The combat command and control system of the US ground forces in the "brigade and below" link. Unified command and control system at the tactical level Splitting of tactical units

There was the smallest combat unit "Patrol Link", it was allocated for guard duty, performing tasks of marching security and, in part, for reconnaissance. During the march of a military unit (cavalry regiment), for reconnaissance, inspection of the area, timely warning of the appearance of the enemy ahead in the direction of movement of the unit, sentinel link. When the unit is located on the terrain for recreation sentinel link also conducted inspection of the area and observation of the enemy. In the late 1930s, the term "Patrol Link" lost its meaning due to the emergence of a new term for these tasks.

Crushing tactical units

Counts [by whom?] that combat units smaller than a squad were introduced by the Chinese Communists during the 1927-1950 war. This tactic was borrowed from the Chinese by Evans Carlson (later General of the US Marine Corps). The tactic was tried during the Nicaraguan War [ ] and later adopted by the US Army.

In this case, the department consists of two or three links. Some of the soldiers (driver, gunner, sniper) are not included in any link. population link(3 - 4 people) is connected, in particular, with the fact that in link out of 2 people with the death of one fighter, the second remains alone. Also, when a fighter is wounded, it is easier to take him out of the battlefield together.

The division of the department into links allows the soldiers themselves to take the initiative [ ] on the battlefield, which boosts army morale and prevents trench warfare. [ ] This concept is especially useful in mercenary (non-draft) armies. [ ]

In the armed forces of the post-Soviet states, the division of the department into links officially absent due to the lowest number of branches of all the armies (8 - 9 people). [ ] However, the formation of machine gun and grenade launcher crews is often present by giving machine gunners and grenade launchers second numbers from among submachine gunners. In addition, the Combat Charter of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of combat motorized rifle squad provides for the division into two battle groups, maneuverable and fire, where the maneuver group, leading an active offensive and capturing enemy positions, consists of 2-3 shooters led by a senior shooter, and a fire group consists of a squad leader, a grenade launcher and a machine gunner. In this case, the composition of combat groups can be arbitrary. This approach is somewhat similar to the practice of using links(fireteams) in the US Armed Forces in terms of mutual maneuver and fire cover links.

Compound link(Fireteam) in the US Armed Forces

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Notes

Literature

Soviet military encyclopedia: [in 8 volumes] / chairman. Ch. ed. commissions A. A. Grechko [vol. eighteen], N. V. Ogarkov [vol. 2-7]. - M. : Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1976-1980.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), Third Edition, published by the Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house in 1969-1978 in 30 volumes;
st.st. 10-12.
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, 1984, 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.);
"Military Encyclopedic Dictionary" (VES), M ., VI, 2007;
Warhead // Naval Dictionary / Chernavin V.N. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1990. - S. 51. - 511 p. - ISBN 5-203-00174-X.
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary missile troops strategic purpose/ Ministry of Defence Russian Federation(Ministry of Defense of Russia).; Chief editor: I. D. Sergeev, V. N. Yakovlev, N. E. Solovtsov. - Moscow: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1999. - 632 p. - 8500 copies. - ISBN 5-85270-315-X.

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An excerpt characterizing the Link (tactical unit)

Having passed with hungry, barefoot soldiers, without a road, through the mountains, on a stormy night forty-five miles, having lost a third of the backward, Bagration went to Gollabrun on the Vienna Znaim road a few hours before the French approached Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov had to go for another whole day with his carts in order to reach Znaim, and therefore, in order to save the army, Bagration, with four thousand hungry, exhausted soldiers, had to hold the entire enemy army that met him in Gollabrun for a day, which was obviously , impossible. But a strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of that deception, which without a fight gave the Vienna bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov in the same way. Murat, having met the weak detachment of Bagration on the Tsnaim road, thought that it was the whole army of Kutuzov. In order to undoubtedly crush this army, he waited for the troops that had lagged behind on the road from Vienna and for this purpose proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that both troops did not change their positions and did not move. Murat assured that peace negotiations were already underway and that therefore, avoiding the useless shedding of blood, he proposed a truce. The Austrian general Count Nostitz, who was standing at the outposts, believed the words of Murat's truce and retreated, opening Bagration's detachment. Another truce went to the Russian chain to announce the same news of peace negotiations and offer a truce to the Russian troops for three days. Bagration replied that he could not accept or not accept a truce, and with a report on the proposal made to him, he sent his adjutant to Kutuzov.
A truce for Kutuzov was the only way to buy time, to give Bagration's exhausted detachment a rest and to let the carts and loads (the movement of which was hidden from the French), although one extra transition to Znaim. The offer of an armistice provided the only and unexpected opportunity to save the army. Having received this news, Kutuzov immediately sent Adjutant General Wintsengerode, who was with him, to the enemy camp. Winzengerode was not only to accept the truce, but also to offer terms of surrender, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his adjutants back to hasten as much as possible the movement of the carts of the entire army along the Kremsko-Znaim road. The exhausted, hungry detachment of Bagration alone had to, covering this movement of carts and the entire army, remain motionless in front of the enemy eight times stronger.
Kutuzov's expectations came true both that the non-binding offers of surrender could give time for some of the convoys to pass, and that Murat's mistake should have been discovered very soon. As soon as Bonaparte, who was in Schönbrunn, 25 versts from Gollabrun, received Murat's report and the draft of a truce and surrender, he saw the deceit and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Au Prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 a huit heures du matin.
"II m" est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mecontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant garde et vous n "avez pas le droit de faire d" armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d "une campagne . Rompez l "armistice sur le champ et Mariechez a l" ennemi. Vous lui ferez declarer, que le general qui a signe cette capitulation, n "avait pas le droit de le faire, qu" il n "y a que l" Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
“Toutes les fois cependant que l" Empereur de Russie ratifierait la dite convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n "est qu" une ruse. Mariechez, detruisez l "armee russe ... vous etes en position de prendre son bagage et son artiller.
“L "aide de camp de l" Empereur de Russie est un ... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n "ont pas de pouvoirs: celui ci n" en avait point ... Les Autriciens se sont laisse jouer pour le passage du pont de Vienne , vous vous laissez jouer par un aide de camp de l "Empereur. Napoleon".
[Prince Murat. Schönbrunn, 25 Brumaire 1805 8 o'clock in the morning.
I cannot find words to express my displeasure to you. You command only my vanguard and have no right to make a truce without my order. You make me lose the fruits of an entire campaign. Break the truce immediately and go against the enemy. You will announce to him that the general who signed this surrender had no right to do so, and no one has, except for the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor agrees to the mentioned condition, I will also agree; but this is nothing but a trick. Go, destroy the Russian army... You can take its carts and its artillery.
The adjutant general of the Russian emperor is a deceiver ... Officers mean nothing when they do not have authority; he also does not have it ... The Austrians allowed themselves to be deceived when crossing the Vienna bridge, and you allow yourself to be deceived by the emperor's adjutants.
Napoleon.]
Adjutant Bonaparte galloped at full speed with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, with all the guards moved to the battlefield, fearing to miss the ready victim, and the 4,000th detachment of Bagration, cheerfully laying out fires, dried, heated, cooked porridge for the first time after three days, and none of the people of the detachment knew and did not think about what lay ahead of him.

