"Scharnhorst". Creation, battles, campaigns and death of the German battleship. Fuhrer Pirates. The sinking of the battleship Scharnhorst Battlecruiser Scharnhorst

"Scharnhorst" at the base

The beams of searchlights probed the angry December sea. Spots of spilled oil, debris, pieces of ice floes and more debris. Rare heads of people floundering in the icy water. Explosions of illuminating projectiles helped the light of searchlights, illuminating the surface with a deathly pale glow. The destroyers of His Royal Majesty Scorpion and Matchless, moonlighting as machines, made their way through the recent battlefield - the excitement of the battle, unlike the sea, subsided. Their formidable adversary has already rested on the bottom 70 miles northeast of the North Cape. Now it was possible to pick up survivors - however, there were few of them. The long, persistent and already rather boring migraine called "Scharnhorst", which tormented the Lords of the Admiralty, finally passed.

Not an easy birth

An untimely “no” often means a silent “yes”. This is what guided Germany in the 30s, carefully, in small unhurried steps, restoring its navy. The first-born of its resurgent core were the Deutschland-class battleships, ships in many ways unique and original for their time. The banks of the Thames were silent for the time being. The French neighbors, showing concern, responded by laying down the Dunkirk, a swift watchdog with 330-mm guns, capable of catching up and cracking down on any of the German "pocket battleships". The concept of a highly autonomous diesel raider has increasingly begun to become vulnerable. The third battleship of the Admiral Graf Spee series was slightly modified in order to increase and strengthen its armor, but this was a half measure. The German admirals already needed a next-generation ship to work in the Atlantic - it had to maintain its high-speed and autonomous qualities and at the same time not be afraid of meeting French hunters. The commander of the fleet, Admiral Raeder, made a proposal to further change the design of the "Deutschlands", two of which (battleships "D" and "E") were being prepared for laying. The idea was to install an additional, third, main-caliber turret while increasing the displacement to 15-18 thousand tons. At the beginning of 1933, the concept of the project put forward the conditions: the new ships must be able to withstand the French "Dunkirk". Consideration of options began - from a displacement of 18 thousand tons and nine 283-mm guns to 26 thousand tons with six promising 330-mm guns. The latter seemed more promising, and it was he who was taken as the basis for further study.

Hitler's coming to power unexpectedly made adjustments to the development of large-tonnage military shipbuilding. At the beginning of his already official career, the newly minted Fuhrer did not want to once again frighten the British with the construction of as many as 26,000-ton ships, the size of which was already an outright mockery for the Versailles Treaty. Hitler urged the admirals to calm their ardor and appetites and build battleships "D" and "E" according to the type of "Admiral Count Spee" with even more advanced armor (220 mm - belt, 70-80 mm - main armored deck). The ships "fat" up to 19 thousand tons, but in Berlin they thought that the forbidden 19 were still more modest and inconspicuous than those that were generally beyond 26. On January 25, the shipyards in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel received orders for the construction of two battleships, which were laid February 14 of the same year. In 1934, France, continuing to express concern, announced the laying of a second Dunkirk-class ship, the battlecruiser Strasbourg. The naval elite began to beg Hitler not to multiply ships that were obviously inferior to a potential enemy, but to give the go-ahead to rework the project.

Given the silence that reigned on the island, the Fuhrer gave permission to increase the displacement of new ships and add a third tower. On July 5, work on the battleships "D" and "E" was suspended, and their redesign began. Initially, they decided to install the towers of the main caliber in a very interesting way: one in the bow, two in the stern, thereby, according to the plan of the designers, a large concentration of fire was achieved back in the event of a possible chase. At the same time, for the first time, an opinion was expressed about laying in the project the possibility of re-equipping with guns of a larger caliber - 330 or 380 mm. Soon, the defensive position of the main battery turrets was abandoned in favor of the traditional one: two at the bow, one at the stern. Has undergone major changes power plant ship. Since diesel engines with the appropriate power, capable of accelerating a ship with a displacement of 26 thousand tons, existed only on paper, it was decided to use a steam turbine power plant with high-pressure boilers of the Wagner system. Only such installations could provide new ships with a speed of 30 knots. In March 1935, when the drawings and other documentation were ready, the question arose again of increasing the caliber of the guns and placing either nine 305 or 330 mm guns, or six twin 350 or 380 mm guns. The command of the fleet insisted on the maximum size, but then, still not sure of the reaction of the "peace-loving islanders", Hitler ordered that for the time being the original nine 283-mm guns be limited. The consolation, of course, was that these were new Krupp guns, more powerful and longer-range than those installed on the "Deutschlands".

In an effort to reassure the British and give their actions at least some legal and legal framework, Hitler agreed to sign a naval agreement with Britain, emphasizing that he considers France to be the main enemy and offender. The Germans promised the British a guaranteed triple superiority of the British battle fleet over the German one: 477 thousand tons of displacement against 166 thousand in Germany. The British thought and agreed. The Versailles restrictions finally collapsed - the Germans got the opportunity to build their fleet quite legally.

In the spring and summer of 1935, the new ships, which received the names Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which were significant for the German fleet, were officially relaunched: May 3 - Gneisenau, June 16 - Scharnhorst.

The new battleships (it was decided to abandon the archaic term "battleship") were not descendants of the excellently designed and built German battlecruisers of the First World War. They bore little resemblance to the further evolution of Mackensen or Ersatz Yorck type ships. The Scharnhorsts were, in fact, enlarged "Deutschlands" on which the consequences of various restrictions and compromises were felt. Already in the process of construction, it became clear that within the allotted 26,000-ton displacement it would not be possible to hold on, and it would be significantly exceeded. This caused serious concerns about the seaworthiness, stability and survivability of the new ships. For example, the armored deck was below the waterline, and the freeboard height was also insufficient. The ships were already on the stocks, and there was no way to radically change anything in them. The stability problem could be improved by installing additional boules, but this solution would inevitably reduce the speed, which was considered unacceptable. Measures were taken to save weight: a strict weight discipline was established, in addition, welding was widely used in construction - the hulls of both battleships, or rather battlecruisers, were welded. These efforts solved the problem of congestion only partially - both ships were quite "wet", inferior in seaworthiness to many classmates.


Battleship launch

October 3, 1936 "Scharnhorst" in a solemn ceremony launched, "Gneisenau" will follow him only on December 8, 1938. Despite the excess weight, the Germans paid great attention to the issues of unsinkability of ships - any waterproof compartment, with the exception of the narrowest at the ends, was divided, in turn, into additional waterproof spaces. In total, there were 21 main watertight compartments, the flooding of two of which, regardless of location, guaranteed to maintain the combat capability of the ship. The main armor belt had a thickness of 350 mm, thinning to the lower edge up to 170 mm, and was intended primarily to protect against a potential enemy - 330-mm Dunkirk guns. Reservation of the main caliber towers reached a maximum thickness of 360 mm. The auxiliary caliber of battleships was developed in quantity: 8 twin 150-mm guns, located in turrets protected by 140 mm armor, and 4 single-gun mounts, covered with only 25 mm shields. The latter was a clear relic of the Deutschland heritage, besides, the overload no longer allowed to place all the guns in the towers. Anti-torpedo protection was designed to counter a torpedo with a warhead of at least 250 kg. After the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Hitler no longer objected to the re-equipment of the Scharnhorsts with new 380-mm guns, even orders were issued for the production of the barrels themselves - the rearmament was supposed to take place according to plan in the winter of 1940-1941, but with the outbreak of World War II it was postponed indefinitely.

