Submarine Decembrist d 1. Submarines of the "Decembrist" type. Deceased or disappeared
The first-borns of Soviet submarine shipbuilding were created with double-hull riveted construction. For hull work, high-quality steel was allocated from pre-revolutionary reserves, intended for the construction of battle cruisers of the Izmail type and light cruisers of the Svetlana type. For the first time in domestic shipbuilding, the hull of a submarine was divided by bulkheads into watertight compartments. The main ballast was housed in six side and two end tanks. In addition, there were deck tanks for navigation in positional position. The solid wheelhouse had the shape of a cylinder (diameter 1.7 meters) with a spherical roof and was first attached to a solid body on the flange and sides, which were later replaced with rivets. The main ballast tanks had hand-operated kingstones. Also, for the first time, the Central City Hospital was filled with water by plane through scuppers, and not with the help of pumps, which made it possible to reduce the time of urgent immersion from 3 minutes in pre-revolutionary Bars-class submarines to 40 seconds. The ventilation valves are controlled pneumatically, but there were local manual drives. Inside the robust hull, there were equalizing and rapid immersion tanks designed for a pressure of 9 kg / cm 2. Some ballast tanks could be used as fuel tanks.
Diesel engines of the German company "MAN", allegedly purchased for the first Soviet diesel locomotives, were installed on the first two submarines as the main engines for the surface course, on the subsequent hulls were four-stroke six-cylinder compressor irreversible 42-B-6 Russian-made diesel engines of the same power.
A friction conical clutch "Bamag" was installed between the diesel engine and the propeller motor, and a cam clutch was installed between the propeller motor and the propeller shaft. To achieve the maximum possible underwater travel range, a double-armature electric motor was created: one anchor, 500 hp, provided full speed, the other, 25 hp, was used for economic travel. The battery was located in sealed pits.
The bow rudders were folding, all rudders had both electric and manual control. The vertical rudder was driven by the Ward-Leonard electrical circuit, and the horizontal rudders were controlled by a controller. The vertical rudder had a peculiarity: the axis of its stock was tilted to the bow by 7 degrees. It was assumed that when transferred to the board, it would simultaneously act as a horizontal, shifted to submersion, due to which it is possible to keep the submarine from surfacing underwater during circulation. However, in practice, this assumption did not come true, and such rudders were no longer used on domestic submarines.
To ascend from a positional position to a cruising position, low-pressure blowers of the "Brown-Bover" company of the V4-03 type, with a capacity of 45 cubic meters per minute, were used. The main water ballast, in addition to blowing air with low pressure (normal ascent) and high pressure (emergency ascent), could also be pumped overboard by the main bilge pumps.
Submarines were armed with 533-mm torpedo tubes that shoot with compressed air, but torpedoes of this caliber did not exist at the moment, so 450-mm torpedoes were used. Shooting was carried out through special grilles inserted into the devices.
Artillery armament was originally supposed to consist of two 102-mm guns, located behind special fairing shields on the upper deck in front of and behind the wheelhouse fence. However, during the discussion of the project, concerns were expressed about a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the boat due to the flooding of the guns with a wave. After that, it was decided to raise the bow gun to the level of the navigating bridge, covering it with a bulwark, and the stern gun - a 45-mm semiautomatic device - also to be installed in the wheelhouse fence. Subsequently, it turned out that such a placement of the bow gun was unsuccessful, since it significantly constrained the navigation bridge itself and greatly interfered with the navigational watch, especially when mooring.
Therefore, during a major overhaul with modernization in 1939-1942, the bow gun was returned to the upper deck, while improving the layout and configuration of the navigating bridge. All this, along with the convenience of keeping an upper watch, improved the stability of the submarine and somewhat reduced the swing of the roll.
Surface unsinkability was ensured when sailing without fuel in ballast tanks, when one compartment of a strong hull was flooded and one main ballast tank adjacent to it. The spherical bulkheads of the central post and end compartments (shelter compartments) were designed for a pressure of 9 kg / cm 2. The centrifugal pump R-130 with a capacity of 250 t / h at a depth of 9 meters and at a depth of 85 meters - 25 t / h was used as a drainage agent. In addition, there were two Borets bilge pumps with a capacity of 15 t / h at a pressure of 9 kg / cm 2.
For the first time on domestic submarines, a whole range of technical solutions was implemented that allowed the crew to leave the damaged submarine underwater. All personnel were provided with individual rescue apparatus and suits. The crew could leave the boat lying at the bottom through torpedo tubes, and also use the airlock in the conning tower. In addition, the bow and stern exit hatches were equipped with lowering tubes. This made it possible to create an air cushion under the ceiling of the compartment and open the hatch to leave it. For communication with the emergency boat, there were two rescue buoys, given from the inside of the hull. It was envisaged to blow the main ballast by divers, as well as to supply air to the compartments. The boat had lifting eyes and scuppers for attaching pontoons.
March 5, 1927 - the laying of the first Soviet-built ship took place - a series I submarine of the Dekabrist type. Five more boats of this series were laid soon. This event marked the revival of the national school of submarine shipbuilding. Six new submarines played important role in the training of submariners, and also contributed to the achievement of victory in the Great Patriotic War. The fate of these ships was different. The lead boat of the Decembrist series was lost in 1940 on a quiet sunny day at a training ground in the Motovsky Bay (Barents Sea). About the combat path of this ship and the circumstances of its deathThe year 1927 marked an important transitional stage in the history of our country and its fleet. In conditions of the most severe devastation after the First World War and the Civil War, the revival of the ships of the tsarist fleet was successfully completed, which was expedient, economically profitable and practically possible to put into operation. The country's development interests required the creation of a strong navy, and hence the construction of new modern ships of various classes. For a variety of political, economic and technical reasons, it was decided to start with submarines. In the first six-year military shipbuilding program for 1926 / 1927-1931 / 1932, the construction of 12 submarines was placed in the first position, since it was believed that in the near future the submarine fleet would become the main striking force of the Navy.
There were proposals to buy one ship from Western countries and, taking it as a sample, improve the design, and then start mass production. The chief of the naval forces of the Red Army R.A.Muklevich strongly opposed this. "They will sell us a boat of yesterday," he argued, "and most importantly, our designers have already achieved significant success in developing a double-hull boat, divided into seven compartments, with a long cruising range, and powerful torpedo armament."
However, Soviet shipbuilding was just beginning to revive after a long period of war and devastation. There was an acute shortage of specialists of all profiles, especially design engineers. In 1919, the founder of the Russian school of submarine shipbuilding, Professor I. G. Bubnov, died of typhus. Some of his associates (M. N. Beklemishev, N. N. Kuteinikov, M. P. Naletov, etc.) for various reasons retired from underwater affairs. Others, such as S. K. Dzhevetsky, lived abroad and practically lost contact with Russia.
In November 1926, a special design bureau for the design of submarines (Technical Bureau No. 4) was created, headed by the talented engineer BM Malinin. Later he wrote in his autobiography: “We had to simultaneously solve three problems, closely related to each other: to develop and build boats, the type of which we had until that time was unknown; to create and immediately practically use the theory of submarines, which we have in the Union there was also no; to educate in the design process cadres of submariners. " It is curious that BM Malinin had only ... 6 people under his command. 
Realistically assessing their capabilities, Soviet specialists came to the conclusion that, relying only on their own knowledge and experience, it would be extremely difficult to quickly overcome technical difficulties, as well as eliminate the lag in the field of submarine shipbuilding. Therefore, in parallel with the creation of the Soviet school, the most serious attention was paid to careful study and implementation foreign experience design and construction of submarines.
A tactical task for a D-type torpedo submarine was developed back in 1923. Guided by them, the team of the Technical Bureau created a project of a submarine with a displacement of 930/1278 tons. Its armament consisted of 8 torpedo tubes and 14 torpedoes of 533 mm caliber, one 102-mm gun and one 45-mm semi-automatic anti-aircraft gun. Two-shaft power plant with a total capacity of 2200/1050 liters. from. provided a speed of 15.3 / 8.7 knots. The cruising range at an economic speed of the course was 8950/150 miles. For the first time in the world, series I boats were equipped with a complex of rescue equipment. This project on September 19, 1926 was approved by the head of the USSR Naval Forces R.A.Muklevich, and on February 17, 1927, it was approved by the USSR Revolutionary Military Council. 
On a sunny morning on March 5, 1927, SM Kirov and RA Muklevich arrived at the shipyard No. 189 in Leningrad. Today is the birthday of our submarine forces, Namorsi said at the rally. Thanks to the successes of our industry, we lay down the first three Soviet submarines. He affixed a silver plate engraved with the ship's name to the roof of the Rapid Dive Tank, the Decembrist. On the other two discs were inscribed the names "Narodovolets" and "Krasnogvardeets". Three more boats of the same series "Revolutionary", "Spartakovets" and "Jacobinets" were laid down on April 14, 1927 at the Nikolaev State Plant No. 198.
During the construction of these submarines, seemingly insurmountable obstacles associated with the lack of the necessary experience more than once arose. Design errors, a number of objective and subjective reasons led to the need to make changes to the project, to alter the already assembled units, which increased the time for testing and fine-tuning the ships. As a result, the submarines of the "Decembrist" type were built and put into operation for 3-4 years. Unfortunately, this did not save the ships from a number of significant disadvantages. The most dangerous of them was the too fast filling of the main ballast tanks, as a result of which there was a constant threat of "sinking" below the permissible depth.
In October 1930, in the Gulf of Finland, a test immersion of a submarine was carried out in order to check the strength and density (waterproofness) of the hull, as well as the operation of mechanisms and devices at the maximum immersion depth (90 meters). When the submarine approached a predetermined depth, a strong blow was suddenly heard in the lower part of the hull, after which the submarine lost its buoyancy and lay down on the ground at a depth of 103 meters. It turned out that the fast dive tank spontaneously filled. Upon examination in the dock, it turned out that the outboard pressure squeezed the kingston pulp plate off the saddle, and the outboard water poured into the tank under high pressure, which was accompanied by a strong hydraulic shock. It became clear that this design is unsuitable for a submarine with a large immersion depth. As a result, it was necessary to create a new type of SC, the plates of which opened outward and in the closed position and pressed against the coaming by the pressure of the seawater. On November 12, 1930, the D-1 finished testing.
On November 8, 1930, she became a member of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces and was enlisted in the 3rd submarine division of the MSBM. On December 16, 1930, it entered service by order of the RVS. In the fall of 1932, it underwent special research tests to accurately identify its tactical and technical elements. On December 28, 1932, the submarine was transferred to the 2nd battalion of the BRPL MSBM, assigned No.-21. In April 1933, an order was issued to transfer a detachment of surface ships and three submarines of the Decembrist class from Kronstadt to Murmansk to strengthen the naval forces of the Soviet Arctic. From May 18 to August 5, 1933, she made the transition from Leningrad to Murmansk along the Belomoro - Baltic Canal as part of EON-1 (together with the submarine D-2 and other surface ships). In the North, from these boats, a separate division was formed, which laid the foundation for the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet. On August 5, 1933, the boat became part of the ODNPL of the Northern Military Flotilla. On August 21, 1934, it received the letter-digital designation D-1.
Soviet submarine shipbuilding gained experience and gained momentum. In mid-November 1930, the submarine Dekabrist became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces, and by 1932 the Navy had 6 such ships. For 13 years from 1928 to June 22, 1941, the number of boats in service increased 14 times, and amounted to 212 units.
In 1934, together with D-2, they made the first voyage to Novaya Zemlya, but in the Barents Sea, the submarines overtook a storm and they were forced to return to the Kola Bay. In 1935, in severe meteorological conditions, she made the transition to Novaya Zemlya and visited the Belushya Bay, returning from the campaign she participated in tactical exercises. She had 86 running days during the year. August 14 - September 2, 1936 made an Arctic campaign together with D-2 along the route: Arkhangelsk - Matochkin Shar - Kara Sea - Russian Gavan - Polyarnoye. On August 18, both submarines reached the Kara Sea, but, having encountered ice fields, were forced to return. Returning to the Barents Sea, following the western shores of Novaya Zemlya, on August 21 they entered the Russian harbor. They had to leave the harbor, overcoming the Arctic ice. Having passed 3,094 miles for the trip, the submarines returned to the Polyarny naval base. From September 23, 1936 to November 8, 1937, underwent a major overhaul at the Baltic Shipyard No.-189 in Leningrad.
