During collectivization. In the footsteps of Soviet collectivization. Hunger resulting from the new agrarian policy

Reasoning and answer from the point of view of pure arithmetic.
In the late 1920s, the USSR faced a serious crisis. The international situation was deepening, another war for the redivision of the world was imminent, and the USSR, although it reached the level of 1913 in terms of basic industrial and agricultural indicators, was much weaker than the Russian Empire in relative terms - after all, the world did not stand still. Therefore, the country was faced with the primary task of making a modernization breakthrough in order to overcome the backlog and development of the country. The country had no resources for this, except for the export of agricultural products. The question "where to get them?" did not stand. It is clear that it was possible to take only in the village. The topical question was "how to make the village produce more?"

How to raise the marketability of agriculture? Marketability is that surplus of production that agriculture is capable of giving to the entire society, except for its own consumption. The surplus was used to provide food for the townspeople, workers, the army, etc. From the same surplus, it was possible to sell grain abroad in order to obtain currency for the purchase of equipment and technologies for new factories. And then there were no other significant sources of products for export.

The then ruling regime chose the path of collectivizing the countryside. For which it is now mercilessly criticized up to declaring it criminal. What is collectivization? This is the union of disparate producers (individual farmers) into one single and large farm. Plus the mechanization of work. That is, collectivization is the enlargement of farms and the mechanization of work in order to increase labor productivity and marketability of all agriculture. Could such a necessary business be criminal? After all, this is a huge progress for the benefit of the whole society, and progress cannot be criminal by definition.

This concludes the lengthy introduction and move on to pure arithmetic. To begin with, take a look at the social structure of the Soviet countryside and make sure that there were no other reserves other than general collectivization to increase the marketability of agricultural production at that time. Academician Strumilin and his "Stratification of the Soviet Village" will help me with this. According to his data, I made the following diagrams:

Critics of collectivization scold her for the fact that the Soviet government did not stake on the kulak, as the most effective business executive and manufacturer. This is true: the fist was efficient and productive. The diagrams show that the kulak farms accounted for 3.5% in terms of the number of farms, while they cultivated 11.5% of the total land. It is clear that it was they who produced the main commercial products that went to the market and to government feed. But were they effective in doing this? For myself - of course, but for the whole society - no. This can be seen from their share in the total income of the village:

By cultivating almost 12% of the land, they had a share of only 8% of taxable income. Those. somewhere, somehow managed to bypass taxes. But the bulk of taxes was given by the middle peasants with 76%, which corresponded to their share of the land.

But this is not my goal. I want to show that only a stake on the productivity growth of all villagers could give a tangible and significant increase in the productivity and marketability of agriculture. Relying only on efficient and productive kulaks had a very weak effect. To do this, let's fix a number of figures from that time: the average gross grain harvest in the late 1920s in the USSR was about 65 million tons with an average yield of 7.5 centners per hectare. The total area of \u200b\u200bcultivated land was 87 million hectares. How these numbers were distributed among these groups:

Of the total harvest of 65 million tons through state purchases, the state is about 11 million tons of grain. The rest of the village sold on the market and consumed itself. It was for these 11 million that the ruling regime lived, fed the townspeople, the army and some of which was exported. This number was categorically not enough: the townspeople lived from hand to mouth, there was not enough money for cards and for export for industrialization.

Let us assume the hypothesis that the state does not carry out collectivization, but relies on an effective kulak. By some miracle, the fist strains, although he categorically did not want to strain (it was easier for him to hand over less grain to the state and sell more and more expensive grain and flour on the market). So, the fist kind of strains and gives out a fantastic yield for those times, 12 centners per hectare instead of 9.3. What will be the alignment in this case? Here's what:

In this situation, the total harvest we get 68 million tons instead of 65, and in this case, not 11 million tons, but 13-14 million will go to government purchases. Do these additional 3-4 million tons of grain from the kulaks solve the problem? They do not decide at all. It is not a fact that they will give them yet. And much more is needed for industrialization. That is why the state, relying on all strata of the rural population, except for openly resisting kulaks, carries out forced collectivization and literally in the first half of the 30s yields up to 9 centners / g, and in the late 30s and 10. And with such a yield, government purchases reach 25-30 million tons annually with an overall increase in gross collections, which allows the state to have much larger food resources than in the 1920s before collectivization.

This simple arithmetic shows that a small increase in the productivity of all peasants has a much greater effect than a slightly larger increase in the productivity of a small, albeit the most efficient, part of the peasantry.

Any event that took place in the history of our country is important, and collectivization in the USSR cannot be briefly considered, since the event concerned a large segment of the population.

In 1927, the 15th Congress took place, at which a decision was made on the need to change the course of agricultural development. The essence of the discussion was the unification of the peasants into one whole and the creation of collective farms. So the process of collectivization began.

Reasons for collectivization

In order to start any process in a country, the citizens of that country must be prepared. This is what happened in the USSR.

The inhabitants of the country were prepared for the process of collectivization and indicated the reasons for its beginning:

1. The country required industrialization, which could not be carried out partially. It was necessary to create a strong agricultural sector that would unite the peasants into one whole.
2. At the time, the government did not look at experience foreign countries... And if abroad the process of the agrarian revolution began first, without the industrial revolution, then we made a decision to combine both processes, for correct construction agrarian policy.
3. In addition to the fact that the village could become the main source of food supply, it also had to become a channel through which you can make major investments and develop industrialization.

All these conditions and reasons became the main starting point in the process of starting the process of collectivization in the Russian countryside.

The goals of collectivization

As in any other process, before starting large-scale changes, it is necessary to set clear goals and understand what needs to be achieved in one direction or another. So it is with collectivization.

In order to start the process, it was required to establish the main goals and go to them in a planned way:

1. The process was to establish socialist production relations. There were no such relations in the countryside before collectivization.
2. It was taken into account that in the villages almost every resident had his own farm, but it was small. Through collectivization, it was planned to create a large collective farm, uniting small farms into collective farms.
3. The need to get rid of the class of fists. This could be done only exclusively by using the dispossession regime. This is what the Stalinist government did.

How was the collectivization of agriculture in the USSR

The government of the Soviet Union understood that the Western economy was developing due to the existence of colonies that did not exist in our country. But there were villages. It was planned to create collective farms of the type and likeness of colonies of foreign countries.

At that time the newspaper Pravda was the main source from which the inhabitants of the country received information. In 1929, it published an article entitled "The Year of the Great Turning Point." It was she who became the beginning of the process.

In the article, the leader of the country, whose authority at that time was quite large, announced the need to destroy the individual imperialist economy. In December of the same year, the beginning of the New Economic Policy and the elimination of the kulaks as a class were announced.

The developed documents characterized the establishment of strict deadlines for the implementation of the dispossession process for the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga. For Ukraine, Siberia and the Urals, a period of two years was set, three years were set for all other regions of the country. Thus, in the first five-year plan, all individual farms were to turn into collective farms.

In the villages, processes were simultaneously going on: a course towards dispossession and the creation of collective farms. All this was done by violent methods, and by 1930 about 320 thousand peasants had become poor. All property, and there was a lot of it - about 175 million rubles - was transferred to the ownership of collective farms.

1934 is considered the year of completion of collectivization.

Q&A rubric

• Why was collectivization accompanied by dispossession?

The transition to collective farms could not have been carried out in another way. Only poor peasants who could not transfer anything for public use voluntarily went to collective farms.
More prosperous peasants tried to preserve their economy in order to develop it. The poor were against this process because they wanted equality. The dispossession was caused by the need to start a general violent collectivization.

• Under what slogan did the collectivization of peasant farms take place?

"Solid collectivization!"

• Which book vividly describes the period of collectivization?

In the 30-40s, there was a huge amount of literature describing the processes of collectivization. Leonid Leonov was one of the first to draw attention to this process in his work "Sot". The novel "Shadows disappear at noon" by Anatoly Ivanov tells about how collective farms were created in Siberian villages.

And of course, "Virgin Soil Upturned" by Mikhail Sholokhov, where you can get acquainted with all the processes that were taking place at that time in the village.

• Can you name the pros and cons of collectivization?

Positive points:

• the number of tractors and combines increased on collective farms;
• thanks to the food distribution system, during the Second World War, it was possible to avoid mass famine in the country.

Negative aspects of the transition to collectivization:

• led to the destruction of the traditional peasant way of life;
• the peasants did not see the results of their own labor;
• consequence of the reduction cattle;
• the peasant class ceased to exist as a class of owners.

What are the features of collectivization?

Features include the following:

1. After the collectivization process began, the country experienced industrial growth.
2. The unification of peasants into collective farms allowed the government to manage the collective farms more efficiently.
3. The entry into the collective farm of each peasant made it possible to begin the process of development of the general collective farm economy.

Are there films about collectivization in the USSR?

There are a lot of films about collectivization, moreover, they were shot during the period of its implementation. The events of that time are most vividly reflected in the films: "Happiness", "Old and New", "Earth and Freedom".

The results of collectivization in the USSR

After the process was completed, the country began to count losses, and the results were disappointing:

• grain production decreased by 10%;
• the number of cattle decreased by 3 times;
• The years 1932-1933 became terrible for the inhabitants of the country. If earlier the village could feed not only itself, but also the city, now it could not even feed itself. This time is considered to be a hungry year;
• despite the fact that people were starving, almost all grain reserves were sold abroad.

The process of mass collectivization destroyed the well-to-do population of the village, but at the same time a large number of the population remained in the collective farms, which was kept in it by force. Thus, the policy of the formation of Russia as an industrial state was carried out.

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

Reasons for collectivization. The implementation of the grandiose industrialization required a radical restructuring of the agrarian sector. In Western countries, the agrarian revolution, i.e. system of improving agricultural production, preceded the industrial revolution. In the USSR, both of these processes had to be carried out simultaneously. At the same time, some party leaders believed that if the capitalist countries created industry at the expense of funds received from the exploitation of colonies, then socialist industrialization could be carried out through the exploitation of the "internal colony" - the peasantry. The village was seen not only as a source of food, but also as an important channel for replenishing financial resources for the needs of industrialization. But it is much easier to siphon off funds from several hundred large farms than dealing with millions of small ones. That is why, with the beginning of industrialization, a course was taken towards the collectivization of agriculture - "the implementation of socialist transformations in the countryside."

In November 1929, Pravda published an article by Stalin, "The Year of the Great Breakthrough," which spoke of "a radical change in the development of our agriculture from small and backward individual farming to large and advanced collective agriculture." In December, Stalin announced the end of the NEP and the transition to a policy of "liquidating the kulaks as a class." On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a resolution "On the rate of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction." It established strict deadlines for the completion of collectivization: for the North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga - autumn 1930, in extreme cases - spring 1931, for other grain regions - autumn 1931 or no later than spring 1932. All other regions were supposed to "solve the problem of collectivization within five years." This formulation was oriented toward completing collectivization by the end of the first five-year plan.

However, this document did not provide an answer to the main questions: by what methods to carry out collectivization, how to carry out dispossession, what to do then with the dispossessed? And since the village had not yet cooled down from the violence of grain procurement campaigns, the same method was adopted - violence.

Dekulakization. In the countryside, there were two interconnected violent processes: the creation of collective farms and dispossession of kulaks. "The elimination of the kulaks" was aimed primarily at providing the collective farms with a material base. From the end of 1929 to the middle of 1930, over 320 thousand peasant farms were dispossessed. Their property is worth over 175 million rubles. transferred to collective farms.

At the same time, the authorities did not give a precise definition of who should be considered kulaks. In the conventional sense, a fist is someone who used hired labor, but the middle peasant who had two cows or two horses, or a good house could also be included in this category. Each district received a dekulakization rate, which was on average 5-7% of the number of peasant households, but the local authorities, following the example of the first five-year plan, tried to overfulfill it. Often, not only the middle peasants were enrolled in kulaks, but also, for whatever reason, the disagreeable poor. To justify these actions, the ominous word "podkulachnik" was coined. In some areas, the number of dispossessed people reached 15-20%.

The elimination of the kulaks as a class, depriving the countryside of the most enterprising, most independent peasants, undermined the spirit of resistance. In addition, the fate of the dispossessed was to serve as an example for the rest, those who did not want to voluntarily go to the collective farm. The kulaks were evicted with families, babies, old people. In cold, unheated wagons, with a minimum amount of household belongings, thousands of people traveled to remote areas of the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. The most active "anti-Soviet" were sent to concentration camps.

To assist the local authorities, 25 thousand city communists ("twenty-five thousand people") were sent to the village.

"Dizzy with success." In many areas, especially in the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the peasantry resisted mass dispossession. Regular units of the Red Army were brought in to suppress peasant unrest. But most often the peasants used passive forms of protest: they refused to join collective farms, destroyed livestock and implements in protest. Terrorist acts were also carried out against the "twenty-five thousand people" and local collective farm activists. Collective farm holiday. Artist S. Gerasimov.