On January 7, 1939, the Scharnhorst entered service, with Captain Zur See Otto Ziliaks as its first commander.

In Norway. Operation Weserbung

New ships, which belonged to battlecruisers, required numerous fine-tuning. The power plant was especially capricious. Training exits in the Baltic showed insufficient seaworthiness and freeboard height. Both battleships are being redesigned with clipper noses more suitable for sailing in the Atlantic. The situation in Europe was becoming more and more tense, the new ships had no time for campaigns to demonstrate the flag, unlike their predecessors, the "Deutschlands". Efforts were made to bring the Scharnhorst to a full combat state as soon as possible. In October, the command decided that the new battleship was already quite capable of going to sea. The fact is that by this time the British had thrown considerable forces into the search for and destruction of the "pocket battleship" "Admiral Count Spee" in the South Atlantic, the ring of beaters around which was already shrinking. In order to reduce pressure on the raider, it was decided to authorize the exit of a pair of battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau into the Atlantic in order to distract the British from their persistent hunting activities. Ironically, it was the tasks of the "pocket battleship" that included disrupting communications and diverting part of the enemy's cruising forces. Now they had to bring in their own heavy ships to bite the tail of the British.

On November 21, 1939, the Scharnhorst and her sistership left Wilhelmshaven for the North Atlantic. On November 23, German ships collided with the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi, a former passenger liner with eight obsolete 152-mm guns. Despite the simply overwhelming difference in armament, the commander of the British cruiser E. Kennedy courageously accepted the battle. Half an hour later, the Rawalpindi turned into a flaming wreck, its commander was killed, the crew lowered the boats. When the old liner was sunk, the German battleships used up almost 120 shells of the main caliber and more than 200 of the auxiliary. The appearance of the cruiser Newcastle on the horizon forced Vice-Admiral Marshal, the commander of the operation, to order a withdrawal, putting up a smoke screen, as he was afraid of the presence of larger ships. The command criticized the Marshal for the huge consumption of ammunition and indecision, but propaganda presented the sinking of the Rawalpindi as a great victory.

Both battleships spent the winter of 1939-1940 in the base and firing practice in the Baltic. At the same time, the propaganda department filmed a special documentary called "Battleship on a military campaign", where "Scharnhorst" starred as the main character. The viewers were shown a picture that the fleet allegedly operates almost near the island of Helgoland, conducting live firing at enemy aircraft and ships. In fact, the shooting took place in the rear of the Baltic.

The next significant milestone in the career of the battleship was participation in the operation "Weserbyung-Nord" - the invasion of Norway. The Weserbung was at critical risk and consisted of a combination of sea and air assaults. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and destroyers, provided cover for the Narvik landing group, which captured the important Norwegian port of Narvik. On the approach, the German squadron was discovered and attacked by British bombers, which, however, did not achieve success. However, the alarmed Admiralty, which did not own the whole picture of what was happening, decided that the Germans were preparing a major raider operation in the North Atlantic, and on the evening of April 7, 1940, the Metropolitan Fleet put to sea. While the destroyers landed rangers on the piers of Narvik, both battleships were cruising to the west. At 04:30 on April 9, 1940, the Gneisenau radar detected a large target 25 km astern, and a combat alarm was played on both ships. Rain and cloudiness severely limited visibility and did not allow full use of excellent optics. At 5 am, the navigator of the Scharnhorst discovered a flash of large-caliber guns in the mirror of the sextant - the size of the fountains from explosions confirmed the seriousness of the guest's intentions. After 5 minutes, signalmen discovered the silhouette of a large ship - it was the battlecruiser Rinaun, along with eight destroyers accompanying it. At first, Vice Admiral Günter Lutyens ordered to turn to the enemy - soon the parties exchanged hits: Gneisenau and Rinaun received two shells each. The Germans, having fixed that Rinaun was not alone, feared torpedo attacks from British destroyers, so Lutyens ordered to increase speed and break away from the enemy. In the end, they succeeded, and on April 12, together with the Admiral Hipper, the battleships returned to Wilhelmshaven. During the campaign, many design flaws of the ships were revealed. They suffered from frequent wave blows to the bow, because of this, there were frequent water penetrations into the tower of the main caliber "A", causing damage to electrical circuits. The power plant was also unreliable. Nevertheless, immediately upon arrival at the base, both battleships began to prepare for a new campaign - combat-ready units among the German heavy ships were in short supply. After a quick repair, the battleships were supposed to again go to the coast of Norway, however, the explosion of the Gneisenau on a mine on May 5 and the subsequent repair postponed the active actions of the group for almost a month.

On June 4, under the flag of Vice Admiral Marshal, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the same Admiral Hipper and a group of destroyers, went to sea as part of Operation Juno, the purpose of which was to impede British shipping off the coast of Norway. After the Hipper destroyed several British ships, Marshal sent him along with the destroyers to refuel in Trondheim, and he himself went to try his luck off the coast of Harstad. At 4:48 p.m. an observer from the fore-mars of the Scharnhorst noticed smoke, and a little later, signalmen identified a large aircraft carrier. It was the British Glories, which, escorted by the destroyers Ardent and Akasta, evacuated two squadrons of land fighters from Norway - Gladiators and Hurricanes. For some reason, none of the Swordfish torpedo bombers, the only one effective against German battleships, was ready to take off. All the trump cards were in the hands of the Marshal. The Germans approached their victim and opened fire first with the main and then with the auxiliary caliber. They fired quickly, and the carrier began to take hit after hit. Escort destroyers showed real heroism in trying to protect their ward in an almost hopeless situation. Soon the Glories turned into a huge bonfire, and the Ardent and Acasta put up a smoke screen. Under her cover, the first went into a desperate torpedo attack, firing 4 torpedoes - the Germans noticed them in time and dodged them. A flurry of shells hit the Ardent, and it soon sank. "Acasta" maneuvered for a long time, knocking down the enemy's aim and avoiding hits. At 7 p.m., the Glories, engulfed in flames, sank, the courageous Acasta did not survive much. Going on the attack, he fired a volley of four torpedoes - "Gneisenau" evaded them, but "Scharnhorst" did not escape the blow of retaliation - one torpedo hit him in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe "C" tower. The battleship was seriously damaged, rolled to port and took 2,500 tons of water. "Acasta", which went to the bottom with the entire crew, sold his life dearly. Since throughout the battle the radio station "Glories" drove one dispatch after another, Marshall decided to urgently return after the end of the battle. In addition, the state of the Scharnhorst caused some concern. The battleship could not give a speed of more than 20 knots, and therefore the Germans went to the nearest Trondheim, where, with the help of a floating repair shop, they managed to make temporary repairs. Only at the end of June, the Scharnhorst reached Kiel and stood on overhaul, which lasted until the end of 1940.