At four o'clock in the evening, Prince Andrei, insisting on his request from Kutuzov, arrived in Grunt and appeared to Bagration.
Bonaparte's adjutant had not yet arrived at Murat's detachment, and the battle had not yet begun. The Bagration detachment knew nothing about the general course of affairs, they talked about peace, but did not believe in its possibility. They talked about the battle and also did not believe in the proximity of the battle. Bagration, knowing Bolkonsky as a beloved and trusted adjutant, received him with special superior distinction and indulgence, explained to him that there would probably be a battle today or tomorrow, and gave him complete freedom to be with him during the battle or in the rear guard to observe the order of retreat , "which was also very important."
“However, today, probably, there will be no business,” said Bagration, as if reassuring Prince Andrei.
“If this is one of the ordinary staff dandies sent to receive a cross, then he will receive an award in the rearguard, and if he wants to be with me, let him ... come in handy if he is a brave officer,” Bagration thought. Prince Andrei, without answering anything, asked the prince's permission to go around the position and find out the location of the troops so that, in case of instructions, he would know where to go. The duty officer of the detachment, a handsome man, smartly dressed and with a diamond ring on his index finger, who spoke French badly but willingly, volunteered to see Prince Andrei off.
From all sides one could see wet officers with sad faces, as if looking for something, and soldiers dragging doors, benches and fences from the village.
“We can’t get rid of these people, prince,” said the staff officer, pointing to these people. - The commanders are disbanding. And here, - he pointed to the spread out tent of the shopper, - they will huddle and sit. This morning he kicked everyone out: look, it's full again. We must drive up, prince, to frighten them. One minute.
“Let’s go and I’ll take cheese and a roll from him,” said Prince Andrei, who had not yet had time to eat.
Why didn't you say, prince? I would offer my bread of salt.
They got off their horses and went under the marketer's tent. Several officers, with flushed and exhausted faces, were sitting at tables, drinking and eating.
“Well, what is it, gentlemen,” said the staff officer in a tone of reproach, like a man who has already repeated the same thing several times. “Because you can’t go away like that. The prince ordered that there be no one. Well, here you are, Mr. Staff Captain, ”he turned to a small, dirty, thin artillery officer, who, without boots (he gave them to the sutler to dry), in only stockings, stood in front of the newcomers, smiling not quite naturally.
- Well, how are you, Captain Tushin, are you not ashamed? - continued the staff officer, - it seems to you, as an artilleryman, you need to show an example, and you are without boots. They will sound the alarm, and you will be very good without boots. (The staff officer smiled.) If you please, go to your places, gentlemen, everything, everything, ”he added bossily.
Prince Andrei smiled involuntarily, glancing at Captain Tushin's staff. Silently and smiling, Tushin, stepping from bare foot to foot, looked inquiringly with large, intelligent and kind eyes first at Prince Andrei, then at the officer's headquarters.
“The soldiers say: be smarter,” said Captain Tushin, smiling and shy, apparently wanting to move from his awkward position into a joking tone.
But he had not finished yet, when he felt that his joke was not accepted and did not come out. He was confused.
“Please leave,” said the staff officer, trying to keep his seriousness.
Prince Andrei glanced once more at the figure of the artilleryman. There was something special about her, not at all military, somewhat comical, but extremely attractive.
The staff officer and Prince Andrei mounted their horses and rode on.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Plavunov,
senior lieutenant S. Nosikov

Currently, the US Department of Defense is carrying out a full-scale modernization of command and control systems, which, along with changes in the organizational and staff structure of formations, units and subunits, provides for the organization of remote access to information resources of places of permanent deployment in theaters.

In this regard, significant efforts are being made to implement programs for the introduction of network information technologies in the practice of combat use of troops. The purpose of the ongoing technological and structural changes is to create formations of a new (modular) type, equipped with systems and means of information support of a modular design, which will not only optimize the structure of formations taking into account the performance of specific tasks, but also provide a significant increase in combat power and efficiency in the use of forces in conducting hostilities.

The range of areas of work in this area is quite wide, ranging from the individual training and equipment of military personnel capable of conducting combat operations in a single information space and ending with the creation of units formed according to a modular principle to solve the corresponding tasks. The implementation of these directions will make it possible to transform parts of the traditional structure into forces of a new type, which will guarantee superiority even over an equal in technical equipment adversary.

The steps being taken to fully modernize the entire information infrastructure and increase the role of information systems are in line with the Pentagon's overall focus on creating a global infrastructure that provides opportunities for sharing and exchanging information resources between all branches of the US Armed Forces within the framework of the concept of combat operations in a single information space.

Such a promising information structure of the American armed forces is called the global information and control network (GPUS), the construction of which is considered by the command of the US Armed Forces as the basis for the transition to the network-centric principle. combat control which provides reliable network support, a high degree of coordination and synchronization of actions of combat and auxiliary formations of all types of the Armed Forces dispersed in the theater of operations, but already on the basis of the joint use of information resources.

As part of the creation of the GIUS, the command of the country's armed forces pays special attention to the development of communication systems and automated control systems for tactical units conducting combat operations in direct contact with the enemy.

The communication systems of tactical subunits are subject to the following basic requirements: ensuring the continuity of combat control when they are on terrain with different terrain; reliability of communication with high mobility of subscribers; guaranteed protection of channels from unauthorized access and the impact of enemy electronic warfare, as well as the provision of a guaranteed quality of service to users.

A key place in solving problems in the tactical level is occupied by wireless access technologies to distributed information resources, since the advantages of using radio communications while working on a network are obvious: mobility, simplicity and speed of access to data, etc. Wireless personal, local and regional networks are already become reality; after the appearance of relevant standards, manufacturers began to create funds for commercial and military consumers.

The main means of communication for formations of the tactical level (battalion and below), of course, remain command communication network radio stations and tactical satellite communication terminals. The command is currently ground forces The US has begun implementing plans to create a new generation of communications, the purpose of which is to ensure the integration of the lower levels of management into the emerging global information infrastructure.

The technical appearance of these means of communication will be determined by the implementation of programs for the creation of multiband multifunctional programmable radio stations. They will consist of unified modules, and their operating frequency range should be from the lower part of the KB- to the decimeter part of the VHF band.

