B2 is great and terrible. Engine from a tank Tank T 34 what kind of fuel

T-34 at war

T-34 ("thirty-four") - Soviet medium tank during the Great Patriotic War, produced in series since 1940, and since 1944 it became the main medium tank of the Red Army of the USSR. Developed in Kharkov. The most massive medium tank of the Second World War. From 1942 to 1945 the main, large-scale production of the T-34 was deployed at powerful machine-building plants in the Urals and Siberia, and continued in the post-war years. The leading plant for the modification of the T-34 was the Ural Tank Plant No. 183. The latest modification (T-34-85) is in service with some countries to this day.

Due to its combat qualities, the T-34 was recognized by a number of specialists as the best medium tank of the Second World War and had a tremendous impact on the further development of world tank building. When creating it, Soviet designers managed to find the optimal balance between the main combat, operational and technological characteristics.

The T-34 tank is the most famous Soviet tank of the Second World War, as well as one of its most recognizable symbols. A large number of these tanks of various modifications have survived to this day in the form of monuments and museum exhibits.

History of creation

A-20 creation program. Since 1931, a series of light wheeled-tracked tanks "BT" was developed in the USSR, the prototype of which was the car of the American designer Walter Christie. In the course of serial production, vehicles of this type were constantly modernized in the direction of increasing firepower, manufacturability, reliability and other parameters. By 1937, the BT-7M tank with a conical turret was created in the USSR and began mass production; further development of the BT line was envisaged in several directions:

Increasing the power reserve by using a diesel engine (this direction led to the creation of the BT-7M tank).
Improvement of wheel travel (the work of N.F. Tsyganov's group on experimental BT-IS tanks).
Strengthening the tank's protection by installing armor at significant angles of inclination with a slight increase in its thickness. The group of N.F. Tsyganov (experimental BT-SV tank) and the design bureau of the Kharkov plant worked in this direction.

From 1931 to 1936 the talented designer Afansy Osipovich Firsov headed the design bureau of the Tank Department of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). All BT tanks were created under his leadership, and he made a significant contribution to the development of the V-2 diesel engine. At the end of 1935, elaborated sketches of a fundamentally new tank appeared: anti-cannon armor with large tilt angles, a long-barreled 76.2 mm cannon, a V-2 diesel engine, weighing up to 30 tons ... But in the summer of 1936, at the height of the repression, A.O. Firsov removed from the leadership of the KB. But he continues to work actively. A new gearbox for the BT tank was launched into production, developed by A.A. Morozov under the leadership of A.O. Firsov, designs the installation of a flamethrower and smoke devices on the tank, personally meets and introduces the new head of the design bureau, M.I.Koshkin. In mid-1937 A.O. Firsov was arrested again and sent to prison, where he died. The first project, created under his leadership by Firsov who replaced Firsov as chief designer Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin, the BT-9 tank, was rejected in the fall of 1937 due to gross design errors and non-compliance with the requirements of the assignment.

Oddly enough, but Koshkin was not imprisoned and shot in the same "terrible 37th" for "sabotage" and disruption of the state order. Also, Koshkin at the same time "thwarted" work on the development of a modification of the BT-BT-IS tank, which was carried out at the same plant by the group of the adjunct VAMM them. Stalin, military engineer 3rd rank A.Ya. Dick, assigned to the Koshkin Design Bureau at the KhPZ. Apparently Koshkin found competent "patrons" in the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building? Or did he initially act on orders from above? It seems that there was a covert struggle between supporters of the eternal "modernization" of the light BT (and in fact, marking time and a waste of "people's" public funds) and supporters of a fundamentally new (breakthrough) middle-class tank, which differed from monsters with three towers, such as T -28.

On October 13, 1937, the Armored Directorate of the Red Army (ABTU) issued factory number 183 (KhPZ) tactical and technical requirements for a new tank under the symbol BT-20 (A-20).

Due to the weakness of the design bureau of plant number 183, a separate design bureau was created at the enterprise for work on the new tank, independent of the design bureau of Koshkin. The design bureau included a number of engineers from the design bureau of plant No. 183 (including A. A. Morozov), as well as about forty graduates of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (VAMM). The leadership of the design bureau was entrusted to the WAMM adjunct, Adolf Dick. Development is going on in difficult conditions: arrests continue at the plant.

In this chaos, Koshkin continues to develop his direction - the drawings, on which the backbone of the Firso design bureau (KB-24) is working, should form the basis of the future tank.

In September 1938, following a review of the BT-20 mockup, it was decided to manufacture three tanks (one wheeled-tracked and two tracked) and one armored hull for shelling tests. By the beginning of 1939, KB-24 completed working drawings for the A-20 and began designing the A-20G [sn 2]. "G" - tracked, later designated A-32.

At the end of September 1939, after showing the A-20 and A-32 (test driver N.F. sea \u200b\u200btrials of the A-32 tank, loaded with ballast (at the same time, a tower from the A-20 with a 45-mm cannon was installed on the tank). On December 19, at a meeting of the Defense Committee, based on the results of tests of the A-32, Resolution No. 443 was adopted, which prescribed: Tank T-32 - tracked, with a diesel engine V-2, manufactured by plant No. 183 of the People's Commissariat for Medium Machinery Industry, with the following changes:

Pre-war tanks manufactured by factory # 183. From left to right: BT-7, A-20, T-34-76 with the L-11 cannon, T-34-76 with the F-34 cannon.

a) increase the thickness of the main armor plates to 45 mm;
b) improve visibility from the tank;
c) install the following weapons on the T-32 tank:
1) an F-32 76 mm cannon, paired with a 7.62 mm machine gun;
2) a separate machine gun for the radio operator - 7.62 mm;
3) a separate machine gun of 7.62 mm caliber;
4) 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine gun.
Name the specified tank T-34.

Pre-production tanks A-34 No. 1 and A-34 No. 2 On the night of March 5-6, 1940, tank No. 1 (test driver N. F. Nosik) and tank No. 2 (test driver I. G. Bitensky or V. Dyukanov) without weapons, camouflaged beyond recognition, as well as two heavy tracked artillery tractors "Voroshilovets" in the strictest secrecy went on their own to Moscow. Due to the breakdown of tank number 2 near Belgorod (breakage of the main clutch), the column split. Tank No. 1 arrived on March 12 at the machine-building plant No. 37 near Moscow, the city of Serpukhov, where it and the tank No. 2 that arrived later were repaired. On the night of March 17, both tanks arrived at the Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin to demonstrate to the leaders of the party and government.

On March 31, 1940, a protocol of the State Defense Committee was signed on the serial production of the A-34 (T-34) tank at plant number 183. The general production plan for 1940 was set at 200 vehicles, from 1942 STZ and KhPZ were to completely switch to the production of T -34 with a plan of 2000 tanks per year.

GABTU D.G. Pavlova presented a report on comparative tests to Marshal G.I. Kulik. That report approved and suspended the production and acceptance of the T-34, until “all shortcomings” were eliminated (what honest and principled generals we had then!). K.E. intervened. Voroshilov: “We will continue to make machines, submit them to the army. Limit the factory mileage to 1000 km ... "(the same" blunt horseman "). At the same time, everyone knew that the war would not be today or tomorrow. Months were carved out. Pavlov was a member of the country's military council, but he was, well, a very “principled officer”. Maybe for this "courage and adherence to principles" Stalin agreed with the appointment of the hero of the Soviet Union DG Pavlov to the "main" district-ZAPOVO? But how Pavlov boldly and fundamentally commanded this district, surrendering Minsk on the fifth day, has already become a fact of history. At the same time, Pavlov himself was a professional tanker, fought in tanks in Spain, received a hero of the Soviet Union for this war. His proposal to create a tracked tank with projectile armor with the installation of a 76 mm cannon on this tank (the caliber of the guns of heavy tanks of those years!) Was even recorded in the minutes of the KO meeting at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in March 1938, two years earlier. That is, Pavlov, better than others, should have understood what kind of tank was in front of him. And it was this man who did everything in his power to disrupt the acceptance of this tank into service.