Raid in the Atlantic

At the end of 1940, the German command decided on a major operation in the Atlantic. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were to carry out a deep raid on the enemy's communications, attacking, if possible, single ships and convoys. The commander of the operation, Gunther Lutyens, was strictly forbidden to engage in battle with capital ships. The operation received the meaningful name "Berlin". On December 28, 1940, the ships went to sea, but fell into a severe storm, in which they received damage to the hull - huge masses of water that hit the places of old wounds turned out to be very dangerous. I had to return to try again on January 22, 1941. Already on February 3, the battleships managed to slip out into the Atlantic, where they began their activities. This generally successful campaign lasted until March 22, 1941 - the German battleships had plenty of fun on the English shipping lanes. Twice they made contact with the enemy battleships: on March 7 with the Malaya guarding the convoy, and on March 16 with the Rodney. Both times, thanks to superior speed, the raiders managed to get away without difficulty. During the campaign, "Gneisenau" destroyed 14, and "Scharnhorst" - 8 enemy ships total displacement 115 thousand tons, causing a stir in the Admiralty.

On March 22, both battleships arrived at the French port of Brest, occupied by Germany, where they stood up for repairs. The presence near the English Channel of a gang of bandits from the main road - the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, who returned from the Atlantic, soon joined the battleships - greatly unnerved the British. In an effort to destroy or at least disable German ships, the British command constantly organized air raids on the parking lots of the Brest group. The Germans pulled large air defense forces to the city, carefully camouflaged the ships, giving them the appearance of land. The decks of the battleships and the cruiser were densely hung with camouflage nets, for greater reliability, real trees and shrubs were mounted on the superstructures and towers. But British intelligence, using the agents of the French Resistance, every time found out the exact parking places. Transferred to La Pallis, the Scharnhorst on July 24, 1941, was subjected to another raid by the British Wellingtons and received five direct hits from bombs from 227 to 454 kg. The ship took 3000 tons of water, electrical equipment was seriously damaged. By the end of the year, after a series of repairs of varying degrees of complexity, both battleships were brought to a combat-ready state. During this period, the center of efforts of the German fleet shifted to the North, through which the Allies conducted caravans of ships to Soviet Union. Hitler called this region the zone of fate, and now the main task of the German surface ships was to disrupt the communications of the allies in the North. In addition, after the death of the Bismarck, the Atlantic ceased to be attractive as a hunting ground for large surface ships, the number of which Germany had was very limited. It was decided to transfer the Brest squadron first to Germany, then further north, to Norway.

Jump "Cerberus"


German ships in the English Channel. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are ahead. Photo taken from the Prinz Eugen

By the beginning of 1942, the German ships were generally ready to leave. The British raids became more and more intense. At a meeting with Hitler in the presence of the top leaders of the fleet and aviation, the final decision was made to break through from Brest by the most dangerous, but on the other hand, the shortest route - directly across the English Channel. The commander of the operation, Vice Admiral Otto Ziliaks, received a detailed plan for a breakthrough called "Operation Cerberus". On February 11, 1942, Scharnhorst (under the flag of Ciliax), Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, accompanied by 6 destroyers and 11 destroyers, left Brest. During the breakthrough, the Germans managed to achieve very close cooperation with the Luftwaffe - each of the three large ships had a communications officer. A powerful umbrella of fighters was deployed over the breaking through detachment. The beginning of the movement of the connection, the British frankly overslept and, recollecting themselves from such impudence, threw everything that was at hand to prevent the enemy. The German squadron was successively attacked by torpedo bombers, torpedo boats and destroyers, each time successfully fighting back. The main enemy turned out to be, nevertheless, the unexploited bottom mines, which generously strewn the bottom of the English Channel. On February 12, on the second day of the transition, off the Dutch coast, the Scharnhorst was successively blown up by two bottom mines. The battleship took almost 1,500 tons of water, there were damages in the engine room, and the ship lost its course. But soon the emergency parties managed to neutralize the consequences of the damage, and on February 13, the Scharnhorst, following the main forces, came to Wilhelmshaven. Operation Cerberus, bold and daring, was a brilliant success.

North again


Side view of Scharnhorst in different years

Upon arrival, the Scharnhorst was transferred to Kiel for repairs. The Gneisenau was also there, having received its fatal bomb on the night of February 27th. A successful hit caused the charges in the cellar of the main caliber tower to ignite, followed by their explosion and a strong fire. The detonation of the shells was avoided by flooding the cellars, but the battleship was completely out of action. Scharnhorst have lost their old partner. A more thorough examination of it by specialists led to the conclusion that a more thorough, and consequently, lengthy repair was needed - primarily boilers and turbines. The summer and autumn of 1942 were spent in exercises and repairs - problems with machines and boilers constantly haunted the ship. By the end of the year, Scharnhorst finally began preparations for a transfer to Norway. This decision was not canceled even in the light of the hysterical order of the Fuhrer on January 1, 1943 to write off all heavy ships for scrap after an unsuccessful New Year's battle off the coast of Norway.

After several unsuccessful attempts, the Scharnhorst as part of the Paderborn operation reached Narvik on March 14, 1943, and on March 22 dropped anchor in the main operational base of the German fleet in northern Norway - Alten Fjord, where the largest German battleship Tirpitz had long been located and heavy cruiser (former battleship) "Lützow". April 1943 was marked by a joint campaign of two battleships along with destroyers to Bear Island. The rest of the time the German squadron spent inactive with rare training exits near the base, to drive ship rats out of gun barrels. The lack of fuel began to affect the fleet. In the summer of 1943, the German radio station on the island of Svalbard was captured by the Norwegians, and the command of the Kriegsmarine began to prepare a response operation with a raid on this Arctic island. At the same time, it was necessary to prove to the Fuhrer that it was not in vain that the surface ships of the fleet were devouring such scarce fuel by entire trains. On September 8, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, together with 10 destroyers, approached Svalbard and fired at coal mines and a mining village. A thousand paratroopers landed on the shore. A battery of two old 76-mm guns was destroyed by naval artillery fire. "Scharnhorst" showed such disgusting results in shooting that immediately upon returning to base it was sent to the exercises. The answer of the opposite side was more constructive and painful: on September 22, 1943, the Tirpitz stationed in the Kaa Fjord was attacked by British dwarf submarines, which seriously damaged it - according to German estimates, the battleship was put out of action until the spring of 1944. Scharnhorst escaped such an unenviable fate only because it was on anti-aircraft exercises. After the Lützow, which had previously gone for overhaul, the Scharnhorst remained the only combat-ready German ship in the Arctic.