The functionality and type of signal of such radio stations will be determined by the software. Basic hardware and software radio stations will form an open systems architecture that will allow the widespread use of commercial technologies and technical solutions, expand the production base, increase competition between suppliers and reduce the cost of acquiring, purchasing and operating radio communications.

Today it becomes especially obvious that reprogrammable radio stations will significantly affect the face of the world's telecommunications infrastructure. All components of these radios, from antennas, components, software to base stations, will be created on the basis of unique technologies.

However, of particular importance in combat conditions, characterized by an instant change in the situation and the dynamism of the situation, is the possibility of forming a radio network, all the administrative functions of which are performed by the nodes themselves without the participation of any elements of the network infrastructure or operator. Networks of this type are called mobile adaptive, which reflects their non-standard architecture, which differs from the classical scheme.

In general, a mobile adaptive network is understood as a dynamically changing network infrastructure formed by a set of mobile nodes, which has the following features:

The absence of external configuration mechanisms, that is, the network is self-configuring;

The network node performs the functions of both a router and an end device;

Relatively short lifetime of the network in the same state.

Deployment diagram of the unified tactical radio system

A mobile adaptive network has a number of advantages compared to networks with a fixed infrastructure - these are high survivability, topology flexibility and automatic adaptation to changes in the network configuration. The basis for the formation of such networks are radio stations created in the United States under the JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System) program.

JTRS provides for the creation of a single family of unified multi-band, modular, programmable radio stations for all types of aircraft, the hardware and software of which will be based on the architecture of open systems.

The JTRS program, implemented since 1997, was originally intended to replace 25-30 military radios different type for one line of programmable devices that could operate in several frequency ranges.

The basis of the program for creating a tactical system of programmable radio stations JTRS is the open architecture SCA (Software Communications Architecture), which defines the structure of applications and communication protocols. Compatibility of various radio stations is achieved by the fact that the software components of the communication protocols are easily transferred to any radio stations that support the SCA architecture.

The US military leadership believes that this system is optimal for achieving success in the functioning of digital network communications on the battlefield, and considers it as one of the components of the GPU S system. , processing, transmission of command and information materials of various formats with high speed and in a time scale close to real, with a high degree of security of communication channels - such key tasks are assigned to the JTRS tactical radio communication system.

Currently, the creation of radio stations of the JTRS family involves work in several directions.

GMR Ground Mobile Radios(Ground Mobile Radio). The family of such radios is a four-channel, software-configurable digital communication system, developed primarily for use on ground military vehicles, such as the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, Ml Abrams MBT, armored vehicles of the MRAP family. Initially, the cost of the program was $370 million, but now it has already exceeded $1.4 billion.

HMS (Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Factor)- creation of portable wearable radio stations and stations for autonomous reconnaissance and remotely controlled vehicles.

JTRS GMR radio stations should form the backbone link of the land part of the GIUS system, providing through software-generated protocols the ability to connect with all other subscribers of the JTRS radio communication system, as well as with previous generation radio systems. The goal of the GMR program is to create a new broadband network communication protocol - Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW), which will allow packet transmission over the Internet protocol and provide wide network capabilities.

The system of ground mobile radio stations GMR must meet the needs of commanders tactical level in solving all key issues - orientation in the situation on the battlefield, flexibility in managing a unit, functioning in a multi-level communication security system, etc. At the same time, JTRS GMR significantly exceeds previous systems in terms of such characteristics as the volume and speed of information transfer.

In order to transmit an equivalent amount of data for the same period of time, either seven EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System) devices are required. automated system positioning, identification and data transmission), or 125 single-channel radio stations SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground & Airborne Radio System), or just one channel using the WNW protocol on GMR radio stations.

In 2011, the US Department of Defense announced that it intended to cut its purchase of JTRS GMR radios from 86,956 to 11,030 units. With this move, it plans to save up to $15 billion.

JBC-P portable handheld radio

Radio stations of the unified tactical communications network GMR

Radio AN/PRC-154

An American soldier using the Rover-5 equipment receives video information from a reconnaissance UAV in real time

Radio stations for the Air Force, Navy and stationary radio stations AMF(Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Station). This direction involves the development of radio stations for the Navy, Air Force and army helicopters. In technical terms, JTRS AMF radio stations are four-eight-channel, duplex, programmable digital radio stations that will be installed on aviation, marine platforms and stationary objects of various classes and provide "seamless" high-performance communication using five original communication protocols - UHF SATCOM, MUOS, WNW, SRW and Link-16. These radio stations will provide the transmission of data, voice messages, as well as provide network capabilities for the interaction of various types of aircraft.

Special purpose radios(Special Radios) were created for the special operations forces (SOF). The development of this type of portable radio stations was under the control of the command of the US SO. They are intended primarily for the special forces of the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, as well as for allied units during special operations by the forces of the NATO bloc.

At present, two portable programmable radio stations have been developed and are being produced, created within the framework of the program under consideration. These are AN/PRC-148 and -152, fully interoperable with other tactical radio systems and supporting SINCGARS and HaveQuick P communication protocols. The National Security Administration has issued a "JTRS approved" certification. Such radio stations are already being supplied to the troops, in particular, to the units of the American troops stationed in the United States and in Afghanistan.

network domain(Networking Enterprise Domain) - the direction associated with the development of communication protocols and network management software for all JTRS radios.

In particular, the AN / PRC-154 "Rifleman" radio station was created under the JTRS program. It works in data and voice mode. At the same time, the signal is checked for errors, corrected, the signal spectrum is expanded for high-quality data transmission, and the signal is further relayed over the communication channel. The JTRS HMS system uses the AN / PRC-154 radio station of various modifications: SFF-C (V) 1 (Small Form Factor C, Version 1); SFF-C; SFF-D.

These radios are single-channel, they use the Type 2 encryption standard. The SFF-J modification is a two-channel radio station that uses the Type 1 encryption standard. The SFF-J modification radio station will be compatible with the SINCGARS, SRW and Bowman transmission protocols.

Currently being developed communication system WIN-T - "Tactical information network for a combatant"(Warfighter Information Network-Tactical), which is a new US information system architecture. It is designed to provide a backbone communications network in the area of responsibility of the US Army Corps up to the battalion (company) level.

The infrastructure of the WIN-T system will be able to transmit speech, digital data and video of all levels of secrecy, provide command and control of troops, and also provide communication to users on the move by placing all elements of the system on mobile platforms. It is planned to use the latest technologies of local networks and the use of JTRS multifunctional programmable radio stations, as well as existing broadband digital radio stations, as means of communication.

General Dynamics Satcom Technologies has entered into a contract with the US Department of Defense for the supply of additional ground satellite communication terminals in order to implement the first stage of the WIN-T Increment 1 program. At this stage, data transmission is possible only when units are parked or at permanent locations .