The order to put the T-34 into mass production was signed by the Defense Committee on March 31, 1940, and the adopted protocol instructed to immediately put it into production at factories No. 183 and STZ. Plant No. 183 was ordered to produce the first experimental batch of 10 tanks by the first days of July. After the completion of the tests of two prototypes, a production plan was adopted, providing for the production of 150 machines in 1940, which by June 7 was increased to 600 machines, 500 of which were to be supplied by plant No. 183, while the remaining 100 were to be delivered by STZ. Due to delays in the supply of components, only four vehicles were assembled at factory # 183 in June, and the production of tanks at STZ was even more delayed. Although the production rates had been raised by the fall, they were still significantly behind the plan and were delayed by the lack of components, so in October, due to the lack of L-11 guns, the military commission accepted only one tank. The production of T-34s at STZ was even more delayed. Throughout 1940, work was underway to adapt the initially complex and low-tech tank to serial production, but despite this, during 1940, according to various sources, only from 97 to 117 vehicles were produced. During the fall of 1940, a number of larger changes were made to the design of the T-34, such as the installation of a more powerful F-34 cannon, and cast and stamped towers were also developed at the Mariupol plant.

But in fact, M.I. Koshkin is not the father of the T-34. Rather, he is his "stepfather", or "cousin" father. Koshkin began his career as a tank designer at the Kirov plant, in the design bureau of medium and heavy tanks. In this design bureau, he worked on "medium" tanks T-28, T-29 with bulletproof armor. The T-29 already differed from the T-28 in the type of chassis, rollers and an experimental torsion bar suspension, instead of a spring one. Then this type of suspension (torsion bars) was used on heavy tanks "KV", "IS". Then Koshkin was transferred to Kharkov, to the design bureau of light tanks, and apparently with the prospect of starting work on the design of the "medium" ones, but on the basis of the light "BT". He had to, fulfilling the order of the army, making a light wheeled-tracked tank BT-20 (A-20), to achieve at least on its base to make a tracked version of this machine-A-20G, and bring it to the same T-34 ... Born from the blueprints of a light tank, the T-34 had problems with tightness in the tank and other shortcomings. Also from the light "BT" Koshkin got the chassis (on some T-34s they even put rollers from the "BT" tank, although they were already necessary calculated) and a spring suspension. Almost in parallel with the "creation and modernization" of the T-34, Koshkin also designed another medium tank, the T-34M, which had other chassis rollers, similar to those of the heavy "KV" wheels, with a torsion bar rather than a spring suspension (an example of the "universalization" of tank production , which was then used by the Germans in the production of their tanks during the War), a more spacious six-sided turret with a commander's cupola (it was later installed on the T-34 in 1942). This tank was even approved by the Defense Committee in January 1941. In May 1941, fifty of these towers were already manufactured at the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant, the first armored hulls, rollers, and a torsion bar suspension were manufactured (the "suspension from BT" remained on the T-34). But the engine for him was never made. And the outbreak of the war put an end to this model. Although the Koshkinskoye Design Bureau was engaged in intensive development of a new, "native" T-34M tank, more "better", but the outbreak of the War demanded a build-up of machines already put on the conveyor, those that are. And then, throughout the war, there was a constant alteration and improvement of the T-34. Its modernization was carried out at every plant where the T-34 was assembled, constantly striving to reduce the cost of the tank. But all the same, the emphasis was placed, first of all, on increasing the number of produced tanks and throwing them into battle, especially in the fall and winter of 1941. "Comfort" was taken up later.

What happened

The start of serial production of the T-34 was the final stage in the three-year work of Soviet tank builders to create a fundamentally new combat vehicle. In 1941, the T-34 was superior to any tank in service with the German army. The Germans, in response to the appearance of the T-34, developed the Panther, but also used captured T-34s wherever they could. Among several modifications of the T-34 was a flamethrower tank with a flamethrower installed in the hull instead of a frontal machine gun. In 1940-1945, the volume of production of "thirty-fours" was constantly increased, while labor costs and cost were reduced. So, during the war, the labor intensity of manufacturing one tank decreased 2.4 times (including an armored hull - 5 times, a diesel engine - 2.5 times), and the cost almost halved (from 270,000 rubles in 1941 to 142,000 rubles in 1945). T-34s were produced in thousands - the number of T-34s of all modifications, built in 1940-1945, exceeds 40,000.

Thirty-four "undoubtedly surpassed all enemy tanks at the beginning of the war in armament, protection and maneuverability. But it also had drawbacks." Childhood illnesses "affected the rapid failure of the onboard clutches. Visibility from the tank and the comfort of the crew left much to be desired .Only a part of the vehicles was equipped with a radio station. The fenders and rectangular holes in the rear of the turret (on the machines of the first releases) were vulnerable. The presence of a frontal machine gun and a driver's hatch weakened the durability of the frontal armor plate. And although the shape of the T-34 hull was an object of imitation for designers for many years, already the heir of the "thirty-four" - the T-44 tank, these shortcomings were eliminated.

Combat use

The first T-34s began to enter the troops in the late autumn of 1940. By June 22, 1941, 1,066 T-34 tanks had been produced, in the border military districts there were 967 T-34s in the mechanized corps (mk) (including 50 in the Baltic Military District, 266 in the Western Special Military District). and in the Kiev Special Military District - 494 pcs.). The proportion of new types of tanks (T-34, KV and T-40 (tank)) in the troops was small, the basis of the Red Army's tank fleet before the war was lightly armored T-26 and BT. From the very first days of the war, T-34s took an active part in the hostilities. In a number of cases, T-34s were successful, but in general, their use, like tanks of other types, during the border battle turned out to be unsuccessful - most of the tanks were quickly lost, while the German offensive was not stopped. The fate of the 15mk vehicles, which had 72 T-34 and 64 KV on June 22, 1941, is quite characteristic. For a month of fighting, almost all the tanks of the mechanized corps were lost. The reasons for the low efficiency and high losses of the T-34 during this period are called the poor development of new tanks by personnel, tactically illiterate use of tanks, a shortage of armor-piercing shells, design flaws of poorly worked out in mass production vehicles, a lack of repair and evacuation means and the rapid movement of the front line , which forced to abandon out of order, but maintainable tanks.

In the battles of the summer of 1941, the insufficient effectiveness against the T-34s of the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank guns, which were the most massive in the German army at that time, as well as German tank guns of all calibers, quickly became clear. However, the Wehrmacht possessed the means to successfully fight the T-34. In particular, 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns, 47-mm Pak 181 (f) and Pak 36 (t) anti-tank guns, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, 100-mm corps guns and 105- mm howitzers.