On May 11, 1937, the D-1 became part of the Northern Fleet, on February 4, 1938, it was enlisted in the 1st division of the Northern Fleet of the Northern Fleet. From September 21 to November 5, 1938, she made a 44-day hike along the route: Cape Tsyp - Navolok - Varde Island - Cape North Cape - Bear Island - Hope Island - Mezhdusharsky Island - Kolguyev Island - Cape Kanin Nose Cape Holy Nose - Kildin Island - Kola Bay. D-1 covered 4841 miles on the surface, 1 001 miles submerged. In total, the submarine was under water for 11 days. On October 31, she made a 24 - hour submerged transition without air regeneration. In 1938, D-1 spent 120 days at sea, having covered more than 10,000 miles, of which 1200 were under water, which was a record achievement for that time. 
From April 15 to September 5, 1939, it underwent maintenance. November 30 - December 10, 1939 with the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war for 11 days was continuously on hourly readiness, which was later replaced by a four-hour readiness, and from February 10 - by an hour one. From 17 to 29 February 1940, she made the second military campaign to the Vardo region. Arriving at the position on February 18, D-1 was there until February 27 inclusive. During this time, the weather conditions at the position were very harsh: the wind - north - west with a force of 6 points, at times up to 10-11 points, a wave - 7-8 points. From a 10-meter depth, as the commander noted, the submarine was simply thrown to the surface. Surfacing on February 20, Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev found a transport in Norwegian territorial waters two miles offshore, heading 300 degrees. It was not possible to determine his nationality. On February 23 and 26, a small breakdown occurred: the Fedoritsky coupling failed - the crosspiece broke. The muff was repaired by personnel. The submarine left the position on February 28, heading to base. According to the submarine commander, the task (reconnaissance of the coast of Norway) was only partially completed, since due to a strong storm the submarine was forced to stay 10-15 miles from the coast. During combat service, the submarine covered 1,339 miles on the surface and 37 miles in the submerged position.
From March 3 to March 13, 1940, the D-1 changed its battery. From March 27 to April 7, 1940, the submarine again carried out patrol service in the North Cape - Vardo area. On June 12, 1940, while at sea, an unauthorized filling of the fast diving tank took place, the accident was prevented by the timely blowing of the tank from the VVD system. In early August 1940, she launched a test torpedo attack on task No. 13 (an attack on a ship moving in variable courses). This task is performed only by boats of the first line, therefore Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev was completely unprepared for its implementation. The release of torpedoes was delayed, the submarine was forced to return to base.
From August 22 to October 10, 1940, D-1 was undergoing current repairs at the Krasny Gorn floating base. On October 22, 1940, she tested mechanisms, a test dive and a signboard. On October 25, 1940, by order of the Commander of the Northern Fleet Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko No.-0432 of October 25, D-1 was declared to have entered the campaign. On November 6, 1940, she moved to the Murmansk raid to participate in the celebration of the next anniversary of the October Revolution.
Yeltischev Fedor Maksimovich(April 21, 1912 - November 13, 1940) Lieutenant Commander. Education: Naval School named after Frunze (1934), Courses for the command personnel of the Diving Training Squad named after I. Kirov (1938). Career: navigator of submarine "Dekabrist" (1935 - 1936), navigator of submarine "Narodovolets" (1936), assistant commander of submarine "Shch-402" (1938), commander of "Shch-403" (1938 - October 29, 1939), commander of submarine "D-1" (October 29, 1939 - November 13, 1940). Member of the Soviet-Finnish war. Killed in the D-1 crash. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (1940).
On November 13, 1940 at 08.58, the submarine D-1 under the command of Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev left the main base and headed for Motovsky Bay to training ground No. 6. According to the order of the commander of the Submarine Brigade, the D-1 commander from 13.00 to 15.00 had to check and work out the diving tables at the training ground. The entire transition from Polar to the test site was observed by SNiS posts. At 13:17, checkpoint No. 113 (at Cape Vyev - Navolok) reported that D-1 plunged along the fencing of the wheelhouse along a bearing of 330 degrees at a distance of 60 cables. At 13.30, the same post observed that D-1 plunged under the periscope at 335 degrees at a distance of 70 cables in the same course. At 13.45, post No. 111 (on Cape Sharapova) saw D-1 under a periscope with a bearing of 160 degrees at a distance of 17 cables. From that moment on, the submarine was no longer observed by posts. The signal to dive from the submarine was received at 13.30. At 14.00 the brigade commander on the "Umba" left Polyarny and at 19.00 arrived in Eina-Guba, where D-1 was not found. The brigade commander asked his chief of staff in Polyarny about the location of D-1, having received the answer that there was no information from D-1 from 13.30, that is, after the submersion signal was given. Not having reports until 18.00, the chief of staff on the radio asked D-1 to show his place. At the same time, the operational duty officer of the SF headquarters requested all SNiS posts regarding the D-1. But, the submarine did not answer any requests. After D-1 did not answer the call of the RTS in Polyarny at 18.40, the radio message for her was repeated several times until 22.22. At 23.15 the chief of staff of the fleet urgently ordered D-1 to show its place by radio and gave instructions to all ships at sea (K-1, K-2 and M-171 were located there) and SNiS posts to constantly call the submarine. The fleet commander sent K-2 to the test site for listening. At 23.40 "Umba" with the brigade commander on board left Eina-Guba and headed to training ground No. 6. EPRON fleet facilities were brought to immediate readiness. At 01.20 on November 14, two boats of the MO-4 type were sent to survey the landfill and the coast of Motovsky Bay. At 01.44, the TFR "Tuman" was sent there with rescue equipment. At 02.22 a.m. "Stretichny" EM with the Commander of the Northern Fleet on board left for Motovsky Bay to clarify the situation. Two hours later, Sch-402 set off in search of D-1, and three hours later - D-3. Throughout the night from November 13 to November 14, an intensive search was conducted in Motovsky Bay, in which the "Rapid", "Tuman", "Umba", boats - hunters and K-1 participated. In the course of the search activities, the sea was listened to with a sound direction finder from K-1 and the water surface was illuminated with searchlights. At 10.30, two MBR-2 aircraft took off in order to survey the Motovsky Bay and its coast. At dawn, the survey of the bay by surface ships continued. At about 10.00 in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Sharapov, the ships discovered four oil spots and various debris, which were later identified as belonging to D-1. Within the limits of the landfill, 18 material evidence was collected, from a solarium to wooden parts, which, according to the unanimous opinion of experts, were the wedges of the crate of the 4th group of batteries, a lifebuoy, small wooden debris and an insulating plug. But the biggest surprise was the find in the southern part of the bay (one and a half miles from Bolshoi Arsky Island) - on the night of November 18, one of the minesweepers first cut off its bottom cable (used in the search), and then the ship's metal detector showed the presence of a large metal object on the ground ... The depth in this place was 190-216 meters.
A commission headed by the Second Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy (for shipbuilding), Admiral L. Haller, came to the Northern Fleet. Based on the results of her work, the conclusion was drawn: "Decembrist" died due to the destruction of a solid hull after diving below the maximum depth. This could have happened either due to a jam in the boat's horizontal rudders, or due to a crew error. But the real cause of the catastrophe could only be established when the submarine was lifted or externally examined. Moreover, the commission recognized the level of combat readiness of the Northern Fleet forces as low. All the North Sea ships were put on hold, and they started combat training from scratch, that is, while at anchor and at mooring lines. However, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral A. Golovko, did not agree with the accusations against the D-1 crew. Already in April 1941, after the end of the winter storms, preparatory work began in the Northern Fleet for the recovery of the sunken submarine. And the first here was to be an exercise for the emergency rescue team of the Northern Fleet. Most likely, the preparations were made for the rise of the Decembrist.
The very fact of preparing a training exercise for the North Sea rescuers suggests that Rear Admiral Golovko knew the depths in the area where the submarine was killed and their availability for long-term work by divers in the icy April water of the Barents Sea. In those years, this meant that the depth at the site of the disaster did not exceed one hundred meters. That is, the Commander of the Northern Fleet believed that the emergency occurred either near the island of Bolshoy Arsky, or at Cape Vyev-Navolok, but not at great depths in the northern part of Motovsky Bay.
Unfortunately, the rescue operation ended unsuccessfully. One of the lift pontoons tore the sheath and jumped to the surface. The submarine Shch-404, which played the role of a "sunken submarine", after an instant fall to the ground of the Kola Bay also quickly "flew" to the surface.
Three possible versions of the death of the submarine were put forward: a collision, a mine explosion and a failure to an incredible depth due to personnel errors. The version of the death from torpedoing by a German submarine from one of the bases of Zapadnaya Litsa and the detonation of a German minefield were not considered. The first two disappeared in the course of the investigation, since they were not supported by facts. The People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov in his report to the Government indicated that the most probable cause of the death of the D-1 could be a sudden loss of buoyancy, which occurred as a result of a breach of the tightness of the fast diving tank. The belated adoption of measures to keep the submarine from falling, which the People's Commissar explained by the confusion of the personnel and the absence of the BCh-5 commander, could well have led to the fact that “the submarine, having passed the maximum depth of the hull strength, lost its tightness and hit the ground with great force, which was followed by a large internal explosion. " The command of the Navy was to a certain extent inclined towards one version - the failure of the submarine to a depth exceeding the limit, because of which the submarine was simply crushed by water pressure. Other reasons were also expressed, but they were all rejected as insufficiently convincing.
Submarine D-1 died under unclear circumstances at a depth of more than 200 meters. The entire crew (55 people) was killed. On December 31, 1940, D-1 was expelled from the Northern Fleet.
The question of the catastrophe is still open; it can only be clarified by an underwater study of the D-1 wreckage. In 1990, the Commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, Admiral F. Gromov, decided to carry out search work in the area where the D-1 was destroyed. The search and rescue vessel of the Northern Fleet - "Georgy Titov", which returned after a deep-sea survey of the area of \u200b\u200bthe sinking of the nuclear submarine K-278, was specially allocated to carry out the work. By April 1, 1990, the forces and means that should participate in the operation were planned, the order of their actions and the use of special technical means, time calculations were made for each stage of work, a system for organizing communications and security measures during work was developed. The start of work was tentatively scheduled for June 1990. But all the deadlines passed, and unexpectedly followed by links from the official representatives of the search and rescue service of the Northern Fleet to the fact that "... naval specialists have never searched for and examined submarines that were lost in the 30-40s", as well as to " ... difficult bottom relief, faults, underwater rocks. Hydroacoustics can be ineffective. ”Information about the search work has disappeared from the pages of the Soviet press.
In July 2000, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral V. Popov, began preparatory work to inspect the alleged area of \u200b\u200bdestruction of the Decembrist. The search operation was scheduled for September 2000. But the disaster of the nuclear submarine K-141 canceled all plans and stopped the search.
In January 2003, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral G. Suchkov, coordinating his actions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, conducted a preliminary survey of the alleged disappearance area of \u200b\u200bthe D-1 in Motovsky Bay. However, a survey of the area using only shipborne hydroacoustics did not give positive results. On October 1, 1996, during a special exercise of the duty forces of the search and rescue detachment of the Northern Fleet, an underwater object over 70 meters long was discovered 200 meters from the alleged point of death of the D-1. The object was discovered by the mine detection station of the minesweeper BT-226, but since at that time there was no television equipment in the fleet, the object was not finally classified. 
Materials used:
Dodonov V. A. Submarine "Decembrist"
Boyko V.N. Forgotten Navy submarines
Kovalev S.A. Forgotten "Decembrist". Independent Military Review No. 19 2006
"Decembrist" (the letter-digital designation D-1 the ship received in September 1934) was accepted into the MSBM on November 18, 1930, and on August 5, 1933 - into the Northern Military Flotilla (after the transition of three boats of the same type - D- 1, D-2 and D-3 - to the North along the White Sea-Baltic Canal, held in June-July of the same year). In the North, from these three boats, a separate division was formed (K.N. Griboyedov was appointed commander), which laid the foundation for the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet.
In 1935, D-1, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank V.P. Karpunin, visited Belushya Guba on Novaya Zemlya, and the next year, for the first time in the history of diving, together with D-2, passed through the Matochkin Shar Strait. On August 18, both boats reached the Kara Sea, but, having encountered ice fields, were forced to return. Returning to the Barents Sea, D-1 and D-2, following the western shores of Novaya Zemlya, entered the Russian harbor on August 21. They had to leave the harbor, overcoming the Arctic ice. Having traveled 3094 miles for the trip, on September 2, D-1 returned to the Polyarny naval base.
