Transaction costs classification of transaction costs. Lectures. Classification of transaction costs

Basic Provisions

Definition 1

Consider the concept of transaction costs, which is understood as the costs that arise when using market mechanisms associated with the conclusion of contracts.

In practice, there are many approaches to classify this type of cost. This is due to the fact that there are also many different views on the consideration of the essence and the problem of transaction costs.

Consider the approaches of various scientists and researchers.

O. Williamson classification

It is customary to distinguish two main groups of costs, which are called in the English phrase as:

ex ante;
ex post.

It is customary to refer to the first group the costs of drawing up a specific project, agreement, and conducting the necessary negotiations.

The second group of costs involves the implementation of direct costs aimed at organizing and operating costs. Here the costs will be associated with the specifics of management, adaptation, legal costs, costs associated with unforeseen events, costs that arise during the execution of the contract.

Classification according to K. Menard

In this approach, more groups are distinguished. It is accepted to classify the considered costs into 4 main groups:

the cost of isolating (or shirking);
costs of scale;
costs associated with information flows;
behavioral costs.

In any operating firm, the problem of inseparability arises. It is assumed that it is not possible to accurately determine the productivity per unit of each factor that is involved in production activities, and also, under such conditions, to accurately calculate the remuneration.

The next type of costs assumes that the larger the volume and scale of the market, the more impersonal exchange flows acquire. Therefore, it is important to develop institutional mechanisms that consider the different nature of contracts, monitor compliance with the laws of countries, monitor, impose sanctions in case of violation of the law.

The third group is information costs. Since all transactions are related to information, information systems and databases, then this group include such costs as the sphere of functioning of information, that is, coding, user training, the cost of transmitting information through communication channels.

The fourth group assumes the costs that arise from the selfish, opportunistic behavior of counterparties when concluding contracts.

Classification by R. Kapelyushnikov

This classification is more common and well-known. Let's take a closer look:

costs associated with searching for various necessary information;
costs incurred when negotiating with counterparties (for example, creating necessary conditions for negotiations, requirements of counterparties to the terms of negotiations, the emerging costs of such negotiations);
the costs of measuring accuracy (arise in a situation when in acts of exchange the quality of goods can be immeasurable or expressed through other measurements). Therefore, there are, for example, costs for additional equipment for measuring;
specification costs;
costs associated with the protection of property rights;
opportunistic costs (carry moral hazard, non-compliance with the terms of contracts).
In general, this classification of transaction costs is broader and more generalized.

Examples of different types of transaction costs from classifications are shown in the figure.

Go back to

We can now turn to the task of classifying transaction costs. It is most reasonable to tie the classification of transaction costs to the stages of the transaction. O. Williamson talks about ex ante and ex post transaction costs, that is, those arising before and after the conclusion of the transaction. If we single out the following as the stages of concluding a transaction: finding a partner, agreeing interests, registering a transaction, monitoring its implementation, then the classification of transaction costs can be presented in the form of a table.

Costs ex ante	Costsex post
Information retrieval costs include the search for information about a potential partner and about the market situation, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the information acquired	Costs of monitoring and preventing opportunism relate to the costs of monitoring compliance with the terms of the transaction and preventing opportunism, that is, avoiding these conditions
Negotiation costs include the costs of negotiating the terms of the exchange, the choice of the form of the transaction	Specification and property protection costs includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, the time and resources required to restore rights violated during the execution of the contract, as well as losses from poor specification of property rights and unreliable protection
Measurement costs relate to the costs required to measure the quality of goods and services for which the transaction is made	Costs of protection from third parties include the costs of protecting against claims of third parties (government, mafia, etc.) for a part of the beneficial effect obtained as a result of the transaction
Costs of concluding a contract reflect the costs of legal or illegal registration of the transaction

The construction of a classification of transaction costs based on the stages of concluding a contract makes it possible to clarify the issue of their quantitative assessment both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. For example, when concluding a deal for renting an apartment, which involves the transfer of the right to use it by the owner of the apartment to the tenant.