The last battle of the battleship "Scharnhorst"


Rear Admiral Erich Bey, commander of the German squadron

By the end of 1943, the situation on Germany's main Eastern Front was becoming increasingly threatening. The Allies, taking advantage of the weakening of German forces in the Arctic, resumed the escort of caravans. Hitler constantly reproached the leadership of the fleet for the inactivity and uselessness of surface ships, which, according to him, could not influence the situation in any way. At a meeting with the Fuhrer on December 19–20, Karl Dönitz assured him that in the very near future the Scharnhorst and the most combat-ready 4 destroyers would go out to intercept the discovered convoy. The temporary commander of the strike force, Rear Admiral Erich Bey (instead of the absent Kyumetz), on December 22, received an order to switch to a three-hour readiness. The Scharnhorst received fuel and provisions for the last time. For the commander of the battleship Fritz Hinze, this was the first trip to the sea in new position. In the zone of relative reach were two British convoys. JW-55B of 19 tankers and transports, escorted by 10 destroyers and 7 escorts, left Loch Ew on 20 December. Moving towards him was another convoy, RA-55 with security forces. In the Barents Sea, both convoys were covered by the British Formation 1 of Admiral R. Burnet, which included the light cruisers Belfast, Sheffield and the heavy Norfolk, and Formation 2 - the battleship Duke of York (flag of the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Bruce Fraser ), the cruiser Jamaica and 4 destroyers. The British convoy JW-55B was first discovered by aircraft, and then by a submarine. Dönitz gave the order to start the operation. At 7 p.m. on December 25, 1943, during the Christmas snowfall, the German squadron left the base. Operation "Ostfront" began. Bey was in constant radio contact with the headquarters of the command of the German forces in Norway. He had a very contradictory order in his hands: on the one hand, he was ordered to attack the convoy at the slightest opportunity and act energetically, on the other hand, he was required to immediately stop the battle when the strongest enemy appeared. The December sea was rough, the Scharnhorst was at the head of the squadron, destroyers were breaking through the waves to the side. Soon their speed had to be reduced to 10 knots. Bey did not realize that all his communications with the shore were being read by the British service "Ultra" - the British knew that the old enemy had left his lair and was at sea.

In the morning at 8 o'clock the Belfast radar detected a German battleship 32 km from the convoy, at 9.20 it was already visually identified from the Sheffield. The Scharnhorst did not turn on its radars in order to maintain stealth. At 0923, the British cruisers opened fire, first with illuminating and then armor-piercing shells - the Scharnhorst immediately responded. For 20 minutes, the opponents exchanged volleys - the German ship was hit by several shells that did not cause severe damage, except for one that destroyed the forward radar antenna. The Scharnhorst was blinded from the bow angles by about 69–80 degrees. Bey decided to withdraw from the battle: the main goal was still the convoy. And he managed to throw off the tail of the British. The Scharnhorst makes a detour and tries to approach the convoy from the other side, from the northeast. English cruisers again discover the enemy. In the exchange of fire that took place, the Norfolk and Belfast are damaged, and the German battleship again leaves the battle. Destroyers do not participate in the battle, as they are too far away. They're running low on fuel, and Bey sends his escort back to base.

At the beginning of the second day, the German admiral decided to end the operation - he could not get through to the convoy, the British were aware of his presence. And most of all Bey feared the presence of a British battleship nearby. The cruisers following the trail of the raider directed Admiral Fraser's Compound 2 to intercept him - the Duke of York had long been alerted. The Scharnhorst was heading straight into the trap. The bow radar was destroyed, the stern radar disabled. At 16.32, the radar of the English battleship detected the target, a few minutes later the raider was fired upon by illuminating shells - its turrets were located on the bow and stern - the Germans were taken by surprise. Nevertheless, the German ship increased its speed and began to respond. Its 283-mm shells could not penetrate the powerful armor of the Duke of York. At 16.55 the first 356-mm English projectile reached its target. The German raider surpassed his opponents in speed and began to increase the distance. Fortunately for the British, Fraser's flagship firing was accurate that day - heavy English shells disabled the Scharnhorst's vital components. At 18 o'clock there was a hit in the engine room: the speed dropped to 10 knots. But after 20 minutes, the engine room reported that it was capable of giving 22 knots. All the surviving members of the battleship's crew testify to the high morale of the Scharnhorst team in its last battle - fires were extinguished quickly, emergency parties closed up holes. The British battleship was constantly covered by German salvos, but direct hits were few and ineffective. Around 19:00, when the Scharnhorst's artillery had already ceased to respond, Fraser ordered the destroyers to torpedo the enemy. The auxiliary caliber was no longer active, and torpedo hits went one after another. The British claim that there were 10 or 11 torpedo hits in total. The battleship settled in the water, the deck was engulfed in fire - the situation became hopeless, and Bey gave the order to leave the ship, he himself decided to share his fate. At 19.45, the Scharnhorst sank with the machines still running. British destroyers launched a rescue operation, but only 36 people were rescued from the icy water. The British paid tribute to the bravely fought enemy: on the way back from Murmansk to Scapa Flow, passing over the place of the death of the Scharnhorst, Fraser ordered a wreath to be thrown into the water in memory of the German sailors who had fulfilled their duty.

On October 3, 2000, a Norwegian Navy expedition discovered a German battleship at a depth of 300 meters, 130 kilometers northeast of North Cape. The Scharnhorst lies keel up, as if sheltering the crew that has found its last refuge.

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Withdrawn from the Navy December 26, 1943 Modern status Sunk at the Battle of North Cape Parameters Tonnage 31,552 tons standard;
38,900 tons full Length 235.4 m total;
229.8 m waterline Width 30.0 m Draft 9.91 m - full Booking main belt - 350 mm;
deck - 95 mm Technical details Power point 3 company turbines Power 161 164 HP Speed 31 knots Autonomy of navigation 10,100 nautical miles at 19 knots Crew 1,968 people (60 officers, 1909 sailors) Armament Artillery 3 × 3 283 mm;
4 × 2 + 4 × 1 150mm Torpedo-mine armament 2 × 3 533 mm torpedo tubes Anti-aircraft weapons 14×105mm;
16×37mm;
10×20mm Aviation 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult

Break through the channel

While in Brest, German ships became the targets of constant air raids. In July 1941, Scharnhorst moved to the port of La Rochelle, south of Brest. Warned of the Scharnhorst leaving the port by aerial reconnaissance and Resistance agents, the Allies were sure that this was another raid. To prevent the raid, they lifted 15 heavy bombers into the air Halifax British Air Force. The damage caused by the bombing was severe enough to force the Scharnhorst to return to the port of Brest for repairs. Bombardment damage, along with those received during the raids, as well as problems with the cooling of the boilers, delayed the Scharnhorst in the port until the end of 1941, when it was decided to send the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as well as heavy cruiser"Prinz Eugen" back to Germany. Since it was very risky to try to break through the North Atlantic, on February 11-13, three large ships, accompanied by dozens of minesweepers and other auxiliary vessels, made a bold breakthrough - "Channel Break" - through the English Channel, called Operation Cerberus. The British were not ready for such a decisive and unexpected breakthrough, their coast guard was not ready to stop the breakthrough, and the jamming of English radars by the Germans did not allow an air attack. However, and Scharnhorst, And Gneisenau were damaged by mines, Scharnhorst two, and Gneisenau one. The fix delayed Scharnhorst at the docks until March, after which he sailed for Norway to rendezvous with the battleship Tirpitz and other German ships to attack Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union. The next few months were devoted to training and acclimatization, culminating in the bombardment of Svalbard in conjunction with Tirpitz.