From September 23, 1936 to November 8, 1937, the boat underwent major repairs and modernization.
When on February 4, 1938, a submarine brigade of two divisions was formed at the Northern Fleet, which was commanded by the first commander of the Decembrist, Captain 1st Rank K.N. Griboyedov, the 1st division, along with the same type D-2 and D-3, entered D-1.
September 21, 1938 submarine under the command of Art. Lieutenant MP Avgustinovich left Polyarny on a 44-day autonomous voyage along the route Tsyp-Navolok - about. Vardø - m. North Cape - about. Bearish - about. Hope - Fr. Mezhsharsky - about. Kolguev - m. Kanin Nos - m. Svyatoy Nos - about. Kildin - Kola Bay. Having overcome 4841 miles on the surface and 1001 miles - underwater, in total D-1 was under water for 11 days, and on October 31, she made a 24-hour transition underwater without air regeneration. During the year, the submarine spent 120 days at sea, having covered more than 10,000 miles, of which 1200 were under water. Without exaggeration, this should be considered a record achievement for that time.
From April 15 to September 5, 1939, the D-1 was undergoing current repairs, from which the boat left on September 1 (two other submarines of the division at that time were under major repairs in Leningrad). By that time, the D-1 had already floated 1540 running hours, which significantly exceeded the norm (1200 hours). According to the level of combat training (BP), the D-1, naturally (due to the repairs being carried out), was in the 2nd line.
On October 29, 1939, Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Yeltishchev, who had previously commanded Sch-403 at the same theater, was appointed commander of the D-1. FM Yeltishchev was not yet allowed to independently control his new ship, so several times the boat went out to sea with an "export" commander.
With the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war for 11 days (from November 30 to December 10, 1939) D-1 was continuously on hourly readiness, which was later replaced by a four-hour one. On January 2, 1940, the boat set out to sea to carry out patrol service at position No. 2, located in the North Cape area. From January 3 to January 17, the submarine was continuously in its position. In the opinion of the submarine commander, the position for the patrol was chosen well, because "It was possible to observe the passage of ships both along the coast and when leaving the fiords." During the patrol service, the movement of the military or merchant ships was not seen, with the exception of two motorboats, fishing both in the position itself and outside it. Position No. 2, the submarine commander believed, could normally be serviced with a wind of up to 8 points and a wave of up to 7 points (in case of stronger waves, the boat had to leave the position in storm squares). And since the position was very close to the coast, it did not meet these requirements.
The combat training of the D-1 was proceeding normally, emergency exercises and specialty classes were carried out. At the same time, the crew was working on task No. 2 for KPL-38. In total, 2833 miles surfaced and 175 miles submerged during the trip, 11 dives were made. The transition to the base took place from 18 to 19 January.
From January 20 to January 21, the crew rested, after which an average repair of the submarine was carried out for seven days. From January 29, the boat was transferred to four-hour readiness, and from February 10 - to one-hour readiness. On February 17, D-1 again entered combat service in the Varde region.
Arriving at the position on February 18, the boat was there until February 27 inclusive. During this time, the weather conditions at the position were very harsh: the wind - north-west with a force of 6 points, sometimes up to 10-11 points, a wave - 7-8 points. From a 10-meter depth, as the commander noted, the boat was simply thrown to the surface.
Having surfaced on February 20, Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev saw in Norwegian territorial waters, two miles from the coast, TR, heading 300 °. It was not possible to determine his nationality. On February 23 and 26, a small breakdown occurred: the Fedoritsky coupling failed (the crosspiece broke). The muff was repaired by personnel. The Decembrist left the position on February 28, heading to the base.
According to the submarine commander, the main task (reconnaissance of the coast of Norway) was only partially completed, since due to a strong storm, D-1 was forced to keep 10-15 miles from the coast. During the combat service, the submarine covered 1339 miles on the surface and 37 miles submerged.
After returning to the base, from February 29 to March 2, rest was arranged for the D-1 personnel, and from March 3 to March 13, the submariners were busy replacing the AB.
After the end of hostilities, from March 27 to April 7, D-1 again carried out patrol service in the North Cape-Varde region.
At first glance, the BP of the D-1 crew in 1940 was proceeding normally (in any case, it was conducted in the same way on all submarines). But if you look more closely, you can find clear violations in the sequence of passing KPL-38.
So, on March 10, 1940, the brigade commander, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky, submitted a written report to the Armed Forces of the Northern Fleet, in which he petitioned for the admission of the D-1 commander Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev to independent control of the boat and further passing the tasks 38 as having fulfilled tasks No. 1 and 2. The Armed Forces of the Fleet, by order No. 091 of March 25, 1940, granted the brigade commander's request. In fact, task number 2 (it included practicing immersion and ascent, underwater course, urgent immersion and diving) was completed only in June-July 1940. With a "Good" rating, the task on July 11, 1940 was accepted by the commander of the 1st DPL captain 2nd rank MP Avgustinovich - but not completely, without passing exercises No. 2g and 2d (diving). Thus, passing off wishful thinking, the command actually "pushed" the unprepared submarine into the 1st line.
And already on May 22, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky submitted a report to the Armed Forces of the Northern Fleet with a petition to transfer the D-1 to the 1st line. But here the brigade commander was unlucky: from 15 to 17 June 1940, the commission of the Naval Combat Training Directorate, which checked the state of the brigade's BP, revealed a number of gross violations committed during the passage of the CPL. In particular, it was found that D-1 was not properly prepared, so the commission “put it aside from being transferred to the 1st line”.
At a meeting of the Armed Forces of the Federation Council, chaired by Vice Admiral GI Levchenko, the brigade commander tried to accuse the commission of bias and tendentiousness, allegedly shown during the check, and said that the commission's instructions were not at all obligatory for him. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces in the person of Rear Admiral V.P. Drozd and Divisional Commissioner N.K. Smirnov did not draw the proper conclusions regarding D.A. Pavlutsky, although the deputy. The BPL commander for political affairs, the regimental commissar I.I. Pekker, recognized all the conclusions of the commission as absolutely correct.
Ignoring the conclusions of the commission, the brigade commander at the beginning of August sent D-1 for a test torpedo attack according to task number 13 (attack of a ship moving in variable courses). This task is performed only by boats of the 1st line, therefore Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Yeltishchev was completely unprepared for its implementation. The release of the torpedoes was delayed, and the boat was forced to return to base.
By the way, the facts of overestimation and presentation of unprepared submarines for transfer to the 1st line took place on other ships of the brigade. During the re-inspection that took place on August 16-17, 1940, the UBP Commission of the Navy noted the failure to comply with most of the instructions of the June commission. Nevertheless, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky continued to disrupt the sequence of the BP of the boats of his brigade.
Meanwhile, D-1 (from August 22 to October 10) was undergoing current repairs at the Krasny Gorn floating base: tank ventilation valves, VVD compressor entrance hatches, as well as bilge pumps and diesel engines were repaired. On October 22, the submarine performed testing of mechanisms, trial diving and signboard. At this exit, the commander and art. mechanical engineer D-1 were absent (were on vacation), and therefore were replaced by the commander of the D-3 and the divisional mechanical engineer. In addition, the commander of the 1st DPL Captain 3rd Rank M.I. Gadzhiev was on board.
By order of the Commander of the Northern Fleet Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko # 0432 dated October 25 (which was based on the report of the submarine commander # 1284 dated October 21), D-1 was declared to have entered the campaign. After that, until November 13, the submarine did not dive, but on November 1 made an exit to determine and destroy the deviation of the magnetic compass.
By order of the fleet No. 0448 of November 6, 1940, it was announced that the D-1 won the BPL championship for the best warhead warhead-4. On the same day, the boat came to the Murmansk roadstead to participate in the celebration of the 23rd anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 12, the submarine in the base was examined by the technical commission of the headquarters of the Federation Council, which recognized it technical condition satisfactory.
On November 13, D-1 was scheduled to prepare for passing the test for task # 2d (diving) KPL-38, after which she should have gone to Eina Bay to meet with the Umba MC. On November 14, a joint exit was planned, during which the brigade commander of the submarine was supposed to be on the "Umba", and on the D-1 - the commander of the 1st DPL and the divisional mechanical engineer. It was supposed, after a preliminary check, to pass the test for drills No. 2d with actual diving.
Despite the fact that the submarine was under repair for about two months, and its commander was on vacation all this time, the D-1 was sent to the test site with depths of over 200 m without sufficient verification of the entire submersion-ascent system and the reliability of the impermeability of a solid hull and tanks. At the same time, the brigade commander did not take into account the fact that on June 12, 1940, an unauthorized filling of the pulp and paper industry took place on D-1, and the accident was prevented only by its timely blowing of the VVD. A serious violation was also the fact that before going to sea, the commanders of the BCh-3, BCh-5 were absent on the ship (moreover, the senior mechanical engineer of the submarine was not replaced by a divisional specialist) and the junior commander in charge of the pipelines of the VVD system.
On November 13, 1940 at 8.58 D-1, under the command of Lieutenant Commander F.M. Yeltishchev, she left the Main Base and headed for Motovskaya Bay, to training ground No. 6. According to the order of the submarine commander, the submarine commander had to check and work out the diving tables at the training ground from 13.00 to 15.00.
The entire transition from Polar to the test site was observed by SNiS posts. At 13:17, post No. 113 (at Cape Vyev-Navolok) reported that D-1 had plunged along the wheelhouse fence along a bearing of 330 ° at a distance of 60 cab., Heading W. At 13.30, the same post observed that D-1 sank under the periscope bearing 335 ° distance 70 cab. the same course. At 13.45, post No. 111 (on Cape Sharapov) saw D-1 under a periscope along a bearing of 160 ° at a distance of 17 cab. S-W course.
From that moment on, the boat was no longer observed by posts. The submarine dive signal was received at 13.30. At 14.00 the brigade commander on the "Umba" left Polyarny and at 19.00 arrived in Eina-Guba, where D-1 was not found. The brigade commander asked his NTTT MP Avgustinovich about the location of the submarine in Polyarny, having received the answer that there was no information from D-1 since 13.30, i.e. after giving the dive signal. Not having reports until 18.00, NSh requested by radio D-1 to show his place. At the same time, the operational duty officer of the SF headquarters requested all SNiS posts regarding the D-1. But the boat did not answer any inquiries.
After D-1 did not answer the call to the RTS in Polyarny at 18.40, the radio message for her was repeated several times, until 22.22. At 23.15 NSh of the fleet, Rear Admiral S.G. Kucherov urgently on the radio ordered D-1 to show its place and gave instructions to all ships at sea (there were K-1, K-2 and M-171) and SNiS posts to constantly call the boat ... The fleet commander sent K-2 to the test site for listening. At 23.40 "Umba" with the submarine brigade commander on board left Eina Guba and headed to training ground No. 6.
EPRON fleet facilities were brought to immediate readiness. At 1.20 on November 14, two boats of the MO-4 type (Nos. 17 and 18) were sent to survey the landfill and the coast of Motovsky Bay. At 1.44 the TFR "Tuman" was sent there with rescue equipment. And, finally, on 2.22, the EM "Stretchny" left for Motovskaya Bay to clarify the situation, on board which was the Commander of the Northern Fleet himself. Two hours later, Sch-402 went in search of D-1, and three hours later - D-3.
Throughout the night from November 13 to November 14, an intensive search was conducted in Motovsky Bay, in which the "Swift", "Tuman", "Umba", hunting boats and K-1 participated. In the course of the search activities, the sea was listened to with a sound direction finder from K-1 and the water surface was illuminated with searchlights.
At 10.30, two seaplanes MBR-2 took off in order to survey the Motovsky Bay and its coast.
At dawn, the survey of the bay by surface ships continued. At about 10.00, in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Sharapov, the ships discovered a large oil slick, a lifebuoy, small pieces of wood and an insulating plug. The depth in this place ranged from 190 to 216 m.
By 14.00, TSC # 890 and TSC # 891 arrived at test site No. 6 and immediately began trawling the area where the oil slick was found. By the evening they were joined by TSC "Toros", "Shtil", RT-80 and RT-69.
The throat works were carried out under. general management of the deputy. NSh of the Northern Fleet, Captain 1st Rank M.N. Popov, and the commander of the TSC battalion, Lieutenant Commander P.V. Panfilov, was responsible for trawling the area and searching for a metal detector. The entire search area was divided into three parts (northern, middle and southern), after which TSCs # 890 and 891 swept it through, following the O-W course. Then the area was again divided into three parts (eastern, middle and western), and the TSC passed it course N-S... Trawling was carried out with Schultz trawls without buoys, with extended tugs. SKR "Tuman" worked with the metal detector. When the trawl touched a foreign object, a pole was placed and the place was precisely determined, after which the TFR "Fog" was called to listen, and the area was no longer trawled. When a significant mass of metal was detected, "Fog" also set a milestone.