Communication in motion will be implemented at the Increment 2 stage. In particular, it is planned to create a high-speed communication network for the US Armed Forces, which will provide communication between combatants and the GIUS.

The WIN-T Increment 2 program is also developing a mobile radio with an automatic self-recovery function, designed to provide stable communication on the move. The implementation of this project should be facilitated by the promising satellite communication system MUOS (Mobile User Objective System), the purpose of which is to provide guaranteed communication services to mobile subscribers on a global scale.

The WIN-T communication system allows communication between subscribers via radio channels, when any channel ceases to meet the requirements, the network automatically establishes communication with subscribers of the MUOS system, thereby ensuring its continuity.

It is noted that 164 million dollars were allocated for the initial tests under the second stage, which began at the end of 2011. It will take up to six months to give an assessment.

Currently, measures are being developed for the next stage of the creation of the WIN-T system - Increment 3, the implementation of which is scheduled for 2016. As a result, the system will be able to fully ensure reliable communication in motion by organizing communication channels with any aerospace platforms (UAVs, aircraft, spacecraft, etc.).

At the Increment 4 stage, secure satellite communications will be provided, as well as interfacing and integration of the entire system as a whole into the GNUS. The implementation of this stage is planned for the period after 2016.

For the safe exchange of video information at the tactical level, programs are being implemented to create autonomous 4G radio networks. Within the framework of these programs, possible ways delivery of video materials in streaming format to portable subscriber devices. Several companies are developing such highly secure networks, namely Textron, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and Siera Nevada Corp. In particular, L-Z Communications recently introduced a new remote-controlled transceiver that provides intelligence display and control of the Rover-6 series of weapons (ROVER - Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver). Initially, the equipment of the Rover-3 series was created, which provided the operator with the opportunity to receive video images of the observation area from optoelectronic reconnaissance equipment located on unmanned or manned aerial vehicles. This equipment operates in three frequency bands (Ki, C, L) and provides data reception at a rate of up to 11 Mbps.

Version "Rover-6", which is a transceiver, provides reception of high quality video images in real time. Such information is displayed on the screen of the terminal for displaying the situation in the form of video information or electronic card terrain.

This equipment is part of the new generation tactical communication system Net-T (Network-Tactical). It uses 802.11 data transfer protocols, which work like cellular networks. The system uses tactical or medium-altitude unmanned aircrafts, and satellite communication terminals are used to organize communication on a global scale.

To provide communication function with ground station tactical UAVs have an additional data link Mini CDL (Common Datalink). Thus, it works not only in the full-scale video transmission mode, but also has a telemetry information transmission channel. On the terminal screen, the operator can mark the points of fire, and then transmit them with target designation data and video data to weapons that are equipped with the appropriate compatible equipment.

Thus, at present, in order to ensure the integration of the US Armed Forces into a single information space, the process of full-scale implementation of promising systems and means of communication based on new information technologies is underway. To increase the effectiveness of interaction between units in the tactical control link and organization of communication between units of various types of aircraft on a global scale, it is planned to use multi-band programmable radio stations of the JTRS family. Considerable attention is paid to this direction in the Pentagon, as a result of which the development of this program and the practical production of the corresponding equipment are an integral part of the general long-term plans for the development of the US Armed Forces as a whole.

Foreign military review No. 4, 2012, pp. 42-47

The tank support combat vehicle should significantly increase the combat potential of the Ground Forces units. Photo from www.wikipedia.org

An analysis of the nature of the combat operations of subunits, units and formations of the Ground Forces (SV) in the conditions of modern armed conflicts shows that significant changes are required in the tactics of their combat use in comparison with the combat operations of past wars (conflicts).

The military doctrine of the state is defensive in nature, therefore, the development of the theory and practice of building ground forces must be viewed through the likely nature of the hostilities of the initial period, in which the main burden will fall primarily on the Ground Forces.

It is gratifying to see that this problem was raised by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.V. Gerasimov in the article “Preparing for conflicts along the borders”, which corresponds to the defensive doctrine and precisely the initial period of the war (NVO No. 20, 2014).

TACTICAL LINK

It can be assumed that the basis strategic planning defense of the state based on the idea of defensive operations of ground forces in theaters of operations (theater of operations) in the most threatened areas, summed up in a single strategic plan for the defense of the state. At the same time, the absence of a military ideology and theory of wars of the future and, accordingly, a new quality of the combat use of tactical formations, views on the tactics of interacting combat arms of the ground forces, and, if necessary, aviation as one of the most important participants in success, and not only in battle, but also in operations, do not give a complete picture of combined arms combat of various scales.

You can rely only on the experience of military exercises and combat operations of various scales of our time, creatively analyzing the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The battles of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade are especially well told in the memoirs of its commander, at that time a colonel, twice Hero Soviet Union Vasily Sergeevich Arkhipov, later Colonel General of the Tank Forces, commander of the armored personnel carrier of the military district, “Time of tank attacks”, (Moscow, Yauza; Eksmo, 2009). Using this book, even now you can teach tankers the tactics of combined arms combat!

Deficiencies in assessments lead to errors in the organization of tactical formations, their weapons, all types of support, stocks of materiel, their accumulation and expenditure in various types of actions and, consequently, the separation of stocks. At the same time, with such an approach to tactics, the question involuntarily arises: what equipment and with what tactical and technical characteristics will be required for these same defensive actions, which will also have counterattack actions (strikes) in the course of defensive combat operations of various scales?

At the same time, the scale of hostilities varies in depth and width of the front in relation to the theater of operations, while the operational directions on them have different military capacities, which makes it possible to determine the possible composition of enemy troops and the necessary need for forces and means to defend their own territory, as well as the nature operating theater equipment, which are largely not equipped to date. We do not set ourselves the task of determining the nature of full-scale actions in strategic theaters, especially since wars are currently unleashed and waged on other principles of application modern means defeat than it was in the last wars of the twentieth century.

Our view is focused on the tactical actions of subunits, units and formations of the ground forces in the platoon-corps link, if we consider a company as a primary tactical subunit capable of acting as a company tactical group (RTG) both independently and as part of a battalion, forming the basis of a battalion tactical group ( BTG) to perform combat missions both independently and as part of several similar combat groups. In this case, the battalion should be considered the main tactical unit, and the brigade - the main tactical unit, leaving the status of the highest tactical unit of the SV behind the corps.