The transaction costs for the lessee will take the following forms:

The costs of searching for information about apartments for rent, prices on the housing market: buying specialized publications and making calls to advertisements or contacting a real estate company, which independently selects several options for a commission - costs in cash and time.
The costs of negotiating with the owners of apartments selected according to the results of the first stage special conditions lease - time costs can be passed on to an intermediary and in this case take the form of money.

The costs of assessing the quality of housing during a visit to the selected apartments - the time and travel costs can also be passed on to the intermediary.
Costs of legal registration of a lease contract, its notarization - costs in monetary form.
The costs of preventing the owner's opportunism, which is expressed in the desire to change the terms of the lease, for example, to increase the rent, are time and psychological costs.
The costs of protecting the right to use the apartment transferred for the term of the contract in the event that the owner makes claims to the tenant about the maintenance of the apartment and / or wants to terminate the contract ahead of schedule - time and monetary costs associated with going to court.

Thus, quantification the transaction costs arising from rental housing can be obtained either by analyzing income intermediary firms, or by summing direct cash costs and time costs multiplied by the average hourly

In the economic literature, there are various classifications of transaction costs. It should be noted that the generally accepted classification of transaction costs did not work out, each of the researchers paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. J. Stigler, Alchian singled out among them "information costs", Levy - the costs of operating the state system; O. Williamson? the costs of opportunistic behavior; M. Milgrom and J. Roberts - the cost of influence; and Jensen and Meckling are agency costs.

Here another problem of the theory of transaction costs manifested itself: in some cases, some economists began to reduce the whole variety of costs of transactions to some particular manifestation of them. Most often in theoretical works there is an identification of transactional and informational costs. Of course, information costs are key to understanding the nature of transaction costs, since the acquisition and processing of information for subsequent transactions is very important, if not crucial... This allowed some economists (for example, Dalman) to argue that "there is only one type of transaction costs that can be talked about - the loss of resources due to imperfect information." Even such a prominent scientist as Alchian tended to equate transaction and information costs. Nevertheless, the information costs associated with the search, information processing, monitoring, etc. the whole set of transaction costs is not exhausted, since it is obvious that there are also such costs of transactions as the costs of protecting property rights, the costs of enforcing contracts, measurement costs, etc.

Within the modern neo-institutional economic theory a variety of approaches to the systematization of transactional

costs, including:

- the North-Eggertsson classification, in which transaction costs are actually divided according to the stages of their occurrence in the contractual relationship;
- the Milgrom-Roberts classification, which is based on the division of the system of transaction costs into two main categories: transaction costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation;
- Menard's classification, based on four main factors that determine the costs of transactions.

This list can also be supplemented with Williamson's typology, which, strictly speaking, is a systematization of the transactions themselves according to their frequency and specificity of assets. O. Williamson separates ex ante and ex post transaction costs - those arising before and after the transaction. The general classification of transaction costs is shown in Table 2.

Table 2 - Williamson classification of transaction costs

Transaction costs
Ex ante costs	Ex post costs
Information search costs: the costs of searching for information about a potential partner, about the market situation, as well as losses, reduced by the acquired information with incompleteness and imperfection.	Costs of monitoring and preventing opportunism: costs of monitoring compliance with the terms of the deal and preventing evasion
Negotiation costs: costs of negotiating the terms of the transaction, the choice of the form of the transaction	Costs of specification and protection of property rights: costs of maintaining courts, arbitration; expenditure of time and resources required to restore rights violated during the execution of the contract, losses from poor specification and unreliable protection
Measurement Cost: Costs required to measure the quality of the goods and services for which a transaction is being made	Costs of protection against third parties: costs of protecting against claims of third parties for part of the beneficial effect obtained as a result of the transaction
Costs of concluding a contract: costs of legal or illegal (informal) execution of a transaction

Among domestic scientists, the classification proposed by R. Kapelyushnikov can be noted, where the following division of transaction costs is carried out according to the external characteristics of the activity to which they relate:

1. Expend the search for information (the cost of searching and acquiring information before concluding a deal, this also includes losses caused by imperfect information);
2. Costs of negotiation (costs of preparation and execution of a contract, negotiation);
3. Cost of measurement (the cost of evaluating the characteristics of a product or service);
4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights (legal costs, costs required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from poor specification and unreliable protection);
5. Costs of opportunistic behavior (costs due to the mismatch of interests of economic agents).