From 14 to 18 November, four thick oil spots and various debris were found in the TSCh test site No. 6, which were later identified as belonging to D-1. Trawls repeatedly (at least five times) were hit by foreign objects. In these places, metal detectors recorded the presence of a large mass of metal.
On November 17, at the naval base, the Polar investigator of the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Northern Fleet, military lawyer V. Pisklov, in the presence of a member of the Armed Forces, political instructor E.N. Markov, the flagship mechanical engineer of the fleet headquarters, Captain-Engineer 3rd Rank M. Slinko, and an investigator of the Special Department of the NKVD, State Security Sergeant Yevseyev, carefully studied the subjects, lifted from the sea surface in the area of \u200b\u200bthe disaster. In total, 18 physical evidence was recorded.
The first item on the list was "liquid picked up at the scene in the amount of 1 bucket and 1 can", according to appearance strongly resembling a solarium. This was followed by a large group of objects (or their fragments) made of wood or cork. The most interesting of them were: “half of a lifebuoy with red and white coloring, a whole lifebuoy, fragments of pressed sheet cork of irregular shape, an individual first aid package with Russian text, a pine block broken off at the ends and painted in anti-acid paint, a pine block, broken off at one end, with the letter "P" applied, covered with anti-acid paint, interspersed with four lead fragments and a plaque (in appearance - from AB) ". After examining these items, naval experts unanimously identified them as belonging to the submarine type "D". Some items were identified quite accurately: for example, a wedge from a crate of the IV group AB.
The nature of the damage to some objects led to the idea of \u200b\u200ba strong internal explosion that took place on the submarine, which occurred in the area of \u200b\u200bthe V compartment, because some items were clearly from this compartment.
Based on the results of the search activities carried out from November 13 to 18, 1940, and the study of the recovered debris, on November 18, the Armed Forces of the Northern Fleet sent the USSR Navy People's Commissar to Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov "Report on the death of the D-1 submarine on November 13, 1940".
The fleet command put forward three possible versions of the death of the boat at once. The first - about the detonation of a submarine on a drifting mine, was considered unlikely by the Armed Forces of the Northern Fleet, because the mine explosion could be clearly visible from the SNiS posts at Cape Sharapov and Vyev-Navolok. In addition, the explosion could be seen and heard by EM "Thundering" and "Swift", who were on that day near D-1, in training ground No. 5. Nevertheless, neither the SNiS posts, nor the ships recorded any underwater explosions.
In fairness, it should be noted that from February 8 to November 15, 1940, in the area of \u200b\u200bMotovskaya Bay - Kildinsky reach of the NK and submarine, 11 detections of floating mines left over from the Soviet-Finnish war were recorded. All drifting mines seen, as a rule, were shot, and. this did not lead to sad consequences.
The second version - a collision of the D-1 with any NK, was also not excluded, but in this case it disappeared. The fact is that before 12.43 on November 13, there were EM "Stretichny" and "Thundering" in the test site No. 6, which, even before the D-1 moved there, went to the test site No. 5. Merchant ships on that day, according to observations of SNiS posts and ships, did not enter Motovskaya Bay. Thus, polygon # 6 was completely empty (unless, of course, we exclude that an unknown submarine was in this square, which could eventually lead to a collision).
A third version of the death of the D-1 was put forward - the failure of the boat to a depth exceeding the limit, because of which the strong hull of the boat could not withstand water pressure. But the Commander of the Federation Council decided that this version was "possible to exclude." The reason for such a categorical conclusion was A.G. Golovko's firm belief that the D-1 passed the entire course of the 2nd line tasks and was preparing to move to the 1st line, and, in addition, “was one of the best ". The entire personnel of the submarine, according to the commander, was "old", the foremen-super-conscripts were also "old", the commander was experienced, [ * ] which allowed the crew, as a whole, to reach a "high PS level". Such optimistic conclusions of A.G. Golovko were based, most likely, on the reports of the submarine commander, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky, which were not properly verified by the Military Council. In addition, A.G. Golovko found it unprofitable to admit both the low level of BP in the fleet, and the presence of numerous cases of fraud by the commanders of formations when "pushing" their ships into the frontline category.
* – Approx. ed. Giving such a high assessment to the operational training of the D-1 commander, A.G. Golovko, perhaps, did not know one case a year ago. The fact is that on August 9, 1939, an unpleasant incident occurred: the commander of Sch-403 Art. Lieutenant F.M. Yeltishchev ran his boat aground. For this incident, the former commander of the Northern Fleet, flagship 2nd rank V.P. Drozd, by his order for the fleet No. 00215 of August 21, 1939, reprimanded him. The commander of Shch-403 was charged with "exceptional personal indiscipline, gross violation of the charter, all the rules and instructions for navigational service."
Therefore, the Commander of the Northern Fleet rejected all three versions of the submarine disaster and suggested that “the cause of death is the explosion inside it,” but he could not formulate the cause of this explosion. It will be possible to finally clarify the circumstances of the death of the D-1, as Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko believed, only after examining it or lifting it from the ground.
It is characteristic that in his report No. 4543ss (about the death of D-1) dated November 14, 1940, sent to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) I.V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b ) A.A. Zhdanov, People's Commissar of the Soviet Navy N.G. Kuznetsov basically agreed with the conclusions of A.G. Golovko, but still did not rush to assessments and did not rule out such a reason as the wrong actions of the submarine commander when diving to depth. In his opinion, a possible cause of the disaster could be either going to a depth beyond the permissible depth (during the diving exercise), "which could have occurred in the event of some malfunction of the dive depth control", or some omission during the urgent dive exercise. And since the depths in the area where the boat disappeared ranged from 250 to 300 m, if it was forced to go to a great depth, the boat would simply be crushed by water pressure.
The first vague suspicions that something was going on in the submarine brigade probably arose from the Commander of the Northern Fleet on November 23, when in order No. 0466 he reprimanded MP Avgustinovich. The formal reason was the late submission of the BP brigade's weekly plan. Not limited to this, the commander demanded that the brigade commander pay special attention to the "disorder in the brigade headquarters." A few days later, the fleet checked the condition of the ships' materiel. A particularly bleak picture was revealed in the BLP.
On most boats, the state of the mechanisms was found to be unsatisfactory, and on Shch-404, M-175 and M-176 - poor. By order No. 0481 of November 26, 1940, the Commander of the Northern Fleet announced that the commanders of these submarines would be reprimanded, and the commanders of the BCh-5 were arrested for 7 days. But that was not all.
On November 27, 1940, Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko issued order No. 00475, which had an eloquent title: "Conclusions on the death of the D-1 SF submarine." Based on the results of the last check of the submarine and raising the materials of the commissions for checking the submarine submarine for the whole year, the Fleet's Armed Forces concluded that "this year the D-1 passed the submarine submarine with a gross violation of the sequence in the execution of tasks." This was followed by a whole list of specific violations committed through the fault of the brigade commander D.A. Pavlutsky. In general, the brigade commander was charged with the fact that he did not systematically comply with the decisions of the commissions of the UBP of the Navy and did not radically rebuild the "vicious practice of the BP".
Acting with the sanction of the NKVMF, the Commander of the Northern Fleet announced the removal from his post of the submarine commander, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky and bringing him to trial by the Military Tribunal. The rest of the commanders, one way or another involved in the death of the D-1, were also punished: the head of the 2nd section of the 2nd division (BP) of the fleet headquarters, captain of the 2nd rank Smirnov, was removed from his post and assigned to a less responsible job, NSh BPL captain of the 3rd rank MP Avgustinovich was brought to the court of honor, and the commander of the 1st DPL, Captain 3rd Rank MI Hajiyev, was put on the surface ("considering his impeccable service"). [ * ]
* - M.I.Gadzhiev was lucky for the second time. The first time, back in the summer of 1940, he did not comply with the order of the chief of the 2nd department of the SF headquarters to arrive in Murmansk for sports competitions, for which he was subject to the court of the Military Tribunal, but, again, thanks to excellent service, he got off with a court of honor. And now he was lucky again, because D-1 was part of his division, and he took personal part in taking over the boat from repair.
In conclusion, the fleet commander demanded "to unconditionally follow the sequence when passing the BP." However, A.G. Golovko himself got it: the NK Navy reprimanded him “for the low level of BP in the fleet” (although the new commander had only been in this position for four months).
The story of the D-1 "surfaced" at a meeting of the highest command personnel of the Navy in Moscow, held in early December 1940. N.G. Kuznetsov, reflecting on the high accident rate in the fleet, recalled this case and presented it as a vivid example of how resulting in poor command and violation of existing regulations. Several interesting points came to light here.
It turns out that when the pulp and paper industry spontaneously filled on D-1 on June 12, the submarine commander F.M. Yeltishchev recorded this case in the Combat Training Journal. But the command of the brigade, as well as the fleet, ignored this case and did not draw any conclusions. Secondly, before putting the submarine for repair, F.M. Yeltishchev specifically asked to pay special attention to the grinding of the Kingston pulp and paper industry. After the repair, the D-1 was taken over by another commander (D-3), so this request of F.M. Yeltishchev was not remembered, and the acceptance was rather superficial. When FM Yeltishchev again took command, he was not given time to "so that he could independently check his boat after repair." In addition, on the D-1, as it turned out during the investigation, the horizontal rudder control bollard was "not quite in order"!
The blame for the death of the boat, as N.G. Kuznetsov believed, lay entirely with the command of the submarine. The People's Commissar was sure that this case could have been avoided "if the brigade commander worked properly, if the commander at the headquarters, which heads the 2nd diving department, worked properly." In conclusion, the NKVMF warned that such irresponsible cases, "as Pavlutsky allowed on the Northern Fleet," should not be allowed in the future, and resolutely demanded that the Military Councils of all fleets personally intervene in the submarine combat training system.
In the meantime, the activities of the Navy Commission to investigate the death of the D-1 came to an end, and some conclusions were drawn. The People's Commissar of the Navy, relying on the materials of the commission, presented on December 19, 1939 to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a report on the death of D-1. Having reported the already known facts about the submarine's combat training in 1940 and the circumstances of its last campaign, N.G. Kuznetsov again considered the possible versions of the disaster. As in his previous report, he believed that the most probable cause of the death of the D-1 could be a sudden loss of buoyancy, which occurred as a result of a breach of the tightness of one of the tanks ("for example, the same pulp and paper industry"). The belated adoption of measures to keep the submarine from falling, which the People's Commissar explained by some confusion of the personnel (after all, the BCh-5 commander was absent on this campaign), could well have led to the fact that “the boat, having passed the maximum depth of the hull strength (100-120 m), lost her tightness and hit the ground with great force, which was followed by a large internal explosion. "
Naturally, this is just an assumption, but the most logical and reasonable one. In any case, the other two versions - the detonation of a submarine on a drifting mine and an act of sabotage - were rejected by him as unlikely. The "mine version" did not convince him because a mine explosion at a shallow depth (5-10 m) would inevitably be accompanied by a large column of water (10-12 m) and sound effect, and, therefore, it would be clearly visible and audible from the neighboring posts of SNiS and NK. A meeting of a submarine with a mine at a greater depth (10-20 m) was, in the opinion of the NKVMF, unrealistic, because at such depths, a mine could not have been for a long time without losing its tightness. The act of sabotage by the personnel, associated with the detonation of an explosive that had been brought in advance, was, according to N.G. Kuznetsov, "even less likely."
Thus, a clear conclusion about the cause of the death of the D-1 was never made: there were only assumptions.
In order to prevent such tragic incidents in the future, the NKVMF of the USSR categorically forbade violating the sequence of passage of the BP (at the same time, he announced that a new CPL had been issued, where the sequence of exercises was clearly indicated), reminded the Military Councils of the fleets about the check (on their part) and reported that in a new "Regulation on ensuring the safety of submarine combat training" will be issued soon. And indeed, this situation soon came out, where it was written in black and white: "A submarine at sea depths does not dive more than the working depth of the boat."
The command of the Navy was to a certain extent inclined towards one version - the failure of the submarine to a depth exceeding the limit, because of which the boat was simply crushed by water pressure. Other reasons were expressed, but they were all rejected as insufficiently evidentiary. At the same time, such a version as a collision in a submerged position with an unknown submarine (for example, a German one) was not considered.