By the spring of 1930, it had become clear to Stalin that the insane collectivization initiated at his call was threatening disaster. Discontent began to infiltrate the army. Stalin made a well-calculated tactical move. On March 2, Pravda published his article "Dizziness with Success." He placed all the blame for the situation on the performers, local workers, declaring that "collective farms cannot be imposed by force." After this article, most of the peasants began to perceive Stalin as the people's defender. A mass exit of peasants from collective farms began.

But a step back was taken only in order to immediately take a dozen steps forward. In September 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) sent a letter to local party organizations condemning their passive behavior, fear of "excesses" and demanded "to achieve a powerful rise in the collective farm movement." In September 1931, collective farms already united 60% of peasant households, in 1934 - 75%.

The results of collectivization. The policy of total collectivization led to disastrous results: for 1929-1934. gross grain production decreased by 10%, the number of cattle and horses for 1929-1932. decreased by one third, pigs - 2 times, sheep - 2.5 times.

The extermination of livestock, the ruin of the countryside by the incessant dispossession of kulaks, the complete disorganization of the work of collective farms in 1932-1933. led to an unprecedented famine, which affected about 25-30 million people. To a large extent, it was provoked by the policy of the authorities. The country's leadership, trying to hide the scale of the tragedy, banned mention of the famine in the media. Despite its scale, 18 million centners of grain were exported abroad to obtain foreign exchange for the needs of industrialization.

However, Stalin celebrated his victory: despite the reduction in grain production, its supplies to the state increased by 2 times. But most importantly, collectivization created the necessary conditions for the implementation of the plans for an industrial leap forward. It provided the city with a huge number of workers, at the same time eliminating agrarian overpopulation, allowed, with a significant decrease in the number of employees, to maintain agricultural production at a level that did not allow prolonged famine, provided industry with the necessary raw materials. Collectivization not only created the conditions for pumping funds from the countryside to the city for the needs of industrialization, but also fulfilled an important political and ideological task, destroying the last island market economy - a private peasant farm.

Collective farm peasantry. Village life in the early 30s. proceeded against the backdrop of the horrors of dispossession and the creation of collective farms. These processes led to the elimination of the social gradation of the peasantry. In the countryside, the kulaks, the middle peasants, and the poor, as well as the generalized concept of the individual peasant, disappeared. New concepts were introduced into everyday life - collective farm peasantry, collective farmer, collective farmer.

The situation of the population in the countryside was much more difficult than in the city. The village was perceived primarily as a supplier of cheap grain and a source of labor. The state constantly increased the grain procurement rate, taking almost half of the harvest from the collective farms. Payment for grain supplied to the state was made at fixed prices, which during the 30s. remained almost unchanged, while the prices of manufactured goods increased almost 10 times. The remuneration of collective farmers was regulated by the workday system. Its size was determined based on the income of the collective farm, i.e. that part of the harvest that remained after settlement with the state and the machine and tractor stations (MTS), which provided the collective farms with agricultural machinery. As a rule, collective farm incomes were low and did not provide a living wage. For workdays, the peasants received payment in grain or other manufactured products. The collective farmer's labor was almost never paid with money.

At the same time, as industrialization progressed, more tractors, combines, motor vehicles and other equipment began to arrive in the countryside, which was concentrated in the MTS. This helped partially mitigate the negative consequences of the loss of draft animals in the previous period. Young specialists appeared in the village - agronomists, machine operators, who were trained by the country's educational institutions.

In the mid-30s. the situation in agriculture has stabilized somewhat. In February 1935, the government allowed the peasants to have a private plot, one cow, two calves, a pig with piglets, and 10 sheep. Individual farms began to supply their products to the market. The card system was canceled. Life in the countryside began to gradually improve, which Stalin did not fail to take advantage of, announcing to the whole country: "Life has become better, life has become more fun."

The Soviet countryside came to terms with the collective farm system, although the peasantry remained the most powerless category of the population. The introduction in the country of passports, which the peasants were not entitled to, meant not only the construction of an administrative wall between town and country, but also the actual attachment of peasants to their place of birth, deprivation of their freedom of movement and choice of occupation. From a legal point of view, a collective farmer who did not have a passport was tied to the collective farm in the same way as a serf was once to his master's land.

The immediate result of forced collectivization was the indifference of collective farmers to socialized property and the results of their own labor.

REGISTRATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE USSR IN THE 1930s

Formation of a totalitarian regime. The immense tasks set before the country, which required centralization and the exertion of all forces, led to the formation of a political regime that was later called totalitarian (from the Latin word "whole", "complete"). Under such a regime, state power is concentrated in the hands of a single group (usually a political party) that has destroyed democratic freedoms and the possibility of an opposition emerging in the country. This ruling group completely subordinates the life of society to its interests and retains power thanks to violence, mass repressions, and the spiritual enslavement of the population.

In the first half of the XX century. such regimes were established not only in the USSR, but also in some other countries, which also solved the problem of a modernization breakthrough.

The core of the totalitarian regime in the USSR was the Communist Party. Party bodies were in charge of the appointment and dismissal of officials, nominated candidates for deputies of the Soviets at various levels. Only party members occupied all responsible government posts, stood at the head of the army, law enforcement and judicial bodies, and led the national economy. No law could be passed without prior approval from the Politburo. Many state and economic functions were transferred to the party authorities. The Politburo determined the entire foreign and domestic policy of the state, solved the planning and organization of production. Even the party symbols acquired an official status - the red banner and the party anthem "Internationale" became state ones.

By the end of the 30s. the face of the party also changed. She finally lost the remnants of democracy. Complete "like-mindedness" reigned in the party ranks. Ordinary party members and even most members of the Central Committee were excluded from the development of party policy, which became the prerogative of the Politburo and the party apparatus.

Ideologization of public life. A special role was played by party control over the mass media through which official views were disseminated and explained. With the help of the "iron curtain" the problem of penetration of other ideological views from outside was solved.

The education system has also undergone changes. The structure was completely rebuilt curricula and content of training courses. They were now based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation not only of social science courses, but sometimes of natural sciences as well.

The creative intelligentsia found itself under undivided party influence, control over the activities of which, along with the organs of the CPSU (b), was carried out by creative unions. In 1932, the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution "On the restructuring of literary and artistic organizations." It was decided "to unite all writers who support the platform of Soviet power and strive to participate in socialist construction, into a single union of Soviet writers. To carry out similar changes in the line of other types of art." In 1934, the First All-Union Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers took place. He adopted the charter and elected a board headed by A.M. Gorky.

Work began on the creation of creative unions of artists, composers, cinematographers, which were to unite all those professionally working in these areas in order to establish party control over them. For "spiritual" support, the government provided certain material benefits and privileges (use of creative houses, workshops, receiving advances during long-term creative work, providing housing, etc.).

In addition to the creative intelligentsia, other categories of the population of the USSR were also covered by official mass organizations. All employees of enterprises and institutions were members of trade unions, which were completely under party control. Young people from the age of 14 were united in the ranks of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Komsomol, Komsomol), declared a reserve and assistant to the party. The younger students were members of the Octobrist organization, and the older ones were the Pioneer organization. Mass associations were created for rationalizers, inventors, women, athletes and other categories of the population.

Formation of the personality cult of Stalin. One of the elements of the political regime of the USSR was the personality cult of Stalin. On December 21, 1929, he turned 50. Until this date, it was not customary to publicly celebrate the anniversaries of the leaders of the party and state. Lenin's jubilee was the only exception. But on that day, the Soviet country learned that it had a great leader - Stalin was publicly declared "Lenin's first disciple" and the only "party leader." The newspaper Pravda was filled with articles, greetings, letters, telegrams, from which a stream of flattery poured. The initiative of "Pravda" was picked up by other newspapers, from the capital to the district, magazines, radio, cinema: the organizer of the October Revolution, the creator of the Red Army and an outstanding commander, the winner of the armies of the White Guards and interventionists, the keeper of Lenin's "general line", the leader of the world proletariat and the great strategist of the five-year plan ...

Stalin began to be called "wise", "great", "brilliant". A "father of nations" and " best friend Soviet children. "Academicians, artists, workers and party workers challenged each other for the palm in praising Stalin. But everyone was surpassed by the Kazakh national poet Dzhambul, who in the same Pravda lucidly explained to everyone that" Stalin is deeper than the ocean, higher than the Himalayas brighter than the sun. He is the teacher of the universe. "

Mass repression. Along with ideological institutions, the totalitarian regime had another reliable support - a system of punitive bodies for persecuting dissidents. In the early 30s. the last political trials took place over the former opponents of the Bolsheviks - the former Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Almost all of them were shot or sent to prisons and camps. In the late 1920s. The "Shakhty affair" served as a signal for the deployment of the fight against "pests" from among the scientific and technical intelligentsia in all sectors of the national economy. Since the early 1930s. launched a massive repressive campaign against the kulaks and middle peasants. On August 7, 1932, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a law written by Stalin "On the Protection of Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Cooperation and Strengthening Public (Socialist) Property", which went down in history as the "five ears of corn" the field was supposed to be shot.

Since November 1934, under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, a Special Meeting was formed, which was given the right to administratively send "enemies of the people" into exile or to forced labor camps for up to five years. At the same time, the principles of judicial procedure that protected the rights of the individual in the face of the state were rejected. A special meeting was given the right to consider cases in the absence of the accused, without the participation of witnesses, a prosecutor and a lawyer.

The reason for the deployment of mass repressions in the country was the murder on December 1, 1934 in Leningrad of a member of the Politburo, first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) S.M. Kirov. A few hours after this tragic event, a law was passed on the "simplified procedure" for considering cases of terrorist acts and organizations. According to this law, the investigation had to be carried out in an expedited manner and complete its work within ten days; the indictment was served on the defendants one day before the trial; cases were heard without the participation of the parties - the prosecutor and the defense counsel; requests for clemency were forbidden, and sentences of execution were carried out immediately after they were announced.

This act was followed by other laws that toughened punishments and expanded the circle of persons subject to repression. Monstrous was the government decree of April 7, 1935, which ordered "minors from the age of 12 who have been convicted of theft, violence, bodily harm, murder or attempted murder, to bring to the criminal court using all measures criminal punishment ", including the death penalty. (Subsequently, this law will be used as a method of pressure on the defendants in order to persuade them to give false testimony in order to protect their children from reprisals.)

Demonstration trials. Finding a weighty reason and creating a "legal foundation," Stalin proceeded to physically eliminate all those dissatisfied with the regime. In 1936, the first of the largest Moscow trials of the leaders of the internal party opposition took place. The closest associates of Lenin - Zinoviev, Kamenev and others - were in the dock. They were accused of the murder of Kirov, of attempts to kill Stalin and other members of the Politburo, as well as overthrowing Soviet power. Prosecutor A. Ya. Vyshinsky said: "I demand to shoot the enraged dogs - every one of them!" The court granted this requirement.

In 1937, a second trial took place, during which another group of representatives of the "Leninist Guard" was convicted. In the same year, a large group of senior officers led by Marshal Tukhachevsky was repressed. In March 1938, the third Moscow trial took place. Former head of government Rykov and "party favorite" Bukharin were shot. Each of these processes led to the unwinding of the flywheel of repression for tens of thousands of people, primarily for relatives and acquaintances, colleagues and even just housemates. Only in the top leadership of the army were they destroyed: out of 5 marshals - 3, out of 5 commanders of I rank - 3, out of 10 commanders of II rank - 10, out of 57 corps commanders - 50, out of 186 division commanders - 154. After them 40 thousand were repressed. . officers of the Red Army.

At the same time, a secret department in the NKVD was created, which was engaged in the destruction of political opponents of the authorities who found themselves abroad. In August 1940, Trotsky was killed in Mexico on Stalin's orders. Many leaders of the white movement and the monarchist emigration fell victim to the Stalinist regime.

According to official, clearly underestimated data, in 1930-1953. 3.8 million people were repressed on charges of counterrevolutionary, anti-state activities, of which 786 thousand were shot.

Constitution of "victorious socialism". The "Great Terror" played the role of a monstrous mechanism through which Stalin tried to eliminate social tensions in the country caused by the negative consequences of his own economic and political decisions. It was impossible to admit the mistakes made, and in order to hide the failure, which means to maintain its unlimited domination over the party, country and the international communist movement, it was necessary by all means of intimidation to wean people from doubting, to teach them to see what in reality did not exist. The logical continuation of this policy was the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, which served as a kind of screen designed to cover up the totalitarian regime with democratic and socialist clothes.

The new constitution was adopted on December 5, 1936 at the VIII All-Union Extraordinary Congress of Soviets. Stalin, substantiating the need to adopt a new constitution, declared that Soviet society "implemented what the Marxists call the first phase of communism - socialism." The “Stalinist constitution” proclaimed the economic criterion for building socialism to abolish private property (and hence the exploitation of man by man) and the creation of two forms of property - state and collective-farm-cooperative. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies were recognized as the political basis of the USSR. The Communist Party was assigned the role of the leading nucleus of society; Marxism-Leninism was declared the official, state ideology.

The Constitution provided all citizens of the USSR, regardless of their gender and nationality, with basic democratic rights and freedoms - freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, personal and home inviolability, as well as direct equal suffrage.

