An important concept that is used in the market of oligopoly. Oligopoly is that such a structure? Kakao manufacturers organization
13. What are the advantages of major firms over small from the standpoint of stability and risk?
14. How is the riskiness of securities?
15. How are the required rate of profitability with risk related?
16. What is the economic content of the Bain coefficient?
17. What are the possibilities of using the Lerner coefficient in determining the degree of market competitiveness?
18. What is the meaning of the Tobin coefficient?
19. What are the possibilities of Papandreus coefficient in assessing the level of monopoly power?
Chapter VII. Degrees and Partial Competition Concept
Monopolies, oligopolies and efficient competition in the market. Dominant firms, their monopoly effect.
Close oligopolies, spectrum of their interaction and influence on the market. Weak oligopoly, its behavior features.
Features and results of monopolistic competition.
When analyzing the degree of competition, all elements of the market structure should be combined on the market. The methodological foundations of the procedure provide for a certain order of judgment.
First of all, the magnitude of the market share of the leading firm is calculated, on the basis of which certain conclusions can be made.
If the magnitude of the market share is very significant (more than 40%), there are no nearest rivals, then the market power of such a company is great. The free exit of other firms for this market can destroy the market power of this company, unless, of course, the company's firm possess a large market force. For the completeness of the analysis of the market, it is also necessary to assess the behavior of the dominant company in relation to other firms on the market and its level of profitability.
If the market shares of large firms are within 25 -50%, then, apparently, there is a close oligopoly, since the concentration indicator of four firms will exceed 60%. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the price strategy and the norms of profit when evaluating the degree of competition.
If the largest share on the market is no more than 20%, the concentration of four firms does not exceed 40%, then it can be argued that there is effective competition in the market, the entrance barriers will not be high and secret agreements minimal.
Usually in economic analysis it is customary to distinguish between three categories of competition degrees:
- dominant firm;
- close oligopoly;
- weak oligopoly (including monopolistic competition).
one . D about m and n and r at uch and I f and r m a.
As already noted, the dominance requires more than 40% of the market and the absence of the nearest rivals. With a very high share in the market, the company actually occupies the position of the monopolist: the demand curve is a common curve of demand in the market, it is inelastic. The dominant firm is acting in a creature as a pure monopoly, and some competition between small firms does not particularly affect the policies of the dominant company maximizing its profits, and due to its demand curve.
The dominant firm is usually faced with the problem of capturing a high share in the market and long-term dominance, and the latter is most difficult.
IN the quality of the example can be given dominant firms, oligopolies
and monopolistic competitors:
- for markets of dominant firms - computers, airplanes, business newspapers, night delivery correspondence - the average market share - 50-90%, at high or medium barriers;
- for markets of close oligopolys (cars, artificial leather, glass, batteries, etc.) - the concentration indicator for4th firms 50-95%;
- for the market of weak oligopolists and monopolistic competition (cinema, theater, commercial publications, retail stores, clothing) - Concentration indicator4th firms 6-30%.
Dominant firms usually show the following monopoly influence in the field of prices:
- increase the price level;
- create a discriminatory price structure.
The actions of these factors makes it possible to obtain super profits (Rice15). In the figure, the points are conventionally represented by some data of statistical observations, which allow you to associate the rate of profit from the value of the input barriers and the behavior of oligopolists; The relationship of the share in the market and the rate of profit on the market is very close and increases with the level of monopoly.
The price discrimination of the dominant firm is that the company can divide the market for segments within which the differentiated ratios of the price - costs are established for various consumer groups in accordance with the inelasticity of demand. For example, higher prices for computers can be installed, some have no worthy competitors, on electronic devices for signaling about the parameters of production processes, etc.
If the firm is close to the monopoly, the main provisions and concepts of the monopoly are used to analyze it. At the same time, it is possible (and in many cases a productive approach) to the analysis of temporary dominance in accordance with the concept of J. Schumpeter, which is known to be different from the neoclassical approach. In accordance with his approach, a big business, even if it is associated with market dominance, is able to give the best result compared to a neoclassical competing result.
The rate of profit firms,% 3
Competitive profit share
Market share of products,%
Fig. 15. Dependence between market share and profit rate.
1- "Normal" conditions are supported;
2-input barriers are low;
3-input barriers are high;
4- oligopolists are cooperated;
5- Oligopolists are entrited
According to this concept (published in 1942), competition is rather as defined as the process of infringement of equilibrium than to establish equilibrium conditions. In accordance with this theory, competition and progress are consistent only in the series of temporary monopolies.
The "Schumpeter" process, in essence, is the exact opposite of neoclassical approaches. According to his ideas, the next event scenario is played in the market. In each period of time, one company can dominate each market that increases prices and gets monopoly benefits. However, these revenues attract the attention of other firms, some initiate their efforts in creating more advanced products and reduce costs in order to take the place of the dominant firm. This new firm can establish monopolized prices and cause monopoly effects by replacing the new company, etc. This process was called "creating destruction" - the innovation creates dominance that allows you to extract monopoly benefits that stimulate the "new innovation", new dominance, etc. The average level of monopoly income may increase; The scale of the processes of malnutrition, destruction, market dominance can be very significant; However, the technological process can create a profit significantly exceeding the costs of irrational use of resources (which is considered as a negative result of the monopoly, and as the cause of its destruction in the market).
In certain relationships, this concept logically complements the approaches of the neolamic theory.
At the same time, this concept requires some sufficiently vulnerable assumptions. First, the dominant firm must have signs of vulnerability so that it can be defeated by competitors. Secondly, entrance barriers should not be high to ensure entry into the competitor market.
It should be noted that the community of Schumpeterian (evolutionary) and neoclassical approaches is that effective competition also implies the processes of regulation with the involvement of significant market share in it.
Analysis reveals the indigenous features of the neoclassical approach - an effective balance between firms, and the evolutionary is a coarse equilibrium, and the creation process causes a sequence of tough actions of monopolies. A number of authors, researchers in the economy of industry markets, considers them substantiated with equal probability.
Represents some interest analysis of passively dominating firms, i.e. Had tactics of passive role, which allows small competitors to select their dominance. However, mostly these considerations are quite dubious, since such firms exist, rather, hypothetically. Typically, the dominant firms are still aggressive in their tactics of suppressing possible rivals.
Interesting considerations about the fact that part of the economy can be considered a subject approach of evolutionism - for example, electronics, chemistry, automotive industry; As for agriculture, trade, they detect the possibility of using neoclassical approaches. Depending on the level of staticness and dynamic of certain markets, one or another approaches are more productive. In the diverse world of markets, dominant firms are able to maintain sometimes long positions, or passing them very slowly. Apparently, the radicality of scientific approaches cannot be based on one of the principles or conceptual approaches, but should have the basis of a multifactorial approach, the use of which in each particular case should be carefully specified.
2. T e s n i o l and g o p o l and i
It is usually believed that a close oligopoly almost always implies the possibility of secret agreements, whereas in a weak oligopoly also agreements, then in a weak oligopoly such agreements are unlikely. The issues of education and existence of oligopolys continue to remain largely discussion, since they reflect significant variation of situations that are weakly be-permensed simulation.
So, oligopolies are characterized by a few and interdependence; They arise from pure dopolia and develop to free oligopoly out of 8 - 10 firms. The few firms makes each of them to take into account the possible reaction to their actions by competitors, i.e. A certain system of action and counteracts is formed. The demand of each company, as well as the strategy of its actions, depend on the reaction of competitors, therefore the multifactorious and probabilistic system of competitive relations occurs, in which each of the participants can show unexpected, extraordinary reactions. From here there is a need to choose for each of the participants of the relevant strategy with a set of possible alternatives or methods for the development of scenarios, predicting the development of the situation, etc. The reaction of competitors encourages the firm's step-by-step behavior, the use of iterative procedures, adjusting the options for answers, etc.
Oligopolists can use any spectrum of interaction - from full cooperation (in certain areas) to pure struggle; Collaborate with the achievement of the results of pure monopoly and maximizing revenues, or to act independently and hostile using elements of a rigid competitive struggle; Much more often, they occupy some intermediate position, to one or another poles. Therefore, naturally, it is extremely difficult to create a unified model of the behavior of oligopolists, including both polar points of behavior and intermediate states, especially those that take into account the specifics of private situations in which markets are also located, and the firms themselves. It is necessary to take into account the significant variety of oligopol structures due to the influence of such parameters as:
- degree of concentration;
- asymmetry or equality between oligopolists;
- difference of costs;
- difference in demand conditions;
- the presence or absence of strategies of the company and long-term planning;
- technological development level;
- condition of the management system on the company, etc.
Thus, the development of the theory of oligopoly faces the need to build multifactorial probabilistic and nonlinear models that must meet one requirement - to meet the practice of the present and forecasts of the future in a sufficiently large range of practical structures and temporary segments. So far, as in most approaches and models, options based on unusual approaches and assumptions are offered, which in itself characterizes not only the solely difficult nature of the processes, but also the obvious disadvantages of methodological approaches. Apparently, for these purposes, the development of the mathematical apparatus of the theory of nonlinear, multifactorial probabilistic and multi-communication systems is necessary - the task of the nearest future.
The fundamental background of the existence of oligopoly consists in the following circumstances:
- incentives for competition;
- joining a secret conspiracy;
- combination of both (mixed incentives).
Competing encourages each company to active, intensive struggle, in order to maximize its income. Its aggressive behavior inevitably causes an acute response of competitors, which may have unexpected elements of negative synergies and even a multiplicative, connected effect (differing from simple summation).
Entry into secret conspiracy is usually attractive, since the cooperation of effort allows the effect close to the monopoly, greater than with competition.