Was such a case possible? Of course, it is possible, but there were no applications for this kind of "victory". Another version of the causes of the catastrophe was put forward. So, I.F. Tsvetkov confidently stated that the D-1 was blown up by mines, which were allegedly set up by the Germans on the approaches to the Zapadnaya Litsa Bay during the period (1939-1940) of a secret German basing point (the so-called "Base Nord "). However, it seems incredible that our naval command, while leasing its territory under the naval base, knew nothing about the German minefields set up in this area. It is doubtful that the Germans, leaving the base in Zapadnaya Litsa in the summer of 1940 (when relations between the USSR and Germany were still good), would not have cleared their mines. This would be contrary to the agreements concluded. But even if we assume that everything was exactly as I.F. Tsvetkov describes, then why then the acoustics who were near our EMs did not hear the underwater explosion?
In general, this version, although effective, is not very suitable for explaining the reasons for the death of the boat.
The question of the D-1 disaster is still open, and only an underwater study of the wreckage of the boat can clarify it.
List of sailors who died on D-1
1. Yeltischev Fedor Maksimovich, Lieutenant-Commander, Submarine Commander
2. Prokhorenko Pyotr Mikhailovich, Art. polit., deputy. com. politically
3. Grachev Ivan Ivanovich, Art. lieutenant, assistant commander
4. Vikhman Matvey Abramovich, Art. lieutenant, commander of warhead-1
5. Warlock Pyotr Lukich, lieutenant, torpedo group commander
6. Rodionov Alexey Georgievich, Jr. lieutenant, rudder commander group
7. Belov Sergey Petrovich, military officer 2 wounds, commander of the movement group
8. Petrukhin Nikolay Semyonovich, paramedic
9. Arzubov Alexander Ivanovich, boatswain
10.Kisilev Ivan Vasilievich, commander of the helmsman squad
11. Chernov Pavel Ivanovich, helmsman
12. Agapov Mikhail Gavrilovich, helmsman
13. Borisov Alexander Pavlovich, helmsman
14. Golovach Ivan Timofeevich, student of the helmsman
15. Zatravkin Yuri Fedorovich, navigator electrician
16. Shagurin Evgeny Konstantinovich, apprentice electrician
17. Titov Vasily Kuzmich, gunner
18. Ushakov Panteley Petrovich, foreman of the torpedo group
19. Kuzmin Ivan Sofronovich, torpedo squad commander
20. Barinov Fyodor Ivanovich, torpedo operator
21. Aleshin Sergey Vasilievich, student of the torpedo operator
22. Gulyukin Ivan Andreevich, student of the torpedo operator
23. Kulakovsky Anatoly Andreevich, student of the torpedo operator
24. Beketov Alexey Semyonovich, student of the torpedo operator
25.Sidorov Alexey Georgievich, radio operator
26. Khasanov Nazib Zarifovich, the commander of the department of acousticians
27. Proshagin Gennady Semyonovich, student of acoustician
28. Fedotov Vasily Sergeevich, foreman of the group of minders
29. Kukov Alexander Alexandrovich, commander of the department. minders
30. Zenin Viktor Vasilievich, minder
31. Romanov Vasily Romanovich, minder
32. Mitrofanov Mikhail Ivanovich, minder
33. Vinogradov Nikolay Yakovlevich, minder
34. Wallpaper Sergey Petrovich, minder
35. Abramenko Ivan Mikhailovich, apprentice minder
36. Bychkov Victor Petrovich, apprentice minder
37. Borzov Vasily Denisovich, apprentice minder
38. Potapov David Alexandrovich, foreman of the group of electricians
39.Smirnov Anatoly Semyonovich, electrician
40. Volkov Petr Efimovich, electrician
41. Chernyshev Vyacheslav Yakovlevich, electrician
42. Kromarvnko Alexander Semyonovich, electrician
43. Vasiliev Egor Vasilievich, apprentice electrician
44. Malyshin Ivan Vasilievich, electrician
45. Akulov Alexander Gavrilovich, apprentice electrician
46. \u200b\u200bGaspor Vasily Ivanovich, foreman of the group of hold
Immediately, without waiting for the official approval of the Revolutionary Military Council (this happened only on February 17, 1927), the documents were transferred to the Baltic plant for construction. On March 5, 1927, the first three submarines of the 1st series were officially laid down there, later assigned to type "D" by the first letter of the name of the lead ship - "Decembrist".
The first-borns of the Soviet submarine shipbuilding were created with a double-hull, riveted structure. For hull work, high-quality steel from pre-revolutionary stocks was allocated, intended for the construction of battle cruisers of the Izmail type and light cruisers of the Svetlana type. The robust case (maximum diameter 4.76 m), designed for a maximum immersion depth of 90 m, had a complex spindle shape with smooth transitions from one diameter to another. Therefore, its sheathing sheets had to be produced by hot punching according to spatial patterns. The spacing was taken equal to 500 mm. For the first time in domestic shipbuilding, the submarine's hull was divided into watertight compartments. Five spherical and one flat watertight bulkheads subdivided the robust hull into seven compartments, the largest of which was the first, where most of the torpedo weapons and the main living and utility rooms of the rank and file were located. In the bulkheads, round manholes with a diameter of 800 mm were cut through with doors that were closed using a ratchet device. The strength of the bulkheads from the side of the concavity was calculated for a pressure of 9 kgf / cm, which corresponded to the maximum immersion depth. The fourth shelter compartment became the central post (CP), where the means of controlling the boat and the fight for survivability were concentrated. Here, the main command post (GKP) was located in a submerged position, and a cylindrical, strong wheelhouse of small dimensions with upper and lower hatches served only to ensure the exit from the submarine.
The diving and ascent system included two end, six pairs of inter-board and middle main ballast tanks (CHB), a strong fast diving tank, high and low pressure air lines. The work of the latter was provided by pipe blowers from the "Brown-Boveri" company. The ventilation valves of the Central City Hospital were supplied with pneumatic and manual drives, the kingstones of the Central City Hospital - only manually. For the convenience of navigation, two deck tanks served in the positional position, the posts for emergency blowing of the CGB with high pressure air were, in addition to the central control unit, also in compartments I and VII. Also, for the first time, the main ballast tanks were filled with water by gravity, and not with the help of pumps, which made it possible to reduce the time of an urgent dive from 3 minutes for a Bars-class submarine to 30 seconds. Some ballast tanks could be used as fuel tanks.
Diesel engines of the German company "MAN", allegedly purchased for the first Soviet diesel locomotives, were installed on the first two ships as main engines for the surface course. At the same time, the production of such diesel engines was organized at the V.V.Kuibyshev Kolomna plant under the brand name 42-B-6. Four subsequent boats of the series received them.
The first two boats of the "Decembrist" type were equipped with MAN diesel engines. Disconnection of diesel engines from propeller shafts was carried out with the help of friction clutches of the firm "Bamag". Of the total supply of diesel fuel (128 tons), only 39 tons were placed in tanks inside a solid hull, and the rest was in onboard ballast tanks (for reloading). Some submariners considered this a disadvantage of the boats, which, when the light hull was damaged, were unmasked by the appearance of a fuel trace on the surface. However, this was the only way to ensure the achieved high performance in terms of cruising range over water and autonomy.
To achieve the maximum possible underwater travel range, a twin-armature PG-20 electric motor was created - one anchor, 500 hp, provided full speed, the other, 25 hp, was used for economic propulsion. In the submerged position, the twin-anchor main rowing electric motors of the type were powered by a battery, four groups of which were located in sealed pits. The battery pits had a battery ventilation system and hydrogen afterburning furnaces, and the arrangement of the groups ensured the convenience of servicing the cells.
At the same time, the high height of the battery pits reduced the volume of office and living quarters. However, the habitability of the boats corresponded to the level of their time: the command staff was placed in cabins, half of the Red Navy men - in the largest first compartment. The air regeneration system installed on domestic boats for the first time allowed the boats to be submerged for 72 hours.
Vertical and horizontal rudders received electric and manual control drives. Communication between the compartments was carried out using negotiating pipes.
The main armament included 8 torpedo tubes with a stock of 14 torpedoes of the 53-27 type (speed 45 knots with a cruising range of 3.7 km, explosive mass - 265 kg). The submarines received 533-mm torpedo tubes for service, but the torpedoes themselves did not yet exist by the time they entered service, and the ships used 450-mm torpedoes for combat training, inserting special gratings into the torpedo tubes.
A 102-mm B-2 gun (barrel length 45 calibers, elevation angle 60 °) and a 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun were installed in the wheelhouse fence. For the 102-mm gun, there were 118 shells, of which 91 were stored in the fenders on the bridge. Artillery armament was originally supposed to consist of two 102-mm guns, located behind special shields-fairings on the upper deck in front of and behind the wheelhouse fence. However, during the discussion of the project, concerns were expressed about a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the submarine due to the flooding of the guns with a wave. After that, they decided to raise the bow gun to the level of the navigating bridge, covering it with a bulwark, and replace the stern gun with a 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun, also installing it in the wheelhouse fence. Subsequently, it turned out that such a placement of a 102-mm gun was unsuccessful, since it significantly constrained the bridge itself and greatly interfered with the navigational watch, especially when mooring.
Therefore, during a major overhaul with modernization in 1936-1941. the bow gun, replacing it with a 100-mm B-24 mount (120 rounds), was returned to the upper deck, while improving the layout and configuration of the navigating bridge. The stern gun was also replaced with a 45 mm 21K mount (500 rounds). All this, along with the convenience of keeping the watch on top, improved the stability of the submarine and somewhat reduced the swing of the roll. More modern models of radio equipment were installed.
Surveillance and communications in the underwater position were provided by two periscopes - commander's and night anti-aircraft, noise-direction finder and sonar communication devices. The guaranteed range of the radio station was about 200 miles. The navigational armament consisted of a Sperry-type gyrocompass and a Forbes log.
The tests of the Decembrist were supervised by Y. K. Zubarev, an authorized representative of the Standing Commission, an experienced commander of the submarine fleet. The lead boat in the surface position reached a maximum speed of 15.3 knots, the immersion time was 1.5 minutes (instead of 30 s. According to the assignment), the initial metacentric height in the surface position was 30 cm, in the underwater position - 15 cm.
These tests, as well as the tests of the slightly ahead of the lead boat "Revolutionary", were complicated not so much by the identified design defects as by the dramatic circumstances of the persecution of the main project leaders. Malinin, Kruger and Bazilevsky were arrested by the OGPU on charges of "sabotage." Therefore, it was necessary to correct the mistakes inevitable in any new business with their limited participation.
The most significant drawbacks were the occurrence of a large roll during immersion and squeezing inward by the outboard pressure of the Kingston plate of the fast immersion tank. The first phenomenon was explained by the overflow of water from side to side in the side tanks of the main ballast, which had common ventilation valves. To eliminate it, the tanks were split side by side with the installation of separate side ventilation valves. At Kingston, the pulp and paper industry was replaced by a plate, which began to be pressed against the saddle by the outboard pressure.
The revealed overload (about 10 tons) was eliminated by the removal of the unsuccessful lead underwater anchor and stern spire, and on Baltic boats it was also compensated by the placement of seven buoyancy cylinders in the cabin fence.
With the elimination of the shortcomings, the boats of the "Decembrist" type turned out to be quite successful and meeting their purpose. This is evidenced by the fact that, having formed the basis of the nascent Northern Fleet, they have successfully mastered this difficult region.