The supreme governing body of the country was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of two chambers - the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. In the intervals between its sessions, the executive and legislative powers were to be exercised by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The USSR included 11 union republics: Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Azerbaijan, Georgian, Armenian, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, Kirghiz.

But in real life most of the provisions of the constitution turned out to be an empty declaration. And socialism "in the Stalinist way" had a very formal similarity with the Marxist understanding of socialism. Its goal was not to create economic, political and cultural prerequisites for the free development of each member of society, but to build up the power of the state by infringing on the interests of the majority of its citizens.

NATIONAL POLITICS AT THE LATE 1920-1930s

The attack on Islam. In the second half of the 20s. the attitude of the Bolsheviks to the Muslim religion changed. Church estates, from which the proceeds went to the maintenance of mosques, schools and hospitals, were abolished. Lands were transferred to the peasantry, schools providing religious education (madrassas) were replaced by secular ones, and hospitals were included in the state health system. Most of the mosques were closed. Sharia courts were also abolished. The clergymen who were removed from their duties were forced to publicly repent that they "deceived the people."

In the cities, at the direction of the Center, a campaign has begun to eradicate Muslim traditions that do not correspond to the norms of "communist morality." In 1927, on International Women's Day on March 8, women gathered for a rally demonstratively tore off their burqa and threw it directly into the fire. For many believers, this sight was a real shock. The fate of the first representatives of this movement was deplorable. Their appearance in public places caused an outburst of indignation, they were beaten and sometimes killed.

Loud propaganda campaigns were launched against ritual prayers and the celebration of Ramadan. The official decree on this matter stated that these humiliating and reactionary customs do not allow workers to "take an active part in building socialism", since they contradict the principles labor discipline and the planned principles of the economy. Polygamy and the payment of kalym (bride price) were also banned as incompatible with Soviet family law. The pilgrimage to Mecca, which every Muslim must complete at least once in his life, has become impossible.

All these measures caused fierce discontent, which, however, did not take the scale of mass resistance. Nevertheless, several Chechen imams have declared holy war against the enemies of Allah. In 1928-1929. uprisings broke out among the highlanders of the North Caucasus. In Central Asia, the Basmach movement raised its head again. These actions were suppressed with the help of army units.

The repression that has befallen Muslims has led to the fact that people have ceased to openly demonstrate their commitment to Islam. However, the Muslim faith and customs have never disappeared from family life. Underground religious brotherhoods arose, whose members secretly performed religious rites.

Sovietization of national cultures. In the late 20s - 30s. the course on the development of national languages \u200b\u200band culture was also curtailed. In 1926, Stalin reproached the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Education for the fact that the policy pursued by him led to the separation of Ukrainian culture from the general Soviet, which is based on Russian culture with "its highest achievement - Leninism."

First of all, the use of local languages \u200b\u200bin public institutions was abolished in national education systems. In primary and secondary schools, the compulsory study of the second language, Russian, was introduced. At the same time, the number of schools where teaching was conducted only in Russian increased. Teaching in higher education was translated into Russian. The only exceptions were Georgia and Armenia, whose peoples jealously guarded the primacy of their languages.

At the same time, the state languages \u200b\u200bof the Caucasus and Central Asia went through a double reform of the alphabet. In 1929, all local writing systems, mainly Arabic, were translated into Latin script. Ten years later, the Cyrillic alphabet, the Russian alphabet, was introduced. These reforms virtually negated previous efforts to spread literacy and written culture among the population.

The army became another source of familiarization with the Russian language. In the 1920s, with the introduction of universal military service, attempts were made to create ethnically homogeneous units. Even then, however, the commanders were usually either Russians or Ukrainians. In 1938, the practice of forming national military units was eliminated. The recruits were sent to formations with a mixed nationality, stationed far from their homeland. The Russian language has become the language of military training and command.

The recognition of the Russian language as the state language of the USSR pursued not only ideological goals. First, it facilitated the possibility of interethnic communication, which was important in the context of the ongoing economic modernization. Secondly, it made life easier for the Russian population in the national republics, whose number increased significantly in connection with the implementation of the five-year plans.

And, thirdly, it made it possible for parents who had far-reaching plans for the future of their children to send them to schools, where they could learn the state language and thus gain advantages over their compatriots. Therefore, national elites did not protest against linguistic innovations.

However, raising the status of the Russian language did not at all mean a return to the tsarist policy of Russification. The anti-religious campaign and the collectivization of agriculture dealt a crushing blow to all national cultures, which were predominantly rural and contained a strong religious element, including Russian culture. Most of Russian villages have lost their Orthodox churches, priests, believers, hardworking peasants, traditional system land tenure, has lost the most important elements of the Russian national culture... The same can be said about Belarus and Ukraine. In addition, the Russian language has now become the spokesman for the multinational party Soviet culture, and not Russian in its traditional sense.

"Leveling up the economic level of national outskirts". Destruction of national cadres. One of the main tasks of industrialization and collectivization, the party proclaimed raising the level of economic development of the national borderlands. To accomplish this task, the same universal methods were used, which often did not take into account national traditions and peculiarities at all. economic activity different nations.

An illustrative example was Kazakhstan, where collectivization was primarily associated with intensified attempts to force the nomadic people to switch to arable farming. In 1929-1932. cattle, and especially sheep, were literally destroyed in Kazakhstan. The number of Kazakhs engaged in cattle breeding decreased from 80% of the total population to almost 25%. The actions of the authorities were so inconsistent with national traditions that the response was fierce armed resistance. The Basmachi, which disappeared in the late 1920s, reappeared. Now they were joined by those who refused to join collective farms. The rebels killed the collective farm bosses and party workers. Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs with their herds went abroad, to Chinese Turkestan.

While proclaiming a course towards "leveling the economic level of the national outskirts," the central government at the same time demonstrated colonial manners. The first five-year plan, for example, called for a reduction in cereal crops in Uzbekistan, and in return, cotton production expanded to incredible proportions. Most of it was to become raw material for factories in the European part of Russia. This policy threatened to turn Uzbekistan into a raw material appendage and provoked strong resistance. The leaders of the Uzbek Republic worked out an alternative plan of economic development, which assumed greater independence and versatility of the republican economy. This plan was rejected, and its authors were arrested and shot on charges of "bourgeois nationalism."

With the beginning of industrialization and collectivization, the principle of "indigenization" was also adjusted. Since directive changes in the economy and centralization of management were by no means always welcomed by local leaders, leaders were increasingly sent from the Center. The leaders of national entities and cultural figures who tried to continue the policy of the twenties were subjected to repression. In 1937-1938. in fact, the party and economic leaders of the national republics were completely replaced. Many leading figures of education, literature and art were repressed. Usually local leaders were replaced by Russians sent directly from Moscow, sometimes by more "understanding" representatives of the indigenous peoples. The most egregious was the situation in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where the republican politburos disappeared into full complement.

Industrial engineering in national areas. Nevertheless, the economic modernization that began in the country changed the face of the national republics. The policy of creating industrial centers based on local raw materials has brought positive results.

In Belarus, mainly woodworking, paper, leather and glass enterprises were built. Already in the years of the first five-year plan, it began to turn into an industrial republic: 40 new enterprises were built, mainly for the production of consumer goods. The share of industrial products in the national economy of the republic was 53%. During the years of the second five-year plan, new industries were created in Belarus: fuel (peat), machine-building, and chemical.

In the Ukrainian SSR, over the years of the first five-year plan, 400 enterprises were put into operation, among them such as Dneproges, Kharkov Tractor, Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Plant, etc. Specific gravity industrial production in the economy of the republic increased to 72.4%. This testified to the transformation of Ukraine into a highly developed industrial republic.

In Central Asia, new cotton ginning factories, silk-winding factories, food factories, canneries, etc. were built. Power plants were built in Fergana, Bukhara and Chirchik. The Tashkent plant of agricultural machinery began to work. A sulfur plant was built in Turkmenistan and mirabilite mining began in the Kara-Bogaz-Gol Bay.

An important role in industrialization was played by the Turkestan-Siberian railway... Its construction was completed in 1930. Turksib connected Siberia, rich in bread, timber and coal, with the cotton growing regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

In the RSFSR, much attention was paid to the development of industry in the autonomous republics: Bashkir, Tatar, Yakutsk, Buryat-Mongol. If capital investments in the industry of the RSFSR as a whole in the first five-year plan increased by 4.9 times, then in Bashkiria - by 7.5 times, in Tatarstan - by 5.2 times. In the years of the second five-year plan, even more significant funds were allocated for the development of autonomous republics, regions and national districts. A powerful woodworking industry was created in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, industrial exploitation of the region's oil and coal resources began, and oil wells were built in Ukhta. The development of oil reserves began in Bashkiria and Tatarstan. Extraction of non-ferrous metals in Yakutia and the development of natural resources of Dagestan and North Ossetia have expanded.

Often the entire country built industrial enterprises on the national outskirts. Workers and builders arrived here from Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, the Urals and other large industrial centers. The internationalism proclaimed by the party was not only a propaganda slogan. Representatives of various nationalities grew up, studied, worked, and created families nearby. In the 30s. in the USSR, a multinational community of people has developed with its own social and cultural specifics, behavioral stereotype, mentality. An artistic expression of the spirit of internationalism that reigned in Soviet society was the most popular film "Pig and Shepherd", which tells about the love of a Russian girl and a guy from Dagestan.

SOVIET CULTURE of the 1930s

Development of education. The 30s went down in the history of our country as the period of the "cultural revolution". This concept meant not only a significant increase, in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period, the educational level of the people and the degree of their involvement in the achievements of culture. Another component of the "cultural revolution" was the undivided domination of the Marxist-Leninist teaching in science, education and all areas of creative activity.

In the context of the economic modernization carried out in the USSR, special attention was paid to raising the professional level of the population. At the same time, the totalitarian regime demanded to change the content of school education and upbringing, for the pedagogical "liberties" of the 1920s. were of little use for the mission of creating a "new man."

In the early 30s. The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a number of resolutions on the school. In the 1930/31 academic year, the country began the transition to universal compulsory primary education in the volume of 4 grades. By 1937, seven-year education became compulsory. The old methods of teaching and upbringing, condemned after the revolution, were returned to the school: lessons, subjects, a rigid schedule, grades, strict discipline and a whole range of punishments, up to expulsion. School curricula were revised, new stable textbooks were created. In 1934, the teaching of geography and civil history was restored on the basis of Marxist-Leninist assessments of the events and phenomena that took place.

School construction was widely developed. Only during 1933-1937. more than 20 thousand new schools were opened in the USSR, about the same as in tsarist Russia in 200 years. By the end of the 30s. over 35 million students studied at school desks. According to the 1939 census, literacy in the USSR was 87.4%.

The system of secondary specialized and higher education... By the end of the 30s. The Soviet Union came out on top in the world in terms of the number of pupils and students. Dozens of secondary and higher educational institutions have emerged in Belarus, the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the centers of the autonomous republics and regions. The circulation of books in 1937 reached 677.8 million copies; books were published in 110 languages \u200b\u200bof the peoples of the Union. Mass libraries were widely developed: by the end of the 30s. their number exceeded 90 thousand.

Science under ideological pressure. However, education and science, as well as literature and art, in the USSR were subjected to ideological attack. Stalin declared that all sciences, including natural and mathematical ones, are political in nature. Scientists who disagreed with this statement were hounded in the press and arrested.

An acute struggle unfolded in biological science. Under the guise of defending Darwinism and Michurin's theory, a group of biologists and philosophers headed by TD Lysenko opposed genetics, declaring it a "bourgeois science." The brilliant developments of Soviet geneticists were curtailed, later many of them (NI Vavilov, NK Koltsov, AS Serebrovsky and others) were repressed.

But Stalin paid the closest attention to historical science. He took under personal control the textbooks on the history of Russia, which came to be called the history of the USSR. According to Stalin's instructions, the past began to be interpreted exclusively as a chronicle of the class struggle of the oppressed against the exploiters. At the same time, a new branch of science appeared, which became one of the leading in the Stalinist ideological structure - "party history". In 1938, a Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was published, which Stalin not only carefully edited, but also wrote one of the paragraphs for it. The publication of this work marked the beginning of the formulation of a single concept of the development of our country, which all Soviet scientists had to follow. And although some of the facts in the textbook were manipulated and distorted in order to exalt the role of Stalin, the Central Committee of the party in its resolution assessed the "Short Course" as "a guide representing the official Leninism, which does not allow any arbitrary interpretation. " Every word, every provision of the "Short Course" had to be perceived as the ultimate truth. In practice, this led to the defeat of all existing scientific schools, a break with the traditions of Russian historical science.

The successes of Soviet science. Ideological dogmas and strict party control had a most detrimental effect on the state of the humanities. But representatives of the natural sciences, although they experienced the negative consequences of the interference of party and punitive bodies, still managed to achieve noticeable successes, continuing the glorious traditions of Russian science.