There are two reasons why the T-34s did not become the weapon that decided the outcome of the battles in the summer of 1941.The first is the incorrect tactics of tank combat among the Russians, the practice of spraying T-34s, using them together with lighter vehicles or as support for infantry, instead of in order, like the Germans, to strike with powerful armored fists, break through the enemy's front and wreak havoc in his rear. The Russians did not grasp the fundamental rule of tank warfare, formulated by Guderian in a single phrase: "Do not dissipate - gather all forces together." The second mistake was in the technique of fighting the Soviet tankers. The T-34 had one very vulnerable spot. The crew of four - the driver, gunner, loader and radio operator - lacked a fifth member, the commander. In the T-34, the commander served as a gunner. The combination of two tasks - maintenance of the gun and control over what is happening on the battlefield - did not contribute to the conduct of quick and effective fire. While the T-34 fired one round, the German T-IV consumed three. Thus, in battle, this served the Germans as compensation for the range of the T-34 cannons, and, despite the strong sloping 45-mm armor, Panzerwaffe's tankers hit Russian vehicles in the tracks of the tracks and other "weak points". In addition, each Soviet tank unit had only one radio transmitter - in the tank of the company commander.

As a result, Russian tank units were less mobile than German ones. Nonetheless, the T-34s remained formidable and respectable weapons throughout the war. It is even difficult to imagine what consequences the massive use of the T-34 in the first weeks of the war could entail. What impression was made by the tactics of the use of their tank units by the Germans on the Soviet infantry. Unfortunately, the Soviet army did not have at that time sufficient experience in conducting battles with large tank formations and a sufficient number of T-34s.

The situation changed dramatically at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942. The number of T-34s increased, and the design was constantly improved. The tactics of using tanks have changed. Artillery and aviation began to be used together with tank formations.

After the abolition of the defeated mechanized corps, by the end of the summer of 1941, the brigade became the largest tank organizational unit. Until the fall of 1941, T-34s sent to the front from factories made up a relatively small percentage of Soviet tanks and did not cause the Germans particularly serious problems. However, since the number of tanks of old types was rapidly decreasing, the share of T-34s in the composition of the Soviet tank forces gradually grew - so, by October 16, 1941 in the Moscow direction, almost 42% of the available 582 tanks (244 tanks) were T-34s. The sudden appearance of new vehicles at the front had a great effect on German tankers:

"... until at the beginning of October 1941 the eastern Orel in front of the German 4th tank division did not appear Russian T-34 tanks and showed our tankers accustomed to victories their superiority in weapons, armor and maneuverability. The T-34 tank made a sensation. This 26 -tone Russian tank was armed with a 76.2-mm cannon (caliber 41.5), the shells of which pierced the armor of German tanks from 1.5 - 2 thousand meters, while German tanks could hit Russians from a distance of no more than 500 m, and even then only if the shells hit the side and rear of the T-34 tank. "

Since the fall of 1941, the T-34s began to pose a serious problem for the German troops, the actions of the 4th armored brigade of M.E. Katukov against units of the 4th armored division of the Wehrmacht near Mtsensk in October 1941 are especially indicative in this regard. If back in early October 1941 G. Guderian in a letter to the leadership of the tank forces stated:

"... the Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and have repeatedly proved their superiority ..."

then by the end of the same month, under the influence of the actions of the Katukov brigade, his opinion about the capabilities of the T-34 changed significantly:

“I drew up a report on this situation, which is new for us, and sent it to the Army Group. I described in understandable terms the clear advantage of the T-34 over our Pz.IV and gave the appropriate conclusions that were supposed to affect our future tank building ... "

After the battle for Moscow, the T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army, since 1942 more of them have been produced than all other tanks combined. In 1942, T-34s take the most active part in battles along the entire front line, with the exception of the Leningrad Front and the Kola Peninsula. The role of these tanks in the Battle of Stalingrad was especially significant, due to the proximity to the combat area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, from the shops of which the tanks went directly to the front. It should be noted that from the end of 1941, German troops began to receive new, more effective means of anti-tank warfare, and therefore, during 1942, the T-34 gradually lost its position of relative invulnerability from the standard anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. From the end of 1941, German troops began to receive sub-caliber and cumulative shells in significant quantities; From the beginning of 1942, production of the 37 mm Pak 35/36 cannon was discontinued, and the 50 mm Pak 38 cannon was significantly increased. In the spring of 1942, German troops began to receive powerful 75 mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns; however, their production developed rather slowly. The troops began to receive anti-tank guns created by altering captured guns - Pak 36 (r) and Pak 97/38, as well as, in relatively small numbers, powerful anti-tank guns with a tapered bore - 28/20-mm sPzB 41, 42- mm Pak 41 and 75-mm Pak 41. The armament of German tanks and self-propelled guns was strengthened - they received long-barreled 50-mm and 75-mm guns with high armor penetration. At the same time, there was a gradual increase in the frontal armor of German tanks and assault guns.

1943 was the year of the most mass production and use of T-34 tanks with a 76 mm cannon. The largest battle of this period was the Battle of Kursk, during which the Soviet tank units, which were based on the T-34, together with other types of troops, managed to stop the German offensive, while suffering heavy losses. Modernized German tanks and assault guns, which had frontal armor reinforced to 70-80 mm, became less vulnerable to the T-34 cannon, while their artillery armament made it possible to confidently hit Soviet tanks. The appearance of heavily armed and well-armored heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" added to this rather bleak picture. The question of enhancing the armament and armoring of the tank was urgently raised, which led to the creation of a modification of the T-34-85.

In 1944, the T-34 with the 76-mm cannon continued to be the main Soviet tank, but from the middle of the year the tank was gradually replaced by the T-34-85. As part of the Soviet tank units, the T-34 took part in major offensive operations, which ended with the defeat of a large number of German units and the liberation of significant territories. Despite lagging behind German tanks in armament and armor, the T-34s acted quite successfully - the Soviet military leadership, having created a significant numerical superiority and seizing the strategic initiative, could choose the directions of strikes and, having hacked the enemy's defenses, introduce tank units into a breakthrough, conducting large-scale operations to the environment. German tank units, at best, managed to fend off the impending crisis, at worst, they were forced to quickly retreat from the planned "boilers", abandoning faulty equipment or simply remaining without fuel. The Soviet military leadership sought to avoid tank battles as much as possible, leaving anti-tank artillery and aviation to fight against German tanks.

The technical reliability of the T-34, significantly increased by the beginning of 1945, allowed the command to conduct a series of quick and deep operations with their participation. At the beginning of 1945, the headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army noted that the T-34s exceeded the guaranteed service life by 1.5-2 times and had a practical resource of up to 350-400 hours.

By the beginning of 1945, the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon was already relatively small in the troops, the niche of the main Soviet tank was firmly occupied by the T-34-85. Nevertheless, the remaining vehicles, in particular in the form of sapper tanks-minesweepers, took an active part in the battles of the final year of the war, including in the Berlin operation. A number of these tanks took part in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

In general, a tank is needed to fight, first of all, with manpower and enemy fortifications, and here a more powerful HE shell is needed. Ammunition (b.c.) T-34 consisted of 100 shots, and 75 of them were with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile. Of course, the tankers themselves, along the way, took into the tank what they needed most. But in any case, not only armor-piercing shells. When the Tiger or Panther reaches the T-34 in 1.5-2 km, and with good optics, and with comfort and a smooth ride, it's great. But the war is not being fought on open ranges. The incidents of destruction of our tanks at such a distance were so isolated that they did not even affect the "local battles". More often than not, the tankers still burned each other point-blank, but from ambushes. And here other qualities of the tank are more important, for example, maneuverability, which depends on the mass of the tank. Until now, our tanks, the great-grandchildren of the T-34, with all characteristics equal to those of the "Americans" and "Germans", have less weight.