End of Scharnhorst

  • KzS Fritz Hintze - October 13 - December 26 (deceased)

Notes

Links

  • Historic Center, U.S. Navy Official Publications Department (en) .
  • History of the battleship Scharnhorst: professionalism versus heroism.
  • Royal Navy: World War II 1939-1945

Literature

  • Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970. (Doubleday and Company; Garden City, New York, 1973) (originally published in Germany as Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905-1970, J.F. Lehmanns, Verlag, Munchen, 1970). Contains various diagrams and drawings of the ship, how it was planned and how it was built.
  • Busch, Fritz-Otto, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. (Robert Hale, London, 1956) ISBN 0-86007-130-8. The story of the Battle of the North Cape as told by the survivors of Scharnhorst
  • Claasen, A. R. A., Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. pp 228-234. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
  • Garzke, William H., Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1985). Includes stories about the creation of the ship and its combat operations, information about weapons and other statistical information about Scharnhorst
  • Alf Jacobsen Battleship "Scharnhorst" = Alf R. Jacobsen "SHARNHORST". - M.: Eksmo, 2005. - 304 p. - ISBN 5-699-14578-8

On December 26, 1943, during the Second World War in the Barents Sea near the North Cape (Magerø Island in northern Norway), a naval battle took place, which is considered the northernmost naval battle in history. During this battle, the German battleship Scharnhorst was sunk by ships of the British Navy.

The battleship Scharnhorst was launched on October 3, 1936 and entered service on January 7, 1939. Named in honor of the general and reformer of the Prussian army, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, and in memory of the World War I cruiser Scharnhorst, sunk in the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914.

As part of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine), the ship was sometimes designated as a battlecruiser due to the caliber of the guns, which did not reach the classic battleship. However, this disadvantage was compensated by high speed, despite the enhanced armor.

After the outbreak of World War II, the Scharnhorst, along with its twin brother Gneisenau, became a real scourge for British maritime communications. It was their reprisals against defenseless transports that caused the formation of the first sea convoys.

These two German battleships ensured the landing of German troops in Norway in the spring of 1940, and on June 8, 1940, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the British aircraft carrier Glories and its escort in the Norwegian Sea: the destroyers Akasta and Ardent.

On Christmas Day 1943, the Scharnhorst and several German destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Erich Bay went to sea to attack the northern convoys JW 55B and RA 55A.

The next day, December 26, due to bad weather, Bay was unable to locate the convoy and sent destroyers further south to search for the convoy, leaving the Scharnhorst alone. Less than 2 hours later, the ship came across the cruisers of the Belfast, Norfolk and Sheffield convoys.

Covering the convoy, the British approached the Scharnhorst, made visual contact and opened fire. Bay tried to follow the order and break through to the transport ships of the convoy, breaking away from the pressing cruisers. These maneuvers took several hours and became fatal for Scharnhorst - the British battleship Duke of York approached the battlefield.

Around 16:50, he approached the German and opened fire on him from a short distance. "Scharnhorst" almost immediately lost two towers of the main caliber, as well as the advantage in speed due to the hit of the projectile in the boiler room.

Having lost her course and, having lost most of her artillery, the German battleship became vulnerable to destroyers, who carried out several successful torpedo attacks. The "Duke of York" approached to pistol range, shooting the immobilized German battleship from all guns, which is called "point blank".

At 19:45, the torn Scharnhorst went under water. After diving from the British ships, powerful underwater explosions were heard. Of the entire crew in 1968, only 36 sailors and not a single officer were saved. The survivors were picked up by British destroyers.

On October 3, 2000, the wreck of the Scharnhorst was discovered almost 130 kilometers north-northeast of the North Cape and was photographed at a depth of about 300 meters by the Norwegian Navy. The battlecruiser lies keel up. The bow section up to the bridge was destroyed by the explosion of the magazines of ammunition. The end of the stern is also missing.

Damned battleship Scharnhorst?

Ultra-modern for its time, the German battleship Scharnhorst, being only half completed, for mysterious reasons turned over in dry dock. At the same time, more than a hundred workers were crushed to death and about two hundred more were seriously injured. The Scharnhorst was returned to its original position, chained and reinforced with beams. Every detail was checked by a dozen craftsmen, but the next troubles could not be avoided. The frames bent in an incredible way, the beams and rigging were torn off and crippled people. The shipyard managers were even forced to increase the pay of shipbuilders so that they would not run away, and those who were not seduced by high salaries were forced to continue working at gunpoint.

On the day the battleship was launched, Adolf Hitler himself arrived in the harbor. In his presence, a symbolic bottle of champagne was broken on board the Scharnhorst, the orchestra played a bravura march, the chief engineer was already preparing to receive congratulations from the Fuhrer. And then suddenly the seven-inch cable burst, and the Scharnhorst collapsed onto two coastal barges, one of which, together with the crew, immediately sank, and on the other, almost the entire crew, who had gathered on the deck and watched the descent of the battleship, perished.

Hitler, who believed immensely in all sorts of signs, after this horrific tragedy, wanted to immediately give the order to send the ill-fated ship for scrap. However, less superstitious generals dissuaded him from such a hasty, in their opinion, decision.

Despite its excellent running characteristics and super armament, the Scharnhorst managed to sink only two auxiliary English ships in all the years of its short service. And secondly, he was catastrophically unlucky: misfortunes continued to haunt him literally with devilish constancy.

So, during the shelling of Danzig from the sea, in the bow tower of the battleship, it is not clear why an explosion occurred that killed and wounded twenty people. A day later, the air supply system in the second bow tower failed, causing twelve more sailors to suffocate in powder gases.

A year later, the battleship took part in the shelling of Oslo, was itself attacked and torpedoed. Following for repairs, at the wide mouth of the Elbe, he collided with the civilian transatlantic liner Bremen, which as a result ran aground and was soon shot down by British bombers.

After many months of repairs, as soon as the Scharnhorst began combat duty off the Norwegian coast, the radar on it failed - the eyes of any ship. While it was being put in order, under the cover of darkness, the Nazi battleship was surrounded by a whole squadron of English ships, which began to shoot the Scharnhorst literally point-blank.

It is amazing, but true: the Scharnhorst commander did not accept the battle and decided to simply run away, breaking through the encirclement. But as a result of an attack by English torpedo bombers, it lost its course and caught fire. In just a few minutes, the fire reached the artillery cellar, and a terrifying explosion practically broke the Scharnhorst in half.

On December 26, 1943, one of the most powerful ships of the German fleet disappeared in the waves northeast of the North Cape. Of the two thousandth crew, only 36 people survived. However, two of their number died already on the shore under the most incredible circumstances. Deciding to cook their own dinner, they lit the stove from the emergency kit. And either they did something wrong, or the curse that hung over the Scharnhorst was still in effect, but the device exploded, dousing both sailors with gasoline, and they burned alive ...