The Soviet physics school received world recognition, represented by the names of S.I. Vavilov (problems of optics), A.F. Ioffe (study of the physics of crystals and semiconductors), P.L. Kapitsa (research in the field of microphysics), L.I. Mandel'shtam ( works in the field of radiophysics and optics), etc. Soviet physicists began an intensive study of the atomic nucleus (L. D. Mysovsky, D. D. Ivanenko, D. V. Skobeltsyn, B. V. and I. V. Kurchatov, etc.) ...

A significant contribution to applied science was made by the works of chemists ND Zelinsky, NS Kurnakov, AE Favorsky, AN Bach, SV Lebedev. A method for the production of synthetic rubber was discovered, the production of artificial fibers, plastics, valuable organic products, etc. began.

World achievements were the works of Soviet biologists - N. I. Vavilov, D. N. Pryanishnikov, V. R. Williams, V. S. Pustovoit.

Soviet mathematical science, astronomy, mechanics, and physiology have achieved significant success.

Geological and geographical research has become widespread. Mineral deposits were discovered - oil between the Volga and the Urals, new coal reserves in the Moscow and Kuznetsk basins, iron ore in the Urals and in other regions. The North was actively explored and developed. This made it possible to sharply reduce the import of certain types of raw materials.

Socialist realism. In the 30s. the process of eliminating differences of opinion in artistic culture was completed. Art, completely subordinate to the party censorship, was obliged to follow one artistic direction - socialist realism. The political essence of this method was that the masters of art had to display Soviet reality not as it really was, but as the authorities idealized it.

Art implanted myths, and most of the Soviet people readily accepted them. After all, since the revolution, the people lived in an atmosphere of belief that the accomplished grandiose social upheaval should bring a wonderful "tomorrow", although "today" was difficult, excruciatingly difficult. And art, together with Stalin's hopeful promises, created the illusion that the happy time had already come.

In the minds of people there was a blurring of boundaries between the desired "bright future" and reality. This state was used by the authorities in order to create the socio-psychological monolithicity of society, which, in turn, allowed them to be manipulated by constructing either labor enthusiasm, or mass indignation against "enemies of the people", or nationwide love for their leader.

Soviet cinema. A particularly great contribution to the transformation of people's consciousness was made by cinema, which has become the most widespread form of art. Events of the 20s and then 30s. reflected in the minds of people not only through their own experience, but also through their interpretation in films. The entire country watched the documentary. It was seen by viewers, sometimes unable to read, unable to deeply analyze events, they perceived the surrounding life not only as a cruel visible reality, but also as a joyful euphoria pouring from the screen. The overwhelming impact of Soviet documentary filmmaking on the mass consciousness is also explained by the fact that brilliant masters worked in this field (D. Vertov, E. K. Tisse, E. I. Shub).

I did not lag behind documentary and feature films. A significant number of feature films were devoted to historical and revolutionary themes: "Chapaev" (directed by the Vasiliev brothers), a trilogy about Maxim (directed by G. M. Kozintsev and L. Z. Trauberg), "We are from Kronstadt" (directed by E. L. Dzigan).

In 1931, the first Soviet sound film "A Way to Life" (directed by NV Ekk), which tells about the upbringing of a new Soviet generation, was released. The films of S. A. Gerasimov "The Seven Bold", "Komsomolsk", "Teacher" were devoted to the same problem. In 1936, the first color motion picture "Grunya Kornakov" (directed by N. V. Ekk) appeared.

In the same period, the traditions of Soviet children's and youth cinema were laid. The film versions of famous works by V. P. Kataev ("The Lonely Sail Gleams"), A. P. Gaidar ("Timur and His Team"), A. N. Tolstoy ("The Golden Key") appear. Wonderful animated films were produced for children.

Especially popular among people of all ages were the musical comedies by G. V. Aleksandrov - "Circus", "Cheerful Guys", "Volga-Volga", I. A. Pyreva - "The Rich Bride", "Tractor Drivers", "Pig and Shepherd" ...

Historical films became the favorite genre of Soviet filmmakers. The films Peter I (directed by V. Petrov), Alexander Nevsky (directed by S. Eisenstein), Minin and Pozharsky (directed by V. Pudovkin) and others enjoyed great popularity.

Talented actors B.M. Andreev, P.M.Aleinikov, B.A.Babochkin, M.I.Zharov, N.A.Kryuchkov, M.A.Ladynina, T.F created vivid images in films of the 30s. Makarova, L. P. Orlova and others.

Musical and visual arts. The musical life of the country was associated with the names of S. Prokofiev, D. D. Shostakovich, A. I. Khachaturyan, T. N. Khrennikov, D. B. Kabalevsky, I. O. Dunaevsky. Groups were created that later glorified Soviet musical culture: the Quartet named after Beethoven, the Grand State Symphony Orchestra, the State Philharmonic Orchestra and others. At the same time, any innovative searches in opera, symphonic, chamber music were resolutely suppressed. When evaluating certain musical works, the personal aesthetic tastes of the party leaders, which were extremely low, affected. This is evidenced by the rejection of the "top" music by D. D. Shostakovich. His opera "Katerina Izmailova" and the ballet "Golden Age" were harshly criticized in the press for "formalism".

The most democratic branch of musical creativity - the song branch - reached its greatest flourishing. Talented composers, such as I. O. Dunaevsky, B. A. Mokrousov, M. I. Blanter, the Pokrass brothers, and others, worked in this field. Their works had a tremendous influence on their contemporaries. Simple, catchy melodies of the songs of these authors were on everyone's lips: they sounded at home and on the street, poured from movie screens and from loudspeakers. And along with the major, cheerful music, uncomplicated poems glorifying the Motherland, labor, Stalin sounded. The pathos of these songs did not correspond to the realities of life, but their romantic-revolutionary elation had a strong impact on a person.

Loyalty to socialist realism was to be demonstrated by masters of fine arts. The main criteria for evaluating the artist were not his professional skill and creative individuality, and the ideological orientation of the plot. Hence the disdain for the genre of still life, landscape and other "petty-bourgeois" excesses, although such talented masters as P. P. Konchalovsky, A. V. Lentulov, M. S. Saryan worked in this area.

Other artists are now leading. Among them, the main place was taken by B.V. Ioganson. His paintings "The Workers' Faculty Is Coming (University workers)", "Interrogation of Communists" and others became classics of socialist realism. A. A. Deineka, who created his famous poetic painting "Future Pilots", Yu. I. Pimenov ("New Moscow"), M. V. Nesterov (a series of portraits of the Soviet intelligentsia), and others worked a lot.

At the same time, portraits, sculptures and busts of Stalin became an indispensable attribute of every city, every institution.

Literature. Theater. The strict party dictatorship and comprehensive censorship could not but influence the general level of mass literary production. One-day works appeared that were more like editorials in newspapers. But, nevertheless, even in these unfavorable years for free creativity, Russian Soviet literature was represented by talented writers who created significant works. In 1931, A.M. Gorky finally returned to his homeland. Here he finished his novel "The Life of Klim Samgin", wrote the plays "Yegor Bulychov and others", "Dostigaev and others". A. N. Tolstoy also put the last point in the trilogy "Walking in agony" in his homeland, created the novel "Peter I" and other works.

MA Sholokhov, the future Nobel Prize laureate, wrote the novel The Quiet Don and the first part of Virgin Soil Upturned. MA Bulgakov worked on the novel "The Master and Margarita" (although it did not reach the public at that time). The works of V.A.Kaverin, L.M. Leonov, A.P. Platonov, K.G. Paustovsky and many other writers were noted for their generous talent. There was excellent children's literature - books by K.I. Chukovsky, S. Ya.Marshak, A.P. Gaidar, A.L.Barto, S.V. Mikhalkov, L.A. Kassil, and others.

Since the end of the 20s. plays by Soviet playwrights were established on the stage: N.F. Pogodin ("The Man with a Gun"), A.E. A. N. Arbuzov ("Tanya") and others. The repertoire of all theaters in the country included Gorky's plays written in different years - "Enemies", "Bourgeois", "Summer Residents", "Barbara" and others.

The most important feature of the cultural revolution was the active involvement of Soviet people in art. This was achieved not only by increasing the number of theaters, cinemas, philharmonic societies, concert halls, but also through the development of amateur performances. Clubs, palaces of culture, houses of children's creativity were created throughout the country; grandiose shows of folk talents and exhibitions of amateur works were organized.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1930s

Changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. In 1933, the fascists came to power in Germany, making no secret of their intentions to start a struggle for the redivision of the world. The USSR was forced to change its foreign policy. First of all, the position was revised according to which all "imperialist" states were perceived as real enemies, ready at any moment to start a war against the Soviet Union. At the end of 1933, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), developed a detailed plan for creating a system of collective security in Europe. From that moment until 1939, Soviet foreign policy acquired an anti-German orientation. Its main goal was the desire for an alliance with democratic countries in order to isolate Nazi Germany and Japan. This course was largely associated with the activities of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs MM Litvinov.

The successful results of the new course were the establishment in November 1933 of diplomatic relations with the United States and the admission of the USSR in 1934 to the League of Nations, where he immediately became a permanent member of its Council. This meant the formal return of the country to the world community as a great power. It is fundamentally important that the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations took place on its terms: all disputes, primarily over the tsarist debts, were resolved in favor of the USSR.

In May 1935, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and France on assistance in the event of a possible attack by any aggressor. But mutual obligations were in fact ineffective, since the treaty was not accompanied by any military agreements. Then an agreement on mutual assistance was signed with Czechoslovakia.

In 1935, the USSR condemned the introduction of universal military service in Germany and the Italian attack on Ethiopia. And after the introduction of German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland, the Soviet Union proposed to the League of Nations to take measures to suppress violations of international obligations. But the voice of the USSR was not heard.

The course of the Comintern to create a united anti-fascist front. The USSR actively used the Comintern to implement its foreign policy plans. Until 1933, Stalin considered the main task of the Comintern to organize support for his internal political course in the international arena. The most harsh criticism of the Stalinist methods came from the world social democracy. Therefore, Stalin declared the Social Democrats the main enemy of the communists of all countries, regarding them as accomplices of fascism. These Comintern attitudes in practice led to a split in the anti-fascist forces, which greatly facilitated the coming of the fascists to power in Germany.

In 1933, along with the revision of the Soviet foreign policy, the principles of the Comintern also changed. The development of a new strategic line was headed by G. Dimitrov - the hero and winner of the Leipzig process against the communists started by the fascists. The new tactics were approved by the VII Congress of the Comintern, which took place in the summer of 1935. The main task of the Communists was to create a united anti-fascist front to prevent a world war. To this end, the communists had to organize cooperation with all forces - from social democrats to liberals. At the same time, the creation of an anti-fascist front and broad anti-war actions were closely linked with the struggle "for the security of the Soviet Union." The Congress warned that in the event of an attack on the USSR, the Communists would call on the working people "by all means to assist the victory of the Red Army over the armies of the imperialists."

The first attempt to put the new tactics of the Comintern into practice was made in 1936 in Spain, when General Franco launched a fascist revolt against the republican government. The USSR openly declared its support for the republic. Soviet troops were sent to Spain military equipment, two thousand advisers, and a significant number of military volunteers. The events in Spain clearly demonstrated the need for joint efforts in the struggle against the growing strength of fascism. But democracies were still weighing which regime was more dangerous for democracy - fascist or communist.

Far Eastern policy of the USSR. Despite the complexity of the European foreign policy, the situation on the western borders of the USSR was relatively calm. At the same time, diplomatic and political conflicts on its Far Eastern borders turned into direct military clashes.

The first military conflict took place in the summer and autumn of 1929 in Northern Manchuria. The CER was the stumbling block. According to the 1924 agreement between the USSR and the Beijing government of China, the railway passed under the joint Soviet-Chinese management. But by the end of the 20s. the Chinese administration was almost completely ousted by Soviet specialists, while the road itself actually became the property of the Soviet Union. This situation became possible due to the unstable political situation in China. But in 1928 the government of Chiang Kai-shek came to power, which began to pursue a policy of uniting all Chinese territories. It tried to take back the positions it had lost on the CER by force. An armed conflict broke out. Soviet troops defeated the Chinese border detachments on Chinese territory, which began hostilities.

At this time, in the Far East, represented by Japan, the world community received a powerful hotbed of inciting war. Having seized Manchuria in 1931, Japan posed a threat to the Far Eastern borders of the Soviet Union, moreover, the CER, which belonged to the USSR, ended up in the territory controlled by Japan. The Japanese threat forced the USSR and China to restore their diplomatic relations.

In November 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was then joined by Italy and Spain. In July 1937, Japan launched a large-scale aggression against China. In such a situation, the USSR and China agreed to mutual rapprochement. In August 1937, a non-aggression pact was signed between them. After the signing of the treaty, the Soviet Union began to provide China with technical and material assistance... Soviet instructors and pilots fought on the side of the Chinese army in the battles.

In the summer of 1938, armed clashes began between Japanese and Soviet troops on the Soviet-Manchu border. A fierce battle took place in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Khasan, not far from Vladivostok. From the Japanese side, this was the first reconnaissance in force. She showed that it would hardly be possible to take the Soviet borders by storm. Nevertheless, in May 1939, Japanese troops invaded Mongolia in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Khalkhin Gol River. Since 1936, the Soviet Union was linked with Mongolia by an alliance agreement. True to its obligations, the USSR sent its troops into the territory of Mongolia.