Even the 122 mm cannon of separate-case loading of the IS-2, yielding in rate of fire to the "tiger" one, solved the problem of not only fighting the armored vehicles of the Germans. The IS-2 was called the breakthrough tank. And the same "Tiger" was just tasked with destroying our armored vehicles, better from afar, better from ambushes and always under the cover of their medium tanks. If the army wins, then it needs breakthrough tanks with a predominance in the battlefield. HE shells. If it retreats, then destroyer tanks are needed. At the same time, the Germans focused on "supertanks" of piece production, "Tigers" and "Panthers" stamped only about 7000 units during the entire War. Stalin focused on the mass production of the T-34 and ZIS-3.

Description of construction

Serial modifications:

Medium tank T-34/76 mod. 1940 - T-34/76 tanks, produced in 1940, had a combat weight of 26.8 tons and were armed with a 76-mm L-11 cannon of the 1939 model;
Medium tank T-34/76 mod. 1941/42 - with the F-32 / F-34 cannon;
Medium tank T-34-76 mod. 1942 - with a cast turret;
Medium tank T-34-76 mod. 1942/43 - a five-speed gearbox was introduced on the tanks, instead of a four-speed one, a more powerful 9-R radio station was installed instead of 71-TK-3, a commander's cupola appeared, and the tower itself became hexagonal.

A short summary of the number of T-34s produced:

For 1940 - 110 pieces;
For 1941 - 2996 pieces;
For 1942 - 1252 units;
For 1943 - 15,821 pieces;
For 1944 - 14648 pieces;
For 1945 - 12551 pieces;
For 1946 - 2707 pieces.

The T-34 has a classic layout. The tank's crew consists of four people - a driver-mechanic and a radio operator-gunner, located in the control compartment and a loader with a commander, who also acts as a gunner, who were located in a two-seat turret.

There were no clearly identified modifications of the linear T-34-76. Nevertheless, there were significant differences in the design of production vehicles, caused by the different production conditions at each of the factories that produced them at certain periods of time, as well as by the general improvement of the tank. In the historical literature, these differences are usually grouped by manufacturer and production period, sometimes with an indication of a characteristic feature if two or more types of machines were produced in parallel at the plant. However, in the army, the picture could become even more complicated, since, due to the high maintainability of the T-34, damaged tanks were most often restored again, and units of damaged vehicles of different versions were often assembled into a whole tank in a variety of combinations.

Armored corps and turret

Armored body T-34 - welded, assembled from rolled plates and sheets of homogeneous steel grade MZ-2 (I8-S), thickness 13, 16, 40 and 45 mm, after assembly subjected to surface hardening. Armor protection of the tank is anti-cannon, equal strength, made with rational angles of inclination. The frontal part consisted of 45 mm thick armor plates converging in a wedge: the upper one located at an angle of 60 ° to the vertical and the lower one, located at an angle of 53 °. Between themselves, the upper and lower frontal armor plates were connected using a beam. The sides of the hull in their lower part were located vertically and had a thickness of 45 mm. The upper part of the sides, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe fenders, consisted of 40-mm armor plates located at an angle of 40 °. The stern part was assembled from two 40-mm armor plates converging in a wedge: the upper one, located at an angle of 47 ° and the bottom, located at an angle of 45 °. The roof of the tank in the area of \u200b\u200bthe engine-transmission compartment was assembled from 16-mm armor plates, and in the area of \u200b\u200bthe turret box it had a thickness of 20 mm. The bottom of the tank was 13 mm thick under the engine compartment and 16 mm in the frontal part, and a small section of the aft end of the bottom consisted of 40 mm armor plate. The T-34 tower is a two-seater, close to a hexagonal shape, with a stern niche. Depending on the manufacturing plant and the year of production, turrets of various designs could be installed on the tank. On the T-34 of the first issues, a welded tower of rolled plates and sheets was installed. The walls of the tower were made of 45-mm armor plates, located at an angle of 30 °, the front of the tower was a 45-mm, curved in the form of a half-cylinder, a plate with cutouts for mounting a gun, machine gun and sight. The roof of the tower consisted of a 15-mm armor plate bent at an angle from 0 ° to 6 ° to the horizontal, the bottom of the aft niche was a horizontal 13-mm armor plate. Although other types of towers were also assembled by welding, it is the towers of the original type that are known in the literature as “welded”.

Firepower

The 76.2-mm L-11 and F-34 guns installed on the T-34 provided him in 1940-1941 with a significant superiority in gun power over all serial samples of foreign armored vehicles due to a balanced combination of relatively high action against both armored and unarmored targets. The armor penetration of the F-34 was significantly inferior to the KwK 40, and pretty decently to the American 75-mm M-3 gun, but in 1941-1942 its capabilities were more than enough to defeat German tanks and assault guns, the thickness of which at that time did not exceed 50- 70 mm. So, according to the secret report of NII-48 from 1942, the frontal armor of German tanks confidently penetrated 76.2-mm shells at almost any distance, including within the course angles ± 45 °. Only the middle frontal armor plate 50 mm thick, located at an inclination of 52 ° to the vertical, made its way only from a distance of up to 800 m. During the war, the design of the tank was constantly modernized, in place of it, other newer and more effective guns were installed on the tank.

Security

The level of armor protection of the T-34 provided him with reliable protection from all standard anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941. The 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank guns, which constituted the vast majority of the Wehrmacht's anti-tank guns, had any chance of penetrating the frontal armor only if they hit weakened areas. The sides of the T-34 with 37-mm caliber projectiles were struck only in the vertical lower part and at short distances, and without giving a guaranteed reserve action. The sub-caliber projectiles were more effective, capable of relatively effectively penetrating the lower side and sides of the turret, however, their actual firing range did not exceed 300 m, and their armor-piercing effect was low - often the tungsten carbide core crumbled into the sand after breaking through the armor, without harming the crew ... The 50-mm KwK 38 cannon with a 42 caliber barrel length, which was installed on the PzKpfw III Ausf.F - Ausf.J tanks, was also ineffective against the frontal armor of the T-34. The short-barreled 75-mm KwK 37 cannons, installed on the early modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG III, were even less effective, and with an armor-piercing projectile, except for hits in weakened zones, they could only hit the lower part of the sides at distances of less than 100 meters. However, the situation was greatly mitigated by the presence of a cumulative projectile in its ammunition load - although the latter worked only at relatively small meeting angles with armor and was also ineffective against the frontal protection of the T-34, but most of the tank was easily hit by it. The first really effective means of fighting the T-34 was the Pak 40 75-mm anti-tank gun, which appeared in the troops in any noticeable quantities by the spring of 1942, and the KwK 40 75-mm tank gun with a 43-caliber barrel length, installed on PzKpfw tanks IV and StuG.III assault guns from the summer of that year. The KwK 40 caliber armor-piercing projectile at a course angle of 0 ° hit the frontal armor of the T-34 hull from a distance of 1000 m or less, while the forehead of the turret in the area of \u200b\u200bthe gun mantlet was hit from 1 km or more. At the same time, the high-hardness armor used on the T-34 was prone to chipping from the inside, even when the shell ricocheted. So, long-barreled 75-mm guns formed dangerous fragments when hit at distances up to 2 km, and 88-mm - already up to 3 km. However, during 1942, relatively few long-barreled 75-mm guns were produced, and the bulk of the anti-tank weapons available to the Wehrmacht were still 37-mm and 50-mm guns. 50-mm guns at normal combat ranges in the summer of 1942 to disable the T-34 required an average of 5 hits with highly deficient sub-caliber projectiles.

About the oil consumption of the V-2 diesel engine and its numerous descendants (V-6 / V-6A / V-6B, V-46, A-650G, A-401, V-54T / A-712) installed on equipment as military (BTR-50, PT-76, T-72, ZSU Shilka), as well as economic (GT-T, ATC-59G, Vityaz DT-30, etc.), and how to fence it is written in note.