A significant part of German historians believe that the Scharnhorst battleship died due to an unfavorable set of circumstances: codes cracked by the British, inconsistency in intelligence actions, successful first enemy shots ... But the true cause of death should probably be sought in the design flaws of the ship: the Scharnhorst of the same type and Gneisenau lost the battle to the veteran Rinaun, and later the Scharnhorst was sunk by almost the most poorly armed battleship of the Second World War

The decision to build the Scharnhorst battlecruiser and the Gneisenau cruiser of the same type is the result of the refusal of the Kriegsmarine command to build the fourth and fifth Deutschland-class ships (in German sources they appear as battleships "D" ("Ersatz Elzass") and "E" ("Ersatz Hessen") in favor of a ship of an improved design with a standard displacement of up to 26,000 tons and an additional third three-gun artillery turret of 280 mm caliber.The cruiser "Scharnhorst" was laid down at the shipyard of the Navy in Wilhelmshaven on June 15, 1935 and received a name in honor of the Prussian general during the Napoleonic Wars, whose name was Gerhard von Scharnhorst.

"Scharnhorst" in the spring of 1939. The ship is equipped with a design stem

Specifications

The design of the new cruiser was carried out in a short time with the expectation of maximizing the use of the backlog left from the unfinished construction of the battleships "D" and "E". As a result, the ship received a traditional smooth-deck hull design with an outer vertical armor belt that protected the citadel from the first bow to the stern turret of the main caliber, as well as a double bottom with a length of 79% of the total length of the ship. The set of the body was carried out according to the longitudinal scheme with the massive use of electric welding. The use of advanced technologies made it possible to launch the ship on October 3, 1936.


Scharnhorst scheme. Below is a view of the Gneisenau cruiser, of the same type according to the modernization project

Source: Sergey Patyanin “Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich

When designing the cruiser, engineers abandoned the diesel power plant in favor of an experimental turbine plant consisting of three turbo-gear units and twelve steam boilers (total power - 160,000 hp), located in three boiler rooms and two engine rooms, arranged in a linear pattern and separated cofferdam compartments. The power plant of the ship had low reliability and provided a cruising range below the design one (7100 and 8200 miles, respectively, at a speed of 19 knots).

The armor of the Scharnhorst cruiser was quite comparable to the protection of the English battleships of the King George V type or the German Bismarck type, which allowed German experts to classify the Scharnhorst as a battleship.

The design of artillery weapons was carried out in accordance with the classic scheme for battleships of the 30s, which provided for the presence of:

  1. Artillery of the main caliber (356-406 mm), designed to destroy enemy battleships;
  2. Artillery of medium caliber (150-203 mm), designed to destroy enemy cruisers and destroyers;
  3. Universal artillery (88-127 mm), designed to destroy both lightly armored surface targets and remote air targets;
  4. Anti-aircraft guns (20–40 mm) designed to destroy high-speed air targets in the immediate vicinity of the ship.

However, in accordance with the original project, nine 283-mm C / 34 guns, which were a modernized version of the guns installed on the Deutschland-class ships, were supposed to be used as the main battery artillery for the Scharnhorst cruiser. The main caliber guns were placed in three three-gun turrets, similar in design to those installed on the Deutschland (two bow and one stern turret - Anton, Bruno and Caesar, respectively). Such armament for a ship with a total displacement of 37,000 tons initially seemed insufficient and already in 1935 led to the development of a project that provided for arming the cruiser with three twin-gun turrets of 380 mm caliber. In order to avoid a delay in the construction of the ship, the project was postponed (there is a seemingly unlikely version that the choice of main battery guns was due to political considerations), and in 1942 it was finally abandoned.


Towers of the main caliber "Anton" and "Bruno" of the cruiser "Scharnhorst". Water pouring into the nose is clearly visible. Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian campaign

When choosing medium-caliber guns, German designers were forced to take into account the existing backlog of 150-mm turrets made for the fourth and fifth Deutschland-class ships. As a result, Scharnhorst received medium-caliber artillery from twelve 150-mm C / 28 guns, eight of which were installed in two-gun turrets, and four more in single-gun turrets. The long-range anti-aircraft battery consisted of fourteen 105-mm C / 33 universal guns, placed in seven twin LC / 31 mounts.

Potential capabilities of the main and medium caliber guns of the Scharnhorst cruiser to destroy surface and air targets

The purpose of the guns

Defeat surface targets

Defeat surface targets

Defeat surface and air targets

Number of guns

Caliber, mm

Barrel length in calibers

Firing range, m

Projectile weight, kg

Rate of fire, rounds per minute

Estimated number of shells with 10-minute firing

Estimated mass of a 10-minute salvo, tons

The light anti-aircraft armament of the cruiser consisted of sixteen 37-mm semi-automatic C / 30 models in eight twin stabilized LC / 30 mounts and eight C / 30 anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber, which provided the so-called “two-echelon” cover of the ship from air attack: the first echelon was longer-range installations of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, the second echelon - faster-firing 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. During combat service, the number of 20-mm machine guns increased several times (in 1939, two machine guns were installed, in the middle of 1941, six quad and two single machine guns, by the middle of 1943, the cruiser had three quad and ten single machine guns of 20 mm caliber).

The fire control system for artillery of the main and medium caliber included three command and rangefinder points - in the conning tower (equipped with a 6-meter stereo range finder), on the bow superstructure and in the stern (equipped with 10.5-meter stereo range finders). Initially, each main battery turret was also equipped with a 10.5-meter rangefinder, but later the rangefinder was removed from the front bow turret due to constant flooding with water while moving. The fire control of the 105 mm guns was carried out by four stabilized posts SL-6 "type 33", equipped with 4-meter rangefinders. In 1939, the ship was equipped with a FuMO-22 radar, and by 1943, with FuMB-1, FuMB-3, FuMB-4 and FuMB-7 electronic intelligence stations.

Aviation

In accordance with the fashion in the 30s for the use of seaplanes to arm large surface ships (it was supposed to use aircraft for anti-submarine defense, reconnaissance and fire adjustment), the Scharnhorst cruiser was armed with an air group consisting of three seaplanes, which were launched using two catapults located on the hangar and aft tower of the main caliber. After completing the task, the seaplanes landed on the water and were lifted aboard by a crane. In 1940, the catapult from the artillery tower was dismantled.


Seaplane "Arado" Ar-196 aboard the "Scharnhorst". Photo taken in 1940 during the Norwegian campaign

Source: Walter Hubach "The Conquest of Denmark and Norway"

Mine and torpedo armament

Initially, there were no mine and torpedo weapons on the cruiser, which corresponded to the existing views on the range of armaments of battleships, however, in 1941, for an unknown reason, two three-tube torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, taken from the Nuremberg light cruiser, were installed on the ship.

combat service

The Scharnhorst cruiser was put into operation on January 7, 1939, but already in the middle of the year the ship was modernized: a new mainmast was installed on it, located closer to the stern, and the straight stem was replaced with the so-called "Atlantic" to improve seaworthiness.