In my opinion, it is a mistake to consider a corps as an operational-tactical formation, and this is an artificial definition, since the corps does not have combat capabilities for conducting an operation, however, under certain conditions, the results of its actions may be of operational significance. Example: military operations of the 24th shopping mall of the South-Western Front under the command of Major General V.M. Badanov in the Stalingrad offensive operation, when at the Tatsinskaya station, in the depths of the German defense, at the airfield, the corps destroyed about 300 Yu-52 transport aircraft that supplied the encircled German troops by air.

Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin personally demanded from the commander of the South-Western Front, Lieutenant-General N.V. Vatutina: "Remember Badanov, help Badanov ..." Subsequently, for military success, the corps was transformed into the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. As for the exact definition of the status of the corps and its purpose as a tactical unit, I recommend that the reader refer to the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, p. 898 (Moscow, Eksmo, 2007).

In our opinion, it is precisely such a gradation of the tactical link of the ground forces that at the present time most closely matches the nature of possible military operations in the initial period of the war. It seems that it is expedient to have regular structures of the tactical level of troops in pairs.

This is also expedient because in conditions of independent, autonomous operations, interaction, mutual assistance and mutual assistance are even more important, which contributes to the fulfillment of a combat mission and strengthens the morale of personnel. Taking into account that the combined arms combat of tactical military formations is the sum of the success of the interacting branches of the troops participating in the battle, and knowing their combat capabilities, it is already possible today to determine the organization, armament, tactics of actions, and as weapons improve, improve the combat capabilities of the formations.

This approach will allow more confident determination performance characteristics promising weapons and on their basis to form tasks for manufacturers.

This will also require a qualitatively new view, which professes the principle that everything is done in the interests of carrying out combat missions by crews (crews) in conditions of maximum convenience of operations with weapons.

I am sure that tankers will support such an approach to the design of military equipment, and one cannot expect a different approach. When you shoot for a quarter of a century, you drive tanks from T-34-85 and self-propelled gun mounts SU-100 based on this tank to T-64A and B, day and night, in winter and summer from Far East and before the Group of Forces in Germany, at exercises of various sizes, then you will inevitably come to such conclusions.

WAITING FOR THE "THIRD GENERATION"

Now, when the development of weapons is changing in the direction of increasing the accuracy, range, power of ammunition, the quality of reconnaissance and munitions guidance on the principle of "shot and forget" (VZ), the massive use of unmanned reconnaissance and strike systems, as well as cluster munitions of artillery and aviation, which strike targets from above, in the least protected part of the armored vehicle, it is required to completely change the design of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in the direction of destroying enemy weapons on the approach, before their direct impact, both on the hull and on the armor of the roof of the hull and turret, especially from the upper hemisphere.

Thus, the airborne control principle is currently applied on the AN-64 "Longbow Apache" helicopter of the American army, which is not on our helicopters, including new models.

In addition, it is required to revise the gun barrels of tanks and anti-tank artillery, tank and anti-tank ammunition, since, according to available information, the quality of the barrels does not provide the required accuracy and accuracy, and anti-tank BPS (armor-piercing sub-caliber shells) "Lead", "Vant" and "Mango" do not have the required armor penetration, as well as PTR "Kornet".

I draw the reader's attention to the article by Ph.D. MM. Rastopshin (NVO No. 11, 2014) "Punch through the armor with the first shot", which provides "Comparative estimates of the defeat of the Abrams by the 9M119M missile, made by Academician Shipunov" with one missile: M1A1 - 0.47; M1A2 - 0.2. Accordingly, the consumption of missiles for their reliable destruction will be 3 and 5 units. The assessment of the probability of hitting the frontal zones of these tanks from the 125 mm Sprut-B gun with the Lead projectile is M1 - 0.30, M1A1 - 0.15, M1A2 - 0.09 and the consumption for reliable destruction, respectively: 4, 7, 12 units. At the end of the article, the author writes: “It is high time for high-ranking officials to figure out the effectiveness of such weapons and not to deceive the Supreme Commander.”

As for the Kornet, I draw attention to another article by the same author, “Russian Kornet vs. American General Abrams”, (NVO, No. 21, 2014) which explains the problems of all types of tank protection, the enemy and ours.

Obviously, the changed conditions of the battle require a new type of tank, which would fully correspond to future battles and campaigns, since we are talking about the autonomy of actions in battle under conditions of simultaneous enemy action throughout the theater and all its important objects.

At the same time, it is advisable to consider the issue of placing the power plant of the tank in its bow.

Then the vacated reserved volume can be used to place means of destruction of attacking enemy ammunition, to increase the stocks of ammunition, fuel, water, products, and in the most protected part of the tank. This design of the tank will provide the crew with the convenience of interacting with weapons in battle, the convenience of loading ammunition, getting the crew into the tank and disembarking from it under the cover of armor, and, if necessary, placing several shooters. But for this it is necessary to remove the automatic loader from the fighting compartment, which, according to the standard, takes about 30 minutes to load, and through the hatches of the tower!

It is necessary to put "specialists", starting with the GABTU and GRAU and further down the list, to load ammunition under enemy machine-gun fire, and through the hatches of the tower. And then those who remain will quickly make a new tank.

Already now there are technical possibilities for loading a 125 mm tank gun with a unitary shot, without an automatic loader and without impairing the fire capabilities of the tank. This is well shown in the article by retired Colonel-General Y. Bukreev (“VPK” No. 7, 2014). "Troops need feedback from industry."

ERROR CORRECTION

The author correctly raises the question that the command of the ground forces should be given the right to develop and approve plans for scientific, practical and experimental design work on the subject of the ground forces. I’ll add on my own: the Commander-in-Chief of the SV should be in the rank of Deputy Minister of Defense, and without his consent, not a single sample can be accepted into service and for production for the SV, especially when the Ministry of Industry and Trade is headed by a sociologist! Then there will be no dictatorship of industrialists to the troops: “Take what we give,” and prices will not rise uncontrollably. In general, the Main Command of the SV has not yet had its own scientific base, its own testing centers and has no influence on production workers. At the same time, the Deputy Defense Ministry for armaments, together with his apparatus, does not provide the required quality of weapons for the SV.

An analysis of the state of affairs with weapons and equipment of the ground forces shows that a power vertical is required to correct the state of affairs on this issue, namely:

The Commander-in-Chief of the SV should be in the rank of Deputy Defense Ministry for the Ground Forces, and he should be subordinate to: his own scientific bases, test centers for types of weapons. And it is not the GRAU with the GABTU MO that should act as customers of weapons for the SV, but the one who is directly responsible for the state and combat capability of the Ground Forces, that is, the Main Command of the SV.

To develop a new type of tank for the SV, not excluding the production of the T-90 and the development of "Armata", create a new institute of armored vehicles, where new Koshkins and comrades will give work, who will give a new tank with a fresh look.

For the production of a new tank, build a new tank plant, since the monopoly of Uralvagonzavod does not contribute to a qualitative leap in tank building.