This classification takes into account the costs of using the market mechanism for coordinating the activities of people, or "market transaction costs". However, transaction costs are also present at other levels.

The classification of costs in terms of their clear division depending on the segment in which transactions take place is given, in particular, in the work of Furubotn and Richter (Table 3).

Table 3 - Classification of transaction costs

The class of "market transaction costs" here includes the typical costs of using the market mechanism; into the class of "management transaction costs"? the costs associated with exercising the right to give orders within the firm (the costs of creating, maintaining or changing the organizational design, including the costs of personnel management, protection against takeovers, investments in information Technology, public relations and lobbying; and the costs of operating the organization, which include information costs for "decision making, monitoring the execution of orders, measuring the performance of employees", etc.

Do Furubotn and Richter distinguish the costs associated with "operating and adjusting the institutional state" in the last class of transaction costs? "political transaction costs". Such costs, by their definition, “are generally the costs of creating public goods through collective action” and include such costs of carrying out government functions as the costs of finding information, making decisions, monitoring and enforcing laws; costs associated with the activities of political parties, the establishment of legal frameworks, which in general can be defined as the costs of creating, maintaining and changing the formal and informal political system.

Inclusion in the analysis of not only market, but also other aspects of transactions is necessary, since research and planning of activities is impossible without taking into account the entire set of operating factors.

Thus, there is no unity in the concept of transaction costs and in their classification presentation today in science.

There are also more complex definitions of transaction costs and their classification. But in most modern research in the field of institutional economics, the term "transaction costs" is used in the sense proposed by Williamson O. This is all the costs in all transactions that occur both within the firm and in the market.

To prove the right to the existence of the basic provisions of neoinstitutional economic theory, of which he is rightfully considered the founder, this is enough.

In neoinstitutional economic theory, the unit of analysis is the act of economic interaction, transaction, transaction. Moreover, the category "transaction" covers both material and contractual aspects of exchange. It is understood very broadly and is used to mean both the exchange of goods and different kinds activities, and the exchange of legal obligations, transactions of both long-term and short-term nature, both requiring detailed documenting, and assuming interaction, which is certainly present in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation.

In the economic theory, the concept of "transaction" was introduced by Commons J. In his opinion, the transaction is not just not an exchange of goods, but the alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society, based on the assumption that institutions ensure the spread of the will of an individual subject outside the areas of his influence on the environment by his actions, that is, beyond the scope of his physical control, therefore, turn out to be transactions, in contrast to the individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods.

Russian neoinstitutional scientists also adhere to a practically similar view. For example, A. Shastitko believes that a transaction should be understood as the activity of the subject in the form of alienation and appropriation of property rights, freedoms adopted in society, which are carried out in the planning process, control over the fulfillment of promises, as well as adaptation to unforeseen circumstances.

Commons J. distinguished three main types of transactions:

1. Transaction of the transaction serves for the implementation of the actual alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms, and in its implementation, mutual consent of the parties is required, based on the economic interests of each of them. In the transaction of the transaction, the condition of symmetry of mutual actions, including relations, between the subjects is observed. Commons argues that the hallmark of a transaction is not production, but the transfer of goods from hand to hand.

2. Management transaction. In it, the key is the internal interactions arising in the management of subordination. They are not symmetrical, at least in formal terms - the right to make decisions belongs to only one side. The asymmetry of behavior in these interactions is a consequence of the asymmetry of the position of the parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations.

3. Transaction of rationing - with it asymmetry is preserved legal status parties, but the place of the managing party is taken by a collective body that performs the function of the specification of rights. Rationalization transactions include: the drafting of the company's budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by the representative authority, the arbitration court's decision on a dispute arising between actors through which wealth is distributed, as well as interactions arising in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation. In the latter, the public union as a collective body has a stronger position in the market both in relation to its constituent entities and in relation to those not participating in it.

Williamson O. evaluates all transactions by transaction frequency and asset specificity. According to these two parameters, he divides transactions into four main types.