Taking into account the weakness of the artillery armament of the cruiser, for almost the entire period of its combat service, the Scharnhorst was used only together with the Gneisenau cruiser of the same type. The first combat operation of the ships was patrolling the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939, during which the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi was sunk.

Later, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took an active part in the Norwegian campaign. Already the first battle of two German ships with a single obsolete (commissioned in 1918) English cruiser Rinaun, which took place on April 9, 1940, confirmed the erroneous choice of main battery guns and the unfortunate location of the front bow main battery turrets. The towers of the main caliber "Anton" on the cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were flooded with water, which led to a short circuit in the ammunition supply circuits and forced the German ships to fight astern of the enemy for a significant part of the time in order to avoid further water entering the towers. When trying to break away from the English cruiser on the Scharnhorst, problems arose with the power plant, because of which he could not reach speeds of more than 25 knots. Ammunition consumption was: 54 283 mm caliber shells and 10 150 mm caliber shells on the Gneisenau, and 195 283 mm caliber shells and 91 150 mm caliber shells on the Scharnhorst. Despite the significant consumption of ammunition, there is no evidence of damage from German shells hitting the Rinaun (according to some reports, there were hits, but the shells could not penetrate the armor). In turn, the Rinaun cruiser managed to hit the Gneisenau with a 381 mm caliber shell (the artillery command post was disabled) and two 114 mm caliber shells (one shell destroyed the rangefinder of the front bow turret of the main caliber, the other hit the superstructure deck on the left board next to the aft 105-mm anti-aircraft gun). The Scharnhorst, which had been trailing in the wake column for a long time, received a hole in the stern during the pursuit (presumably from a 381 mm caliber projectile).

The battle of June 8, 1940, despite the victory won by the Germans (the English aircraft carrier Glories and the destroyers Ardent and Acasta accompanying it were sunk), only confirmed the correctness of the opinion about the design flaws of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. During the battle on the Scharnhorst, a boiler pipe ruptured, due to which the speed dropped to 28.5 knots. At 18 hours 38 minutes, the Scharnhorst was torpedoed by the destroyer Akasta and received a hole in the starboard side in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe stern tower of the main caliber (the length of the hole was 12 meters, the height was 4 meters). As a result of a torpedo hit, the aft turret of the main caliber, the IV turret of the medium artillery of the starboard side failed, the ship took 2500 tons of water and received an increasing roll to starboard. Nevertheless, the Scharnhorst managed to arrive under its own power at the Norwegian port of Trondheim (June 9 at 16:00). During the battle, which ended with the sinking of an aircraft carrier and two destroyers, the Gneisenau used 175, and the Scharnhorst - 212 283 mm caliber shells, in general, both ships fired 1448 rounds of 150 mm caliber ammunition. Due to the damage received on June 8, Scharnhorst was sent to dry dock in Kiel, where he stayed until the end of 1940. In December 1940-March 1941, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau undertook two raids into the Atlantic. The raid in December 1940 was interrupted due to malfunctions in power plant"Gneisenau". During the raid across the Atlantic from January 22 to March 22, 1941, Scharnhorst destroyed 8 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 48,886 gt (Gneisenau - 14 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 66,449 gt). During the raid, the German cruisers avoided contact with the large English ships. So, the attack of the HX-106 convoy was stopped after the appearance of the British battleship Ramilles, and the attack of the SL-67 convoy - with the appearance of the Malaya battleship.


Scharnhorst in the Atlantic. Photo taken in early 1941

Source: Sergey Patyanin “Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich

On July 24, 1941, the Scharnhorst was damaged during an English air raid in La Pallis, and on February 11-13, 1942, together with the Gneisenau, made a breakthrough from French Brest to Norway, while on February 12 the cruiser was blown up by mines twice. The passage of the cruisers to Norway indicated that the Kriegsmarine command had ceased to regard the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as real threat for convoys in the Atlantic, but expected to use them in conjunction with the battleship Tirpitz and the cruiser Admiral Scheer as a potential threat to Arctic convoys in order to divert large Allied surface ships to this theater of operations.

The presence of large German warships in Norwegian ports objectively posed a rather strong threat to the safety of convoys and served as one of the official reasons put forward by the Allies as a justification for stopping sending convoys to the USSR (in Soviet historiography, the refusal to send convoys was usually explained by the intrigues of capitalist governments). The situation on the Soviet-German front and low throughput On November 1, 1943, the allies were forced to resume sending Arctic convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. For their protection, an original scheme was used, taking into account the geographical features of the theater of operations, as well as the possibility of combat use of surface and submarine forces of the Kriegsmarine. Allied convoys en route from the USSR (code RA) and to the USSR (code JW) consisted of 10–20 merchant ships, which at the initial stages of the journey were guarded by destroyers, frigates and corvettes, providing reliable anti-submarine defense. The convoys, moving towards each other, simultaneously entered the most dangerous area south of Medvezhiy Island, where formations of large surface ships of near and far cover began to protect them. The close cover, which consisted of cruisers, escorted convoys, and the long-range cover, which included battleship, patrolled an area from 10 miles east to 200 miles northwest of the convoy route. Such a cover scheme made it possible, by attracting very limited funds, to create a layered defense. During the period from November 1 to mid-December 1943, the Allies managed to carry out three convoys to the USSR without losses (JW-54A, JW-54B, JW-55A) and two from the USSR (RA-54A and RA-54B). Such activity of cargo turnover between the ports of Great Britain and the USSR made it meaningless for the stay of German battleships and cruisers in Norwegian ports. It seemed rational to carry out at least one successful attack on the convoy by a large surface ship, which would at least force the enemy to stop transportation for some time (until the analysis of the events that took place was completed), and at the maximum could cause the idea of ​​Arctic convoys to be abandoned again. In order to organize the raid, the Germans traced, without taking active hostilities, the entire route of the JW-55A convoy, which made it possible to open the system for organizing the protection of convoys.

The target for the raid was convoy JW-55B (nineteen transports and tankers), which left the British bay of Lough Yu on December 20 under the protection of ten destroyers, four corvettes and three minesweepers, and was discovered on December 22 by a German reconnaissance aircraft 400 miles to west of the Norwegian port of Tromso. In accordance with the adopted security scheme, the RA-55A convoy was moving towards the JW-55B convoy, accompanied by ten destroyers, three corvettes and one minesweeper. The British heavy cruiser Norfolk and the light cruisers Sheffield and Belfast carried out close protection of the convoys in the threatened zone. The long-range guard was carried out by a compound consisting of the battleship Duke of York (belonging to the Prince of Wales class, sometimes referred to in Russian-language literature as the Duke of York), the cruiser Jamaica and four destroyers. By German plan the formation of the battlecruiser Scharnhorst and five destroyers was supposed to avoid meeting with long-range guards (literally, the order for the operation sounded like this: “ In principle, you should interrupt the battle in the event of the appearance of superior enemy forces.), intercept the convoy and, inflicting maximum damage on it (« The fight shouldn't end in a stalemate. Every opportunity to attack should be used.» ) , as well as repeatedly evading a meeting with long-range security, return to the port. It is not entirely clear why the Scharnhorst was chosen for the operation, which required long high-speed transitions, which did not have an advantage in speed over the guard ships and repeatedly demonstrated the unreliable operation of the power plant.