Create a new test center for armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons with subordination to the High Command of the SV.

Create a new ammunition business on a similar principle: a scientific base, pilot production, a testing center, mass production.

Everything must be concentrated and subordinated to the command of the SV!

Until now, it has not been possible to obtain a tank project that would harmonize all the requirements for a tank as a combat tracked vehicle with reliable armor protection, active and passive, powerful weapons, high-quality fire control systems and unitary loading ammunition in an amount of at least 60 pieces per ammunition and in the presence of a loader in the crew. Unless, of course, we are talking about a tank as a combat tracked vehicle that allows the crew to conduct autonomous combat in the convenience of operating with weapons and with high results.

As an example: during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the T-34-76 crews spent up to two, and sometimes up to three rounds of ammunition (AM) of shells (there were 100 shells in the AM). And they did not choose targets, but hit all targets with a cannon.

As for the versatility of tank weapons, it is necessary to abandon the missile weapons of tanks and transfer these functions to the BMPT tank support combat vehicle. Have a pair of them for a tank platoon of five vehicles: two combat pairs and a platoon commander's tank. It just seems that combining a projectile and an ATGM in one tank is a big deal, but only an amateur who has never fired from a tank and does not know everything that happens in the fighting compartment of a tank and what it is like to operate with a weapon in tightness and closeness, in conditions of limited visibility of the battlefield.

Tanks fire direct fire at ranges of up to 2-2.5 km, since it is difficult to find a long range in the western theater of operations, and BMPTs fire at the same ranges or more, but more efficiently, since dust and smoke from cannon shots do not interfere with them, and also destroy air targets, covering the battle formations of the companies and the battalion as a whole.

During tank battles in the Second World War, firing was carried out mainly at a distance of 1 km, since the terrain did not allow aimed fire at a long range, and only on the Kursk Bulge the German "menagerie" fired at 1.5-2 km at our thirty-fours, punching right through them. Armor-piercing shells for 88 mm guns were sub-caliber, for the KwK 43 gun -1125 m / s initial speed and at a distance of 2000 m they pierced 106/90 mm armor. In this case, the field of view of the sights was 25-28 degrees, and the sight had a cutting range scales along the perimeter of the field of view.

The quality of the tanks was mentioned not only in documents, but also in the stories of front-line tankers: “We were afraid of the Tigers - he would come out from behind a hillock, put out a gun, burn 20 tanks and leave, and you wouldn’t do anything to him!” The superiority of German tanks over Soviet ones was revealed during the Battle of Kursk, when German tank formations, which had already gone over to the defense, thwarted the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army with fire from the spot.

At the end of the fighting, the army commander, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov turned to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Union - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov with a letter dated 08/20/1943 with a comparative analysis of the combat qualities of our and German tanks based on the results of hostilities and with a conclusion that our tanks lost superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons. This letter has been published and the reader can read it.

METHODOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

The proposed design of the Armata tank does not correspond to the nature of future hostilities and cannot be used as the main tank, since any combat situations can arise on the battlefield, and it is not possible to foresee their occurrence and development, and a significant retention of crews is most likely cannot be provided. Therefore, there is no need to flatter yourself on this score and rub glasses on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, society and tankers.

It is advisable to use it as the basis of tactical formations for sudden strong and short strikes in order to destroy command posts, communications centers, air defense systems, missile systems of various types in positions, and stocks of materiel. Strong and effective raiding actions will not only inflict material damage, but will also have a great moral effect!

In 2013, in tank biathlon shooting, they could not hit the target with cannon fire from a place on a stationary target for 2 km. What can we say about firing on the move at a moving target, but in conditions of direct fire confrontation and air strikes?

It is necessary to teach firing and solving fire tasks individually, as the author practiced while serving in a training tank regiment, and not by increasing the number of firing from a regular gun, as some military leaders suggest.

An example for me was Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, when I was looking for an answer to the question of how to improve the fire skills of tank commanders and battalion gunners. In his work “Memoirs”, I found the answer, and this is how it sounds: “Our company got to shoot at a 12-figure target in growth with a single fire from a prone position from an emphasis on a distance of 1400 steps. Shooting was difficult: it was necessary to follow the wind and, in accordance with it, take out the aiming point, aiming not even at the target, but two or four figures to the right of the target, since the wind blew from the right ... The company commander and I gave aiming points and watched every shot. Rota gave a super-excellent result.

I think that our commanders and military leaders would do well to read this work of a great military theorist and practitioner, which was B.M. Shaposhnikov (“Memoirs. Military Scientific Works”, Military Publishing House, 1974, p. 140). These classes took place in 1904, and the method of individual training in shooting, but from tanks, came in handy in 1974. However, it was necessary to create a training class for fire control and combat of a tank platoon, split the two-hour tank-shooting training into two parts: the first hour - classes in the classroom, where fire was simulated on various targets and the fire task was solved, and the second hour - classes at the tank firing camp with practical shooting with a propeller cartridge, and later - shooting on a tank directrix with a 23 mm projectile at actual ranges. And the fire training was completed with regular firing of 100 mm practical shot in the firing exercise "3a".

This method of individual training in fire training was used in the battalion, and this improved the results of firing from tanks by one and a half times. I think that some military leaders should use this experience, and not increase the consumption of regular shots by 5-6 times.

One can speak of a change in the spatial nature of combat actions towards an increase, of the autonomy of the actions of subunits, but one cannot lead troops into battle with models of equipment developed half a century ago. Tanks don't need maximum speed 90 km / h, if the average combat and marching speeds are more than 20-30 km / h, it is very difficult to give.

I know this from my own experience. And even more so in the initial period of hostilities, when the uncertainty of the situation, losses, fires around, just human fear will lead to a violation of peacetime plans, since the enemy will fight according to his plans, and not according to ours. And he, the enemy, will immediately strive to seize the initiative in hostilities. Hence the large losses of personnel and equipment, especially since large-scale military operations have not been conducted by the troops for 70 years.

As an example, I would like to cite the combat report of the 202nd motorized rifle division of the 12th microdivision of 07/03/1941 No. 069 to the commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General Sobennikov.

“3. The division has almost completely lost its manpower - there are 200-250 people in the regiments. Heavy machine guns and anti-tank artillery destroyed by the enemy, the existing artillery has no shells. There are no explosives (explosives), engineering equipment, mines, land mines, etc. have been missing since the very beginning of the war, and it is not known where this can be obtained. There are no means of communication, gasoline and food have to be obtained on the spot. Where to send the wounded is unknown, and where to get medicines is also unknown.