The first is a one-time (or elementary) exchange on the anonymous market. In this case, the frequency of the transaction is rare and there is no asset specificity.

The second is the repetitive exchange of bulk goods. In this case, the frequency of the transaction increases. There is still no asset specificity.

The third is a recurring contract involving investments in specific assets. A specific asset is created specifically for a specific transaction. This means that the next best opportunity to use the asset is far less rewarding and risky. There are specific assets among the entire set, the next use of which is much less profitable. Upon termination of the contract for the sale of a non-specific asset, the seller does not incur any particular loss. But the termination of the contract for the sale of a specific asset leads to significant losses for him. Therefore, in the process of negotiations regarding the conclusion of such contracts, the seller will require: either monetary compensation in the amount of capitalization of your risk; or legal guarantees of the safety of the contract; or decision-making power and the ability to bear shared risk.

And the fourth is investing in idiosyncratic (unique, exclusive assets). ... It is customary to call an asset idiosyncratic if it is used alternatively (when it is withdrawn from a given transaction) it loses its value altogether or its value becomes negligible. These assets include half of production investments, investments in a specific technological process.

As for a recurring contract for the use of a specific asset, it, according to Williamson O., entails a "fundamental transformation" when instead of the market type of connectivity there is an off-market partnership type of communication - communicative interactions leading to the mutual dependence of subjects in the market network. He believes that more than half of all transactions in terms of value are related to transactions of mutual dependence, and in terms of frequency, 90-95% are accounted for by one-time or repeated transactions. bulk goods... Those. practically in the economy there is not just a market in the traditional understanding of neoclassicists, but a dense network of institutional interactions based on relationships of mutual dependence.

Hence, if we consider the ICC market from the standpoint of the duration of transactions, then it can be conditionally divided into two sectors. The first is the sector of relatively rare but lengthy interdependence transactions. They make the environment more stable and predictable. Figuratively speaking, the "skeleton of the market" is formed by these long-term transactions. And the second sector, associated with massive, but shorter transactions. Transactions in this sector support the efficiency of the market by creating a competitive background for economic relations among the subjects of the ISK.

The development of the market takes place through the constant "flow" of transactions from the first sector to the second and vice versa. Moving from the first level (one-time exchange in the anonymous market) to the fourth (investments in idiosyncratic assets, which can be communicative connections), the subject reduces production costs, saving on scale, and for the sake of compensating for risk increases transactional ones. In other words, movement in this direction ensures a decrease in transformation costs and, other things being equal, an increase in transaction costs, because the risk of significant violations in market activities in case of termination of the contract, it increases many times.

A natural consequence of the evolution process on the market of ISK subjects is the desire to increase the number of transactions in the first sector and the time of their existence. But, on the other hand, this entails a decrease in the mobility of subjects, and the consolidation of various types of their associations, capable of taking a monopoly position in the market. Following the basic laws of economic theory, at some point conditions are created for the imbalance between the sectors, the associations of subjects are destroyed, the number of long-term transactions in the first sector decreases. Transactions "flow" into the first sector, the number of massive and shorter-term transactions grows until equilibrium is reached. This process is cyclical. And the current state of the market for ICC subjects is characterized by a movement towards an equilibrium state through transactions of the first sector. This is evidenced by the actively discussed today in the literature and on state level the problem of creating self-regulatory organizations in construction.

Transactions (that is, types of interaction) can be characterized by a number of characteristics. They may be:

General or specific (refer to standard or fairly unique resources);

Fleeting or long-term, one-time or regularly recurring;

Weakly or strongly dependent on unpredictable future events;

Standalone or closely intertwined with other transactions;

With easily or difficultly measurable end results (allowing more or less effective control over the participants' fulfillment of their obligations).

Transactions differ in what requirements they place on the limited rational abilities of economic agents and what scope they leave for their opportunistic behavior. For each type of transaction, special coordinating and protective mechanisms are created to mitigate the associated friction and losses.

Let us dwell in some detail on each of these signs.