Munich Agreement. Meanwhile, the fascist powers carried out new territorial conquests in Europe. In mid-May 1938, German troops concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leadership was ready to help her without France, but on condition that she herself asked the USSR about it. However, Czechoslovakia still hoped for the support of the Western allies.

In September, when the situation escalated to the limit, the leaders of Britain and France arrived in Munich for talks with Germany and Italy. Neither Czechoslovakia nor the USSR were admitted to the conference. The Munich Agreement finally consolidated the course of the Western powers to "pacify" the fascist aggressors, satisfying Germany's claims to sever the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was ready to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia, guided by the charter of the League of Nations. For this, it was necessary that Czechoslovakia applied to the Council of the League of Nations with a corresponding request. But the ruling circles of Czechoslovakia did not do this.

The USSR's hopes for the possibility of creating a collective security system were finally dispelled after the signing in September 1938 of the Anglo-German, and in December of the same year, the Franco-German declarations, which were essentially non-aggression pacts. In these documents, the contracting parties declared their desire "never to wage war against each other again." The Soviet Union, seeking to protect itself from a possible military conflict, began searching for a new foreign policy line.

Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations. After the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, the heads of government of England and France proclaimed the onset of an "era of peace" in Europe. Taking advantage of the connivance of the Western powers, Hitler sent troops to Prague on March 15, 1939, and finally liquidated Czechoslovakia as an independent state, and on March 23, he seized the Memel region, which was part of Lithuania. At the same time, Germany made demands on Poland to annex Danzig, which had the status of a free city, and part of Polish territory. In April 1939, Italy occupied Albania. This somewhat sobered the ruling circles of England and France and forced them to agree to the Soviet Union's proposal to begin negotiations and conclude an agreement on measures to suppress German aggression.

On August 12, after lengthy delays, representatives of England and France arrived in Moscow. Here it suddenly became clear that the British did not have the authority to negotiate and sign an agreement. Both missions were headed by secondary military leaders, while the Soviet delegation was headed by the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov.

The Soviet side presented a detailed plan of joint actions of the armed forces of the USSR, Britain and France against the aggressor. In accordance with this plan, the Red Army was supposed to deploy 136 divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9-10 thousand tanks and 5-5.5 thousand combat aircraft in Europe. The British delegation announced that in the event of a war, England would initially send only 6 divisions to the continent.

The Soviet Union did not have a common border with Germany. Consequently, he could take part in repelling the aggression only if the allies of England and France - Poland and Romania - let Soviet troops pass through their territory. Meanwhile, neither the British nor the French did anything to induce the Polish and Romanian governments to agree to the passage of Soviet troops. On the contrary, the members of the military delegations of the Western powers were warned by their governments that this decisive issue for the whole matter should not be discussed in Moscow. The negotiations were deliberately dragged out. The French and British delegations followed the instructions of their governments to negotiate slowly, "to strive to reduce the military agreement to the most general terms possible."

Rapprochement of the USSR and Germany. Hitler, without abandoning the use of force to resolve the "Polish question", also suggested that the USSR begin negotiations on concluding a non-aggression pact and delimiting spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Stalin faced a difficult choice: either to reject Hitler's proposals and thereby agree with the withdrawal of German troops to the borders of the Soviet Union in the event of Poland's defeat in the war with Germany, or to conclude agreements with Germany that would make it possible to move the borders of the USSR far to the west and to some time to avoid war. For the Soviet leadership, the attempts of the Western powers to push Germany into war with the Soviet Union, as well as Hitler's desire to expand his "living space" at the expense of the eastern lands, were no secret. Moscow knew about the completion of the preparation of German troops for the attack on Poland and the possible defeat of the Polish troops due to the obvious superiority of the German army over the Polish.

The more difficult the negotiations with the Anglo-French delegation in Moscow were, the more Stalin was inclined to the conclusion that it was necessary to sign an agreement with Germany. It was also necessary to take into account the fact that since May 1939, military operations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops against the Japanese were conducted on the territory of Mongolia. The Soviet Union faced an extremely unfavorable prospect of waging war simultaneously on its eastern and western borders.

On August 23, 1939, the whole world was agitated by the shocking news: People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov (appointed to this post in May 1939) and German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression pact. This fact came as a complete surprise to the Soviet people. But no one knew the most important thing - secret protocols were attached to the agreement, which fixed the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence between Moscow and Berlin. According to the protocols, a line of demarcation was established between German and Soviet troops in Poland; the Baltic states, Finland and Bessarabia belonged to the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Undoubtedly, at that time, the treaty was beneficial to both countries. He allowed Hitler to start capturing the first bastion in the east without unnecessary complications and at the same time convince his generals that Germany would not have to fight on several fronts at once. Stalin gained time to strengthen the country's defense, as well as the opportunity to push back the initial positions of a potential enemy and restore the state within the borders of the former Russian Empire.

The conclusion of the Soviet-German agreements thwarted the attempts of the Western powers to involve the USSR in the war with Germany and, conversely, made it possible to switch the direction of German aggression primarily to the West. The Soviet-German rapprochement introduced a certain discord in relations between Germany and Japan, and eliminated the threat of a war on two fronts for the USSR.

Having settled matters in the west, the Soviet Union stepped up military operations in the east. At the end of August, Soviet troops under the command of G.K. Zhukov surrounded and defeated the 6th Japanese Army on the river. Khalkhin-Gol. The Japanese government was forced to sign a peace agreement in Moscow, according to which hostilities ceased from September 16, 1939. The threat of an escalation of war in the Far East was eliminated.

What you need to know on this topic:

Socio-economic and political development of Russia at the beginning of the XX century. Nicholas II.

Internal policy of tsarism. Nicholas II. Increased repression. "Police Socialism".

Russian-Japanese War. Reasons, course, results.

Revolution 1905-1907 The nature, driving forces and features of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907. stages of the revolution. The reasons for the defeat and the significance of the revolution.

Elections to the State Duma. I State Duma. The agrarian question in the Duma. Dispersal of the Duma. II State Duma. Coup d'état on June 3, 1907

Third June political system. Electoral law June 3, 1907 III State Duma. The alignment of political forces in the Duma. Duma activity. Government terror. Decline of the labor movement in 1907-1910

Stolypin agrarian reform.

IV State Duma. Party composition and Duma factions. Duma activity.

The political crisis in Russia on the eve of the war. The labor movement in the summer of 1914 The crisis of the upper classes.

The international position of Russia at the beginning of the XX century.

The beginning of the First World War. The origin and nature of the war. Russia's entry into the war. The attitude of parties and classes to the war.

The course of hostilities. Strategic forces and plans of the parties. Results of the war. The role of the Eastern Front in the First World War.

Economy of Russia during the First World War.

The workers 'and peasants' movement in 1915-1916 The revolutionary movement in the army and navy. Growth of anti-war sentiment. Formation of bourgeois opposition.

Russian culture of the 19th - early 20th centuries

Aggravation of socio-political contradictions in the country in January-February 1917. The beginning, prerequisites and nature of the revolution. The uprising in Petrograd. Formation of the Petrograd Soviet. Provisional Committee of the State Duma. Order No. I. Formation of the Provisional Government. Abdication of Nicholas II. The reasons for the emergence of dual power and its essence. The February coup in Moscow, at the front, in the provinces.

From February to October. The policy of the Provisional Government in relation to war and peace, on agrarian, national, labor issues. Relations between the Provisional Government and the Soviets. V. I. Lenin's arrival in Petrograd.

Political parties (Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks): political programs, influence among the masses.

Crises of the Provisional Government. An attempt at a military coup in the country. The growth of revolutionary sentiments among the masses. Bolshevization of the metropolitan Soviets.

Preparation and conduct of an armed uprising in Petrograd.

II All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Decisions about power, peace, land. Formation of bodies of state power and administration. The composition of the first Soviet government.

The victory of the armed uprising in Moscow. Government agreement with the Left SRs. Elections to the Constituent Assembly, its convocation and dispersal.

The first socio-economic transformations in the field of industry, agriculture, finance, labor and women's issues. Church and State.

Brest Peace Treaty, its terms and meaning.

Economic tasks of the Soviet government in the spring of 1918 Aggravation of the food problem. The introduction of the food dictatorship. Workers' food detachments. Comedies.

The revolt of the Left SRs and the collapse of the two-party system in Russia.

First Soviet Constitution.

The reasons for the intervention and the civil war. The course of hostilities. Human and material losses during the civil war and military intervention.

Domestic policy of the Soviet leadership during the war. "War Communism". GOELRO plan.

The policy of the new government in relation to culture.

Foreign policy. Agreements with border countries. Russia's participation in the Genoa, Hague, Moscow and Lausanne conferences. Diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the main capitalist countries.

Domestic policy. Socio-economic and political crisis of the early 20s. Famine 1921-1922 Transition to a new economic policy. The essence of the NEP. NEP in the field of agriculture, trade, industry. Financial reform. Economic recovery. Crises during the NEP period and its curtailment.

Projects for the creation of the USSR. I Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The first government and the Constitution of the USSR.

Lenin's illness and death. Internal party struggle. The beginning of the formation of Stalin's regime of power.

Industrialization and collectivization. Development and implementation of the first five-year plans. Socialist competition - purpose, forms, leaders.

Formation and strengthening state system economic management.

A course towards complete collectivization. Dekulakization.

Results of industrialization and collectivization.

Political, national-state development in the 30s. Internal party struggle. Political repression. Formation of the nomenclature as a layer of managers. The Stalinist regime and the USSR Constitution of 1936

Soviet culture in the 20-30s

Foreign policy of the second half of the 20s - mid 30s.

Domestic policy. The growth of military production. Emergency measures in the field of labor law. Measures to solve the grain problem. Military establishment. The growth of the Red Army. Military reform. Repressions against the commanding personnel of the Red Army and the Red Army.

Foreign policy. Non-aggression pact and treaty of friendship and borders between the USSR and Germany. The entry of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus into the USSR. Soviet-Finnish war. Inclusion of the Baltic republics and other territories into the USSR.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War. First stage war. The transformation of the country into a military camp. Military defeats 1941-1942 and their reasons. Major military events. Capitulation of Nazi Germany. Participation of the USSR in the war with Japan.

Soviet rear during the war.

Deportation of peoples.

Partisan struggle.

Human and material losses during the war.

Creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. Declaration of the United Nations. Second front problem. Big Three conferences. Problems of the post-war peace settlement and all-round cooperation. USSR and UN.

The beginning of the cold war. Contribution of the USSR to the creation of the "socialist camp". The formation of the CMEA.

Domestic policy of the USSR in the mid 40s - early 50s. Restoring the national economy.

Social and political life. Policy in the field of science and culture. Continued repression. "The Leningrad Affair". Campaign against cosmopolitanism. "Doctors' case".

Socio-economic development of Soviet society in the mid-50s - first half of the 60s.

Social and political development: XX Congress of the CPSU and condemnation of the personality cult of Stalin. Rehabilitation of victims of repression and deportation. Internal party struggle in the second half of the 50s.

Foreign policy: the creation of the Department of Internal Affairs. The entry of Soviet troops into Hungary. Aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations. The split of the "socialist camp". Soviet-American relations and the Caribbean crisis. USSR and the countries of the "third world". Reduction of the size of the armed forces of the USSR. Moscow Treaty on the Limitation of Nuclear Tests.

USSR in the mid 60s - first half of the 80s.

Socio-economic development: economic reform 1965

The growing difficulties of economic development. Falling rates of socio-economic growth.

USSR Constitution 1977

Social and political life of the USSR in the 1970s - early 1980s

Foreign Policy: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Securing post-war borders in Europe. Moscow treaty with the FRG. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Soviet-American treaties of the 70s. Soviet-Chinese relations. The entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Aggravation of international tension and the USSR. Strengthening of the Soviet-American confrontation in the early 80s.

USSR in 1985-1991

Domestic policy: an attempt to accelerate the country's socio-economic development. An attempt to reform the political system of Soviet society. Congresses of People's Deputies. Election of the President of the USSR. Multiparty system. Aggravation of the political crisis.

Aggravation of the national question. Attempts to reform the national state structure of the USSR. Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. "Novoogarevsky process". The collapse of the USSR.

Foreign Policy: Soviet-American Relations and the Problem of Disarmament. Treaties with leading capitalist countries. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Changing relations with the countries of the socialist community. Disintegration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Russian Federation in 1992-2000

Domestic policy: "Shock therapy" in the economy: price liberalization, stages of privatization of trade industrial enterprises... Fall in production. Increased social tension. Growth and deceleration of the rate of financial inflation. Aggravation of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches. Dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. The October events of 1993 Abolition of local bodies of Soviet power. Elections to the Federal Assembly. Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993. Formation of a presidential republic. Aggravation and overcoming of national conflicts in the North Caucasus.