Mixed incentives consist in the fact that it is possible to use both a secret conspiracy and cutting prices, cooperation, choosing position in the market (for example, outside the price record rings), etc.
The behavior of oligopolists in the market can be very different - from convenient cooperation, where the "collective monopolist" operates to the company that leads a continuous war using innovations of various nature (and above all, technological).
The attitude to the behavior of firms to the secret agreements is different from representatives of various schools. Representatives of the Chicago UCLA - schools believe that secret agreements are doomed to quick collapse due to natural internal conflicts.
However, representatives of other schools rightly note that many cartels exist at once with decades, which can not be considered rapid collapse. Since real results are significantly dependent on accidents, apparently, reality is not very consistent with those or other scientific schools and indicates the need for further scientific searches and generalizations.
Several generalized models that characterize the behavior of oligopolists can be brought.
1. At high concentration, the likelihood of the existence of secret agreements is large due to a number of reasons:
− high concentration creates objective prerequisites for organizing mutual agreements; Leaders who have significant market share are experiencing insignificant pressure from small firms;
− the small number of firms makes it possible to identify and punish a firm lowering the price; With a large number of firms (10-15), such capacity to reduce prices increase significantly for one of the firms, which will be detected not so quickly.
Secret agreements are characteristic of a close oligopoly, whereas in weak they are quickly destroyed; A close oligopoly is always to the "group monopoly" with maximizing profits; Weak oligopoly tends to effectively compete with lower prices.
2. The similarities of the conditions of firms. If the terms of demand and costs coincide sufficiently, then the interests of firms are coincided, which encourages the development of cooperation. It is not difficult to see that these conditions have quite definite time limits - technological innovations, for example, are able to drastically reduce the costs of the company, and the trends towards cooperation will be violated.
3. Establishing closer business relationships between firms. As business contacts establish, mutual understanding at the top management level increases, which generates mutually rigorous relationships.
Thus, between the close and weak oligopoly, the differences exist, but they have not only quantitative, but also high-quality nature. Close oligopolies are characterized by a tough competition (but not always), weak oligopolies are able to conclude secret agreements (although not very often). The concentration can contribute to a significant increase in the rate of profit (prices), and especially this is characteristic of a range of concentrations of 40-60%, reflecting the fixation of prices in a close oligopoly (Fig. 16.) Points noted by cases of statistical observation; Graphs illustrate the possibility of a linear or stepped approximation; For the latter, the interval of a sharp increase in profit rate is characteristic.
Consider the types of secret agreements that occur in oligopolies - from close concrete to unofficial.
For targeted agreementsprices in close oligopolies can lead to a purely monopoly effect. Cartel, as an organization that is created by firms to control, coordination and cooperation, usually establishes
prices and develops a system of sanctions against violators of the contract (collusion). Carteels can act overwhelming:
- establish sales quotas;
- monitor investment;
- combine income.
The classic example of the cartel is OPEC - organization of countries - oil exporters on the oil market of the planet.
50 concentration,% 100
Figure 16. Dependence between the level of concentration and the level of profitability.
1- linear approximation;
2- stepped approximation.
American law fixing prices declared illegal in most sectors of the economy, but the hidden establishment of fixed prices remains in practice through a number of information messages (secret meetings, telephone, email information, and
Silent Collusion (agreement)can be carried out in a variety of and soft forms; Firms do not sign any documents, but may provide conventional signals about preferred price levels, which is one of the forms of indirect agreements.
3. With l and b and I am about l and g about p about l and me.
Weak oligopoly is an area from moderate concentration to pure competition, i.e. It is quite voluminous and conditional.
According to the developed chambersblin concept, monopolistic competition is characterized by low levels of concentration, in which each company has a weak degree of monopoly; Firms demand curves have a weak negative tilt and none of the companies have a market share greater than 10%.
The features of monopolistic competition include the following: 1. The existence of some product differentiation caused by the occurrence of certain preferences in consumers. A weak degree of market power determines the slow decrease in the firm's demand curve.
Product differentiation may be due to a number of reasons:
- physical difference of products (for example, various dopular properties);
- difference of varieties of products (bread, clothing, shoes, etc.);
- location of outlets.
2. Barriers of free entry into the market for new firms, which can be attractive in the existence of super-profile on the market.
3. Since there are no firms with a sufficiently high share in the market, each company is relatively independent and has pressure from the remaining market firms.
Conditions considered characterize markets for many types of products. It can be noted such typical cases of conditionally monopolistic competition, like trade of clothing or food products: a steady center of clients in the city district and a steady, but remote competition for outlets, located pronounced. Demand is high, elastic; The demand curve is almost horizontal, but has a small niche for pricing.
Costs |
Costs |
||
qL Mes. |
Fig. 17. Monopolistic competition.
a) - demand is highly elastic; b) - demand is non-ielastic;
1 - limit costs;
2 - average costs;
3. - Demand;
4 - limit income; AB - inactive power;
CD - additive to the price of minimum costs.
For a short-term period, the situation presented in Figure may occur. 17 a. The demand curve is above the cost curve, which allows the company to get super-profile in a short period of time (shaded rectangle), in case the company produces the production of q s. The introduction of new firms to the market lowers the company's demand curve before the provision of a tangent to the average cost curve and, thereby destroying super-profile.
In fig. 17 B none of the long-term curves of demand is not higher than the limiting curve, so the superprior is excluded. The company may exist with the volume of q L, at a point of equality of marginal incomes to maximum costs when achieving a competitive rate of profit.
Monopolistic competition destroys long-term superflife, even when demand is not completely elastic. Monopolistic competition causes the following deviations from the results of pure competition, which is shown in Fig. 17 b. With it, demand is lowered down until
while the average costs do not affect the demand curve. Super profits do not exist, but the price is above the minimum average costs and there are unloaded production facilities. And costs, and prices will be somewhat higher than with net competition, which cause MES - and the price, and the volume of the release QL above the MES. These added costs carry certain benefits for consumers. For example, trading points in certain places can establish elevated prices, which, at the same time, do not make other remote outlets more attractive. Preference may be on a variety of goods (quality), and by service time, in terms of service, etc.
Other deviations are redundant power, since the issue Ql< MES. В частности, в торговой сети это выражается в пустых проходах между полками магазинов или незаполненных местах ресторанов и кафе. Тем не менее, монополистическая конкуренция обычно близка к результатам чистой совершенной конкуренции.
Basic concepts: categories of competition degree; dominant firm; close oligopoly; weak oligopoly; market share and profit rate; price discrimination; a variety of oligopol structures; Secret agreements and cartels; The possibility of obtaining super-profits.
Conclusions to chapter VII
The conditions of dominance of the company on the market provide it with a monopolist position with appropriate consequences. In the area of \u200b\u200bprices, this increase in price levels and discriminatory price structure.
A close oligopoly has trends towards secret agreements and the possibility of using a wide range of interaction - from complete cooperation to a clean struggle, therefore the creation of a unified model of the behavior of oligopolists remains problematic. Secret agreements are very diverse, dynamic, have a different spectrum of action and consequences.
Weak oligopoly are sufficiently conditional and volume, allowing a small super-profile in the short-term period.
Control questions
1. What are the conditions of the existence of monopoly, oligopolies and effective competition in the market?
2. What are the characteristic dominant firms? Give examples of markets of dominant firms. What is their monopoly effect? What is the essence of the "Schumpeterian approach"?
3. What is the essence of a close oligopoly? What are the spectra of interactions of close oligopoly and variety of oligopol structures?
4. What is a weak oligopoly and what is the behavior of weak oligopolists on
5. What is the feature of monopolistic competition?
Chapter VIII. Model model
The main elements of the market structure and equation that connects them with the average rate of profit firms.
Industry structure of the US industry market. Census groups of US industries and problems of its objectivity.
one . E L E M E N T S T R U K T U R y and and x in a and m about d e y with t in and e
Elements of the market structure, such as market share, concentration, input barriers and others, form a complex multifactor system. They interact with each other not always predictably and form quite complex causal relations. In some cases, depending on the specific situations, the market share, and concentration, and input barriers can go to first place. Each of the elements may be the most important at a certain point in a certain industry. Real models of interaction of elements may only relate to specific examples, to certain statistics, i.e. It can be recognized that the uniform universal model, suitable for all the case of life, does not exist. Each real model is based on specific statistics and meets certain purposes. However, there is a fundamental prerequisite that determines the degree of stability of the company and its normal functioning (and, accordingly, the principle of constructing the model) is the level of profitability of the firm. This premise was justified and subsequently confirmed by a number of hypotheses. It is the profitability and its increase that acts as the main motion for any company, and the importance of any element can be estimated according to its specific contribution to increasing the profitability of a fairly typical firm.
At the initial stages of research (1950s), attempts were made to identify the structure of value and cost models of the All-industrial concentration or indicator of the concentration of four firms due to the availability of relevant economic data. Due to the fact that many specific conditions for individual firms were involuntarily underestimated and other elements of the structure were overlooked, such estimates had very relative value. Studies of the 1960-1970 period. were focused on the extremely accurate features of individual firms and their shares in the markets; They allowed to clarify the role of individual elements of the firm in the market structure. Research series 1960-1975 and 19801983 For example, 100-250 major US corporations pursued a goal to repeatedly test the main elements to obtain some
1. Dominant firm
2. Close oligopoly
3. Weak oligopoly
Usually in economic analysis it is customary to distinguish between three categories of competition degrees:
Dominant firm;
Close oligopoly;
Weak oligopoly (including monopolistic competition).