1. The degree of specificity. According to G. Becker, it is customary to call a resource common in the economy that is of interest to many producers. Its market value depends little on where it is used. A specific resource is a resource that can only be used by this particular manufacturer. For everyone else, it represents zero value. It can be special not only in relation to one the only company, but also in relation to any one industry, region, country. The measure of specificity is judged by how much the asset's value would be reduced if it were used elsewhere. Some resources may also turn out to be "intended" for a single user, not because they are of interest only to him, but because at the moment there is no demand for them from other users. Activities related to specific resources are difficult, since their owner incurs high transaction costs associated, for example, with the inability to sometimes refuse a deal with a supplier of such a resource. According to the figurative expression of R.I. Kapelyushnikov, he turns out to be, as it were, "locked" in a deal with his current partner. Therefore, transactions with specific resources require, as a rule, well-thought-out, sometimes very costly, measures to protect the interests of the owners.

2. The degree of regularity and duration of transactions. If the transaction is one-time and its execution takes a short time, the relationship will be built primarily on an impersonal, formalized basis (say, using standard contracts). When a deal between the same partners is repeated regularly and / or its execution requires them to be in long-term close contact, then each of the participants gets the opportunity to get to know the other better and begin to take into account his interests more fully. Their relationship takes on a less formal, more personalized character. Many issues are resolved through personal communication, which avoids the costs arising from the use of such formal mechanisms as court, arbitration or the actions of other government regulators.

3. Degree of uncertainty. Economic actors interacting with limited rational, that is, their ability to foresee the future is not absolute. At the time of the conclusion of a long-term transaction, there is usually a great deal of uncertainty about the future state of the market. This prompts the subjects to detail contracts, thinking over all possible situations, or leaving a number of positions open, which, in turn, requires additional protection measures.

4. The degree of measurability of the characteristics of the transaction. Any product or service is a certain consumer value that can be measured to varying degrees. For example, it is easier to determine the consumer value of oil than the management potential of management. construction organization... It is precisely with the difficulty of measurement that high transaction costs are associated with the purchase of hard-to-measure goods.

5. The degree of interdependence of transactions. Transactions can be autonomous or closely intertwined with many others within the business process of making a product. Disruption of the chain of interrelated transactions can lead to the loss of the entire business chain. And the stronger the dependence of the subject on the decisions of others, the greater the costs required to coordinate his actions and those of others, insurance against possible changes in a series of contracts. The more general, short-term, definite, controlled and autonomous nature of the transaction, the more reasons either to do without its legal registration at all, or to limit ourselves to drawing up the simplest standard contract... On the contrary, the more special, repetitive, indefinite, difficult to measure and interconnected it is, the stronger the incentives to establish long-term relationships on a formal and informal basis. Accordingly, the lower or the higher the level of transaction costs.

Naturally, the size of the actual costs related to transactions is determined by the characteristics of the transactions themselves. In other words, the costs present in transactions - transaction costs - are the costs of economic interaction, in whatever form it takes place.

The total costs of society are made up of the costs of land, labor, capital and entrepreneurial abilities necessary, firstly, to transform the physical properties of various goods (their color, chemical composition, location, etc.) and, secondly, to establish interaction between the economic agents themselves (delimitation, protection, transfer and association of property rights). If the level of “transformational” costs (as North D. called them) is determined primarily by technological factors, then the level of transaction costs is determined by institutional ones. According to the apt expression of Arrow K., transaction costs are "the cost of maintaining economic systems on the fly."

The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in the 30s of the 20th century. It has been used to explain the existence of hierarchical structures that are opposite to the market, such as the firm. As previously emphasized, R. Coase associated the formation of these "islands of consciousness" with relative advantages in terms of savings on transaction costs. He saw the specifics of the functioning of the company in the suppression of the price mechanism and its replacement with a system of internal administrative control.

Among the integral costs that economics deals with, it is necessary to distinguish two types of costs:

Transformation costs - "production costs";

Transaction costs.

Transformation costs are sometimes called production costs. But this analogy can be recognized only conditionally, since the most significant production costs include both transformation and transaction costs. But for this study, this division is sufficient; here, transformational costs are understood as production costs, but not integral ones.

Transformation costs are costs accompanying the process of physical change of material, as a result of which a product is produced that has a certain value. These costs include not only the costs of processing the material, but also the costs associated with planning and coordinating the production process, if the latter concerns technology, and not the interactions of subjects.