Parliamentary elections 1995 Presidential elections 1996 Power and opposition. An attempt to return to the course of liberal reforms (spring 1997) and its failure. The financial crisis of August 1998: causes, economic and political consequences. "The Second Chechen War". Parliamentary elections in 1999 and early presidential elections in 2000. Foreign policy: Russia in the CIS. The participation of Russian troops in the "hot spots" of the near abroad: Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan. Russia's relations with non-CIS countries. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe and neighboring countries. Russian-American agreements. Russia and NATO. Russia and the Council of Europe. Yugoslavian crises (1999-2000) and Russia's position.

• Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. History of the state and peoples of Russia. XX century.

december 1928 - 1933

The process of uniting individual peasant farms into collective farms. The goal of collectivization is the establishment of socialist production relations in the countryside, the elimination of small-scale commodity production in order to resolve grain difficulties and provide the country with the necessary amount of marketable grain. Spawned a massive famine in the early 30s.

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Collectivization had at least four goals. The first, officially proclaimed by the party leadership, is the implementation of socialist reforms in the countryside. The heterogeneity and diversity of the economy was perceived as a contradiction that must be overcome. In the future, it was planned to create a large-scale socialist agricultural production that would reliably provide the state with bread, meat and raw materials. Cooperation was considered a way of transition to socialism in the countryside. By 1927, more than a third of peasant farms were covered by various forms of cooperation.

The second goal is to ensure an uninterrupted supply of rapidly growing cities during industrialization. The main features of industrialization were projected onto collectivization. The frantic rates of industrial growth and urbanization demanded a sharp increase in an extremely short time in the supply of food to the city.

The third goal is to free workers from the countryside for construction projects in the first five-year plans. Collective farms were large grain producers. The introduction of technology in them was supposed to free millions of peasants from hard manual labor. They were now waiting for work in factories and factories.

The fourth goal is also associated with industrialization - increasing the sale of grain for export with the help of collective farm production. The proceeds from this sale were to be used to purchase machinery and equipment for Soviet factories. At that time, the state did not have any other source of foreign exchange funds.

In 1927 another “grain crisis” broke out in the country. Due to the lack of industrial goods for exchange for grain, as well as crop failure in a number of regions, the amount of marketable bread entered the market has decreased, as well as the sale of agricultural products to the state. Industry could not keep up to feed the city through commodity exchange. Fearing a repetition of grain crises and disruption of the industrialization plan, the country's leadership decided to accelerate the implementation of complete collectivization. The opinion of agrarian economists (A.V. Chayanov, N.D. Kondratyev, etc.) that the most promising for the economy is the combination of individual-family, collective and state forms of organization of production, was ignored.

In December 1927, the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a special resolution on the issue of work in the countryside, in which it proclaimed "The course towards collectivization." The tasks were set: 1) to create "grain and meat factories"; 2) to provide conditions for the use of machines, fertilizers, the latest agro- and zootechnical production methods; 3) free up labor for industrialization construction projects; 4) to eliminate the division of the peasants into poor peasants, middle peasants and kulaks. The Law on General Principles of Land Use and Land Management was issued, according to which significant sums were allocated from the state budget to finance collective farms. Machine-tractor stations (MTS) were organized in rural areas for the maintenance of peasant united cooperatives. Collective farms were open to everyone.

Collective farms (collective farms) were governed by a general meeting and a board elected by it, headed by a chairman. There were three types of collective farms: 1) a partnership for joint cultivation of the land (TOZ), where only complex machines were socialized, and the main means of production (land, inventory, working and productive livestock) were in private use; 2) an artel, where land, implements, working and productive livestock were socialized, and vegetable gardens, small livestock and poultry, hand tools were left in personal property; 3) communes where everything was common, sometimes before organization catering... It was assumed that the peasant himself would be convinced of the advantages of socialization, and they were in no hurry to adopt administrative measures.

Taking a course towards industrialization, the Soviet leadership faced the problem of a lack of funds and labor for industry. You could get both, first of all, from the agricultural sector of the economy, where by the end of the 20s. 80% of the country's population was concentrated. A way out was found in the creation of collective farms. The practice of socialist construction dictated fast, rigid tempos and methods.

"THE YEAR OF THE GREAT BREAKING"

The transition to the policy of collectivization began in the summer of 1929, shortly after the adoption of the first five-year plan. The main reason for its accelerated pace was that the state failed to pump funds from the countryside to industry by setting low prices for agricultural products. The peasants refused to sell their products on unfavorable terms. In addition, small, technically poorly equipped peasant farms were unable to provide the growing urban population and the army with food, and the developing industry with raw materials.

In November 1929, the article "The Year of the Great Turning Point" was published. It spoke of "a radical change in the development of our agriculture from small and backward individual farming to large and advanced collective farming."

In the spirit of this article, in January 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution "On the rate of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm development." It outlined tough terms for its implementation. Two zones were distinguished: the first - the North Caucasian Territory, the Middle and Lower Volga regions, in which collectivization was scheduled to end in the fall of 1930 and in the spring of 1931; the second — all other grain-growing regions — by the fall of 1931 to the spring of 1932. By the end of the first five-year plan, collectivization was planned to be carried out on a national scale.

To carry out collectivization, 25 thousand workers from the cities were mobilized, ready to carry out party directives. Evasion from collectivization began to be interpreted as a crime. Under the threat of closing markets and churches, peasants were forced to join collective farms. The property of those who dared to resist collectivization was confiscated. By the end of February 1930, the number of collective farms was already 14 million farms - 60% of the total

In the winter of 1929-1930. in many villages and towns a terrible picture was observed. The peasants drove to the collective farm yard (often just a barn surrounded by a fence) all their cattle: cows, sheep, and even chickens and geese. The leaders of the collective farms on the ground understood the party's decisions in their own way - if you socialize, then everything, including the bird. Who, how and with what funds will feed the cattle in winter, was not foreseen in advance. Naturally, most of the animals died after a few days. More sophisticated peasants slaughtered their cattle in advance, not wanting to give it to the collective farm. Thus, a huge blow was dealt to animal husbandry. In fact, at first there was nothing to take from the collective farms. The city began to experience even greater food shortages than before.

RELAXING

The lack of food led to the growth of non-economic coercion in the agricultural sector - the further, the more people did not buy from the peasant, but took, which led to an even greater reduction in production. First of all, wealthy peasants, called kulaks, did not want to hand over their grain, cattle, inventory. Many of them openly spoke out against local authorities and village activists. In response, the local authorities are switching to dispossession of kulaks, which since 1930 has been elevated to the rank of state policy. The leasing of land and the use of hired labor were prohibited. Determining who is a "kulak" and who is a "middle peasant" was directly involved in the field. There was no single and accurate classification. In some areas, kulaks were attributed to those who had two cows, or two horses, or a good house. Therefore, each district received its own rate of dispossession. In February 1930, a decree was issued defining its order. The kulaks were divided into three categories: the first ("counter-revolutionary active") - subject to arrest and could be sentenced to death; the second (active opponents of collectivization) - eviction to remote areas; the third - to resettlement within the region. Artificial division into groups, the uncertainty of their characteristics created the basis for arbitrariness on the ground. The lists of families subject to dispossession were compiled by local OGPU bodies and local authorities with the participation of village activists. The resolution determined that the number of dispossessed people in the district should not exceed 3-5% of all peasant farms.

The country was increasingly covered with a network of camps, settlements of "special settlers" (exiled "kulaks" and their family members). By January 1932, 1.4 million people had been evicted, of which several hundred thousand - to remote regions of the country. They were sent to forced labor (for example, to the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal), logging in the Urals, Karelia, Siberia, and the Far East. Many died on the way, many - upon arrival at the place, because, as a rule, the "special settlers" were planted in a bare place: in the forest, in the mountains, in the steppe. The evicted families were allowed to take clothes, bedding and kitchen utensils with them, food for 3 months, but the total luggage should not weigh more than 30 poods (480 kg). The rest of the property was confiscated and distributed between the collective farm and the poor. The families of the Red Army soldiers and the command staff of the Red Army were not subject to eviction and confiscation of property. Dekulakization became a tool for forcing collectivization: those who resisted the creation of collective farms on legal grounds could be repressed as kulaks or those who sympathized with them - "podkulachnikov".

FROM LETTERS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VTSIK M.I. KALININ. EARLY 1930s

“Dear Comrade Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin! I am reporting from the Makarikhi camp - Kotlas. ... Have you seen that defenseless children from 2 weeks and older move with their parents and suffer in completely unsuitable barracks ... Bread is given out 5 days late. Such a scanty ration, and that is untimely ... We all, innocent, are waiting for the final consideration of the case according to our applications ... ".

“Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Comrade M.I. Kalinin. While in exile, I saw enough of the horror of this mass eviction of entire families ... Let it be kulaks, although many of them had a completely insignificant, lower than the middle peasant state, even harmful elements, although, to tell the truth, many got here only because of the evil languages \u200b\u200bof their neighbors, but nevertheless these are people, not beasts, and they have to live much worse than beasts live with a cultural owner ... "

"Dizziness from success"

Forced collectivization and dispossession of kulaks provoked a protest from the peasants. In February-March 1930, mass slaughter of cattle began, the number of cattle reduced by a third as a result. In 1929, 1,300 peasant anti-collective farm actions were registered. In the northern Caucasus and in a number of regions of Ukraine, regular units of the Red Army were sent to pacify the peasants. The army, which consisted mainly of peasant children, also permeated discontent. At the same time in the villages there were numerous facts of the murder of "twenty-five thousand" - workers' activists sent from the city to organize collective farms. Fists repeatedly broke and spoiled collective farm machines during the spring sowing and wrote threatening messages to the chairmen of the farms.

On March 2, 1930, Pravda published Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success," which accused the local leadership of exaggerating. A resolution was adopted on the struggle against the "distortion of the party line in the collective farm movement." Some local leaders have been punished demonstratively. At the same time, in March, the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel was adopted. It proclaimed the principle of voluntary entry into a collective farm, determined the procedure for unification, the amount of social means of production.

From the article by I.V. Stalin's "Dizziness with success", March 2, 1930: "... You cannot impose collective farms by force. That would be silly and reactionary. The collective farm movement must rely on the active support of the bulk of the peasantry. It is impossible to mechanically transplant samples of collective farm construction in developed regions into undeveloped regions. That would be silly and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the policy of collectivization with one blow ... To tease the collective farmer by the "socialization" of residential buildings, all dairy cattle, all small livestock, poultry, when the grain problem has not yet been resolved, when the artel form of collective farms has not yet been fixed - Is it not clear that such a "policy" can be pleasing and beneficial only to our sworn enemies? In order to straighten out the line of our work in the field of collective farm development, we must put an end to these sentiments ... "

HUNGER 1932-33 YY.

In the early 1930s, global grain prices plummeted. Harvests 1931 and 1932 in the USSR were below average. However, the sale of grain abroad in order to obtain foreign exchange for the purchase of industrial equipment continued. The termination of exports threatened to disrupt the industrialization program. In 1930, 835 million centners of grain were harvested, of which 48.4 million centners were exported. In 1931, respectively, collected - 695, exported 51.8 million centners.

In 1932, the collective farms of the grain-growing regions were unable to fulfill the assignments for the delivery of grain. Extraordinary commissions were sent there. The village was swept by a wave of administrative terror. The withdrawal of millions of centners of grain annually from the collective farms for the needs of industrialization soon caused a terrible famine. Often, even the grain that was intended for spring sowing was seized. They sowed little, and gathered little. But the supply plan had to be fulfilled. Then the last products were taken from the collective farmers. Imported machines cost the people a very high price, the famine of 1932-1933. Famine broke out in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Central Russia. Moreover, many starving areas were just the breadbasket of the country. Some historians estimate that the famine took the lives of more than 5 million people.

RESULTS

After the publication of Stalin's article "Dizziness with Success", a massive withdrawal of peasants from collective farms was noted. But soon they re-enter them. The agricultural tax rates for individual farmers were increased by 50% in comparison with collective farms, which did not allow normal individual farming. In September 1931, collectivization reached 60%. In 1934, 75%. The entire policy of the Soviet leadership in relation to agriculture was aimed at keeping the peasant within strict limits: either work on a collective farm, or leave for the city and join the new proletariat. To prevent uncontrolled population migration in December 1932, passports and a registration system were introduced. The peasants did not receive passports. Without them, it was impossible to move to the city and get a job there. Leaving the collective farm was possible only with the permission of the chairman. This situation persisted until the 1960s. But at the same time, the so-called organized recruitment of labor from the countryside to the construction sites of the first five-year plans was taking place on a massive scale.

With the passage of time, the peasants' dissatisfaction with collectivization subsided. The poor, by and large, had nothing to lose. The middle peasants got used to the new situation and did not dare to openly oppose the government. In addition, the collective farm system, breaking one of the beginnings of peasant life - individual farming, continued other traditions - the communal spirit of the Russian countryside, interdependence and joint work. New life did not give a direct incentive for economic initiative. A good chairman could provide an acceptable standard of living on a collective farm, while a careless one could bring him to poverty. But gradually the farms rose to their feet and began to provide the food that the state demanded of them. The collective farmers worked for the so-called "workdays" - a mark for going to work. For "workdays" they also received part of the products produced by the collective farm. At first, it was simply not necessary to dream of prosperity, good prosperity. The resistance of the kulaks, which some called "the world eaters", others - the enterprising masters, was broken by repression and taxes. However, many of them still retained a hidden anger and resentment against the Soviet system. All this was already reflected in the years of the Great Patriotic War in the manifestation of cooperation with the enemy of a part of the repressed kulaks.