Dominant firm
Dominance requires more than 40% of the market and the absence of the nearest rivals. With a very high share in the market, the company actually occupies the position of the monopolist: the demand curve is a common curve of demand in the market, it is inelastic. The dominant firm acts in essence as a pure monopoly, and some competition between small firms does not particularly affect the policies of the dominant firm maximizing their profits, and due to its demand curve.
The dominant firm is usually faced with the problem of capturing a high share in the market and long-term dominance, and the latter is most difficult.
As an example, the dominant firms of oligopoly and monopolistic competitors can be given:
For markets of dominant firms - computers, aircraft, business newspapers, night delivery of correspondence - the average share of the company in the market - 50-90%, at high or medium barriers;
For markets of close oligopolys (cars, artificial leather, glass, batteries, etc.) - an indicator of concentration in 4th firms 50-95%;
For the market of weak oligopolists and monopolistic competition (cinema, theater, commercial publications, retail stores, clothing) - a concentration indicator of 4th firms 6-30%.
Dominant firms usually show the following monopoly influence in the field of prices:
Increase the price level;
Create a discriminatory price structure.
The actions of these factors makes it possible to obtain super profits (RIS10).
Figure 10 - Dependence between market share and profit rate
In the figure, the points are conventionally represented by some data of statistical observations, which allow you to associate the rate of profit from the value of the input barriers and the behavior of oligopolists; The connection of the share in the market and the rates of profit on the market is very close and increases with the level of monopoly:
1 - "Normal" conditions are supported;
2 - Low entrance barriers;
3 - High entrance barriers;
4 - Oligopolists are cooperated;
5 - Oligopolists are entrited.
The price discrimination of the dominant firm is that the company can divide the market for segments within which the differentiated ratios of the price - costs are established for various consumer groups in accordance with the inelasticity of demand. For example, higher prices for computers can be installed, some have no worthy competitors, on electronic devices for signaling about the parameters of production processes, etc.
If the firm is close to the monopoly, the main provisions and concepts of the monopoly are used to analyze it.
Represents some interest analysis of passively dominating firms, i.e. Had tactics of passive role, which allows small competitors to select their dominance. However, mostly these considerations are quite dubious, since such firms exist, rather, hypothetically. Typically, the dominant firms are still aggressive in their tactics of suppressing possible rivals.
Close oligopoly
It is usually believed that close oligopoly almost always implies the possibility of secret agreements, whereas such agreements are unlikely in a weak oligopoly. The issues of education and existence of oligopolys continue to remain largely discussion, since they reflect significant variation of situations that are weakly be-permensed simulation.
Oligopolies are characterized by a few and interdependence; They arise from pure dopolia and develop to free oligopoly out of 8 - 10 firms. The few firms makes each of them to take into account the possible reaction to their actions by competitors, i.e. A certain system of action and counteracts is formed. The demand of each company, as well as the strategy of its actions, depend on the reaction of competitors, therefore the multifactorious and probabilistic system of competitive relations occurs, in which each of the participants can show unexpected, extraordinary reactions. From here there is a need to choose for each of the participants of the relevant strategy with a set of possible alternatives or methods for the development of scenarios, predicting the development of the situation, etc. The reaction of competitors encourages the firm's step-by-step behavior, the use of iterative procedures, adjusting the options for answers, etc.
Oligopolists can use any spectrum of interaction - from full cooperation (in certain areas) to pure struggle; Collaborate with the achievement of the results of pure monopoly and maximizing revenues, or to act independently and hostile using elements of a rigid competitive struggle; Much more often, they occupy some intermediate position, to one or another poles.
It is necessary to take into account the significant variety of oligopol structures due to the influence of such parameters as:
Degree of concentration;
Asymmetry or equality between oligopolists;
Difference of costs;
Difference in demand conditions;
The presence or absence of strategies of the company and long-term planning;
Technological development level;
Condition of the management system on the company, etc.
The fundamental background of the existence of oligopoly consists in the following circumstances:
1) incentives for competition;
2) entry into a secret conspiracy;
3) a combination of both (mixed incentives).
1) Incentives for competition. Competing encourages each company to active , intensive struggle, in order to maximize its income. Its aggressive behavior inevitably causes an acute response of competitors, which may have unexpected elements of negative synergies and even a multiplicative, connected effect (differing from simple summation).
2) Entry Usually attractive because the cooperation of effort makes it possible to get an effect close to the monopoly, greater than when competing.
3) Mixed incentives It is that it is possible to use both a secret conspiracy and cutting prices, cooperation, the choice of position in the market, etc.
The behavior of oligopolists in the market can be very different - from convenient cooperation, where the "collective monopolist" operates to the company that leads a continuous war using innovations of various nature (and above all, technological).
Several generalized models that characterize the behavior of oligopolists can be brought.
1. At high concentration, the likelihood of the existence of secret agreements is large due to a number of reasons:
High concentration creates objective prerequisites for organizing mutual agreements; Leaders who have significant market share are experiencing insignificant pressure from small firms;
The small number of firms makes it possible to identify and punish a firm lowering the price; With a large number of firms (10 - 15), there are already less opportunities.
Secret agreements are characteristic of a close oligopoly, whereas in weak they are quickly destroyed; A close oligopoly is always to the "group monopoly" with maximizing profits; Weak oligopoly tends to effectively compete with lower prices.
2. The similarity of the conditions of firms. If the terms of demand and costs coincide sufficiently, then the interests of firms are coincided, which encourages the development of cooperation. It is not difficult to see that these conditions have quite definite time limits - technological innovations, for example, are able to drastically reduce the costs of the company, and the trends towards cooperation will be violated.
3. Establishing closer business relationships between firms. As business contacts establishments are established between firms, mutual understanding at the top management level is increasing, which generates mutually rigorous relationships.
Thus, between the close and weak oligopoly, the differences exist, but they have not only quantitative, but also high-quality nature. Close oligopolies are characterized by a tough competition (but not always), weak oligopolies are able to conclude secret agreements (although not very often). The concentration can contribute to a significant increase in the rate of profit (prices), and it is especially characteristic of a range of concentrations of 40-60% reflecting fixing prices in a close oligopoly.
Consider types of secret agreementshaving a place in oligopoly - from close concrete to unofficial.
For targeted agreements Prices in close oligopolies can lead to a purely monopoly effect. The cartel, as an organization that is created by firms to control, coordination and cooperation, usually sets prices and develops a system of sanctions against violators of the contract (CORTOR). Carteels can act overwhelming:
Establish sales quotas;
Monitor investment;
Combine income.
The classic example of the cartel is OPEC - organization of countries - oil exporters on the oil market of the planet.
Silent Collusion (agreement) can be carried out in a variety of and soft forms; Firms do not sign any documents, but may provide conventional signals about preferred price levels, which is one of the forms of indirect agreements.
Weak oligopoly
Weak oligopoly is an area from moderate concentration to pure competition, i.e. It is quite voluminous and conditional.
Monopolistic competition is characterized by low levels of concentration, in which each company has a weak degree of monopoly; Firms demand curves have a weak negative tilt and none of the companies have a market share greater than 10%.
The features of monopolistic competition include the following:
1. The existence of some differentiation of the product caused by the emergence of certain preferences in consumers.
2. Barriers of free entry into the market for new firms, which can be attractive in the existence of super-profile on the market.
3. Since there are no firms with a sufficiently high share in the market, each company is relatively independent and does not have pressure from the remaining market firms.
Conditions considered characterize markets for many types of products. These typical cases can be noted. conditionally monopolistic competitionLike trade of clothing or food products: a sustainable center of customers in the city district and a steady, but remote competition for outlets located pronounced.
For a short-term period, the situation presented in Figure may occur. 11 a. The demand curve is above the cost curve, which allows the company to receive super-profile in a short period of time (shaded rectangle), in case the company exercises production qS.
The introduction of new firms to the market lowers the company's demand curve before the provision of a tangent to the average cost curve and, thereby destroying super-profile. In fig. 11 B none of the long-term curves of demand is not higher than the limiting curve, so the superprior is excluded. The company may exist with the volume of release qL,at the point of equality of marginal income, the maximum costs when reaching a competitive rate of profit.
Figure 11 - Monopolistic Competition
a) - short-term period; b) - long-term period; 1 - limit costs; 2 - average costs; 3 - demand; 4 - limit income; AB - inactive power; CD - additive to the price of minimum costs.
Monopolistic competition destroys long-term superflife, even when demand is not completely elastic. Monopolistic competition causes the following deviations from the results of pure competition, which is shown in Fig. 11 b. With it, demand is lowered down until the average costs will affect the demand curve. Super profits do not exist, but the price is above the minimum average costs and there are unloaded production facilities. And costs, and prices will be somewhat higher than with net competition, which cause MES - and the price, and the volume of the release QL above the MES. These added costs carry certain benefits for consumers. For example, trading points in certain places can establish elevated prices, which, at the same time, do not make other remote outlets more attractive.
Other deviations are redundant power, since the issue Ql< MES. В частности, в торговой сети это выражается в пустых проходах между полками магазинов или незаполненных местах ресторанов и кафе.
So, the conditions of dominance of the company on the market provide it with the position of a monopolist with the corresponding consequences. In the area of \u200b\u200bprices, this increase in price levels and discriminatory price structure.
A close oligopoly has trends towards secret agreements and the possibility of using a wide range of interaction - from complete cooperation to a clean struggle, therefore the creation of a unified model of the behavior of oligopolists remains problematic. Secret agreements are very diverse, dynamic, have a different spectrum of action and consequences.
Weak oligopoly are sufficiently conditional and volume, allowing a small super-profile in the short-term period.