A total of 6 ships of this project were built. "D-1" died in 1940, and the remaining 5 submarines took part in the Great Patriotic War. One, "D-Z", fought in the North, the other, "D-2", - in the Baltic: the rest - in the Black Sea. "D-6" was blown up when Sevastopol was abandoned, "DZ" and "D-4" died, and by the end of the war only two submarines of this project remained in the Navy. Currently "D-2" is installed as a memorial in St. Petersburg.
| Displacement -surface - 934 tons, underwater - 1361 tons |
| Length overall -76.6 m |
| Maximum width -6.4 m |
| Average draft -3.8 m |
| Power point -2 diesel engines with a total capacity of 2200 hp and 2 electric motors with a total capacity of 1050 hp. 2 groups of storage batteries, 60 batteries each brand "DK", 2 screws. |
| Fuel reserve -normal - 28.5 t, full - 114 |
| Speed \u200b\u200b-maximum surface - 14.6 knots, underwater 8.5 knots |
| Cruising range -on the surface - 2570 miles at 14.6 knots, - 8950 miles at 9 knots; submerged - 17 at 8.5 knots, - 158 miles at 2.9 knots. |
| Immersion depth -working - 75 meters, limit - 90 meters |
| Dive time -90 seconds |
| Armament -6 533-mm bow torpedo tubes; 2 533 mm aft torpedo tubes; 14 533 mm torpedoes; 1 - 101.6 / 45 artillery mount "B-2"; 120 - 101.6 mm rounds; 1 - 45/46 artillery mount "21-K"; 500 45 mm rounds |
| Time spent under water -72 hours |
| Autonomy -normal - 28 days, maximum - 40 days |
| Buoyancy reserve -45 % |
| Crew -10 officers, 10 foremen, 28 privates |
Laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad at Plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on November 3, 1928, entered service on November 18, 1930. Joined the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
In the autumn of 1932, it underwent special research tests to accurately identify its tactical and technical elements. From May 18 to August 5, 1933 she moved from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On August 5, 1933, it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. August 21, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-1". In 1935, in severe meteorological conditions, she made the transition to Novaya Zemlya (together with D-2), and after returning from the campaign she participated in tactical exercises. August 14 - September 2, 1936 made the Arctic cruise along the route: "Arkhangelsk - Matochkin Shar - Kara Sea - Russian Gavan - Polar". 3094 miles covered. From September 23, 1936 to November 8, 1937 - major overhaul and modernization. On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. From September 21 to November 5, 1938, she made a 44-day hike along the route: "Cape Tsyp-Navolok - Vardo Island - North Cape Cape - Bear Island - Nadezhdy Island - Mezhdusharsky Island - Kolguev Island - Cape Kanin Nos - Cape Holy Nos - Kildin Island ". Completed 4,841 miles on the surface, 1001 miles underwater. In total, the boat was under water for 11 days. October 31 - 24-hour submerged transition without air regeneration. In 1939-1940. - participation in the Soviet-Finnish war (Soviet-Finnish). Patrolling in the Varanger fiord area. Made three military campaigns. No success.
On November 13, 1940, she died under unexplained circumstances during a training dive in Motovsky Bay at a depth of 255 meters during combat training tasks. The entire crew (55 people) was killed.
Commanders: Sekunov B.A. (1930), captain 3rd rank Karpunin V.P. (1936), senior lieutenant Avgustinovich M.P. (1938), Kolyshkin I.A., Yeltischev F.M. (October 29, 1939 - November 13, 1940.).
"D-2" ("Narodovolets")
(serial number 178)
Laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad at Plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on May 19, 1929, entered service on October 11, 1931. Joined the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
From May 18 to August 5, 1933 she made the transition from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On August 5, 1933, it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. August 21, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-2". In 1934 she made a trip to Novaya Zemlya. In 1935, in severe meteorological conditions, she made the transition to Novaya Zemlya (together with the D-1), and after returning from the campaign she participated in tactical exercises. In August 1936, together with "D-1", she visited Novaya Zemlya, and after passing through the Matochkin Shar Strait, she entered the Kara Sea. Back in the Kola Bay, both boats took part in tactical exercises. On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. In 1937, together with D-3, she made a high-latitude voyage to Bear Island and the Spitsbergen Bank, covering a total of 3.673 miles. From April to May 1939, she provided radio communications for V.K. Kokkinaki's aircraft during its non-stop flight to the USA. On September 22-29, 1939 she returned to Leningrad and got up for repairs and modernization. Joined the division of submarines under construction and overhaul of the Submarine Training Brigade of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet;
On August 17, 1941, upon completion of repairs and modernization, it was again included in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. In early September 1941, she left the water area of \u200b\u200bthe plant, after which she was based on the river. Neva. On September 15, 1942, she transferred from Leningrad to Kronstadt. September 23 - November 4, 1942 - the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War.
21 hours 10 minutes September 23 - moved into position in the area of \u200b\u200bthe west. exits from the Irbensky Strait. and pr. Soelawayn (position No. 4; then had to act on the position of the western island of Bornholm). To the dive point in Vost. Hogland Reach (arrived at 0529 hours on September 24) moved to support BTShch-210, -211, -215, -217, -218 and ZSKA. At 16 hours 52 minutes on September 24 at 45 cab. sev.-zap. about. Gogland got into an anti-submarine net and hit the ground hard. The vertical rudder was out of order, mine channels of the bow horizontal rudders were torn off. At 21.14 the boat managed to free itself from the net, after which the rudder was examined by 13 divers. The inspection was repeated on the night of September 26, after which the boat's handling improved. At 00.20 on September 29, she completed the crossing of the Gulf of Finland and at 5:20 on September 29, arrived in the area of \u200b\u200bthe position near Cape Ristna. On the morning of September 30, near the Irbensky Strait. discovered the TFR of the enemy. At 23.03 on September 30, the boat was ordered to move to the position of the West. about. Bornholm (position # 1). At 09.57 on October 3, she carried out a torpedo attack on a KON (2 TP, 2 MM) in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Khegby (northern end of Oland Island) (TP 12000 t, attack \u003d sub / vi / 2, d \u003d 6 cab., Through 1 min explosion - notch, no data). When entering the second attack on the "remaining" TR, the commander considered himself discovered by MM and refused to attack. The SP was not persecuted. On the morning of October 6, I arrived at the position. At 11.04 on October 7, OTR launched a torpedo attack south-west. Istada (TR? T, attack \u003d sub / pr / 1, d \u003d 7 cab., When fired, it emerged to the surface, TR evaded the torpedo - notch, no data). At 22.22 on October 8, OTR launched a torpedo attack 36 miles north. m-ka Rügenwalde (TR? t, attack \u003d overhead / pr / 1, d \u003d 1.5-2 cab., miss - unsuccessfully attacked by the Swiss. TR "Gunnar"). In the afternoon of October 9, OTR refused to attack because of a large KU. At 00.47 on October 11, OTR launched a torpedo attack 18 miles southeast. m-ka Smyugehuk (TR? t, attack \u003d overhead / pr / 1 d \u003d 3 cab., miss - notch, no data). At 10.39 on October 14, the OTR launched a torpedo attack in the same area (TP? T, attack \u003d sub / pr / 1, d \u003d 4 cab., At the time of the salvo due to an error of the horizontal steering, the boat went deep, miss - notch, No data). At 16.33 she made a torpedo attack by the OTR (TP 8000 t, attack \u003d sub / pr / 1, d \u003d 4 cab., After 1 min a strong explosion - at 55 ° 10 'N / 13 ° 39 "E). the German TR "Jacobus Fritzen", 4090 brt, coal cargo, +1, \u003d 3) was sunk. 15-18 October stormy on the position. In the evening of October 16, the stock of the Kingston rapid diving tank broke down - the artillery cellar was flooded, the tank was out of order. On October 18, she was caught in a fishing net. At 17.55 on October 19, she carried out a torpedo attack by the KON (2 PRZhD, 1 VSKR, 5 SKR) at 55 ° 11 "9 N / 19 ° 15" 1 E. (PRZhD, attack \u003d sub / vi / 2, d \u003d 6 cab., After 1 min 2 explosions were heard - damaged German PRZhD "Deutschland", 2972 \u200b\u200bbrt, transporting vacationers of the Norwegian Legion, +24, \u003d 29, PRZhD repaired by February 1943). Correspondent counterattacked to no avail. PLO, who dropped 16 hl. October 22 moved to the area of \u200b\u200bBukh. Hana. In the afternoon of October 23, she could not attack the OTR due to an unprofitable KU. On October 25, she transferred to Karlskrona. On the night of October 26, she discovered a submarine, which she dodged by turning. In the morning, by order of the command, I began to return to the base. On the evening of October 29, 10 miles east. about. Bogscher was discovered and attacked to no avail by the enemy TFR, which dropped 48 hlb. At 21.36 on October 30, the crossing of the Gulf of Finland began. At 20.57 on November 3, when crossing the obstacle, the Seeigel touched the mine defender's mine. At 11.18 on November 4, the submarine was met by our SKA and in the afternoon arrived in Bukh. Norre-Kappellaht (Lavensari Island). At 17.00 on November 6 - 00.55 on November 7, in support of BTShch-207, -210, -211, -217, -218 and 2, SKA moved to Kronstadt.
In the evening of November 10, 1942, she moved to Leningrad for repairs and winter parking. On the crossing, it was unsuccessfully fired upon by enemy artillery. May 10, 1943 prepared for a military campaign. On August 12, 1943, she moved from Leningrad to Kronstadt. On the crossing, it was subjected to enemy artillery fire without result. In the summer of 1944, she was armed with the British sonar station "ASDIC-129" ("Dragon") and the system of bubbleless torpedo firing (BTS). Until October 1944, she carried out combat training in Kronstadt. 01-30 October 1944 - the second military campaign in the Second World War. On October 1-5, the Finnish skerry fairway went into the Baltic Sea for operations in the east. coast about. Oland - south. entrance to the pr. Kalmarsund (position No. 9). Immediately after the release, breakdowns began in the material part. On October 6, the vertical rudder was temporarily out of order. At 10.00 on October 8, OTR launched a torpedo attack 33 miles south. m. Hoborg (TR 1000 t, attack \u003d sub / vi / 2, d \u003d 5 cab., TR dodged torpedoes - notch, no data, apparently attacked by a Swiss fishing vessel). On the evening of October 9, the submarine commander ordered the submarine to occupy a sector bounded by bearings 245-220 ° southwest of Libava (sector 2). On the evening of October 10, I arrived at a new position. On October 11, the vertical rudder limiter failed on the submarine. On October 16, she was unable to attack OTR due to an unprofitable KU. On October 19, the periscope shaft was flooded with water. On October 20, Fedoritsky's clutch failed. On October 22, the Gall chain failed. On the morning of October 24, in the area of \u200b\u200bm-ka Pappensee, she could not attack the KOH due to an error of the steering-horizontal. On the morning of October 26, by order of the submarine commander, she took up a position at m. Pappensee. At 12.54 on October 26, she carried out a torpedo attack by the KON (1 TR, 1 MM, 1 TFR) 8 miles west. m-ka Pappensee (TR 5000 t (according to other sources, transport "Nina", 1371 brt)), attack \u003d sub / vi / 2, d \u003d 8 cab., the commander watched the death of the TR in the periscope - notch, data no). After the attack, the submarine counterattacked the cor. PLO, who dropped 5 hlb on the boat. The forces of the explosions hit the submarine twice on the ground, after which the vertical rudder began to shift only by 4 °, and then stopped working altogether. At 02.20 on October 27, she began her return to base, controlled by screws. In the afternoon of October 29, she anchored at about. Ute arrived in Turku on October 30.
December 12, 1944 - January 20, 1945 - the third military campaign in the Second World War. At 08.48 on December 12, she left Helsinki to a position limited by bearings of 250-270 ° west. Vindavas (sector number 1). On December 13, the pump shock absorber burst. At 17.30 on December 14, I arrived at the position. The actions of the submarine were greatly hampered by the sparking of diesels and large vaporization when the diesels were exhausted into the water. Throughout the campaign, she had numerous contacts with the PLO forces. On the evening of December 16, when trying to attack a KON, the TFR was discovered and attacked, which dropped several. hlb. At 04.52 on December 23, she launched a torpedo attack by the KON (1 TR, 1 TFR) at 57 ° 21 "8 N / 21 ° 05" 5 E. (TR? T, attack \u003d overhead / vi / 2, d \u003d 5 cab., Miss - notch, no data). In the afternoon of December 25, I discovered 4 DB B, but did not go into the attack. On the night of December 26, it was unable to attack KON due to the opposition of the TFR. At 20.10 on December 29, she carried out a torpedo attack by the KON (2 TR, 3 TFR) at the point 57 ° 17 "8 N / 21 ° 07" 2 E. (TR 9-10000 t, attack \u003d overhead / vi / 2, d \u003d 3.5-4 cab., 50 seconds later, 1 torpedo hit the TR - notch, no data). The PL was not persecuted. On the morning of January 1, 1945, the corps was discovered and fired upon to no avail. PLO. At 06.19 on January 3, she made a torpedo attack by KON (1 TR, 1 TFR) (TR? T, attack \u003d overhead / vi / 2, d \u003d 6 cab., Miss - notch, no data). In the following days, she had contacts exclusively with Cor. PLO. On January 10, she received an order to operate in the southern sectors. and southwest. Vindavas (position # 5 is new). On January 16, during a storm, the horizontal rudders were damaged. On the morning of January 18, when laying on the ground at a depth of 62 m during a storm, it hit the stones hard - the kingstons of the ballast tanks and the vertical rudder were damaged. At 20.13 the return to the base began. At 14.00 on January 20, BTShch-217 was met and at 21.55 arrived at Hanko.