In 1934, the final stage of collectivization was announced. The division of the peasants into poor peasants, middle peasants and kulaks was done away with. By 1937, 93% of peasant farms were merged into collective and state farms. State land was assigned to collective farms for perpetual use. Collective farms had land and labor. The machines were provided by state machine and tractor stations (MTS). For their work, MTS took part of the harvested crop. The collective farms were responsible for delivering 25-33% of their production to the state at a "fixed price".

Formally, the management of the collective farm was carried out on the basis of self-government: the general meeting of collective farmers elected the chairman, the board and the audit commission. In fact, the collective farms were run by the district party committees.

Collectivization solved the problem of free transfer of funds from the agrarian sector to industry, ensured the supply of the army and industrial centers with agricultural products, and also solved the problem of export deliveries of grain and raw materials. During the first five-year plan, 40% of export earnings came from grain exports. Instead of 500-600 million poods of marketable grain that had been procured earlier, in the mid-1930s the country procured 1200-1400 million poods of marketable grain annually. Collective farms, although not satisfying, still fed the growing population of the state, primarily cities. The organization of large farms and the introduction of machine technology in them made it possible to withdraw from agriculture a huge number of people who worked on industrialization construction sites, then fought against Nazism and again raised industry in the postwar years. In other words, a huge part of the village's human and material resources was freed up.

The main result of collectivization was the industrial leap that was carried out with many unjustified costs, but still realized.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF W. CHURCHILL

About the conversation with I. Stalin at the negotiations in Moscow in August 1942 (the conversation turned to collectivization in the USSR in the 1930s)

(...) This theme immediately revived Marshal [Stalin].

"Well no," he said, "the collectivization policy was a terrible struggle."

"I thought that you thought it difficult," I said [Churchill], "after all, you were dealing not with a few tens of thousands of aristocrats or big landowners, but with millions of little people."

“With ten million,” he said, raising his hands. - It was something terrible, it lasted four years, but in order to get rid of periodic hunger strikes, Russia absolutely needed to plow the land with tractors. We must mechanize our agriculture. When we gave tractors to peasants, they fell into disrepair after a few months. Only collective farms with workshops can operate tractors. We did our best to explain this to the peasants ...

[the conversation turned to the well-to-do peasants and Churchill asked]: "Were those people you called kulaks?"

“Yes,” he replied without repeating the word. After a pause, he remarked: "It was all very bad and difficult, but necessary."

"What happened?" I asked.

“Many of them agreed to come with us,” he replied. "Some of them were given land for individual cultivation in the Tomsk region, or in the Irkutsk region, or even further north, but most of them were very unpopular, and they were destroyed by their farm laborers."

There was a rather long pause. Then Stalin went on: “We have not only greatly increased the food supply, but also immeasurably improved the quality of the grain. Previously, all sorts of grain were grown. Now in our entire country no one is allowed to sow any other varieties besides the standard Soviet grain. Otherwise, they are treated harshly. This means an even greater increase in food supplies. "

I ... remember how deeply impressed I was at that time by the news that millions of men and women were being destroyed or moved permanently. Undoubtedly, a generation will be born that will not know their suffering, but it will certainly have more food and bless the name of Stalin ...

The radical turn of the countryside towards socialism can be considered already secured.

Immediately, using specific examples of how collectivization was carried out, he points to the violation of the principle of voluntariness, which was admitted locally when organizing collective farms. Stalin condemned the actions of the local authorities, which were not provided for by the plans for accelerated collectivization, in particular, the premature planting of agricultural communes:

Not a commune, but an agricultural artel is the main link in the collective farm movement, but the artel does not socialize: household lands (small gardens, orchards), residential buildings, a certain part of dairy cattle, small livestock, poultry, etc.

Stalin accused the "zealous socializers" of "degrading and discrediting" the collective farm movement and condemned their actions:

pouring water into the mill of our class enemies.

Note that in order to finally stop the flywheel of repression against the peasantry, Stalin also needed to publish the article "Answer to Comrades Collective Farmers". There, he unequivocally pointed out to the lower party members that "the party line has changed":

They forgot that cavalry attacks, necessary and useful for solving military problems, are unsuitable and pernicious in solving problems of collective farm development ... Apparently, the laurels of Don Quixote do not let our "left" benders sleep.

Soon after the publication of the article, by the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 14, "On the fight against the distortion of the party line in the collective farm movement", the actions of the party workers in question were qualified as "leftist folds", as a result of which the collectivization campaign was temporarily suspended. and a number of grassroots workers were convicted.

The problem of the development of domestic agriculture in Russia has become extremely aggravated recently with the introduction of international sanctions against the Russian economy. From time to time the ruling circles of Russia are forced to touch upon this problem. So, in September 2014, the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev said about the need to create favorable conditions for the development of domestic agricultural production, measures are being taken in the field of import substitution as part of the food security of our country.

In our opinion, the experience of the development of agriculture in other historical periods of our country is interesting in this direction. Collectivization was one of the important activities in the field of agriculture.

In this article, we will consider what goals were set during the period of collectivization, what were its results, what were the so-called "excesses" and why and why liberals criticize the Soviet past.

The accelerated industrialization and collectivization of the USSR is sometimes called the "great turning point" or "second revolution" - so enormous were their scope, pace and impact on the future fate of society and the state.

Chronologically, they are most often dated from 1928 to 1940. Most of this period of time falls on the first two five-year plans (1928 - 1932 and 1933 - 1937), when the key events of the "great turning point" took place. On this path there were many difficulties and mistakes, feats and crimes, victories and failures; successes in the development of the national economy and failures in many of its sectors, especially in agriculture.

At first, industrialization was considered the main task of the “great turning point,” and the collectivization of the countryside was only its tool, support. Collectivization was launched later than industrialization. However, in the first half of the thirties, collectivization emerged as an independent direction in public policy, requiring no less close attention than industrialization.

Relationships among peasants in pre-revolutionary Russia

Before analyzing the course and true results of collectivization, it is especially important to refute the statements repeatedly repeated by the liberal bourgeois about the "kulaks" as the most active and hardworking peasants who develop productive forces in agriculture. Attention should be paid to the assessment that they were given by those who did not belong to the Bolshevik party and were not its supporters. Thus, one should refer to the work of A.S. Ermolov "Crop failure and national disaster" 1892.

Marginal notes:History reference

A.S. Ermolov was not just not a revolutionary, he belonged to landlords- in January 1917 he owned an estate of 1,248 dessiatines in the Voronezh province and 1,325 dessiatines in the Ryazan province. Moreover, he was member of the tsarist government... So, in 1894 he took up the post of Minister of Agriculture and State Property, in 1896 he became a full secret councilor, secretary of state (1903), and from May 1905 - a member of the State Council.

His idea of \u200b\u200bthe so-called "kulaks" is very interesting.

Note that this concept was actively used in tsarist Russia with a brightly negative coloration and is not some kind of "invention" of the Soviet era. So, he writes that

In close connection with the question of the collection of state, zemstvo and social taxes that fall on the peasant population, and, one might say, mainly on the basis of these penalties, a terrible ulcer has developed in our rural life, in the end it corrupts and carries away the people's welfare - these are the so-called kulaks and usury. With the urgent need for money that the peasants have - for paying duties, for acquiring after a fire, for buying a horse after it has been stolen, or cattle after death, these ulcers find the widest field for their development.

Given the existing, established with the best goals and, perhaps, quite necessary restrictions on the sale of public and private collection of the primary needs of the peasant economy, as well as allotment land, there is no correct credit available to the peasants at all.

Only the rural usurer, who provides himself with enormous percentages that reward him for the frequent loss of capital itself, comes to his aid in cases of such dire need, but this help, of course, is costly to those who are happy to turn to it. Once owing to such a usurer, the peasant can almost never get out of the noose that entangles him and which for the most part brings him to complete ruin. Often the peasant is already plowing and sowing, and gathering grain only for the kulak.

Further A.S. Ermolov writes that it is often almost impossible for even landowners to receive penalties from peasants if they fail to fulfill their obligations, if they leave work without permission, they even consider going to court as an extreme measure. But rural usurers act in a completely different way, who return to themselves their "not in the same way, in other ways, not in money, so in kind, grain, cattle, land, work, etc."

Describing the system of financial enslavement of the peasants, he notes that:

It is hard to believe to what extent the interest rates that are charged from the peasants for the money lent to them reach and which are mainly dependent on the degree of the people's need ”. As an example, he cites a situation when in the summer, especially during the period of a favorable harvest, “the loan is given no more than 45-50% per annum, in the fall the same lenders demand no less than 120%, and sometimes up to 240%, and very often the security is the pledge of peasant shower allotments, which the owners themselves then rent from their own lenders. Sometimes the land selected by the lender for a debt at the rate of 3-4 rubles per tithe is rented back to its owner for 10-12 rubles. However, in most cases such percentages are still recognized as insufficient, since in addition to that, various works, services, payments in kind - in addition to cash, etc. With bread loans - for a pood in winter or spring, in the fall two returns ... ". He writes that “in recent years, credit secured by property has been especially widespread, and the usurer does not disdain anything — agricultural implements, worn clothes, standing bread, and even a workhorse and cattle are used. When the time of reckoning comes and the peasant has nothing to pay the debts with, then all this turns into sale, and more often it is surrendered to the same creditor, and he also sets the price at which the pledged thing is accepted by him in payment of the debt, so that often, having given a pledge, the peasant remains in debt, sometimes not even less, against the original debt figure.

A.S. Ermolov in his work concludes that settle the situation in the countryside, in order to "put an end to the harmful activities of the rural usurer, kulaks and buyers ..." Tsarist Russia failed to do this and the problem was passed on to Soviet Russia.

Collectivization: prerequisites for

Collectivization- this is a profound transformation not only of the countryside and agriculture, but of the entire country. It influenced the entire economy as a whole, the social structure of society, demographic processes and urbanization. At the first stage, it caused a grave catastrophe, which was accompanied by massive suffering and human casualties. It was during the first stage of the reform that the most fundamental mistakes were made with the most dire consequences for the entire Soviet period (not counting the stage of dismantling the Soviet system after 1988). The fact that the Soviet state survived this catastrophe speaks of its great potential and the reserve of trust that the people placed in it.

The very idea of \u200b\u200bcooperative farming partnerships was not, of course, a Soviet invention. Already in the 19th century, A.N. Engelhardt wrote about her in the tenth letter (December 3, 1880):

If the peasant lands were both cultivated and fertilized together, not with niv, but entirely by all the owners together, as the landowners' land is cultivated, with the division of the product itself, then the grain yields of the peasants would be no lower than those of the landowners. The peasants themselves agree with this. Narrow sows, cultivated by each owner separately, prevent both good cultivation and correct distribution of manure. By cultivating the land together, these shortcomings would be eliminated and the yields would be even better.

During the Stolypin reform, production cooperation was seen as the main way of raising poor peasant farms. In 1913, the First All-Russian Agricultural Congress was held in Kiev, the resolution of which ended with such an appeal to land management authorities and the government:

One of the first places should be occupied by the organization of partnerships for the joint use of land, both its own and especially leased land, through collective processing of it. The role of land management in relation to these partnerships should consist in the allocation of small-sized plots to one place and as close as possible to the villages, to which the Congress draws the attention of the government. The role of agronomy will consist in the broadest propaganda of the very idea of \u200b\u200bpartnerships and in putting it into practice.

The state of relations between the authorities and the peasantry in a country like Russia was almost the main issue of the state. The middle of the 20s passed under the slogan "Face to the Village", which in fact meant economic support wealthy peasants... The liberalization of the electoral law, carried out in 1924, was fully used by the kulaks as the most organized and wealthy category of peasants. During the elections to local Soviets in 1925, the share of horseless peasants among the deputies fell to 4%. The acquisition by the kulaks of real political power in the countryside created a dangerous situation in the party as well - the discontent of rural party organizations was reinforced by the strengthening of the left opposition in the center.

The change in the political situation also contributed to social stratification. In 1927, 3% of farms classified as kulak owned 14 - 20% of all means of production and about a third of all agricultural machines in the countryside. The leasing of land to the kulaks, the shadow hiring of farm laborers, and loans of seeds and implements for working off expanded. Therefore, obtaining a reliable "social portrait" of the village has become an important state task.

After the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b), a Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) was formed on collectivization issues under the leadership of A.Ya. Yakovlev (Epstein), which was to recommend a model of the collective farm. On December 7, 1929, by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR was formed (contrary to the Constitution, which did not imply a Union People's Commissariat in this industry). He was entrusted with collectivization and the functions of promising and operational management of agriculture and forestry. A.Ya. Yakovlev was appointed People's Commissar. The Academy of Agricultural Sciences and its network of institutes also came under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture.