The oligopolistic market is the type of market structure, characterized by the strategic interaction of few, possessing market authorities and competing for sales of firms.
The oligopolistic market can be represented as standardized (pure oligopoly) and differentiated product (differentiated oligopoly).
The most important signs are:
A limited number of firms that share the sectoral market;
Significant concentration of production in individual firms, which makes each company large relative to the aggregate market demand (this characteristic indicates that with small volumes of market demand, even a small firm can act in conditions of oligpolystic interaction.);
Limited access to the industry, which can be due to both formal (patents and licenses) and economic (effects of scale, high penetration costs) by barriers;
The strategic behavior of firms, which is the principal characteristic of the oligopolistic market, means that the company aware of their interdependence is building their competitive strategy, taking into account the possible reaction of competitors to the actions taken.
In terms of oligopolistic cooperation (response to each other), the market feature is that firms face not only with the reaction of consumers, but also with the reaction of their competitors. Therefore, unlike previously considered market structures, with oligopoly, the firm is limited in making decisions not only to the inclined demand curve, but also by the actions of competitors.
Depending on the emerging situation, the firm currently operated on the oligopolistic market can elect different response strategies. Therefore, for the oligopolistic markets of a single point of equilibrium, to which the firms seek do not exist, and the companies of one industry can interact as monopolists, and as competitive firms.
When industry companies implement a cooperative interaction strategy, coordinating their actions by simulating the pricing or strategy of each other's competition, the price and supply will be in monopolous. If the firms are followed by a non-opoperative strategy, conducting an independent, aimed at strengthening his own position strategy, prices and supply will be approached by competitive.
Depending on the nature of the response to the actions of competitors in the conditions of oligopoly, various models of interaction of firms can be formed:
With consciously implemented cooperative strategy, the market is organized in the form of a cartel, which is characterized by restricting the market supply and establishing monopoly high prices;
The cartel is a group of firms, a joint market of the market and carrying out concerted actions regarding the proposal (limiting the volume of output) and prices (fixation) in order to obtain monopolized profits.
Despite the obvious benefit for participants, the cartel is an unstable formation. First, there are always factors opposing its occurrence. The greater the number of firms in the industry and differences in their level of production costs than more diverse their products and the lower industry barriers than unstable industry demand, the more difficult it is to achieve coordination of the activities of firms and the likelihood of the cartel.
Secondly, even in the case of the formation of the cartel, the problem arises the problem of ensuring its stability, which represents the task much more complicated than its creation. In this regard, the problem of monitoring the implementation of the agreement is most important to preserve the cartel, especially since the mechanism of its destruction is also laid within the cartel itself.
The success of the cartel activity depends on the ability of its participants to identify and prevent violations of the agreements reached. The practical implementation of such a requirement is feasible only if the monitoring and sanctions procedures for compliance with the agreement do not require large costs, and the sanctions applied to violators exceed the benefits of violation of the agreement.
In the conditions of dominance, a separate company on the market arises a model of price leadership, in which the leader's company establishes the price based on demand for its products, and the remaining industry firms take it as a given and act as completely competitive firms;
When the industry has a dominant firm, providing a significant share of sectoral supply, other industry firms in their pricing policies prefer to follow the leader. The stability of the price leadercy model is ensured not only with the help of possible sanctions from the leader, but also the interest of other market participants in the presence of a leader who boils the burden of market research and the development of the optimal price. The essence of the interaction of firms in this model is that the price that maximizing the profit of the price leader is a factor asking the conditions of production by the rest of the sectoral market. (Fig. 6.)
Knowing the market demand curve d and the proposal curve (the sum of the curves of limit costs) of the remaining companies in the industry SN, the price leader determines the curve of demand for its DL products as a difference between industry demand and competitors offer. Since at the price of P1, the entire sectoral demand will be covered with competitors, and at the price of P2 competitors will not be able to carry out proposal and the entire sectoral demand will be satisfied with the price leader, then the demand curve for the production of the DL leader is formed in the form of a broken R1P2DL curve.
Having the MSL limiting curve, the price leader will set the price of the PL providing it to the profit maximization (MSL \u003d MRL). If all the companies of the industry market are adopted by Jenu leader as an equilibrium market price, then the proposal of the new leader will be QL, and the remaining firms of the industry QN (PL \u003d SN), which in the amount will give the cumulative volume of the sectoral supply Qd \u003d Ql + Qn. As a scrap, the proposal of each individual firm will be formed in accordance with its limit costs.
Fig. 6. Model of price leadership
If there is a dominant company in the market, market coordination is carried out by adapting firms to the price of a leader, which acts as a factor asking the conditions of production to the other industries.
The competitive strategy of the price leader is that it should focus on receiving long-term profits, aggressively responding to the challenges of competitors both in terms of price and market share. On the contrary, the competitive strategy of firms that occupy a subordinate position is that, avoiding direct confrontation leader, to use measures (most often innovative nature) to which the leader cannot respond to respond. Often the dominant firm does not have opportunities to impose its price to competitors. But in this case, it remains for industry firms a kind of conductor pricing (declares new prices), and then they talk about barometric price leadership.
When firms enter into a conscious rivalry for sales, the industry will drift to establish a long-term to establish a long-term competitive equilibrium;
The interaction of firms can take the form of a blocking pricing model if firms seek to preserve the situation in the industry by increasing the barriers to the industry, selling products at prices close to the level of medium long-term expenses.
One of the forms of manifestation of barometric pricing leadership is pricing, limiting the penetration into the industry of new firms. The feature of the oligopolistic interaction is that firms are inclined to maintain the status Quo industry, in every way opposed to its violation, since it is the equilibrium that has developed in the industry ensures the most favorable conditions for earning profits. If the penetration barriers to the industry are low, the firms current in the industry can artificially raise them by reducing the market price. For example, (Fig. 7), implementing a cooperative strategy, industry firms could receive economic profits, producing q products and by setting the price of R. However, the existence of economic profits would be an attractive factor for penetration into the industry of new firms, which would follow the decline in profits. , And perhaps, the displacement of some firms from it.
Fig. 7. Model of blocking pricing
Therefore, knowing the level of sectoral demand and costs, as well as assessing the minimum possible average costs of applicants to the industry, which operate in the industry of the company can establish the market price of P1, at the level of minimum long-term average costs, which will deprive economic profit firms, but at the same time will make the penetration " Slazhakov "in the industry is impossible. What a really price level will be chosen by the company depends on both the curves of their own costs and the potential of "strangers". If the cost of the latter is higher than the average divers, the sectoral price will be set at the level of minimum costs, but below the minimum costs that can provide the firm-threatening market entry.
In an effort to consolidate its market authorities, oligopolistic interacting firms can coordinate their activities in order to counter new firms to the market.
Such practice can be used in order to displace competitors from the industry, when the company dominating in the industry sets prices at the level of minimum short-term average costs, calculating compensating for the losses in the long term.
When interacting firms produce standardized products, they can build their strategy based on the specification of the volume of competitors (model Koro) or the invariance of their prices (Berran's model);
In practice, cooperative strategies are difficult, and sometimes impossible. Therefore, in order to increase the profit, the company go to a conscious rivalry for an increase in market share, leading to the "price wars".
Suppose the industry is represented by dopoline, and firms have the same and permanent average costs. (Fig. 8) In the industry's industry demand, the company will be done by the market, producing q products at the price of P, and will receive economic profits. If one of the firms reduce the price before P1, then it, increasing the offer to Q1, will capture the entire market.
AC \u003d MS Dotr
Fig.8. Model "War of Prices"
If a competitor also reduces the price, admit to P2, the entire market Q2 will get to him, and the firm has lost profits will be forced to go for a further decline in price. Competitor's response will force the company to reduce the price until it drops to the level of medium costs and its further decline will not bring any benefits to the equilibrium of Berran.
Berrtrand Equilibrium (Bertrand Equilibrium) describes the situation in the market, in which the firm duopolies compete, lowering the price of goods and increasing the volume of release. The equilibrium stability is achieved when the price turns out to be equal to limit costs, that is, a competitive equilibrium is achieved.
As a result of the "price war", the issue Q3 and the price of P3 will be at the level characteristic of the case of perfect competition, in which the price is equal to minimal average costs (P3 \u003d AC \u003d MC), and firms do not receive economic profits.
When the company's companies do not coordinate their activities and lead a conscious rivalry for sales, equilibrium in the industry will be achieved with the price of equal average costs.
The price war is a cycle of a gradual decrease in the existing price level in order to displacing competitors from the oligopolistic market.
Without a doubt, price wars are beneficial to consumers, as they lead to the redistribution of excess welfare in their favor, at the same time they are burdensome for firms due to significant losses that are carrying all the participants in rivalry regardless of the outcome of the struggle.
In addition, the possibility of using the rivalry strategy for the price under the conditions of oligopoly is strongly limited. First, such a strategy is quickly and easily imitated by competitors, and the firm is difficult to achieve the goals. Secondly, the ease of adaptation of competitors is in itself a threat to the lack of competitive potential from the company. Therefore, in oligopolistic markets, preference is given to non-counseling methods of competition, which are difficult to copy.
The Dugolia model is Kurto demonstrates the mechanism for establishing a market equilibrium in conditions when two firms operating in the industry simultaneously make decisions on the volume of output of the standardized good, based on specifying the volume of the competitor. The essence of the interaction of firms is that each of them takes its own decision on the volume of issue, taking the volume of production by another constant (Fig. 9).