When you stand near a T-34 tank, wherever and in whatever condition it is, shiny with paint or, like ours, shabby and cut with a cutter, you want to take off your cap. Looking inside, in my thoughts I see my grandfather Misha, the gunner-radio operator. I remember his story, how I crawled out of the car, engulfed in tongues of flame, near Vienna. This is the history of my people, the pride of my country. And the technical idea is still alive.

Technical thoughts led me with my GT-T to him, namely to his V-2-34 engine. More precisely, this is a SU-100 self-propelled gun, judging by the shape of the remains of the hull cut off during the conversion of the combat vehicle into a transport top.

Diesel engines of the B-2 type developed in the 30s are still characterized by high specific parameters, their specific weight is only 2.05 kg / hp, and specific fuel consumption is 165 g / hp * h. But the age of the design causes disadvantages, the main of which are: ineffective operation of oil scraper rings of an outdated design and, as a consequence, high oil consumption for waste - 20 g / hp * h; rapid wear of the valve guides and even greater oil consumption that enters the cylinders after lubricating the cylinder head camshafts.

The design of the GT-T transporter-tractor uses the power plant of the PT-76 amphibious tank based on single-row diesel engines of the V-6 family, derived from the two-row V-2.

Many parts and assemblies of this type of motors are unified. Including the head of the main (left) cylinder block assembly, blocks with liners (silumin and cast iron) and pistons. On my B-6A, the wear of the valve bushings for 33 years of moderate operation has developed so much that when the manifold is removed, the process of flight and combustion of oil is observed in the valves with the naked eye. I had to change the cylinder head assembly.

The emergence of new materials and technologies makes it relatively easy to eliminate the above disadvantages. Nevertheless, for many years of serial production of diesel engines V-2, D12, A-650 and M-401, their design has practically not changed. And in the engine compartments of modern Ural tanks, the original forms of the V-2 tank diesel are easily guessed.

In the late thirties, we created a unique tank engine that stepped into the 21st century. To understand what we are dealing with and to admire the design idea again, let's look into history.

In the early 30s of the twentieth century, not only we did not have special tank engines. Thoughts that we were the first to put diesel on tanks are not entirely correct. The first to use a diesel engine on serial tanks in 1932 were the Poles, followed by the Japanese. These were low-power automobile diesel engines. The tanks were also relatively light. In the first half of the 30s. Soviet tanks were equipped with aviation gasoline engines that had exhausted their flight life. The operating conditions of a tank engine are sharp changes in the operating mode, load drops, difficult cooling conditions, air intake, etc. A tank engine must be more powerful than a car engine. Medium tanks needed an easy-to-operate, durable and reliable engine with a capacity of 300-400 hp, with good adaptability to significant overloads. As the German general G. Guderian wrote after the war, a tank engine should be considered the same weapon as a cannon.

In the early 30s, against the background of the lack of special tank engines in the world in general, in our country, they began to create a special tank diesel engine. It was a daring undertaking. The best design personnel were thrown into its implementation. Despite the lack of experience, the designers began work on creating a diesel engine capable of developing crankshaft revolutions up to 2000 rpm. They decided to design it as universal, i.e. suitable for installation on tanks, aircraft and tracked tractors. It was necessary to obtain the following indicators: power - 400-500 hp. at 1700/1800 rpm, specific gravity no more than 0.6 kgf / hp. In the 1930s, they worked on diesel engines not only at the NAMI Automobile Institute, but also at the Central Institute of Aviation Motors. They were developed for installation on airplanes and airships. The AN-1 heavy fuel aircraft engine created by CIAM was distinguished by its high efficiency and served as the basis for a number of many high-speed engines that are still used today, the basis and not a prototype, including the future tank engine.

By May 1, 1933, the BD-2 high-speed diesel engine was assembled and tested. But tests revealed so many defects in it that it was out of the question to put it on a tank. For example, the engine head with two valves did not provide the target power due to the low cylinder fill ratio. The exhaust was so smoky and pungent that it interfered with the work of the crews of the experienced BT-5 tanks. The crankcase and crankshaft structures were not sufficiently rigid. And nevertheless, by the end of 1937, a new finished model of a four-valve diesel engine was installed on the test bench, which by that time had received the name V-2. In the summer of 1939, the first B-2 serial diesel engines installed on tanks, artillery tractors and on test benches were subjected to the most rigorous examination.

In 1939, large-scale production of the world's first 500-horsepower high-speed tank V-2 diesel engines began, which were put into production by the same order of the Defense Committee, which adopted the T-34 and KV. The engine was born together with the tank.It had no analogues in the world of tank building. possessed amazing universalism.

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, V-2 tank diesels were produced only by plant # 75 in Kharkov. The pre-war developments of the factory # 75 design bureau include the creation of a 6-cylinder tank diesel engine V-4 with a capacity of 300 hp. at 1800 rpm, designed for installation in a light tank T-50. Their production was to be organized at one plant near Moscow. The war prevented this. But factory # 75 managed to produce several dozen of these motors. Other pre-war developments - diesel engines V-5 and V-6 (supercharged), created in "metal". Experimental diesel engines were also manufactured: boosted in terms of speed up to 700 hp. V-2sf and 850-strong V-2sn supercharged. The outbreak of war forced to stop this work and focus on improving the main diesel engine V-2. With the beginning of the war, V-2 began to produce STZ, and a little later, plant No. 76 in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Kirovsky (ChKZ). The first diesel engines in Chelyabinsk began to be produced in December 1941. I. Ya. Trashutin (all engines of post-war Ural tanks) became the chief designer of ChKZ for diesel engines. But there weren't enough motors. And in 1942 a diesel plant No. 77 was urgently built in Barnaul (the first ten diesels were produced in November 1942). All in all, these factories in 1942 produced 17211, in 1943 - 22974 and in 1944 - 28136 diesel engines. T-34 tanks and self-propelled units based on it were equipped with a V-2-34 diesel engine (on BT tanks - a V-2 diesel, and on heavy KB there was its 640-strong version of the V-2K). It is a 4-stroke, 12-cylinder V-type high-speed naturally aspirated water-cooled diesel engine with jet fuel spray. The cylinders are angled 60 ″ to each other. Rated engine power 450 HP at 1750 rpm of the crankshaft. Operating power at 1700 rpm - 500 HP The number of revolutions of the crankshaft at idle speed is 600 rpm. Specific fuel consumption - 160-170 g / hp. Cylinder diameter - 150 mm, displacement - 38, 8 liters, compression ratio - 14-15. The dry weight of the engine is 874 kg.

In the post-war years, the following modifications of the V-2 and V-6 engines were used at the objects of armored vehicles: V-55, V-55V, V-54B, V-54, V-54G, V-54K-IS, V-54K-IST , V-105B, V-105V, V-34-M11, V-2-34KR, V-2-34T, V12-5B, V-12-6V, V-6B, V-6, V-6PG, V -6PV, V-6PVG, V-6M, V-6R, V-6R-1 and V-6M-1. The B-2 was also adapted for the most varied needs of the national economy with the birth of a large number of modifications. The V-404S engine for the Antarctic snowmobile "Kharkovchanka" became a great success of the designer.