At first, the formation of collective farms went well, the peasants perceived the collective farm as an artel, a well-known type of production cooperation that does not destroy the peasant yard - the main cell of the entire structure of the Russian countryside. Moreover, the idea of \u200b\u200bjoint cultivation of the land, production cooperation, existed in the communal peasantry for a long time, long before collectivization and even before the revolution. Collectivization was seen as the revival and strengthening of the community.

The progress of collectivization in agriculture

Peasants constituted 80% of the population of pre-revolutionary Russia. Of these, 50% were poor, 30% were middle peasants, 20% were kulaks. Now the kulak is constantly presented as an intelligent, hardworking peasant. Of course there were some. But, basically, it was a world eater, a dealer using hired labor. The Soviet government could not leave the bulk of the peasants to the mercy of fate. In addition, it was necessary to feed the city. Where is the exit? I had to introduce surplus appropriation and tax in kind. Combeds were organized. But these activities did not solve the problem.

In the mid-1920s, the main link in cooperative construction was supply and sales cooperation. In the second half of the decade, legislation pays much more attention to production cooperatives... The most important normative act in this area was the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of March 16, 1927 "On collective farms", which drew attention to the simplest forms of production cooperation - partnerships for social cultivation of land, machine partnerships, proposing to involve in them ever large masses of the peasantry and primarily the poor. At the same time, higher forms of cooperation - artels and communes - are not forgotten.

IN AND. Lenin formulated his vision of the main tasks for building socialism in our country. He believed that this required:

• creation of a modern industry,
• organization of peasant cooperatives,
• implementation of a cultural revolution that will eliminate illiteracy among the peasantry and raise the scientific and technical level of the population.

Lenin emphasized:

The power of the state over all large-scale means of production, political power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with small and very small peasants, guaranteed proletarian leadership over the peasantry, etc. - is this not all you need to build a fully socialist society from cooperatives? ...

The question was how to carry out the assigned tasks - in stages or by forced methods. In view of the outwardly imperialist threat hanging over the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s, in the conditions of the still underdeveloped degree of industry inherited from the tsarist period, in order to mobilize all resources for the implementation of a rapid, vital breakthrough for the country, the Soviet government was forced to choose a method of forced implementation industrialization, curtail the NEP.

Since our country was agrarian, funds for industrialization had to be taken from the countryside. Collectivization took place in the interests of accelerated industrialization.

What are "excesses" in collectivization

Contrary to the popular myth, according to which the authorities immediately launched an attack on the kulaks, the matter at the very beginning was limited to relatively evolutionary methods... Thus, in 1927, when a military threat loomed over the USSR, the party sought only to limit the appetites of the rural bourgeoisie. New taxes were developed on kulak income. They also had to deliver increased quotas during grain harvest. The number of workers they hired was limited. However, the authorities faced sabotage of agricultural supplies.

As you know, a similar situation was observed in the period 1914-1917, as a result of which the army and cities faced a shortage of food. A.I. wrote about all this in his memoirs. Denikin. Thus, by that time there was a negative experience, when the inaction of the authorities due to the need to control the mobilization and concentration of resources at a critical moment for the country turned into catastrophic consequences ... Under the circumstances, it was necessary to resort to emergency measures, the so-called "dispossession".

Marginal Notes: On Terror of the Kulaks

The kulaks tried to harm the building of collective farms, intimidate the peasant poor, and influence the middle peasant. Everything was used: slander, intimidation, threats and physical reprisals against the activists of the collective farm peasantry. Only within the limits of the Amur District in 1928 the kulaks committed 60 terrorist acts.

It is worth noting that we are talking about 1928, when there was no talk of any "repression" and "dispossession". Real terror was unleashed by the kulaks against the Soviet power and the working people. It should not be surprising that the authorities were forced to retaliate against the criminals. The power was obliged to strike, otherwise it is not power. Conducting total collectivization and dispossession (to knock out the base from under the criminals) to a very large extent was caused precisely by the attempts of hostile social groups to kindle a new civil war.

By the way, long before any decrees dispossession began in the localities - in the provinces and villages. No, not at all because of envy of successful neighbors, but because of the inability of the "economically efficient" rural bourgeois to live like a human being in the Russian community.

So, in 1928, 1307 terrorist attacks were committed by fists on the territory of the RSFSR, including over 400 murders of communists, activists, teachers, policemen and tractor drivers. In 1929, only in the villages and villages of the central regions of Russia, 1,002 terrorist attacks were recorded, including 384 murders and 141 arson of collective farm buildings. In reality, the situation was much more difficult - a lot of murders, arson and sabotage were not recorded due to the weakness of the law enforcement agencies, or were registered as accidents.

There was no way to find the criminals without a complete "cleanup" of the kulaks. If this had been carried out, for example, in 1928 with exemplary severity and ruthlessness, then many innocent victims and big problems would have been avoided later.

In 1930 (even when most of the dispossessed were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan), there were 2391 terrorist attacks and 456 kulak gangs armed with firearms, up to machine guns, in the country. More than 170 militiamen, Red Army men and Chekists were killed in battles with bandits.

Thus, it was necessary to actively combat the sabotage of the kulaks. Moreover, the local authorities made a lot of excesses in the process of collectivization, when a number of party workers tried to artificially speed up this process, not taking into account the specifics of the place and time, when the principle of voluntariness of joining collective farms was violated, not only the basic means of production, but also poultry were socialized. , small livestock, residential buildings.

All this was condemned by I.V. Stalin in the article "Dizziness with Success," published in the newspaper Pravda on March 2, 1930.

He also presented the essence difficult controversial situation in the countryside in the answer of M.A. Sholokhov to his letter dated April 4, 1933, in which he emphasized many excesses. Stalin expressed his gratitude to him for the letters, as they:

they open the sore of our Party and Soviet work, they reveal how sometimes our workers, wanting to bridle the enemy, accidentally hit their friends and sink to sadism ... But this is only one side of the matter ... And the other side is that respected farmers ... carried out ... sabotage and were not averse to leaving the workers, the Red Army - without bread ....

In Stalin's words:

Many consider these statements by I.V. Stalin's "smoke screen", which had the goal of absolving itself of responsibility for the costs in the course of the collectivization process, to cover up all excesses.

However, the case was not limited to simple verbal condemnation of the actions of local authorities..

Certain measures were taken to correct mistakes and to impose sanctions against party officials who bend the party line. So, in the period 1934 - 1938 31,515 people were released as "incorrectly deported" and 33,565 were transferred to dependents.

On October 22, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree "On issuing passports to children of special settlers and exiles", providing for the issuance of passports to those who are not defamed in anything, "on a general basis and not to obstruct them from leaving for study or work." In 1935, according to the new Charter of the agricultural cartel, the peasants were given the right to personal subsidiary farming. On October 1 of the same year, the free sale of meat, fats, fish, sugar and potatoes was restored.

As noted, criminal cases were initiated against a number of republican and local party leaders, for example, against the leadership of the Lepel region of the Byelorussian SSR. So, in the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of February 22, 1937 "On the situation in the Lepel region of the BSSR" it is emphasized that the local authorities have committed:

illegal confiscation of property from peasants, both collective farmers and individual farmers, carried out under the guise of collecting arrears on cash taxes and in-kind supplies.

In the post-Soviet period, they tried to form an opinion according to which collectivization had failed. The fact of the famine that broke out in a number of regions of the USSR in 1932-1933 was cited as the main confirmation of the corresponding thesis.

Tragedy, of course, took place. However, it appears that the statement that hunger was the result of collectivization as such is incorrect... According to historians, the following should be singled out as the main reasons:

• First, this phenomenon has become the result of excesses made by the local party bosses in the course of collectivization... Insufficient experience, chaos in orders, lack of an adequate level of training, radicalism of a number of workers led to dire consequences.
• Secondly, one cannot ignore the fact that the kulaks, instigated by various counter-revolutionary forces, carried out direct sabotage and destroyed their cattle and horses.
• Thirdly, we must not close our eyes to the fact that one of the reasons for hunger was drought in Ukraine in 1930-1932. Professor Mikhail Florinsky writes about this, who fought against Soviet power during the Civil War. According to him, "several droughts in 1930 and 1931, especially in Ukraine, worsened the state of agriculture and created conditions for famine."

It should also be noted that the assertion that collectivization took place exclusively with the help of one coercion is incorrect. As the Belgian historian Ludo Martens writes in his book Forbidden Stalin:

the impulse of the most violent episodes of collectivization came from the oppressed peasant masses themselves.

As an example, he cites the statement of a peasant from the Black Sea region, who said that he had lived all his life in a farm laborer's environment. After the victory of the October Revolution, he received land, annually - loans, but:

"Despite the help of the Soviet regime, ..., I could not run my own economy and improve it." I saw the way out in "joining the tractor column, helping it and working in it."

Results of agricultural collectivization

As the mistakes made in the course of collectivization were corrected, it was possible to achieve liftingagriculture.

Thus, the village was receiving new equipment on an increasing scale. By 1932, 22% of the arable land was cultivated with the help of tractors, and by the end of the second five-year plan, up to 60%. In the years of the first five-year plan, 154 thousand tractors were supplied to agriculture (94 thousand - of domestic production).

By 1935, 34 thousand trucks, 31 thousand combines and 281 thousand tractors were used in agriculture. During the years of the second five-year plan, agriculture received 405 thousand tractors. During the period under review, the number of machine and tractor stations doubled. In 1932, they served a third of the collective farms of the USSR, and five years later - 78%. American journalists M. Sayers and A. Kahn, assessing the results of collectivization, emphasized that the Soviet people:

whose grandfathers from time immemorial bent their backs, working with primitive scythes, hoes, wooden plows, now harvested rich crops with tractors and combines and fought pests with the help of chemicals scattered from airplanes.

The Belgian historian Ludo Martens in his book "Another Look at Stalin" (1994) provides the following data:

in 1930 the harvest reached 83.5 million tons. In 1931 - 1932 there was a drop in grain production (69.9 million tons in 1932). In 1933, an increase in yield was recorded - 89.8 million tons, which generally continued in subsequent years. In 1940, the harvest reached 118.8 million tons. The picture is similar with the value of agricultural production. In 1928 - 13.1 billion rubles, in 1934 - 14.7 billion rubles, and in 1940 it reached 23.2 billion rubles.

To support the collective farm movement and as a special mechanism, a powerful cooperative movement was deployed.

According to (Elyutin, ON Cooperation in Russia - an unclaimed experience / ON Elyutin // Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 8. History. - 1998. - No. 5. - P. 30-53.) In stalinist times there were over 114 thousand workshops and other industrial enterprises, where at least 1.8 million people worked. They produced almost 6% of the gross industrial output of the USSR (depending on the method of assessing the level of market "cooperative" prices, much more), in its composition: 40% of all furniture in the country, 70% of all metal utensils, 35% of outer knitwear, almost 100% of toys ...

Scientific and engineering works, which gave very good results - so the system of industrial cooperation included 100 design bureaus, 22 experimental laboratories, two research institutes.

His data do not take into account cooperative rural artels, in which workers (both collective farmers and individual farmers) were partially employed - in their free time from agricultural work. It is very difficult to accurately estimate their number now; they probably included up to 20-30 million (!) People in the 30s.

The destruction of the Soviet cooperation and the Soviet market began with the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the reorganization of industrial cooperation" of April 14, 1956. Since 56, personal subsidiary farming has been destroyed at an accelerated pace, private livestock has been practically liquidated, collective farms have been "enlarged", which dealt a terrible blow to small villages, the property of cooperatives and individuals was "transferred to state bodies", that is, confiscated and passed under the control of party bosses ...

And if we analyze the results of collectivization for subsequent periods, then Stalin made such a groundwork that the partocracy, which seized power after the coup d'etat of 1953, was able to "fatten" for more than 40 years.

If on the eve of the first five-year plan, the country's agriculture consisted of 25 million small peasant farms (households) based on manual labor, then a few years later the largest highly mechanized agricultural production was created.

For example, the gross output of the Soviet countryside, in comparison with 1913 for 60 years, increased 4.4 times, and labor productivity - 6 times. The USSR took one of the first places in the world for food production: it produced more than any other country in the world of wheat, rye, barley, sugar beets, potatoes, milk. In 1954 - 1961, the USSR had the highest average annual growth rate of agricultural products in the world - 6%.

Compared to the record year 1913, when 250 kg of grain per capita was produced, the USSR increased these figures by 3 times. Animal husbandry also developed. As of January 10, 1966, for example, there were 93.4 million head of cattle in the USSR (in 1916 - 58.4 million), including 40.1 million head of cows (1916 - 28.8 million .), 59.5 million pigs (1916 - 23 million), 135.3 million sheep and goats (1916 - 89.7 million heads). In the early 1980s, the average yield in the USSR was 15 centners per hectare.

In the next part we will continue talking about collectivization, starting with how liberals distort information about the Soviet past in general and about collectivization in particular ...

 

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