Suppose market demand is presented with curve D, and the limit costs of the company MS are constant. If the company does not believe that another company will not produce, then the maximizing profit of its issue will be Q. If it assumes that the company C will carry out a proposal in the amount of Q units, then the firm A, perceiving it as a shift on the same amount of demand The D1 will optimize their release at Q1 level. Any further increase in the supply of the company b firm A will perceive as a shift in demand for its products D2 and optimize the release in accordance with this Q2. Thus, changing depending on the predeterdays on the volume of the release of the company 5, solutions in terms of production of the company A are the curve of responding to the QA to changes in the production of B. acting similarly. The firm B will have its own curve of response QB for the alleged actions of the company A. (Fig. 10.)
Fig. 9. Firm response curves. 10. Establishment of market equilibrium
duopoly dugolia for duopolia KURNO
Duopoly (Duopoly) -making structure, when two firms are operating on the market, the interaction between which determines the volume of production in the industry and the market price.
Reflecting maximizing profits The volume of production of one company, depending on the release of another, the response curves allow you to trace how the equilibrium release is established. If the company A will produce QA1, then in accordance with its response curve, the firm b will not produce, since in this case the market price of products is equal to the average costs and any increase in the issue will reduce its decline below average costs. When the company A carries out production at QA2 level, the company b will respond to this issue QB1. Responding to the release of a competitor QB1 firm A will reduce the release to QA3. Ultimately, establishing the volume of the issue in accordance with its response curve, the firms reach equilibrium at the intersection point of these curves, which will give an equilibrium level of their production Q * A and Q * b.
This equilibrium is drunken, which indicates the best of the company's maximization of the company under specified actions of a competitor.
Equilibrium equilibrium is achieved on the market when a company, acting independently, chooses such an optimal production volume that another company expects from it. Equilibrium Koro occurs as a point of intersection of the reacting curves of two firms. The reacting curve shows how the volume of the release of one company depends on the volume of the release of another company. However, the model itself does not explain how equilibrium is achieved, since it implies the volume of competitor's production permanent.
If firms were produced at the level of limiting costs A \u003d QA2; B \u003d QB3 they would have achieved a competitive equilibrium at which a greater release would be carried out, but they would not receive economic profits. In this sense, the achievement of equilibrium is more profitable for them, as it allows to extract economic profits. However, if the firms entered into conspiracy and limited the total production volume so that the limit revenue was equal to the limit costs, they would increase their profits by choosing a combination of release on the QA2QB3 curve, called a contract curve.
In case of uncertainty of market conditions and targeted preferences, companies, the interaction of firms can lead to several, moreover, by different, equilibrium provisions, depending on the elected strategy of behavior.
The model of a broken demand curve reflects the case of price competition in the conditions of oligopoly, when it is assumed that firms always respond to a decline in prices by competitors and do not react if they are raised. The model of a broken demand curve was proposed independently P. Sui, as well as R. Hitchich and K. Hall and 1939, and then developed and was developed and was changed by a number of researchers of an uncomordinated oligopoly.
Suppose similar firms sell identical goods at a price P, implementing Q units (Fig. 11). If one of the firms reduced the price before P1, it could increase sales to Q1. But since other industries will follow its example, the firm will be able to implement only Q1. If the company will increase the price (P2), then in the absence of a reaction from other firms, it implements Q2, and if there is a market offer, it will increase to Q2. Thus, the curve of sectoral demand takes the type of a broken Dotr curve, the inflection point of which is the point of the prevailing industry price.
Fig. 11. Model of a broken demand curve
It is not difficult to note that the demand curve for each oligopolist's products tends to be highly elastic above the inflection point and not elastic below it, because Mr revenue becomes sharply negative and gross income firms will decline. This means that oligopolistic firms will refrain from the unreasonable increase in prices, fearing the loss of their market share and profits, as well as from an unmotivated price reduction, fearing the loss of sales growth potential, market share and profits. Considering the position of the MR marginal revenue curve, it can be assumed that even with the change in limit costs within the vertical part of the limiting revenue curve (MC1, MS2), prices and sales will not be changed.
In conditions of close oligopolistic interaction, competitors do not respond to an increase in a separate price company and adequately respond to its decline.
In practice, the model does not always work so much, because not any price reduction is perceived by competitors as the desire to conquer the market. Since the goods are easily replaceable, the participants in the oligopolistic market are inclined to sell their product with a clean oligopoly by the same, and with differentiated oligopoly at comparative prices.
Showing persistence in reducing prices, the oligopolist risks to cause a chain response of competitors' response and reducing demand for its products. And in the end, do not increase your profits, but to reduce it.
In principle, the same thing happens when prices increase. Only in this case the uncertainty factor is no longer "sanctions" of competitors, and possible "support" on their part. Those can join price increases, and then the loss of customers with this company will be small (in the conditions of universal rise in price, buyers will not find more profitable proposals and retain loyalty to goods of the company). But competitors may not raise prices. With this option, the loss of the popularity of goods that have come down compared to the counterparts will be significant.
Thus, and with a decrease, and with increasing prices, the demand curve for the production of a company in the conditions of a non-attorneed oligopoly has a broken view. Until the start of the active reaction of competitors, it follows one trajectory, and after it - on the other.
Especially emphasize the unpredictability of the breakpoint. Its position is entirely depends on the subjective assessment of the actions of this company competitors. More specifically: whether they will find them admissible or unacceptable, will respond. The change in prices and volumes of production during a non-ordinated oligopoly becomes a risky business. Very easy to cause a price war. The only reliable tactic becomes the principle "Do not do sharp movement". All changes are better to produce small steps, with a permanent loaf to the reaction of competitors. Thus, for a non-ordered oligopolistic market, the inflexibility of prices is characteristic.
There is another possible reason for the inflexibility of prices, special attention to which the first researchers of the problem. If the limiting cost curve (MS) crosses the maximum income line through its vertical section (and not lower than it, as in our figure), then the MS curve shift is higher or below the initial position will not entail the changes in the optimal combination of price and volume of production. That is, the price ceases to respond to the change in costs. After all, as long as the point of intersection of limit costs with the limit income line will not be out of the vertical segment of the latter, it will be projected on the same point of demand curve.
Models of the theory of games
When there are interaction between firms and the behavior of each of them is due to many institutional conditions - infidency information, uncertainty, the presence of transaction costs, the multiplicity of goals, the actions of competitors based on the stability of preferences and the absolute rationality of market participants, the completeness of the information and the existence of a single pass-optimal equilibrium of the model Neoclassical theory become little suitable for economic analysis. It is more preferable to analyze the interaction of market participants and determine such interaction conditions is institutional economic theory. It comes from the fact that preferences are not specified and stable, but are formed under the influence of many changing conditions (institutions). Given the availability of information costs and limited knowledge, as a determining choice of principle, it does not use optimality, but satisfaction. One of the methods of institutional analysis of interaction of firms is formal models based on the theory of games.
The game is the relationship between economic entities in situations with pre-established rules when it is necessary to make responsible decisions.
Game Theory (Game Theory) -Nuka, exploring mathematical methods, the behavior of participants in situations (players) related to decision-making. It represents a way to analyze interdependent behavior, when the decisions of one participant influence the decisions of the other, and vice versa. It does not require complete rationality in behavior and does not imply the presence of a single equilibrium.
Since we are talking about interconnected behavior, the whole game is based on the principle of evaluating the results of the strategies of the participants of the game. To do this, a win matrix is \u200b\u200bcreated, which represents options and evaluations of the results of solutions of participants in the interaction, and the game itself can be represented in a strategic or deployed form. At the same time, the games may be non-operative when the exchange of information between participants in the game is impossible, and cooperative when such an exchange is possible. Deployed form
Strategic form
| Strategy | Lower | Do not reduce | |
| To reduce the price | -3 ; -3 | 5 ; -10 | |
| Do not reduce the price | -10 ; 5 | 0 ; 0 |
Both forms illustrate possible solutions and assess the results of these solutions. If the company will reduce the price for its products, it will increase its profits by increasing sales, only if the firm b will not reduce the price of its products - (15; -10). If the firm would follow the example of the company A and will reduce the price, then this will lead to a decrease in profits from both firms (-5; -5). On the contrary, in the case of a decline in the price of the company b and maintaining it by the company D, the latter will be reduced, and the firms would grow (-10; 15). Only in the case of the preservation of the existing price, firms do not change the profits (0; 0). The essence of the game is that in the face of the uncertainty of the competitor's behavior to develop equilibrium, that is, the most acceptable in terms of consequences, the interaction strategy.
As part of the interaction of firms, various types of equilibrium can be achieved. When the actions of the firm A provide the maximum result, regardless of the nature of the response of the company B, they talk about the equilibrium of the dominant strategy. It is achieved in the case of crossing the dominant strategies of both firms. The situation in which the strategy of firms A provides the maximum result depending on the action of the company B, is called a nash equilibrium, which means that none of the firms will be able to increase their winnings unilaterally. If the equilibrium is achieved, provided that the improvement of the position of one of the firms is impossible without deteriorating the situation, then in this case there is an equilibrium by Pareto. In the case when the maximization of the results of the participants of the game is achieved as a result of the decision of the decision by one company on the basis of the other company known to it, there is an equilibrium of the solderberry, which has the place always.
There is no equilibrium of dominant strategies in the above game, since there are no strategies that give the maximum winnings regardless of the competitor actions. Nash equilibrium will be achieved at point (0: 0), since with this strategy, none of the participants are interested in changing it. Pareto equilibrium is achieved at points (0; 0) and (-3; -3), since in these situations it is impossible to improve the position of one participant without deteriorating the position of the other. As for the equilibrium in Staklinburg, it will be for the company A at the point (5; -10), and for the company b - (-10; 5).