In the 1960s, the Trashutin Design Bureau created the B-46 turbo-piston diesel engines for the T-72 tanks and subsequent generations of combat vehicles. Further development was the latest modifications of the B-82 and B-92, which at the turn of the century reached the parameters initiated by the B-2 designers in the 30s - specific weight 1 - 0.7 kg / hp, power more than 1000 hp. at 2000 rpm. Equipped with gas turbine supercharging, improved fuel equipment and a cylinder-piston group, the V-92S2 diesel engine is at the level of the best world models, and surpasses most in terms of economy and specific mass-dimensional indicators. The mass of the В-92С2 engine is only 1020 kg, which is more than 2 times less than the weight of the AVDS-1790 (USA), C12V (England), UDV-12-1100 (France) engines. In terms of overall power, the V-92S2 surpasses them by 1.5 - 4.5 times, and in terms of fuel efficiency - by 5-25%. has a torque reserve of 25-30%. Such a reserve greatly facilitates machine control, increases maneuverability and average speed. The T-90 tank is one of the best serial images of armored military equipment in the world due to the highest combat effectiveness, acceptable cost and amazing reliability.

Let's go back to our life in the Polar Mountains. Being engaged in geological research, I again found myself at the facility where a self-propelled tractor SU-100 has been growing into the tundra for half a century. She, like three similarly reconstructed SAU-76 in other places, was abandoned in the early 60s of the last century in the open air by uranium geologists. To assess the condition of the insides of the V-2-34 diesel, I habitually opened the nozzle hatch in the head cover of the left cylinder block. What I saw amazed me. Shiny mirrors on the camshafts, all covered with a thin layer of oil.

It's as if the engine had been stopped just recently, not 50 years ago. All fuel pumps (high-pressure fuel pumps and BNK), as well as the air start distributor, were apparently borrowed at one time by passing AT-S-chiks. The right intake manifold is loose. Starter and alternator removed. Everything else was in place and not very rusty.

After a little consumption with a sledgehammer, the control rods came to life, passing along the bottom of the hull from the driver's seat to the main and side clutches and brakes. The main one turned off by pressing the pedal, but the engine did not want to turn over by the flywheel, it was stuck. Those. in any case, it is not suitable for work without a bulkhead. Having estimated the amount of work, the necessary equipment and strength, I returned to my geological camp.

Taking advantage of the wet weather that was not working for the geologist, the next day, with a group of student youth, he began dismantling the cylinder head of the left collapse of V-2-34. Absolutely all nuts were unscrewed without problems, even the nuts of the main anchor rods.

When lifting the cylinder head, the latter stuck with a gasket and did not want to separate from the block surface. As it turned out later, it was necessary to take away the head with a shirt and sleeves. But this became clear much later, when disassembling the GT-T diesel engine, which at that time was standing right there, next to the "tank". After the block of cylinders, dressed on anchor pins, remained in the place of the left camber, and the cylinder head assembly was taken to the side, another miracle appeared. All rubber seals, both anchor shafts and bypass tubes, made of natural honey-colored rubber, remained elastic.

My overgrown face was reflected in the cylinder liner mirrors. The fingers automatically ran along the upper edges of the mirrors - the wear on the sleeves was almost not felt. But there was no time to dismantle the pistons. At that time, I was not going to change the cylinder-piston group on my B-6A. Nevertheless, diesel fuel with used oil was poured into the cylinders, and the mirrors were additionally coated with grease. The entire left camber was wrapped in an oiled tarpaulin for the winter.

Some time later, due to the age of the car, the main clutch jammed at the base, so that one of the rods from the shutdown leash was thrown through the ejector into the street. In parallel with the replacement of the clutch, he began to prepare the replacement of the diesel cylinder head with the one brought from the "tank", relatively new in terms of wear and at the same time old in age. By the way, my head was no longer my own.

I changed it to the head of the main collapse of the A-650 diesel engine, left over from the AT-C (product 712) and kept in my reserve, complete with a block and pistons. Then the piston did not change because of the decent output on the liners of this block. When I removed the cylinder head from my engine, I was distressed and puzzled by the very poor condition of the mirrors.

In addition to normal wear and tear and decent performance, there were ring scratches on the liners, similar to traces of sticking piston rings or cracks. It really could be. In history there was a case of movement without water in a system of 300 meters, after it was dumped through a torn pipe. Then I changed the cylinder head along with the gasket and rubber seals of the bypass pipes. Here I had to regret the piston left on the "tank"!

Winter passed for various other things and worries about the base. My tractor was disassembled. Already in the summer I asked a friend to drive a GAZ-34039 to get spare parts for a piston.

Let's go to GAZ to pick up the piston.

When we drove up to our lonely self-propelled vehicle, it turned out that someone curious, most likely a reindeer herder, had scattered my packaging at the beginning of summer. There was water in the cylinders. The cylinders weren't so perfect anymore. I regretted not taking everything at once. But, as it turned out, I still could not have done it without disassembling the right camber. We pulled off the left block of cylinders. But to remove the pistons from the connecting rods, you must gradually turn the crankshaft.

The cylinder blocks B-2-34 are removed. The motor spins freely

And he did not turn - he stood as if glued. The engine began to crank only after removing the nuts of the stitching and anchor rods of the right camber. The pistons went up along with the entire block and head. It became clear, and after removing the cylinder head, it was clear that the pistons in two cylinders with open valves were simply rusted. A little tinkering had to be done before the cylinder block was lifted off the pistons and set aside.

The engine without cylinders rotated easily and we started to dismantle the pistons, which, as you know, should be replaced in pairs with liners. Field technology - the piston is carefully warmed up by a blowtorch and beaten into the end of the piston pin with a non-ferrous metal punch. After reaching a sufficient temperature, the pin freely extends until the piston is free from the connecting rod and remains in the seat until it cools.

Since the left-hand camber cylinders still suffered from premature de-preservation by an unknown intruder, it was decided to take all the pistons so that there was plenty to choose from for the inline B-6A kit. For 2 revolutions of the crankshaft behind the fan wheel, all pistons with fingers were packed into boxes. It remained to load into the GAZon and pack the extracted two cylinder blocks, removed fasteners and tubes. In the evening we set off on our way back. With the self-propelled tractor, my sense of duty remained ...

Preparing the piston and assembling the engine took place in late autumn. According to the plan, it was supposed to disassemble the native cylinder block V-6A GT-T and press the liners from V-2-34 into it.

But it turned out that the sleeves that had worked for 33 years in the silumin shirt of the block did not want to leave it either with a sledgehammer or with a puller. The stripper bar was bent. The sleeve was pushed by 3 mm with a sledgehammer through a copper bar. Obviously, the entire jacket of the block had to be heated before extracting the sleeves.

But I remembered about the stored block from the A-650 made of aluminum alloy. Then I didn't want to make the car heavier with a cast-iron block from V-2-34, it is much heavier. But after the AT-S block shirt had been slopped and thoroughly washed, I saw cracks in it between the cylinder seats.

It is clear that such a head is only suitable for scrap or as a visual aid. There was no choice but to assemble a block in a cast-iron shirt. When washing and cleaning the disassembled cylinder blocks B-6A, A-650 and B-2-34, I was struck by the strict conformity of the casting, despite the difference in years of manufacture and materials (silumin and cast iron), as well as perfect elasticity and a fresh smell of rubber that emanated from the O-rings removed from the sleeves. They were brown rubber. Uncasing the V-2-34 block, as well as the block from the A-650, was easily performed with a screw puller.

The sleeves are in good condition, and the pistons from them were soaked in a barrel of diesel fuel and washed. Most of the piston rings are stuck in their grooves.