4. The 202nd MD has completely lost its combat effectiveness, and when the enemy attacks the occupied line, the division cannot continue to linger for defense. (VPK No. 36, 2013)

WE MAKE CONCLUSIONS

The means of defeating a potential enemy are improving qualitatively, and we need to reconsider all approaches to equipping troops in the direction of increasing their autonomy and combat qualities. And disperse them in operational directions to repel the enemy's first strike in accordance with the country's defense plan, otherwise the troops may end up in the position of the 202nd MD, which is unacceptable!

What conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysis?

1. It is required to determine the combat composition of the units, units and formations of the Ground Forces, having formations in an even number, two or four branches (platoons, companies, battalions, brigades), while the battalions must be completely autonomous, separate military units and be the combat basis of the brigades . To have in the composition of all types of military branches of the SV and to create combat tactical formations in advance, before the start of hostilities. In this case, the battalions are built on the principle of strict subordination of subunits, and the battalions themselves are under the operational subordination of the brigades and are transferred to the direct subordination of the brigades on a signal. The completeness of brigades in battalions determines their combat ability, combat mission - shock (counter-attack) or defensive (counter-offensive) character.

2. To have all brigades and corps, as mechanized (mechanized brigades - MBR, mechanized corps - MK), of the same type, but differing in a set of combat battalions (brigades) in accordance with the decision of the senior commander for a battle (operation), and they should be concentrated on the principle of "go apart, but fight together!”

All fire weapons of brigades and corps are subordinate to their commanders in peacetime and wartime and are used to support the battle of combat battalions (brigades).

3. Engineering support is becoming more important, for example, in a battalion, each company should have a tank bridge-laying machine, an engineering barrier vehicle, a trench vehicle, and mining (demining) equipment; camouflage with service and improvised means, both camouflage and special mask sets, inflatable models of equipment, is becoming important, and all of them must be brought together into regular battalion platoons. The battalions must have a full-time anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery.

4. Armament should provide a combination of flat fire from tanks and mounted fire from mortars.

5. A higher quality of training of headquarters, their coherence and coherence will be required, but this is a separate special conversation.

6. Particular, if not exclusive, attention should be focused on the training of officers, which should be based on training in the ability to quickly assess the situation, make decisions and assign tasks to subordinates. Initially - for your unit, and later - to teach you to assess the situation one step higher than your position. Candidates for command and staff positions should be selected on the basis of their diligence, respect for subordinates and comrades in the service, balance of mind and character, and fulfill their official duty with honor and dignity. Candidates must be discussed at a meeting of officers, and the decision of the meeting is binding on the command. Then there will be no negativity in the appointment to a higher position, and we can expect the appearance of new Suvorovs, Kutuzovs, Shaposhnikovs, Rokossovskys, Katukovs and other military leaders loyal and devoted to the Fatherland.

7. The organization of command and control of battalion units should be carried out by all types of communications: before the start of hostilities - by personal communication and by coded cards, and with the outbreak of hostilities using radio communications and coded cards, in defense (when located on the spot) by wired telephone and coded cards. This experience was tested in 1982 in the 12th Guards Tank Division, was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, General of the Army M.M. Zaitsev, after which it was proposed "to do everything as in the 12th division."

8. As of now, the commander and chief of staff of the battalion must be provided with ZAS equipment and a satellite communication channel.

9. In all cases of action in the battalion, there must be a completely autonomous communication system, interfaced with the ICBM communication system and not interfering with the electronic warfare of the brigade and corps. At the same time, speaking about the automated command and control system for troops and weapons (ACCS), it should be divided into ACCS for platoon and company commanders (batteries) and combat Information Systems(BIS) of line tanks, otherwise neither the ACS, nor the BIS, nor the radio will work. The crews of combat vehicles will be disoriented, which will lead to loss of control.

10. In the conditions of conducting hostilities in disparate areas of theater of operations Special attention should focus on the material support of battalions, brigades and corps for conducting autonomous operations and have strong subunits of all types of support in their composition.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following: the result can be achieved only in the case of a comprehensive solution to the problems of the Ground Forces and only a systematic approach to them, transforming the troops along the entire vertical - command, command and control (headquarters and communications), organizational measures, logistics, mobilization measures, theater equipment and, of course, the re-equipment of the SV with new weapons systems and military equipment.

At the same time, the support of society should be carried out - as necessary condition success, as the unity of the army and the people!

Topic No. 2 Organization of communications at the tactical level of command Lesson No. 7 Control of the communications system and platoon during preparation and during the battle

Training questions: 1. Liaison officers in SMEs (tb) and their responsibilities 2. Content of communications management

Literature: 1. Manual on communications of the Ground Forces (Communications in formations, units and subunits of the Ground Forces). - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985. 2. Fundamentals of organizing communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003. 3. Fundamentals of the organization of communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. Schematic album. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003

Training Question No. 1 Liaison Officers in SMEs (TB) and ADN and their Responsibilities

In accordance with the requirements of the charter of the internal service, the chief of staff is personally responsible for organizing command and control in the battalion. Art. 131. The chief of staff of the battalion in peacetime and wartime is responsible: ... for organizing and maintaining a stable and continuous management of the battalion units; Art. 135. The chief of staff of the battalion is obliged to: ... - organize communications in the battalion, check the condition and combat readiness of communications equipment, develop measures to covert management and monitor their implementation; ... (Chapter 2 of the UVS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation)

The "Combat Charter for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat" says: "Art. 41. The chief of staff of the battalion is the direct organizer of the work of the headquarters and is personally responsible ... for organizing and ensuring the continuous management of units; Art. 52. ... Responsibility for organizing communications, deploying a communications system and an automated command and control system for troops and their condition rests with the battalion chief of staff. The direct organizer of communications is the chief of communications - the commander of the communications platoon. »

The main document regulating the activities of all officials for communications in the TZU, is the MANUAL ON COMMUNICATIONS OF CONNECTIONS AND PARTS OF THE GROUND FORCES