Models of game theory make it possible not only to analyze the behavior of market participants in one situation or another, but also to identify the problems arising in the process of interaction - coordination, compatibility and cooperation. Since the real practice of firms are in constant interaction (recurring games), then the decisions made by them are based on previous experience, and they themselves come to the conclusion that in the long-term period, cooperative behavior is more profitable in the long-term period.
The relative inflexibility of prices for the products of oligopolistic industries compared with the goods of the branches of competitive, convincingly explained in the model of a broken demand curve, is firmly established empirical fact permanently observed in the real economy. The consequences of this phenomenon for the fate of the market system are exceptionally great.
Recall that the general logic of evidence of the benefits of a market economy is based on the mechanisms of price self-regulation of the market. In the case of an uncomordinated oligopoly, this mechanism is not entirely destroyed, it is blocked: the prices have become more modes, they do not respond flexibly more to changes in supply and suggestions, if not counting the most sustained changes in these parameters. In the conditions of a non-plated oligopoly, serious distortions of prices and production volumes are possible compared to objective market requests. Destructive price wars arise for giant corporations, when these disproportions break out and oligopolists go to open competitive bouts. Examples of such wars were especially common in the early stages of the formation of a large business - at the end of the XIX - the first half of the XX century.
It is clear that such large-scale failures in the work of market mechanisms attracted close attention of various schools of economists.
From the point of view of Marxism, the market oligopolyization (or - in Marxist terminology is its monopolization. Marxism connects the monopolization of the market, not with the presence of a single company on it, AS domination of several largest companies. Therefore, the terms of monopoly, monopolization have a slightly different meaning than in Soviet economic literature than In Nemmarxist tradition. The most close analogue is the concept of oligopoly, in Marxist works not used at all) is in anticipation of the collapse of capitalism. Indeed, the market economy exceeds other activities of the economy due to the mechanism of self-regulation associated with the availability of competition. But small businesses do not maintain competition and cannot be the basis of technical progress. Inevitably arise large enterprises, and with them and oligopoly.
That is, the competition itself creates an oligopoly (monopoly). The oligopoly, destroys or at least sharply weakens the mechanism of market self-regulation. Thus, capitalism becomes the graveman for himself.
It is in such reasoning that one of the main theoretical foundations of Marxist radicalism consists. If you proceed from the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist system, it is natural not to think about how to repair a historically doomed building of the bourgeois society. On the contrary, it is logical to take energetic efforts to create a new, better building - socialism.
Most non-policing scientific schools do not deny significant destructive potential covered for the market system in the economy oligulation. However, conclusions from the analysis of the situation are made more optimistic.
First, the adaptation opportunities of the market are emphasized. Oligopoly does not completely eliminate competition. In its pure form, it (like a monopoly) on the market is rare. As a rule, the main "players" is noticeably more: 3-4 largest producers and even more companies of the second rank. In addition to national firms, foreign companies usually have access to the market in modern conditions. And more complex models of oligopoly than those considered at the present course clearly show that with an increase in the number of oligopolists, the equilibrium is dringed to competitive equilibrium. That is why prices continue even on the oligopolistic market to remain a mechanism for self-regulation of the economy (although, of course, not so effective as with perfect competition).
Secondly, it is impossible to challenge the vitality of small businesses. On the threshold of the XXI century. From 2/3 to 3/4 of all employed in developed countries continues to work in small firms. Therefore, the process of the oligopolyization of the economy does not carry a total nature. Islands and continents of oligopoly is still washes by the ocean of free competition and it is he determines the general climate of the market functioning.
Thirdly, a significant positive role is played by the state conducting active antimonopoly policies and thus reduce the degree of imperfection of the market.
The dispute about the relationship of the process of oligopolyization (monopolization) and historical fate of the market economy is not completed. Obviously, however, that the rapid collapse of capitalism, as Marxists expected about a hundred years ago, he did not lead. However, in the early 1930s, one of the varieties of oligopoly - cartels - really put this system almost on the edge of death.
The cartels had a sharply negative impact on the market economy. Moreover, all the shortcomings of pure monopoly in practice are known to humanity mainly from the experience of cartel activities. The worst samples of the intensification of prices and the understatement of the production of products were given precisely cartels. By the way, Russia with such a terrible concept as "commodity hunger", first faced not during the war, not under socialism, but before the First World War, as a result of the intentional containment of the production volume of syndicates.
Practiced cartels and conscious deterioration in product quality. International Electrotechnical Kittel "FEB", for example, in the 30s recommended to limit the service life of the electric light bulbs 1 thousand hours, although there was already a technology that allowed it to bring it up to 3 thousand. Calculation was simple: the faster the lamps, the more new Buy to replace. Often, the cartels slowed down technical progress: in order to save costs, new inventions "were placed under the Sukno" until the machines were extended to the goods on the old technology.
A particularly strong negative impact on the economy, the cartels were provided during the period of severe overproduction crises - in the 30s. Although the goods at this time did not find sales, the cartels did not reduce prices on them, preferring to reduce production volumes and dismiss workers. For each cartel separately, it was quite a rational tactic: it is better to sell one product at a full price than two half. After all, with an equal revenue, the cost variables in the first case will be twice as well, which means there is a chance, despite the crisis, keep profits. Nevertheless, the farm as a whole was paid for this deepening crisis: the fall in production and unemployment during the Great Depression (1929-1933) reached the highest values \u200b\u200bin the history of capitalism. Comparing the oppressed market economy of those years with the dynamically developed USSR era of the first five-year plan, many large non-Marxist economists of that era (including the Great J. M. Keynes) expressed concern that capitalism comes from the historical scene.
The lesson was not in vain. In most countries, the cartels at the same time or a little later were legally prohibited. The creation of cartels and according to modern Russian legislation is not allowed. Currently, the cartels exist (and are pursued by the authorities of all countries) as secret collusion. Legally, they are allowed only in some special areas of the economy (for example, in old, dying industries or in export activity) and only under the control of the state.
Carters in modern Russia
Due to the legal ban, officially cartels in modern Russia do not exist. However, the practice of one-time pricing is distributed quite wide. It is enough to remember how periodically in the consumer market there is a deficiency of the cream or sunflower oil, then gasoline. And then these products again appear with highly increased prices at the same time in all sellers. What is frightened by the disappearance of the desired product, the buyer contrary to sober logic is only rejoicing.
Often, the functions close to the cartel are also trying to exercise a variety of associations on a more permanent basis: tea importers, juice producers, etc. In October 1998, for example, the State Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation began investigating the increase in gasoline prices by members of the Moscow Fuel Association, which unites about 60 owner-owners of gas station and controlling 85-90% of gasoline-sold in Moscow.
However, even more fears cause the future in this sense. High concentration of production, the inability to conquer customers by market methods, which have developed in a still pre-reform era, close contacts of all enterprises of the main industries and a number of other factors favors the massive occurrence of cartels. If the development of events really goes on this scenario, the economy can cause major damage. Its prevention is therefore an important task of state economic policy.
In conclusion, we will focus on the problem of social efficiency of oligopoly as a special type of market. No doubt is the fact that in the form of a cartel oligopoly is extremely ineffective. We have already said that in this case it is actually about group monopoly.
It is more difficult to deal with an uncomordinated oligopoly and "game according to the rules", where competition is incomparably stronger than in the cartel industries. Of course, all the shortcomings of imperfect competition are characteristic of these forms of oligopolies. Moreover, due to a significant degree of market control, these shortcomings are manifested at oligopoly much more than, let's say, with monopolistic competition.
The inevitability of oligopoly in conditions of large production
The people's saying says: the cow is always bought with horns, i.e. The disadvantages and advantages of each phenomenon should be considered together. Are there any listed weaknesses of the oligopoly of a revolt (and absolutely integral!) Side of the advantages of major firms? And maybe it is worth come true with them, since all of the industry is soon, where is the effective production, is it necessary to become oligopolistic? In fact, as it was already shown in the number of large enterprises in the industry can not be greater, which creates prerequisites for its oligulation. What side ultimately outweighs: shortcomings of imperfect competition or benefits of large production?
At first glance, it may seem that only a negative attitude towards large firms can be found from the theory of oligopolies. However, the works of a number of scientists, in particular, a prominent modern American economist, the Laureate of the Pulitzer and Bankrottovskaya Awards Alfred D. Chandler, revealed positive aspects of the activities of large oligopolistic enterprises and developed practical recommendations for the formation of an effective market strategy of giants, in particular, the main directions of investments were identified. They must implement.
Oligopolyization and productivity growth in the world and in Russia
First of all, the following pattern is established on the extensive actual material: the transition of the industry into the oligopolistic state is usually accompanied by a sharp increase in productivity. We will give at least the most famous examples from world history.
The creation of J. D. Rockefeller Giant Oil Trust "Standard Oil" led to a 6-fold reduction in the price of 1 Kerosene Gallon (from 2.5 to 0.4 cents) in just 6 years. In the same way, the oligopolyization of ferrous metallurgy caused not an increase (as it would be possible to think), and the rapid reduction in costs and prices. Founded by E. Carnegie Giant sold in 1889 1 tons of rails for $ 23, while in 1880 she cost 68 dollars.
In modern Russia, we can observe the same process in those sectors where small enterprises initially dominated, and now the process of production concentration is quickly. This situation is very typical for our country: such a path was the majority of the new private businesses, where the tone is specified not privatized, but created "at the naked place" - and therefore originally ended - companies. Complete for an example on a low price level in a rapidly oligopoly beer industry.