Justification from the order (" The superiority of the Scharnhorst in gunpower gives the best chance of success, and it must be used.”) also does not explain the decision of the German command - it is not clear what kind of advantage in gun power we are talking about. The Scharnhorst had nine 283 mm guns with a firing range of 40 km and twelve 150 mm guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, of which 9 and 6 guns, respectively, could be used in line combat. In turn, the British had ten 356 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 35 km on the battleship Duke of York, eight 203 mm caliber guns with a firing range of 24 km on the Norfolk and thirty-six 152 mm caliber guns with a firing range 20 km (twelve guns each on Belfast, Sheffield and Jamaica), all of which could be used simultaneously. In addition, the British could use eight 133-mm guns with a firing range of 22.2 km, mounted on the Duke of York battleship (there were sixteen 133-mm guns on the battleship, installed eight on board).

Kriegsmarine

Construction started June 15, 1935 Launched into the water October 3, 1936 Commissioned January 7, 1939 Withdrawn from the Navy December 26, 1943 Modern status Sunk at the Battle of North Cape Parameters Tonnage 31,552 tons standard;
38,900 tons full Length 235.4 m total;
229.8 m waterline Width 30.0 m Draft 9.91 m - full Booking main belt - 350 mm;
deck - 95 mm Technical details Power point 3 ABB turbines; screws 3 three-bladed propellers, 4.8 m in diameter Power 161 164 HP Speed 31 knots Autonomy of navigation 10,100 nautical miles at 19 knots Crew 1,968 people (60 officers, 1909 sailors) Armament Artillery 3 × 3 283 mm;
4 × 2 + 4 × 1 150mm Torpedo-mine armament 2 × 3 533 mm torpedo tubes Anti-aircraft weapons 14×105mm;
16×37mm;
10×20mm Aviation 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult

Very few sailors volunteered to serve on the Scharnhorst. Most of the crew members were transferred from other ships. This was a necessary measure, as the sailors thought that the ship was cursed even during construction. As her hull was being assembled in drydock, the Scharnhorst rolled over on its side, killing 60 to 70 workers. After that, the mother of one of the dead workers cursed the ship. Subsequent incidents only strengthened this rumor. On the day of launching, the ship broke off the moorings and slid into the water, where it rammed a cruiser that had been out of action for several months. The incident was never fully investigated. Just a few months before her death, while sailing in one of the Norwegian fjords, the ship's radar failed to cope with thick fog and Scharnhorst rammed a German liner used to transport soldiers. Although he Scharnhorst almost did not suffer, the liner was out of action for several months.

The beginning of the war

Cruiser in 1939

First combat operation Scharnhorst was patrolling the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands at the end of November 1939, together with Gneisenau where they sank an English armed transport. Spring 1940 Scharnhorst And Gneisenau ensured the invasion of Norway (Operation Weserübung). On April 9, 1940, near Norway, they met in battle with an English battlecruiser. Renown, British and Gneisenau inflicted minor damage on each other, Scharnhorst also suffered from the elements. In the flooded tower "Anton" (1st main caliber) there was a short circuit in the chains of electric drives for supplying ammunition, the tower was out of order. In addition, due to the need to keep full speed, the right machine was damaged. Scharnhorst, but the Germans still managed to break away from the obsolete British cruiser. Scharnhorst And Gneisenau sunk British aircraft carrier Glorious and his escort: destroyers and, June 8, 1940, about 64 degrees north of Norway. During the fight Scharnhorst was damaged by a torpedo Acasta, 50 sailors were killed and the left propeller shaft was damaged. Soon, due to flooding, the middle car had to be turned off as well. The cellars of the Caesar tower (3rd main caliber) were flooded. June 13 at the harbor Scharnhorst raided Blackburn Skua dive bombers from an aircraft carrier Ark Royal. The raid was ineffective: out of 15 aircraft, 8 were shot down, only one bomb hit the target and even it did not explode.

Due to damage received on June 8 Scharnhorst was sent to dry dock in Kiel, where he stayed until the end of 1940.

Late December 1940 Scharnhorst And Gneisenau tried to break through the British blockade and enter the North Atlantic trade routes, but were forced to turn back due to a breakdown Gneisenau.

A page from a US Navy pamphlet for sailors, World War II, describing the cruiser.

Raid in the Atlantic

Main article: Operation Berlin

Breakthrough across the English Channel

While in Brest, German ships became the targets of constant air raids. In July 1941, Scharnhorst moved to the port of La Rochelle, south of Brest. Warned of the Scharnhorst leaving the port by aerial reconnaissance and Resistance agents, the Allies were sure that this was another raid. To prevent the raid, they lifted 15 heavy bombers into the air. Halifax British Air Force. The damage caused by the bombing was severe enough to force the Scharnhorst to return to the port of Brest for repairs. Bombardment damage, along with those received during the raids, as well as problems with the cooling of the boilers, delayed the Scharnhorst in port until the end of 1941, when it was decided to send the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as well as the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, back to Germany . Since it was very risky to try to break through the North Atlantic, on February 11-13, three large ships, accompanied by dozens of minesweepers and other auxiliary vessels, made a breakthrough across the English Channel, called Operation Cerberus. The British were not ready for such a decisive and unexpected breakthrough, their coast guard was not ready to stop the breakthrough, and the jamming of English radars by the Germans did not allow an air attack. However, and Scharnhorst, And Gneisenau were damaged by mines, Scharnhorst two, and Gneisenau one. The fix delayed Scharnhorst at the docks until March, after which he sailed for Norway to rendezvous with the battleship Tirpitz and other German ships to attack Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union. The next few months were devoted to training and acclimatization, culminating in the bombardment of Svalbard in conjunction with Tirpitz.

End of Scharnhorst

  • KzS Fritz Hintze - October 13 - December 26 (deceased)

Notes

Links

  • Historic Center, U.S. Navy Official Publications Department (en) .
  • History of the battleship Scharnhorst: professionalism versus heroism.
  • Royal Navy: World War II 1939-1945

Literature

  • Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970. (Doubleday and Company; Garden City, New York, 1973) (originally published in Germany as Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905-1970, J.F. Lehmanns, Verlag, Munchen, 1970). Contains various diagrams and drawings of the ship, how it was planned and how it was built.
  • Busch, Fritz-Otto, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. (Robert Hale, London, 1956) ISBN 0-86007-130-8. The story of the Battle of the North Cape as told by survivors from Scharnhorst
  • Claasen, A. R. A., Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. pp. 228–234. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
  • Garzke, William H., Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr., Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1985). Includes stories about the creation of the ship and its combat operations, information about weapons and other statistical information about Scharnhorst
  • Alf Jacobsen Battleship "Scharnhorst" = Alf R. Jacobsen "SHARNHORST". - M.: Eksmo, 2005. - 304 p. - ISBN 5-699-14578-8

 

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