April 20 - May 18, 1945 - the fourth military campaign in the Second World War. At 13.58 on April 20, it reached a position 60 miles south. m-ka Faludden (occupied part of position No. 8). In the afternoon on April 22, near the north-east. coast about. Gotland discovered by Swiss. cor. PLO, which for 4 hours unsuccessfully dropped 68 hlb on the PL. At 21.20 on April 23, I arrived at the position. On April 27, by order of the commander, the submarine moved to Libava (position No. 1). On the night of April 28, the TFR was discovered and attacked, which dropped 7 hlb within 1 hour. There was a leak at the junction of the sheets of the strong hull in the VI compartment, and the fast diving tanks were damaged. On the night of May 7, the submarine received an order to take up a position on the approaches to Libau at 56 ° 18 "N / 19 ° 30" E. (busy by 10.00). On the night of May 9, she discovered the TFR, but did not go into the attack because of the unfavorable KU. On May 11, she received an order to take a position between the meridian of Hoborg and Fr. Utklippan and parallels 55 ° 45 "and 57 ° 00" N. In connection with the end of hostilities, on May 18, she arrived in Turku.
February 15, 1946 - December 24, 1955 was part of the 4th Navy, performed combat training missions. January 12, 1949 assigned to the subclass of large submarines. On June 9, 1949, it was renamed B-2. On June 20, 1956, it was decommissioned, disarmed and reorganized into a training station for survivability. On August 17, 1956, it was renamed UTS-6. In 1969 a memorial plaque was installed on the boat. March 5, 1987 excluded from the lists of the Navy's floating craft. On July 8, 1989, after refurbishment, it was installed in Leningrad (near the Shkipersky channel not far from the Marine Station) as a monument to the Russian fleet and shipbuilding. The submarine compartments have been recreated as they were during the war. On September 2, 1994, it was opened for inspection as a branch of the Central Naval Museum.
The term of combat service is 46.3 months (July 1, 1941 - May 9, 1945). 4 military campaigns (69 days). 12 torpedo attacks, as a result of which 2 ships were sunk (5461 brt) and 1 ship was damaged, possibly 1 more ship was sunk.
The commanders were: Nazarov M.K. (1931), office 2 p. Reisner L.M. (1936), Art. l. Zhukov A.A. (1939), K. l-t., K. 3 p., K. 2 R. Lindenberg R.V. (1941-1945)
"D-3"
(serial number 179)
Laid down on March 5 in Leningrad at Plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on July 12, 1929, entered service on November 14, 1931. Joined the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
July 26 - September 21, 1933 - transition from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On September 21, 1933 it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. August 21, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-3". On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. In 1937, together with the D-2, she made a high-latitude voyage to Bear Island and the Spitsbergen Bank, covering a total of 3,673 miles.
On February 5, 1938, she went to the Kola Bay to determine the magnetic deviation, and in the morning of the next day she laid down on the course of leaving the bay to the Barents Sea. On board the boat was a group of the best radio operators in the fleet. They were supposed to support the radio bridge: the SP-1 station - Moscow. In February 1938 she took part in the removal from the ice floe of the polar station "SP-1" headed by DI Papanin. On February 13, 1938, for the first time in history, it passed under the Arctic ice, crossing a 5-cable ice bridge separating it from clear water (30-minute dive). From October 1938 to April 1940, major overhaul and modernization took place in Leningrad.
June 22 - July 4, 1941 the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War. The beginning of the war was met in the Motka Bay according to the combat training plan. At 19.43 on June 22, 1941, it reached a position in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Nordkin. On June 25, she discovered the periscope of an enemy submarine, but was unable to attack it, and dodged it by urgent diving and maneuvering. There were no more meetings with the enemy. The boat returned safely to base.
August 16 - September 7, 1941 the third military campaign in the Second World War. On August 19, she launched an attack on the transport traveling as part of the convoy, but the torpedo passed by, as she had to shoot blindly, due to the immersion of the periscope. On August 25, she again found the enemy transport, but was unable to launch the attack. The boat returned safely to base.
September 22 - October 17, 1941 the fourth military campaign in the Second World War. She worked out a new method of torpedo firing, when not one, but two or three torpedoes were fired at the target, which gave the greatest opportunity to defeat the enemy. Returning from the cruise, the boat commander announced four attacks (September 26, 27, 30, and October 11), during which 1 tanker and 3 enemy transports were sunk (on September 26, a 2,000 brt transport was sunk, and on September 27, a 1,500 brt tanker On September 30, when launching the attack, the boat ran aground, from which it took off an hour later, and on October 11, the commander did not see the result of the attack, since after the release of torpedoes the target was hidden by a snow charge).
November 22 - December 15, 1941 the fifth military campaign in the Second World War. On November 28, at Cape Sverholt-Klubben in Porsangerfjord, a transport with a displacement of 6,000 brt is attacked. Although upon the return of the boat to the base, its commander was credited with its destruction, but according to post-war data, the enemy did not lose transports at this time and in this place.
On December 5, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe North Cape - Porsanger Fjord, the submarine found two enemy transports under the escort of a destroyer. After 50 minutes, "D-3" fired four torpedoes at the terminal transport with a displacement of 10,000 brt. Hearing the explosions, the boat considered that the transport was sunk, but according to the enemy's data, the Lane transport with a displacement of 6,856 brt, under the escort of a minesweeper, was subjected to an unsuccessful attack. On December 6, 1941, the boat goes on the attack again. At 13.57, a convoy was found as part of a three-masted transport, accompanied by a minesweeper. The boat attacked the transport with three torpedoes, and at 14.18, surfacing under the periscope, the commander saw that the ship was sinking its bow into the water, and the minesweeper was taking people off it. As a result of this attack, the boat was credited with the sinking of the Abraham Lincoln transport with a displacement of 9.570 brt. According to other sources, the transports "Moshill" (2.959 brt) and "Ringar" (5.013 brt), which were escorting the destroyer, became the object of the attack. This convoy did not suffer losses and arrived safely at the destination. As a result of the last campaign, she was credited with the destruction of three enemy transports, with a total displacement of 25,000 brt. (according to the results of 1941 - 7 transports of 36,000 brt).
On January 17, 1942, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "for exemplary fulfillment of combat missions of the command at the front of the struggle against the German invaders and for the valor and courage shown at the same time," the submarine "D-3" was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
February 22 - March 16, 1942 the sixth military campaign in the Second World War. Exit to a position in the Tanafjord area. On February 27, the boat spotted an enemy convoy, but the attack fell through due to the commander's mistake. It was not possible to launch an attack against enemy minesweepers on March 3. On March 8, 1942, "D-3" was withdrawn from position to cover the allied convoy "PQ-12", and on March 11, "Krasnogvardeets" followed to the rescue of "Sch-402", which was left without fuel off the coast of the enemy. K-21 came to the aid of the Shch-402 most quickly, and the D-3 received an order on March 13 to return to its previous position. The next day, the submarine attacks a group of German ships consisting of minelayers Brummer and Cobra, guarded by four minesweepers. The submarine commander announced the destruction of the enemy patrol ship, but the torpedo passed a few meters from the M-1504 minesweeper. The enemy dropped 36 depth charges onto the boat, from the explosions of which the kingston of the equalizing tank began to pass through and water began to flow into the compartment through the gauge glass. On the evening of March 14, 1942, the submarine commander received the go-ahead to return to base.
May 2-18, 1942 Seventh military campaign in the Second World War. Already on May 2, the boat was attacking the convoy. Explosions were heard on the boat and the transport with a displacement of 6,000 brt was considered sunk. In fact, the attack was carried out on the transports Algol (976 brt) and Yuris (3.232 brt), which were guarded by three ships. The passing torpedoes saw escort ships, and the convoy arrived at its destination without loss. On May 16, the boat goes on the attack again. Despite the fact that its commander, according to him, saw how 5 escort ships were removed from the dying transport of people, the success of this attack was also not confirmed by the enemy. The next day, the Hallingdal transport, escorted by 5 ships, was attacked. The commander of the boat announced the sinking of a transport with a displacement of 12,000 brt, but the enemy did not lose ships and vessels at this time and in this place. Upon returning from the campaign, the boat commander reported on the sinking of three enemy transports, with a total displacement of 26,000 brt. According to the results of seven cruises, the boat scored 8 sunken enemy transports with a total displacement of 28.140 brt and damaged 1 transport of 3.200 brt. There is no confirmation of the success of the attacks yet.
June 10, 1942 departure to the last eighth military campaign in the Second World War. The boat did not get in touch anymore and did not return to the base. Together with the boat, 53 members of its crew were also killed. Probably, the boat was killed by a mine in the area of \u200b\u200bHelnes Cape, although it is possible that it was blown up at the Bantos A barrier at the entrance to the Kola Bay, which was placed on March 20, 1942 by the Brummer and Cobra minelayers, who so safely escaped torpedoes from "D-3" a week before the mine setting.
The term of combat service is 12.3 months (June 22, 1941 - June 30, 1942). 8 military campaigns (138 days). 11 torpedo attacks, which possibly sunk 4 ships and damaged 1.
The commanders were: Griboyedov K.N. (1931), Art. l-t Kotelnikov D.I. (1938), Ph.D. Konstantinov F.V. (1941), K. l-t., K. 3 p. Bibiev M.A. (1941-1942).
"D-4"
(serial number 27)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant No. 198. Launched on April 6, 1929, entered service on January 5, 1931. Joined the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933 she paid a visit to Istanbul. September 15, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-4". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. From December 1938 to September 27, 1941, she got up at the Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol for major repairs and modernization. September 27, 1941 relocation to Poti.
September 29 - October 10, 1941 the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War. Unsuccessful.
November 29 - December 29, 1941 the fourth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 1, 1941, east of Cape Kaliakra, the boat attacked a convoy of two transports accompanied by destroyers with three torpedoes, but the torpedoes passed by.
May - May 9, 1942 the seventh military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to ensure Sevastopol.
May 15 - May 21, 1942 the eighth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to ensure Sevastopol.
May 23 - May 28, 1942 the ninth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to ensure Sevastopol. On May 27, 1942, in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Ai-Todor, the boat was attacked by enemy boats, and in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Utrish near Novorossiysk - by a torpedo bomber. She successfully avoided damage and returned safely to base.
May 29 - June 4, 1942 the tenth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to ensure Sevastopol.
June 5 - June 12, 1942 the eleventh military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to ensure Sevastopol. For five flights to supply Sevastopol, she delivered 318.6 tons of cargo to the city, of which 123 tons of ammunition, 38 tons of gasoline, 157.6 tons of food, evacuated 78 people to the Caucasus.
June - July 2, 1942 unsuccessful exit. The enemy's strong anti-aircraft defense did not allow the boat to deliver cargo (44 tons of ammunition and 6.2 tons of food).
March 23 - April 12, 1943 the fourteenth military campaign in the Second World War. To no avail. According to some reports, the victim of the torpedoes of the boat was the Bulgarian steamer "Rodina" at 4.158 brt.
May 22 - June 11, 1943 fifteenth military campaign in the Second World War. June 1, 1943 in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Tarkhankut twice attacks an enemy convoy. Torpedoes pass without hitting targets.
August 3 - August 28, 1943 the sixteenth military campaign in the Second World War. Destruction of two transports at Cape Tarkhankut. On August 10, the steamship Boy Feddersen was sunk at 6.689 brt (former Soviet Kharkov), and on August 20, the Bulgarian steamship Varna at 2.141 brt.
November 11, 1943 departure to the last seventeenth military campaign in the Second World War. On November 23, near Evpatoria, the boat sent the transport "Santa Fe" to the bottom at 4.627 brt.
On December 4, 1943, it was presumably sunk in the Kalimitsky Gulf southwest of Cape Uret by the Uj-103 and Uj-102 anti-submarine ships after an unsuccessful attack by landing barge No. 566. The entire crew died (presumably 53 people).
The term of military service is 26.1 months (October 1, 1941 - December 4, 1943), 16 military campaigns (212 days). 6 torpedo attacks, as a result of which 3 transports (13757 brt) were sunk.
The commanders were: Surin V.S. (1931), K. l-t, K. 3 p. Izrailevich I.S. (1941), Ph.D. Trofimov I. Ya. (1943).