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The Chief of Staff directs communications through the Chief of Communications. He is obliged: - to establish the general procedure for the use of means of communication and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - determine the procedure for establishing and maintaining communication between subordinate, attached, supporting and interacting units (subdivisions); - set the task for the head of communications to organize and ensure communications; - approve the communication plan; - give orders on communications to subordinates; - organize control over the work and security of communications.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: When assigning a task to the chief of communications, the chief of staff indicates: - building the combat (marching) order of the battalion; - tasks of the battalion and units, the order of interaction between them; - organization, placement, places and time of launcher deployment, order and directions of their movement; - with whom, by what time, by what means to establish contact and to which areas to pay special attention; - the procedure for using communication facilities and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - the procedure for restoring communication in case of failure of the PU; - communication readiness time.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Art. 50 "Instructions ...": The head of communications is the direct head of all personnel of the communications units. In peacetime and wartime, he is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of subordinates, communications units, the timely organization of communications and the state of communications, and the stable functioning of the communications system.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officials: The chief of communications is obliged to: constantly know the tactical and radio-electronic situation and the communications situation, as well as the state of communications in subordinate units; make timely decisions on the organization and provision of communication; manage communications planning and communications system deployment; develop a communication order and set tasks for communication officials; participate in the development of a combat training plan, a battalion mobilization plan; ensure and control the timeliness of the passage of information in the communication system; provide for measures to ensure communications in the event of a failure of the battalion launchers and taking control of subordinate authorities; develop and implement measures for the security of classified communications and for the protection of the communications system from technical intelligence, the effects of electronic warfare and weapons of mass destruction;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: The chief of communications is obliged to: organize control over compliance with the procedure for using communications equipment, automated control systems and established operating modes of the RES; organize the reception and delivery of secret and postal items; to carry out planning and organization of technical support for communications and automated control systems in a timely manner; exercise control over the course of combat training of the communications platoon and ensure its constant high combat readiness; study and generalize the experience of organizing communications, combat training and bring it to the attention of subordinates; know the degree of training of personnel; know the losses of personnel and means of communication of units and take measures to replenish them; submit communication data in a combat report in a timely manner; keep a worksheet.

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The communications chief is also the head of the battalion's KNP communications center. The duties of the head of communications as the head of the service are defined in the Charter of the internal service of the RF Armed Forces. The head of the communication center is responsible for the constant readiness and stable operation of the node. He is obliged: - to know the combat situation and the state of communications in the battalion; - manage the deployment (folding) and movement of the communication center and ensure the timely establishment and maintenance of stable communications; - ensure the timely transmission (delivery) of combat documents, commands, combat control and warning signals passing through the communication center, and control their accounting; - exercise control over the technical condition and proper operation of communication facilities and timely maintenance;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Head of the communications center. . . is obliged to: - organize and ensure accurate duty and compliance with the requirements of the operational and technical service manuals at the node; - in case of violations of communication, immediately take measures to restore it; - ensure the uninterrupted operation of communications with the higher headquarters, know the location and procedure for moving its communication nodes (stations), detour directions for communication with them; - ensure the implementation of the established modes of operation of various means of communication, measures to protect communications from technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, the requirements for the security of communications and electromagnetic compatibility of all RES located on the KNP (KP); - organize engineering equipment, camouflage, protection against weapons of mass destruction, security and defense of the communication center.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications issues: The unit commander (department, head of the station, control room ...) is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of the unit entrusted to him, the timely and high-quality performance of the assigned tasks, combat training, the moral and psychological state and military discipline of the subordinate personal composition. He is obliged to: - know the data on the situation and the state of communications provided by the unit, as well as the state of his subordinates; - make decisions in a timely manner, manage the planning and combat use of the unit; organize interaction and maintain it with other communication units of the unit; - organize and control the operational and technical service on the communication lines deployed by the unit, the technical operation of communication equipment and automated control systems.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officers: The head of the communications direction is subordinate to the head of communications and is responsible for the timely establishment and provision of communications in the direction. He is obliged: - to know the location and direction of movement of the command posts of his headquarters and the unit (unit) with which communication is provided; - know the call signs of the communication centers of the command posts of their headquarters and units with which communication is provided, the signals for controlling the communication system and units, the procedure for maintaining communication with the communication control points; - conduct reconnaissance of the direction of deployment (laying) of the communication line; - timely deploy and organize operational maintenance, security and defense of communication lines; - provide camouflage and protection of communication lines from fire, means of technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy;

Duties of battalion officials on communications: The head of the communications direction ... is obliged to: - report to the chief of communications (communications officer) on the progress of the assigned task, on the readiness of communications and on the movements of control points of the unit (unit) with which he provides communications; - report to the commander of the unit with which he provides communication on his task, on the readiness of communication and constantly take care of timely receipt of data from him on the direction, procedure and timing of the movement of control points; - know the radiation, chemical and biological situation in the direction of laying a wire communication line and, if areas of contamination are found, report to the head of communications (communications officer) and look for ways to bypass; - keep an accounting card (working card), on which to apply the direction of laying a wire line, the location of communication nodes (stations), control posts, the calculation of forces and means of communication.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: The head of the relay point (station) reports to the head of communications and is responsible for the smooth operation of the point (station) and ensuring relaying in the designated radio networks.

Management This is a conscious human impact on various objects and processes occurring in the surrounding world, which is carried out in order to give the processes a certain direction and obtain the desired results.

The control cycle is a complete set of periodically following each other components of the control process: - obtaining information by the control link, - processing information in order to develop a decision, - transferring data for implementation, - collecting information about the result of control.

General scheme control Program, indication Environment direct connection Control subject Control action Control object feedback Information about control result Control result

The control system must have high survivability, noise immunity. reliability and provide the possibility of both centralized and decentralized management of departments. Control facilities include communication facilities and an automated control system, technical means of covert command and control of troops, information processing and calculation, registration and reproduction. The communication system and the automated control system are the main means and the material and technical basis for the control of units (forces and means).

Communications management consists in the purposeful activity of the chief of communications, unit headquarters, unit commanders, other communications management bodies to create (develop) and comprehensively prepare the system, communications units of the unit in constant readiness to ensure the management of units, as well as to manage the system and communications units in fulfilling the set tasks. Communications management should ensure: - timely and covert deployment of a communications system and its build-up in the course of hostilities; - stability and continuity of the communication system; the implementation of flexible maneuver lines, channels and means of communication in accordance with the evolving situation; - timely passage of all types of information in command and control systems; - implementation of measures to protect the communication system from technical means of reconnaissance, destruction and electronic suppression of the enemy; - combat and mobilization readiness of communications units, effective use their capabilities; - operational restoration of communications, as well as the combat capability of communications units; - fulfillment of communication security requirements.

Communication management includes: - continuous acquisition, collection, processing, study, analysis, evaluation and display of data on the situation and the state of communication; - making a decision on the organization of communication; - bringing tasks to subordinates; - communication planning for combat operations, other types of combat activities of the “unity (unit); - organization and maintenance of interaction; - organizing and carrying out activities for all types of ensuring the use of the system, parts and subdivisions of communications; - management of the preparation of subordinate communications control bodies, units and subdivisions of communications for use; - organization and implementation of control and assistance to subordinate units and communications units; - direct management of the actions of communication units and subunits in the performance of their assigned tasks; - maintaining the moral and psychological state of communication units and subdivisions; - organization and control of communication security and information protection; other activities.

It might be useful to read:

	Portal "Warfare "
	link in Wiktionary
	Link at Wikiquote
	in Wikisource
	Link (tactical unit) at Wikinews