13. What are the advantages of large firms over small from the standpoint of stability and risk? 14. How is the riskiness of securities? 15. How are the required rate of profitability with risk? 16. What is the economic content of Bain's coefficient? 17. What are the possibility of using the Lerner coefficient in determining the degree of competitiveness of the market? 18. What is the meaning of the Tobin coefficient? 19. What are the possibilities of Papandreu coefficient in assessing the level of monopoly power? Chapter VII. The degree and concept of partial competition of monopoly, oligopoly and efficient competition in the market. Dominant firms, their monopoly effect. Close oligopolies, spectrum of their interaction and influence on the market. Weak oligopoly, its behavior features. Features and results of monopolistic competition. When analyzing the degree of competition, all elements of the market structure should be combined on the market. The methodological foundations of the procedure provide for a certain order of judgment. First of all, the magnitude of the market share of the leading firm is calculated, on the basis of which certain conclusions can be made. If the magnitude of the market share is very significant (more than 40%), there are no nearest rivals, then the market power of such a company is great. The free exit of other firms for this market can destroy the market power of this company, unless, of course, the company's firm possess a large market force. For the completeness of the analysis of the market, it is also necessary to assess the behavior of the dominant company in relation to other firms on the market and its level of profitability. If the market shares of large firms are within 25 -50%, then, apparently, there is a close oligopoly, since the concentration indicator of four firms will exceed 60%. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the price strategy and the norms of profit when evaluating the degree of competition. If the largest share on the market is no more than 20%, the concentration of four firms does not exceed 40%, then it can be argued that there is effective competition in the market, the entrance barriers will not be high and secret agreements minimal. Usually in economic analysis it is customary to distinguish between three categories of competition degrees: - dominant firm; - close oligopoly; - Weak oligopoly (including monopolistic competition). Each category has its own specific features that need to be considered more thorough. 71 1. Dominant firm. As already noted, the dominance requires more than 40% of the market and the absence of the nearest rivals. With a very high share in the market, the company actually occupies the position of the monopolist: the demand curve is a common curve of demand in the market, it is inelastic. The dominant firm acts in the essence as a net monopoly, and some competition between small firms does not particularly affect the policies of the dominant company maximizing its profits, and the dominant firm due to its demand curve usually faces the problem of capturing a high share in the market and long-term dominance, and the latter Implement the most difficult. As an example, dominant firms, oligopolys and monopolistic competitors can be given: - for the markets of dominant companies - computers, airplanes, business newspapers, night delivery of correspondence - the average market share - 50-90%, at high or medium barriers; - for markets of close oligopolys (cars, artificial leather, glass, batteries, etc.) - a concentration indicator of 4-95%; - for the market of weak oligopolists and monopolistic competition (cinema, theater, commercial publications, retail stores, clothing) - a concentration indicator of 4th firms 6-30%. Dominant firms usually show the following monopoly influence in the field of prices: - increase the price level; - Create a discriminatory price structure. The actions of these factors makes it possible to obtain super profits (Rice15). In the figure, the points are conventionally represented by some data of statistical observations, which allow you to associate the rate of profit from the value of the input barriers and the behavior of oligopolists; The relationship of the share in the market and the rate of profit on the market is very close and increases with the level of monopoly. The price discrimination of the dominant firm is that the company can divide the market for segments within which the differentiated ratios of the price - costs are established for various consumer groups in accordance with the inelasticity of demand. For example, higher prices for computers can be installed, some have no worthy competitors, on electronic devices for signaling about the parameters of production processes, etc. If the firm is close to the monopoly, the main provisions and concepts of the monopoly are used to analyze it. At the same time, it is possible (and in many cases a productive approach) to the analysis of temporary dominance in accordance with the concept of J. Schumpeter, which is known to be different from the neoclassical approach. In accordance with his approach, a big business, even if it is associated with market dominance, is able to give the best result compared to a neoclassical competing result. 72 4 4 Profit rate of the company,% 3 1 5 5 2 Competitive share of profits 100 market share of products,% Fig. 15. Dependence between market share and profit rate. 1- "Normal" conditions are supported; 2-input barriers are low; 3-input barriers are high; 4- oligopolists are cooperated; 5- oligopolists are entitled according to this concept (published in 1942), competition is rather determined as the process of a balance of equilibrium than to establish equilibrium conditions. In accordance with this theory, competition and progress are consistent only in the series of temporary monopolies. The "Schumpeter" process, in essence, is the exact opposite of neoclassical approaches. According to his ideas, the next event scenario is played in the market. In each period of time, one company can dominate each market that increases prices and gets monopoly benefits. However, these revenues attract the attention of other firms, some initiate their efforts in creating more advanced products and reduce costs in order to take the place of the dominant firm. This new firm can establish monopolized prices and cause monopoly effects by replacing the new company, etc. This process was called "creating destruction" - the innovation creates dominance that allows you to extract monopoly benefits that stimulate the "new innovation", new dominance, etc. The average level of monopoly income may increase; The scale of the processes of malnutrition, destruction, market dominance can be very significant; However, the technological process can create a profit significantly exceeding the costs of irrational use of resources (which is considered as a negative result of the monopoly, and as the cause of its destruction in the market). In certain relationships, this concept logically complements the approaches of the neolamic theory. At the same time, this concept requires some sufficiently vulnerable assumptions. First, the dominant firm must have signs of vulnerability so that it can be defeated by competitors. Secondly, entrance barriers should not be high to ensure entry into the competitor market. 73 Note that the community of Schumpetierian (evolutionary) and neoclassical approaches is that effective competition also involves regulatory processes involving significant market share in it. Analysis reveals the indigenous features of the neoclassical approach - an effective balance between firms, and the evolutionary is a coarse equilibrium, and the creation process causes a sequence of tough actions of monopolies. A number of authors, researchers in the economy of industry markets, considers them substantiated with equal probability. Represents some interest analysis of passively dominating firms, i.e. Had tactics of passive role, which allows small competitors to select their dominance. However, mostly these considerations are quite dubious, since such firms exist, rather, hypothetically. Typically, the dominant firms are still aggressive in their tactics of suppressing possible rivals. Interesting considerations about the fact that part of the economy can be considered a subject approach of evolutionism - for example, electronics, chemistry, automotive industry; As for agriculture, trade, they detect the possibility of using neoclassical approaches. Depending on the level of staticness and dynamic of certain markets, one or another approaches are more productive. In the diverse world of markets, dominant firms are able to maintain sometimes long positions, or passing them very slowly. Apparently, the radicality of scientific approaches cannot be based on one of the principles or conceptual approaches, but should have the basis of a multifactorial approach, the use of which in each particular case should be carefully specified. 2. Close oligopoly usually believes that close oligopoly almost always implies the possibility of secret agreements, whereas in a weak oligopoly also agreements, then in weak oligopoly such agreements are unlikely. The issues of education and existence of oligopolys continue to remain largely discussion, since they reflect significant variation of situations that are weakly be-permensed simulation. So, oligopolies are characterized by a few and interdependence; They arise from pure dopolia and develop to free oligopoly out of 8 - 10 firms. The few firms makes each of them to take into account the possible reaction to their actions by competitors, i.e. A certain system of action and counteracts is formed. The demand of each company, as well as the strategy of its actions, depend on the reaction of competitors, therefore the multifactorious and probabilistic system of competitive relations occurs, in which each of the participants can show unexpected, extraordinary reactions. From here there is a need to choose for each of the participants of the relevant strategy with a set of possible alternatives or methods for the development of scenarios, predicting the development of the situation, etc. The reaction of competitors encourages the firm's step-by-step behavior, the use of iterative procedures, adjusting the options for answers, etc. 74 Oligopolists can use any spectrum of interaction - from full cooperation (in certain areas) to pure struggle; Collaborate with the achievement of the results of pure monopoly and maximizing revenues, or to act independently and hostile using elements of a rigid competitive struggle; Much more often, they occupy some intermediate position, to one or another poles. Therefore, naturally, it is extremely difficult to create a unified model of the behavior of oligopolists, including both polar points of behavior and intermediate states, especially those that take into account the specifics of private situations in which markets are also located, and the firms themselves. It is necessary to take into account the significant variety of oligopol structures due to the influence of such parameters as: - the degree of concentration; - asymmetry or equality between oligopolists; - difference in costs; - difference in the conditions of demand; - availability or absence of firm strategies and long-term planning; - level of technological development; - the state of the management system on the company, etc. Thus, the development of the theory of oligopoly faces the need to build multifactorial probabilistic and nonlinear models that must meet one requirement - to meet the practice of the present and forecasts of the future in a sufficiently large range of practical structures and temporary segments. So far, as in most approaches and models, options based on unusual approaches and assumptions are offered, which in itself characterizes not only the solely difficult nature of the processes, but also the obvious disadvantages of methodological approaches. Apparently, for these purposes, the development of the mathematical apparatus of the theory of nonlinear, multifactorial probabilistic and multi-communication systems is necessary - the task of the nearest future. The fundamental background of the existence of oligopoly is in the following circumstances: - incentives for competition; - joining a secret conspiracy; - a combination of both (mixed incentives). Competing encourages each company to active, intensive struggle, in order to maximize its income. Its aggressive behavior inevitably causes an acute response of competitors, which may have unexpected elements of negative synergies and even a multiplicative, connected effect (differing from simple summation). Entry into secret conspiracy is usually attractive, since the cooperation of effort allows the effect close to the monopoly, greater than with competition. Mixed incentives consist in the fact that it is possible to use both a secret conspiracy and cutting prices, cooperation, choosing position in the market (for example, outside the price record rings), etc. The behavior of oligopolists in the market can be very different - from convenient cooperation, where the "collective monopolist" operates to the company that leads a continuous war using innovations of various nature (and above all, technological). 