Rings of pistons removed from V-2-34 in comparison with the rings of worn pistons of the GT-T diesel engine, after cleaning, move without play in the grooves. My old pistons were no longer usable due to broken grooves. In preparation for assembling the engine, the piston rings were fixed with cotton thread. The visual difference between the B-6A and B-2-34 pistons is only that the bottom of the B-6 piston is smooth bowl-shaped inside, and the bottom of the piston from the "tank" is made in the form of a grid of heat-dissipating fins. The pistons from V-2-34 were easily installed on the connecting rods of my V-6A in the same way that they were removed.

The assembly of the unit, like all preparation work, was carried out on a table in a warm and well-lit environment. O-ring rubber liners, together with seals and a gasket under the cylinder head, were purchased in advance from LLC "Neva-diesel", St. Petersburg. In the end, it turned out that the cylinder block B-2-34 was reassembled in a cast-iron jacket with 6 liners selected from 12. For control, the unit, ready for installation, was subjected to hydraulic tests. During the day, it was filled with diesel fuel on the plane of the cylinder head mirror installation.

The B-2 engine is perhaps the most famous diesel engine. Created in the late thirties, various modifications of it still continue to serve. Of course, undoubtedly, "thirty-four", the most famous tank of the Second World War, only the engine with which this tank was equipped remained in the shadows. This engine turned out to be so successful that its modifications are still being produced.

Serial production of the V-2 engine began on the day the Second World War began, September 1, 1939. The backlog of this engine still surprises. This engine was several decades ahead of its time.

As strange as it may sound, this engine was originally developed for aviation, for Soviet heavy bombers. But it was not possible to make an engine that would satisfy the Soviet aircraft designers. For aviation, the power of this engine was not enough, and the engine did not take root in the aircraft industry.

However, this engine came to the court in the tank building. As a legacy from aviation, this engine, in the era of "cast-iron" diesel engine building, acquired an aluminum cylinder block, and many other light-alloy parts. As a result, the engine had a high power-to-weight ratio.

The engine design was incredibly successful. Probably its main difference from super-modern engines is that the engine lacks electronics. Fuel injection into the B-2 cylinders was carried out using a high-pressure twelve-plunger fuel pump. Now on modern diesel engines, fuel is supplied to the injectors using a common high pressure accumulator (the so-called Common Rail system, which translates as "common rail").

However, each cylinder of the engine, like most modern diesels, had four valves and an overhead camshaft, while many diesels produced in those years had a bottom camshaft.

Unlike most diesel engines of that era, which applied the principle of pre-chamber or vortex-chamber mixture formation, the V-2 engine used direct fuel injection, as well as on modern diesel engines. So the V-2 engine was ahead of its time by five decades, no less.

Of course, not only Soviet tank builders paid attention to diesel engines. And the first tank in the world to have a diesel engine was the Japanese Type 89 tank, but this tank was originally produced with a gasoline engine. In contrast, the T-34 tank was originally designed for the V-2 diesel engine. This allowed the maximum use of all its advantages.

Throughout the war, the Germans used gasoline engines on their tanks. There were many reasons for this: a shortage of non-ferrous metals, a shortage of diesel fuel, the lion's share of which went to the needs of the navy.

B-2 was born in agony. The order for the development of a tank diesel engine was received in 1931, and it passed state tests only in 1939, and was put into mass production. Although, by that time he had already passed the "baptism of fire" on the KV tank during the Soviet-Finnish war.

One of the most important advantages of a diesel engine is its economy. It is believed that a diesel engine is less fire hazardous than a carbureted one. But this gain is, by and large, insignificant. Diesel fuel vapors easily flared up in fuel tanks. The tankers themselves said that it was safest to go into battle with full tanks.

The power reserve for a tank is essential. And in this respect, the diesel has won. For example, the range of the T-34 tank on the highway was 380 km, while that of the famous German Tiger tank was 140 km. Another German tank T-IV, with an engine power of 300 hp. s, the cruising range on the highway was 300 km.

Another important advantage of a diesel engine is its multi-fuel capacity. If necessary, the tank could be filled with gasoline or aviation kerosene, preferably with the addition of oil, and it was possible to continue moving.

Of course, the use of this fuel quickly disabled the engine, but in the event of a critical situation, such factors were not paid attention to. Currently, the use of heavy fuel engines in tank building is the norm.

The V-2 engine, of course, was used not only on the T-34 tank, but also on the KV, IS family of tanks, and self-propelled artillery installations created on the basis of these tanks. Only the modifications were different: V-2-34, V-2IS, V-2-44. The engine power also changed slightly. If the T-34 power was equal to 500 liters. s, then on tanks of the IS family its power was increased to 520 hp. Already before the start of the war, there were 5 modifications of this engine.

Work to increase the engine power was carried out constantly. During the war, the V-2SN turbocharged engine was developed, the power of which was increased to 850 hp. This engine was tested on the IS-3 tank.

After the war, the modernization of the engine continued. For example, the B-46 engine, which was installed on the T-72 tank, developed a power of 700 hp, and the V-92 turbocharged engine for the T-90 tank reached 1000 hp.

At the end of the war, various modifications of the V-2 engine began to be actively used in the national economy. One of the engine modifications was installed on the well-known Soviet tractor produced at ChTZ - DET-250.

For the national economy, special derated engines were developed, produced under the "D" index. These engines were installed on tug boats, river trams, diesel locomotives, railcars, MAZ heavy vehicles, and were used as a generator drive.

Of course, numerous attempts were made in tank construction to replace the engines of the B-2 family with other, more modern ones. In the sixties, the 5TDF boxer engine was developed for the T-64 and T-72 tanks. The engines of this family had good characteristics, were compact, but extremely expensive and difficult to manufacture and operate. Therefore, the engines of the B-2 family remained the basis of Soviet and then Russian tank building.

So what is the secret of this engine? Its design, developed in the thirties, despite the fact that it has certain disadvantages associated with the development time of the engine, when many technologies in production were not available, even in our time, practically has not undergone any changes.

This engine was designed to grow. Developed over 80 years ago, it still has decent characteristics in the 21st century. Engines of this family are still produced in Chelyabinsk at ChTZ and in Barnaul at Barnaultransmash.

Respect to the author of the article !!!
However, the list of materials on the shortcomings of the T-34 is not yet complete.
If you complete the main article, I will be only too glad.
After all, the weakest point of the T-34 tank was its "bracelets". This is what the designers call the tracks. The tank had a miraculous ability to take off his shoes. For various reasons and for the slightest reason. Even the ritual of a tanker arose as soon as the column stopped the mechanics - the drivers jumped out and tapped the outer half fingers with a sledgehammer.
The tank's suspension was greatly facilitated by its suspension. More precisely, its absence. The suspension was nominally, because it was practically compressed all the time. The ground clearance was reduced - the caterpillar received excessive slack.
This is due to the ever-increasing combat weight and low technology for making springs. The springs were tempered "by eye" and no one had previously upset them
Guidance mechanisms. T-34 With electric drive. But in fact they were simply twisted by hand.
And the Germans have jewelry hydraulics, the Americans have a gun stabilizer.
Let's go further. Engine
The author is a little mistaken about its origin and design. Diesel is brilliant and we still have not come up with a full replacement for it. The T-90 still has the same diesel engine, the differences are in details
It's not about that. The diesel was good. BUT
It used the fuel equipment of our Robert Bosch ...
And no need to say that our de learned then to sharpen it on their own with a file. The Soviet Union did not learn how to make diesel fuel equipment until its very collapse.
The second is that a specialist in tuning diesel equipment even now is worth the weight of despicable metal. And then? - well, probably 10 people in the whole country.
And strange things. It turns out that from fifty to seventy percent of the T-34 tanks were produced in gasoline versions. And somehow these numbers don't seem dubious to me

Gasoline engine on T-34

Let's start from the end, that is, with the installation of a gasoline engine on the T-34 tank. Indeed, this was the case. From the fall of 1941 until the summer of 1942, diesel engines were practically not produced. And the MT-17 gasoline engine was installed on the T-34 tank. This is a German aircraft engine of a primitive design, which we produced under license.