"D-5" ("Spartak")
(serial number 28)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant number 198 (Nikolaev state plant). Launched on April 16, 1929, entered service on May 17, 1931. Joined the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933 she paid a visit to Istanbul. September 15, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-5". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet.
November 18 - November 21, 1941 the fifth military campaign in the Second World War. November 19, 1941 fired at enemy positions in the Alushta region.
December 28, 1941 - January 2, 1942 the sixth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 30, 1941, as part of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, she landed a sabotage group in the Koktebel bay. Of the 31 people, only 21 managed to disembark, and two of them died during disembarkation, capsizing in the boat. The remaining ten people were taken back to Novorossiysk. Until January 2, 1942, navigation support for the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation.
On March 23, 1942, when moored in Tuapse, the boat received heavy damage to the hull and mechanisms from close explosions of aerial bombs, but remained afloat and was put under repair.
June 26 - July 1, 1942 the ninth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport support of Sevastopol. For three flights, she delivered 120.2 tons of ammunition, 71 tons of gasoline, evacuated 177 people to the Caucasus.
December 4 - December 18, 1942 the fourteenth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 8, 1942, the boat sent artillery fire to the Turkish motor-sailing schooner "Kociboglu" ("Kojiboglu" - 100 tons).
Spring 1943 - being repaired. She no longer participated in hostilities.
Since October 15, 1946, it has been at the disposal of the Research Mine-Torpedo Institute of the Navy. On October 2, 1948, the boat was reorganized into an experimental submarine. January 12, 1949 assigned to the subclass of large submarines. June 16, 1949 renamed to "B-32". On December 29, 1955, she was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with delivery to the OFI for dismantling and sale. On January 18, 1956, it was disbanded and subsequently cut into metal on the basis of Glavvtorchermet in Sevastopol.
The term of combat service is 20.3 months (June 22, 1941 - March 1, 1943), 16 military campaigns (145 days). 1 torpedo attack. 1 ship (100 tons) was sunk by artillery fire.
The commanders were: room 3 r. Savitsky S.T. (1941), Art. l-t., c. l-t. Strshelnitsky Yu.A. (1941), Art. l-t., c. l-t. Timofeev I. Ya. (1942), Ph.D. Sukhodolsky N.V. (1944), office 3 p. Panov N.A. (1944).
"D-6" ("Jacobin")
(serial number 29)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant number 198 (Nikolaev state plant). Launched on November 15, 1930, entered service on June 12, 1931. Joined the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933 she paid a visit to Istanbul. September 15, 1934 received the letter-digital designation "D-6". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1935 (?) She got up at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol for overhaul and modernization. On August 18, 1941, she went to sea, but 60 miles west of Sevastopol she was attacked by enemy aircraft, was damaged and was forced to return and again get up for repairs. On November 12, 1941, during the bombing of the Marine Plant in Sevastopol, it was again damaged. On June 26, 1942, due to the impossibility of evacuation with the dismantled hull and mechanisms, by order of the command, it was blown up and destroyed by the crew on the eve of the Soviet troops leaving the city. On July 11, 1942, she was expelled from the Navy. In the spring of 1945 it was raised by the Black Sea Fleet's rescue service. On June 7, 1945, due to the inexpediency of restoration, it was excluded from the Black Sea Fleet for the second time in connection with delivery to the OFI for dismantling and cutting into metal.
History reference
In terms of service life, this boat has no equal in our submarine fleet. Different winds caressed her naval flag, the waves of the Baltic, Barents and Kara seas closed over her. Today the wind of history rushes over the deck of the glorious submarine. But everything must have a beginning.
On November 26, 1926, the USSR Labor and Defense Council approved the program of military shipbuilding for 1926-1932, which provided, in addition to the construction of surface ships, the construction of 12 submarines of various types.
On March 5, 1927 at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad, the firstborn of the Soviet submarine shipbuilding was laid - the head submarine "Decembrist" (from August 21, 1934 - D-1). At the same time, the construction of Narodovollets (from August 21, 1934, D-2) and Krasnogvardeyts (from August 21, 1934, D-3) began. S.M. Kirov hammered the first rivet into the bottom detail of the D-1 lead boat. On November 3, 1928, the Decembrist left the stocks, and on May 19, 1929, the Narodovolets submarine was launched. In April 1927, three more D-class submarines were laid down at the shipyard in Nikolaev. These ships were built according to a project developed under the leadership of the talented designer B.M. Malinin (1889-1949) and constituted the first series of USSR submarines. B. Malinin was one of the few engineers who, even before the revolution, personally participated in the construction of submarines. On the basis of this experience and extremely scant theoretical data, B. Malinin with a group of designers began to develop design materials for the construction of the first Soviet submarines. A total of 6 submarines of the Dekabrist class were built.
The tactical and technical elements of the first Soviet submarines were at a high level and were not inferior to foreign ones, and even surpassed them in some respects. New submarines were subjected to very tough tests, and
On October 12, 1931, "Narodovolets" became part of the Navy. In 1933 the White Sea - Baltic Canal was commissioned. The opening of navigation along this largest waterway in our country (length 226 km) made it possible to transfer part of the ships from the Baltic Sea to the Northern Sea Theater. In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense on April 15, all three D-class submarines were transferred to the North, where they became the first submarines of the young Northern Military Flotilla. On August 5, 1933, all three boats were included in this flotilla.
In 1939, the well-known Soviet pilot VK Kokkinaki made a non-stop flight from Moscow across the North Atlantic to the United States on a Moscow plane. To ensure this flight, the command of the Northern Fleet allocated submarines Shch-402, Shch-403, Shch-404 and D-2. When performing this task, the submariners climbed to high latitudes, using the experience of sailing D-3 ("Krasnogvardeets"). For the development of the northern maritime theater, a large group of North Sea residents were awarded orders. The commander of the D-2 L.M. Reisner was awarded the Order of Lenin. Before the Great Patriotic War on September 22, 1939, the D-2 returned to Leningrad for overhaul and modernization, and in August 1941 it was included in the Baltic Fleet. The crew of the boat met the Great Patriotic War at the Baltic Shipyard. Submariners shared the hardships of the blockade winter of 1941-1942 with the Leningraders. The submarine under the command of Captain 3rd Rank R.V. Lindenberg made its first combat campaign from September 23 to November 4, 1942, and the next day it landed in an anti-submarine net. Gave the fullest forward speed with simultaneous blowing of the main ballast tanks.
The boat surfaced, but did not get rid of the net. For two nights (during the day they were submerged so that the enemy would not find the boat), the emergency party chopped steel cables in rough weather in cold weather. The work was supervised by Lieutenant Commander S. N. Bogorad (later the commander of the Baltic Shch-310, Hero of the Soviet Union). D-2 broke into the South Baltic, torpedoed and sank the transport "Jakubus Fritzen" (4090 brt) off the Bornholm island, and five days later attacked a convoy, which included two railway ferries carrying Wehrmacht soldiers. One of these ferries "Deutschland" (2972 brt) was seriously damaged, more than 600 soldiers and officers were killed. The submarine was pursued by anti-submarine ships, within four hours 48 depth charges were dropped on it, but the D-2 returned safely to Leningrad, where it was met by the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. In total, the submarine had 12 torpedo attacks and four enemy transports. During the war, D-2 made 4 military campaigns (from September 23 to November 4, 1942, October 2 - 30, 1944, from December 12, 1944 to January 20, 1945 and from April 20 to May 18, 1945) ...
After the end of the war, the D-2 continued to serve in the Baltic. In the post-war period, in 1953-1954, the boat participated in tests of microclimate systems. This is a unique experiment staged in connection with the creation of the first Soviet atomic submarine of project 627. The nuclear power plant made it possible to significantly increase the duration of autonomous diving. But at the same time, the problem arose of ensuring the habitability of the ship - creating conditions on it for maintaining the health and performance of the personnel.
In June 1956, the submarine was withdrawn from the fleet, disarmed and reorganized into a training station for damage control (UTS-6). In its new capacity, the D-2 was successfully used until 1987, providing submariners with methods of fighting fire and water, as well as methods of getting out of a sunken submarine.
In 1989, the USSR government adopted a special decree on the creation of a memorial complex dedicated to the heroes-submariners of the Great Patriotic War, scientists, designers and shipbuilders. Such a memorial complex was developed on the basis of the D-2 submarine. Technical documentation for restoration work developed by the Central Design Bureau of Marine Engineering FSUE TsKB MT Rubin (EV Butuzov, VP Semenov, K.Z.Saravaysky), and the bulk of the restoration and restoration work was carried out by the Baltic Shipyard. The scientific development of the exposition project and its architectural and artistic solution were carried out by the staff of the Central Naval Museum.
Unlike similar memorial boats of the Pacific and Northern fleets, it was decided to restore in the compartments equipment, instruments and mechanisms (some of them are operational), as they were during the period of combat use of the submarine. The exception was the battery pits, from which the batteries were unloaded, and the pits themselves were used to house the exposition.
Among the museum ships of Russia and other countries, the submarine D-2 "Narodovolets" occupies a special place. This is noted by numerous visitors and foreign specialists... The uniqueness of the sub is that during its construction at the Baltic Shipyard (1927-1931) there was no electric welding, and therefore now you can see a riveted strong hull. In fact, all components and assemblies (including the diesel from the German company MAN) have been recreated, which allows you to feel the conditions in which Soviet submariners lived and carried out combat service. Most of all, of course, visitors are struck by the creepy, as it seems to them, tightness and unsuitability of the boat's compartments for life.
On September 2, 1994, the naval flag was solemnly raised on the D-2 submarine (Narodovolets) and a museum exposition was opened. V.V. Putin, Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, Vice-Admiral V.V. Grishanov, Rear Admiral L.D. Chernavin, Head of the Central Naval Museum Captain 1st Rank E.N. .Korchagin and others. The memorial complex has become a remarkable monument to the history of the Russian fleet and submarine building, the life of one of the first Russian submarines continued. Scientific conferences, exhibitions and meetings of veterans-submariners are held in the museum halls of the complex.
The branch of the TsVMM on the D-2 "Narodovolets" submarine is not only a carrier of naval combat history - it is also a cultural center. For example, there is a conference room in the coastal building of the memorial complex, where the control and engineering support post is located. Various events are constantly held there.
Today this work was carried out in accordance with the programs of preparation for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Russian submarine forces, the 75th anniversary of the D-2 Narodovolets submarine and the 300th anniversary of the Central Naval Museum (2009).
This unique ship museum employs people who are in love with the history of the glorious Russian submarine fleet: Captain 1st rank in reserve, senior researcher L.A. Nesterov, captain 1st rank retired, junior researcher B.A. Arkhipov, captain 1st rank retired R. V. Ryzhikov, captain of the 3rd rank of the reserve engineer A. G. Laskov, who at one time served on diesel and nuclear submarines of the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets.
Kind words are deserved by the staff of T. V. Nosova, N. G. Frolova, M. V. Kornilova, who take an active part in organizing excursions, keeping the museum in excellent condition.
BASIC TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTSSUBMARINE BOAT D-2 ("NATIONAL WELFARE")
- Displacement, t: surface - 940, underwater - 1360.
- Length, m - 76.6.
- Maximum width, m - 6.4.
- Draft, m - 3.6.
- Speed, knots: surface - 14.6, underwater - 9.5.
- Autonomy, days - 40.
- Maximum immersion depth, m - 90.
- Crew;, people - 53.
- Armament:
- torpedo - 8-533 mm torpedo tubes, 14 torpedoes,
- artillery - 1-102-mm and 1-45-mm guns.
SUBMARINE COMMANDERS"PEOPLE'S WELCOME"- D 2
- Vorobiev Vladimir Semenovich - 1928-1931
- Nazarov Mikhail Kuzmich - 1931-1932
- Reisner Lev Mikhailovich - 1932-1937
- Datchenko Gavriil Grigorievich - 1937-1938
- Zhukov Arkady Alekseevich - 1938-1939
- Zaydulitt Izmail Magigulovich - 1939-1940
- Lindenberg Roman Vladimirovich - 1940-1945
- Alexandrov Valentin Petrovich - 1945-1947
- Kovalenko Georgy Danilovich - 1947-1948
- Egorov Sergey Grigorievich - 1948-1949
- Andashev Viktor Petrovich - since 1949
- Khomich Ivan Markovich - 1951-1955
- Ananyev Vsevolod Ivanovich - 1955
- Krylov Yuri Alexandrovich - 1955-1956
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