75 The attitude to the behavior of firms entering into secret agreements is different from representatives of various schools. Representatives of the Chicago UCLA - schools believe that secret agreements are doomed to quick collapse due to natural internal conflicts. However, representatives of other schools rightly note that many cartels exist at once with decades, which can not be considered rapid collapse. Since real results are significantly dependent on accidents, apparently, reality is not very consistent with those or other scientific schools and indicates the need for further scientific searches and generalizations. Several generalized models that characterize the behavior of oligopolists can be brought. 1. At high concentration, the likelihood of the existence of secret agreements is large due to a number of reasons: - High concentration creates objective prerequisites for the organization of mutual agreements; Leaders who have significant market share are experiencing insignificant pressure from small firms; - the small number of firms makes it possible to identify and punish a firm reduced price; With a large number of firms (10-15), such capacity to reduce prices increase significantly for one of the firms, which will be detected not so quickly. Secret agreements are characteristic of a close oligopoly, whereas in weak they are quickly destroyed; A close oligopoly is always to the "group monopoly" with maximizing profits; Weak oligopoly tends to effectively compete with lower prices. 2. The similarity of the conditions of firms. If the terms of demand and costs coincide sufficiently, then the interests of firms are coincided, which encourages the development of cooperation. It is not difficult to see that these conditions have quite definite time limits - technological innovations, for example, are able to drastically reduce the costs of the company, and the trends towards cooperation will be violated. 3. Establishing closer business relationships between firms. As business contacts establish, mutual understanding at the top management level increases, which generates mutually rigorous relationships. Thus, between the close and weak oligopoly, the differences exist, but they have not only quantitative, but also high-quality nature. Close oligopolies are characterized by a tough competition (but not always), weak oligopolies are able to conclude secret agreements (although not very often). The concentration can contribute to a significant increase in the rate of profit (prices), and especially this is characteristic of a range of concentrations of 40-60%, reflecting the fixation of prices in a close oligopoly (Fig. 16.) Points noted by cases of statistical observation; Graphs illustrate the possibility of a linear or stepped approximation; For the latter, the interval of a sharp increase in profit rate is characteristic. Consider the types of secret agreements that occur in oligopolies - from close concrete to unofficial. With targeted agreements, prices in close oligopoly can lead to a purely monopoly effect. Cartel, as an organization that is created by firms to control, coordination and cooperation, usually sets 76 prices and develops a system of sanctions against violators of the contract (collusion). Carteels can act overwhelming: - to install sales quotas; - monitor investments; - Combine income. The classic example of the cartel is OPEC - organization of countries - oil exporters on the oil market of the planet. Norma 2 profits,% 1 50 Concentration,% 100 Figure 16. Dependence between the level of concentration and the level of profitability. 1- linear approximation; 2- stepped approximation. American law fixing prices declared illegal in most sectors of the economy, but the hidden setting of fixed prices remains in practice through a number of information messages (secret meetings, phone information, email, etc.). Silent conspiracy (agreement) can be carried out in various and soft forms; Firms do not sign any documents, but may provide conventional signals about preferred price levels, which is one of the forms of indirect agreements. 3. Weak oligopoly. Weak oligopoly is an area from moderate concentration to pure competition, i.e. It is quite voluminous and conditional. According to the developed chambersblin concept, monopolistic competition is characterized by low levels of concentration, in which each company has a weak degree of monopoly; Firms demand curves have a weak negative tilt and none of the companies have a market share greater than 10%. The features of monopolistic competition include the following: 1. The existence of some product differentiation caused by the occurrence of certain preferences in consumers. A weak degree of market power determines the slow decrease in the firm's demand curve. Product differentiation may be due to a number of reasons: 77 - physical difference of products (for example, various dopular properties); - difference in product varieties (bread, clothing, shoes, etc.); - location of outlets. 2. Barriers of free entry into the market for new firms, which can be attractive in the existence of super-profile on the market. 3. Since there are no firms with a sufficiently high share in the market, each company is relatively independent and has pressure from the remaining market firms. Conditions considered characterize markets for many types of products. It can be noted such typical cases of conditionally monopolistic competition, like trade of clothing or food products: a steady center of clients in the city district and a steady, but remote competition for outlets, located pronounced. Demand is high, elastic; The demand curve is almost horizontal, but has a small niche for pricing. Cost costs a) Price b) Price 2 1 1 2 3 CD 3 AB 4 4 QS Q QL Mes Q Fig. 17. Monopolistic competition. a) - demand is highly elastic; b) - demand is non-ielastic; 1 - limit costs; 2 - average costs; 3. - Demand; 4 - limit income; AB - inactive power; CD - additive to the price of minimum costs. For a short-term period, the situation presented in Figure may occur. 17 a. The demand curve is above the cost curve, which allows the firm to receive super-profile in a short period of time (shaded rectangle), if the company provides the release of QS products. The introduction of new firms to the market lowers the company's demand curve before the provision of a tangent to the average cost curve and, thereby destroying super-profile. In fig. 17 B none of the long-term curves of demand is not higher than the limiting curve, so the superprior is excluded. The company may exist with the volume of ql, at a point of equality of marginal incomes to maximal costs when achieving a competitive profit rate. 78 Monopolistic competition destroys long-term superflife, even when demand is not completely elastic. Monopolistic competition causes the following deviations from the results of pure competition, which is shown in Fig. 17 b. With it, demand is lowered down until the average costs will affect the demand curve. Super profits do not exist, but the price is above the minimum average costs and there are unloaded production facilities. And costs, and prices will be somewhat higher than with net competition, which cause MES - and the price, and the volume of the release QL above the MES. These added costs carry certain benefits for consumers. For example, trading points in certain places can establish elevated prices, which, at the same time, do not make other remote outlets more attractive. Preference may be on a variety of goods (quality), and by service time, in terms of service, etc. Other deviations are redundant power, since the issue Ql< MES. В частности, в торговой сети это выражается в пустых проходах между полками магазинов или незаполненных местах ресторанов и кафе. Тем не менее, монополистическая конкуренция обычно близка к результатам чистой совершенной конкуренции. Основные понятия: категории степени конкуренции; доминирующая фирма; тесная олигополия; слабая олигополия; рыночная доля и норма прибыли; ценовая дискриминация; разнообразие олигопольных структур; тайные соглашения и картели; возможности получения сверхприбыли. Выводы к главе VII Условия доминирования фирмы на рынке обеспечивают ей позицию монополиста с соответствующими последствиями. В области цен это повышение уровня цен и дискриминационная структура цен. Тесная олигополия имеет тенденции к тайным соглашениям и возможности применения широкого спектра взаимодействия - от полной кооперации до чистой борьбы, поэтому создание единой модели поведения олигополистов остается проблематичным. Тайные соглашения весьма разнообразны, динамичны, имеют различный спектр действия и последствий. Слабые олигополии достаточно условны и объемны, позволяют получение небольшой сверхприбыли в краткосрочном периоде. Контрольные вопросы 1. Какие условия существования монополии, олигополии и эффективной конкуренции на рынке? 2. Чем характерны доминирующие фирмы? Приведите примеры рынков доминирующих фирм. В чем заключается их монопольное влияние? В чем суть «шумпетерианского подхода»? 79 3. В чем суть тесной олигополии? Каковы спектры взаимодействий тесных олигополий и разнообразия олигопольных структур? 4. Что такое слабая олигополия и каково поведение слабых олигополистов на рынке? 5. В чем заключается особенность монополистической конкуренции? Глава VIII. Модели структуры Основные элементы структуры рынка и уравнение, связывающее их со средней нормой прибыли фирмы. Отраслевая структура рынка промышленности США. Перепись групп отраслей США и проблемы ее объективности. Стандарты категории рынков и тенденции изменения эффективной конкуренции. 1.Элементы структуры и их взаимодействие Элементы структуры рынка, такие как рыночная доля, концентрация, входные барьеры и другие, образуют собой сложную многофакторную систему. Они взаимодействуют друг с другом не всегда предсказуемым образом и формируют достаточно сложные причинно-следственные связи. В ряде случаев, в зависимости от конкретных ситуаций, на первое место могут выходить и рыночная доля, и концентрация, и входные барьеры. Каждый из элементов может быть наиболее важным в определенный момент и в определенной отрасли. Реальные модели взаимодействия элементов могут относиться только к конкретным примерам, к определенной статистике, т.е. можно признать, что единой универсальной модели, пригодной на все случае жизни, не существует. Каждая реальная модель основывается на конкретной статистике и соответствует определенным целям. Тем не менее, существует фундаментальная предпосылка, определяющая степень стабильности фирмы и ее нормального функционирования (и соответственно, принципа построения модели) – это уровень рентабельности фирмы. Это предпосылка была обоснована и впоследствии подтверждена рядом гипотез. Именно рентабельность и ее повышение выступают основным побудителем для любой фирмы, а важность любого элемента может быть оценена по его удельному вкладу в повышение рентабельности достаточно типичной фирмы. На начальных этапах исследований (1950-е гг.) делались попытки выявить структуру ценностно-стоимостных моделей всеотраслевой концентрации или показателя уровня концентрации четырех фирм в силу доступности соответствующих экономических данных. В связи с тем, что невольно недооценивались многие специфические условия отдельных фирм и упускались из вида другие элементы структуры, подобные оценки имели весьма относительную ценность. Исследования периода 1960-1970 гг. были сосредоточены уже на предельно точных особенностях отдельных фирм и их долях на рынках; они позволили уточнить роль отдельных элементов фирмы в рыночной структуре. Серия исследований 1960-1975 гг. и 1980- 1983 гг. на примере 100-250 крупных корпораций США преследовала цель неоднократно тестировать основные элементы для получения некоторых 80
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