Its antiquity is visible even in the photograph - the engine does not have a cylinder block, each cylinder has its own jacket.

MT-17 is a tank version of the engine. Despite its ancient design, the engine was perfect for a tank. He, with the help of a simple adjustment, allowed his power to be changed from three hundred and eighty to seven hundred horsepower. In terms of torque at low revs, it surpassed the tank diesel of the T-55 tank. In theory, he needed aviation gasoline, but in practice, given its huge cylinder volume and low compression ratio of 5.5, he could work on anything. He had a resource of three hundred hours and was well mastered in production. For the price, it was five times cheaper than a diesel engine. It only remained to move the fuel tanks out of the fighting compartment to the stern, and it would have turned out to be a pretty decent tank with a cheap engine mastered in production.

Such a tank, only with a diesel engine, was made in several copies.

As for the famous V-2 diesel engine that was installed on the T-34, there are many myths about it.
The first myth tells that B-2 is so wonderful because it came from aviation. There were two aircraft diesel engines in development. AD-1 had a camber angle of forty-five degrees and not sixty as in the B-2 and the cylinder diameter was one hundred and fifty millimeters with a piston stroke of one hundred and sixty-five millimeters, against one hundred fifty to one hundred and eighty for the V-2 engine. Diesel AN-1 generally had cylinders with a diameter of one hundred and eighty millimeters and a piston stroke of two hundred.
These parameters will often be mentioned in the article because they are the main ones when describing the engine.
The aircraft trace is manifested in the fact that the diesel workers were consulted by the designer Klimov. He was just engaged in the production of a French aircraft engine under license, which was designated in the homeland as the M-100.
The second myth. The Germans were unable to copy our wonderful diesel. Considering that we bought fuel equipment for a diesel engine in Germany before the war, then this myth is not true.
The third myth. The B-2 engine is so wonderful that its descendants are still on the T-90 tank. Here I want to upset you, the descendants of the B-2 are still standing on modern tanks because the country's leadership had rams for a long time. They spent all the people's money on the development of a tank gas turbine and on an exotic diesel for the T-64 tank. There was simply no money left for a conventional diesel engine.
Here I would like to make a small lyrical digression. Our country is potentially rich, but three types of completely different tanks per country are too many. And two more types of attack helicopters. Even the richer America does not allow this.
Modern science recommends that the cylinder diameter be equal to the length of the piston stroke. The first to use this was the designer of aircraft engines Shvetsov. He took as a basis the piston group of the American Wright Cyclone engine produced under license from us as ASh-63 with a dimension of one hundred fifty-five by one hundred and seventy-five and reduced the piston stroke length to one hundred and fifty millimeters. As a result, the best Russian piston aircraft engine ASh-82 appeared.

As you can see, in the descendants of B-2, the dimension of the piston group is far from ideal.
Our new tank has a new diesel engine. For him, they took a cylinder diameter of one hundred and fifty millimeters, and the piston stroke was reduced to one hundred and sixty millimeters. As a result, the engine displacement decreased from 38.88 liters to 34.6 liters, and the power increased from one thousand horsepower to one thousand five hundred horsepower. And the liter capacity has almost doubled.

The famous V-2 and its famous fan far beyond the dimensions of the engine, due to which the body of the T-34 tank was added thirty centimeters of the height of the body.

The last of the B-2 family (in the top photo) with a capacity of one thousand horsepower and a new engine with a capacity of one and a half thousand horsepower installed on the T-14 tank and the T-25 infantry fighting vehicle - you can read about them on this website.
As for seventy or even fifty percent of the T-34 tanks produced with a gasoline engine, this is a strong exaggeration.

Konstantin Fedorovich Chelpan (May 24, 1899 - March 11, 1938) - Soviet designer of diesel engines, head of the diesel department of the Kharkov steam locomotive plant, head of the design team for the creation of the V-2 tank diesel engine, used, in particular, in the T-34 tank. Chief Designer for Mechanical Engineering (since 1935).
...
Under the leadership of Chelpan, an aluminum tank diesel V-2 was created, which was installed in the T-34 tank and other vehicles. For the development of the engine, the engineer received the Order of Lenin in 1935 and the title of Chief Designer.

Arrested on December 15, 1937 in the "Greek conspiracy" case. Condemned by the Commission of the NKVD of the USSR and the Prosecutor of the USSR to death. On March 11, 1938, he was shot in a Kharkov prison.
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konstantin_Fyodorovich_Chelpan

And the protocol: "Chelpan Konstantin Fedorovich - to shoot. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov, Prosecutor of the USSR Vyshinsky." True, their signatures are not in the protocol, but there is a signature ... of a junior lieutenant of state security in the Kharkov region, a certain Yankilovich. There is also a piece of paper fifteen centimeters in size stating that, on the basis of an order, the deputy. the head of the Kharkov department of the NKVD, Major Reikhman, the sentence was carried out on March 11, 1938 by the commandant Zeleny, the military prosecutor Zavyalov and the head of the prison Kulishov.

The designers, employees of the Chelpan department courageously refused the testimony given under torture at the trial, but this did not save either GI Aptekman, MB Levitan, or Z.B. Gurtovoy, or their colleagues from being shot.
http://www.greekgazeta.ru/archives/nomer03/articles/28.shtml

In the same 1937 KhPZ, among many enterprises and organizations, was swept by a wave of struggle against "enemies of the people." The extermination of highly qualified personnel of managers, specialists, foremen and workers began. The prologue to this was a letter from the military representative P. Sokolov to the People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov "about the overwhelming majority of" former people "in the leadership of the tank department of the plant." The campaign was immediately supported by the party leadership of the plant, headed by A. Epishev. A full set of charges was brought against the "pests": K.F. Chelpan was accused of "disrupting the government assignment for the production of diesel engines" and "deliberate organization of diesel defects", G.I. The pharmacist was arrested, recalling the breakdowns that occurred during the tests, which served as confirmation of his "wrecking" activities. The chief engineer of the KhPZ F.I. Lyashch, who "rendered the machine tools unusable," chief metallurgist A.M. Metantsev and many others, "recruited" by the director of the KhPZ I.P. Bondarenko, the list of charges to which included almost all imaginable and inconceivable atrocities - from "dulling vigilance" to "organizing an explosion at the plant" ... people ". The extermination of highly qualified personnel of managers, specialists, foremen and workers began. The prologue to this was a letter from the military representative P. Sokolov to the People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov "about the overwhelming majority of" former people "in the leadership of the tank department of the plant." The campaign was immediately supported by the party leadership of the plant, headed by A. Epishev. A full set of charges was brought against the "pests": K.F. Chelpan was accused of "disrupting the government assignment for the production of diesel engines" and "deliberate organization of diesel defects", G.I. The pharmacist was arrested, recalling the breakdowns that occurred during the tests, which served as confirmation of his "wrecking" activities. The chief engineer of the KhPZ F.I. Lyashch, who "rendered the machine tools unusable," chief metallurgist A.M. Metantsev and many others, "recruited" by the director of the KhPZ I.P. Bondarenko, the list of charges against which included almost all imaginable and inconceivable atrocities - from "dulling vigilance" to "organizing an explosion at a factory" ...

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