 - when the battleship Malaya appeared.


Scharnhorst in the Atlantic. Photo taken in early 1941

Source: Sergei Patyanin “The Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich "

On July 24, 1941, the Scharnhorst was damaged during a British air raid in La Pallis, and on February 11-13, 1942, together with the Gneisenau, she made a breakthrough from French Brest to Norway, while on February 12 the cruiser was twice blown up by mines. The transfer of cruisers to Norway indicated that the command of the Kriegsmarine ceased to regard the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a real threat to convoys in the Atlantic, but expected to use them together with the battleship Tirpitz and the cruiser Admiral Scheer as a potential threat to Arctic convoys. in order to divert large surface ships of the allies to this theater of operations.

The presence of large German warships in Norwegian ports objectively posed a rather strong threat to the security of convoys and served as one of the official reasons put forward by the Allies as an excuse for stopping the dispatch of convoys to the USSR (in Soviet historiography, the refusal to send convoys was usually explained by the intrigues of capitalist governments). The situation on the Soviet-German front and the low capacity of the routes for transporting military cargo to the USSR through Iran and the Far East forced the Allies on November 1, 1943, to resume sending Arctic convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. For their protection, an original scheme was used, taking into account the geographical features of the theater of military operations, as well as the possibilities of the combat use of the surface and submarine forces of the Kriegsmarine. Allied convoys en route from the USSR (RA code) and to the USSR (JW code) consisted of 10–20 merchant ships, which were guarded at the initial stages of the journey by destroyers, frigates and corvettes, which provided reliable anti-submarine defense. The convoys, moving towards each other, simultaneously entered the most dangerous area south of Bear Island, where formations of large surface ships of short and long range cover began to guard them. The close cover, consisting of cruisers, escorted the convoys, and the long-range cover, which included a ship of the line, patrolled an area from 10 miles east to 200 miles northwest of the convoy route. Such a cover scheme made it possible, attracting very limited funds, to create an echeloned defense. During the period from November 1 to mid-December 1943, the Allies managed to conduct three convoys in the USSR (JW-54A, JW-54B, JW-55A) and two from the USSR (RA-54A and RA-54B) without losses. Such an activity of cargo turnover between the ports of Great Britain and the USSR made the presence of German battleships and cruisers in Norwegian ports meaningless. It seemed rational to conduct at least one successful attack on a convoy by a large surface ship, which at least would have forced the enemy for some time (until the analysis of the events that occurred) to stop transportation, and as a maximum, it could have caused the rejection of the idea of \u200b\u200bArctic convoys. In order to organize the raid, the Germans traced, without taking active hostilities, the entire route of the convoy JW-55A, which made it possible to open the convoy security system.

The target for the raid was convoy JW-55B (nineteen transports and tankers), which left the British Loch Yu on 20 December under the protection of ten destroyers, four corvettes and three minesweepers, and was spotted on 22 December by a German reconnaissance aircraft 400 miles to west of the Norwegian port of Tromso. In accordance with the adopted security scheme, the RA-55A convoy was moving towards the JW-55B convoy, accompanied by ten destroyers, three corvettes and one minesweeper. The close protection of the convoys in the threatened zone was carried out by the British heavy cruiser Norfolk and the light cruisers Sheffield and Belfast. Long-range protection was carried out by the formation of the battleship Duke of York (belonged to the Prince of Wales class, sometimes referred to in Russian literature as the Duke of York), the cruiser Jamaica and four destroyers. According to the German plan, the formation of the battle cruiser Scharnhorst and five destroyers should have avoided meeting with long-range guards (literally, the order to conduct the operation sounded like this: In principle, you must interrupt the battle in case of the appearance of superior enemy forces "), intercept the convoy and, inflicting maximum damage on it (« The fight must not end in stalemate. Every opportunity to attack should be used» ) , and also re-evading a meeting with a long-range guard, return to the port. It is not entirely clear why the Scharnhorst was chosen for the operation, which required lengthy high-speed transitions, which did not have an advantage in speed over escort ships and repeatedly demonstrated the unreliable operation of the power plant.

Justification from the order (" The Scharnhorst's superiority in gun power gives the best chance of success, and it should be used”) Also does not explain the decision of the German command - it is not clear what kind of advantage in gun power is in question. The Scharnhorst had nine 283 mm guns with a firing range of 40 km and twelve 150 mm guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, of which 9 and 6 guns, respectively, could be used in a linear battle. In turn, the British had ten 356 mm guns with a firing range of 35 km on the Duke of York battleship, eight 203 mm guns with a firing range of 24 km on the Norfolk and thirty-six 152 mm guns with a firing range 20 km (twelve guns on Belfast, Sheffield and Jamaica), and all of them could be used simultaneously. In addition, the British could use eight 133-mm guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, mounted on the battleship "Duke of York" (in total, the battleship had sixteen 133-mm guns, eight on board).

Kriegsmarine

Construction started June 15, 1935 Launched October 3, 1936 Commissioned January 7, 1939 Withdrawn from the fleet December 26, 1943 Modern status Sunk in Battle of North Cape Options Tonnage 31,552 tons standard;
38,900 tons full Length 235.4 m total;
229.8 m waterline Width 30.0 m Draft 9.91 m - full Reservation main belt - 350 mm;
deck - 95 mm Technical details Power point 3 turbines from ABB; Screws 3 three-bladed propellers, 4.8 m in diameter Power 161 164 HP Speed 31 knots Swimming autonomy 10,100 nautical miles at 19 knots Crew 1,968 people (60 officers, 1909 sailors) Armament Artillery 3 × 3 283 mm;
4 × 2 + 4 × 1 150mm Torpedo-mine armament 2 × 3 533 mm torpedo tubes Anti-aircraft armament 14 × 105 mm;
16 × 37 mm;
10 × 20 mm Aviation 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult

Very few sailors volunteered to serve on the Scharnhorst. Most of the crew were transferred from other ships. This was a necessary measure, since the sailors thought that the ship was cursed even during construction. When its hull was being assembled in dry dock, the Scharnhorst collapsed on its side, killing 60 to 70 workers. After that, the mother of one of the killed workers cursed the ship. Subsequent incidents only reinforced this rumor. On the day of launching, the ship broke off the moorings and slipped into the water, where it rammed a cruiser, which was out of action for several months. The incident was never fully investigated. Just a few months before his death, while sailing in one of the Norwegian fjords, the ship's radar could not cope with the thick fog and Scharnhorst rammed a German liner used to transport soldiers. Although myself Scharnhorst almost not suffered, the liner was out of order for several months.

The beginning of the war

Cruiser in 1939

The first combat operation Scharnhorst was patrolling the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939, together with Gneisenau where they sank an English armed transport. Spring 1940 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau supported the invasion of Norway (Operation Weserübung). On April 9, 1940, near Norway, they met in battle with an English battle cruiser Renown , British and Gneisenau inflicted minor damage to each other, Scharnhorst also suffered from the elements. In the flooded tower "Anton" (1st main caliber), a short circuit occurred in the circuits of the electric drives for supplying ammunition, the tower was out of order. In addition, due to the need to keep full speed, the right car was damaged Scharnhorst, but the Germans still managed to break away from the outdated British cruiser. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sunk a British aircraft carrier Glorious and his escort: destroyers and, on 8 June 1940, about 64 degrees north of Norway. During the fight Scharnhorst was damaged by a torpedo with Acasta, 50 sailors were killed and the left propeller shaft was damaged. Soon, due to flooding, the middle car had to be turned off. The cellars of the Caesar tower (3rd main caliber) were flooded. June 13 at the harbor Scharnhorst carried out a raid by Blackburn Skua dive bombers from an aircraft carrier Ark Royal ... The raid was ineffective: out of 15 aircraft, 8 were shot down, only one bomb hit the target and even it did not explode.

Due to damage received on June 8 Scharnhorst was sent to dry dock in Kiel, where he stayed until the end of 1940.

Late December 1940 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau tried to break through the British blockade and enter the North Atlantic trade routes, but were forced to turn back due to a breakdown Gneisenau.

A page from a US Navy booklet for sailors during World War II describing the cruiser.

Raid to the Atlantic

Main article: Operation Berlin

Breakthrough across the English Channel

While in Brest, German ships became targets of constant air raids. In July 1941 the Scharnhorst moved to the port of La Rochelle, south of Brest. Warned of the Scharnhorst's exit from the port by aerial reconnaissance and Resistance agents, the Allies were confident that this was another raid. To prevent a raid, they flew 15 heavy bombers. Halifax British Air Force. The damage caused by the bombing was severe enough to force the Scharnhorst to return to the port of Brest for repairs. Damage from the bombardment, together with those received during the raids, as well as problems with the cooling of the boilers, held the Scharnhorst in port until the end of 1941, when it was decided to send the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as well as the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen back to Germany ... Since it was very risky to try to break through the North Atlantic, on February 11-13, three large ships, accompanied by dozens of minesweepers and other auxiliary vessels, made a breakthrough across the English Channel, called Operation Cerberus. The British were not ready for such a decisive and unexpected breakthrough, their coast guard was not ready to stop the breakthrough, and the jamming of British radars by the Germans did not allow an air attack. However, and Scharnhorstand Gneisenau were damaged by mines Scharnhorst two, and Gneisenau one. The fix delayed Scharnhorst at the docks until March, after which he sailed to Norway to meet with the battleship Tirpitz and other German ships to attack Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. The next few months were devoted to training and acclimatization, ending with the bombing of Spitsbergen in conjunction with Tirpitz.

The end of the Scharnhorst

  • KzS Fritz Hintze - October 13 - December 26 (deceased)

Notes

Links

  • Historic Center, US Navy Department of Official Publications (en).
  • History of the battleship Scharnhorst: professionalism versus heroism.
  • Royal Navy: World War II 1939-1945 (eng.)

Literature

  • Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970... (Doubleday and Company; Garden City, New York, 1973) (originally published in Germany under the title Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905-1970, J.F. Lehmanns, Verlag, Munchen, 1970). Contains various diagrams and drawings of the ship, how it was planned and how it was built.
  • Busch, Fritz-Otto, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. (Robert Hale, London, 1956) ISBN 0-86007-130-8. The story of the Battle of North Cape as told by a survivor with Scharnhorst
  • Claasen, A. R. A., Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945... Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. pp. 228-234. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
  • Garzke, Willliam H., Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II... (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1985). Includes stories about the creation of the ship and its combat operations, information about weapons and other statistical information about Scharnhorst
  • Alf Jacobsen Battleship "Scharnhorst" \u003d Alf R. Jacobsen "SHARNHORST". - M .: Eksmo, 2005 .-- 304 p. - ISBN 5-699-14578-8

 

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