Transaction costs are costs that ensure the transfer of property rights from one person to another and the protection of these rights. Unlike transformation costs, transaction costs are not related to the process of value creation itself. They provide the transaction. Relatively speaking, transformation costs create goods, the properties of which are valuable for an individual or a collective agent of the economy (enterprise, firm, association).

There are several definitions of transaction costs.

R. Coase defined transaction costs as the costs of market functioning. Prior to this, economic theory assumed that the market was free, that market agents did not invest anything in it, that the price mechanism ensured coordination, communicating signals to market agents absolutely free of charge or at such prices that could be neglected. Coase contrasted transaction costs, which he attributed only to the market, with the so-called "agency costs" that arise within the firm, for example, the costs of opportunistic behavior.

The next stage in the development of the theory of transaction costs falls on the 50s of the 20th century.It is associated with a whole group of names, including A. Alchian, G. Demsets, J. Stigler, O. Williamson, K. Arrow. These scientists have combined the costs of functioning of the firm and the market into one category, opposing them to transformation costs.

Currently, transaction costs are understood by the overwhelming majority of scientists integrally, as the costs of the functioning of the system. Most general definition transaction costs are the expenditure of resources for planning, adaptation and control over the fulfillment of obligations assumed by individuals in the process of alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms accepted in society.

It should be noted that today there is no generally accepted classification of transaction costs. Each of the researchers paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. For example, Stigler J. singled out among them "information costs", Williamson O. - "costs of opportunistic behavior", Jensen M. and Meckling W. - "costs of monitoring the behavior of an agent and the costs of his self-restraint", Barzel J. - "costs of measuring ", [Indicated in 219], Milgrom P. and Roberts J. -" costs of influence ", Hansmann G. -" costs of collective decision-making ", and Dalman K. included in their composition" costs of collecting and processing information, costs of negotiations and decision-making, the costs of control and legal protection of the performance of the contract ”[specified in 79]. Let us dwell on the most recognized classifications in the scientific community.

Menard Cl. identifies four types of transaction costs:

Isolation costs caused by varying degrees of technological divisibility of production operations;

Information costs, including the costs of coding the cost of signal transmission, the costs of decoding and the costs of learning how to use the information system;

Costs of scale arising from the existence of impersonal exchange systems requiring a system to enforce contracts;

The costs of opportunistic behavior.

Milgrom P. and Roberts J. proposed to divide them into two categories: costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation. Coordination costs, in turn, contain three components, and motivational costs have two.

Coordination costs include:

The cost of defining the details of the contract. In essence, this is a market survey in order to determine the qualitative characteristics of an offer that can satisfy a need before the final choice is made in favor of a particular product.

The costs of identifying partners. They are associated with some kind of survey of partners who supply the required services or goods (their location, the ability to fulfill a given contract, the required prices, etc.).

Direct coordination costs. When concluding a complex contract, it becomes necessary to create a certain structure within which the parties agree to conclude a contract. Its task is to support the negotiation process. It can be like a structure having legal status and a certain communicative structure, the action of which is provided with the help of social, public institutions.

The second group of costs - motivational costs - is associated with the costs arising in the selection process:

Costs of incomplete information. The limited rationality of the subjects cannot provide complete and exhaustive information. Hence, the incompleteness of this information can lead to a refusal to complete a transaction, to acquire a good. In other words, the level of uncertainty can be so high that actors would rather refuse transactions than spend resources, such as time, on obtaining additional information and reducing uncertainty.

The costs of opportunism. Opportunistic is the behavior of a subject that is not related to moral considerations, which is expressed in strategic manipulation of information in conditions of uncertainty and a conscious asymmetric distribution of information, as well as concealment of the actions performed. Most often they appear within the firm, but they are also possible in market contracts. These are, for example, attempts to reduce the costs associated with overcoming a partner's dishonesty. The subject tries to reduce them either by hiring subjects-controllers, or by more detailed elaboration of the concluded contract.

Wallis J. and North D. classified transaction costs in relation to the contractual process: arising before the exchange; arising in the exchange process; arising after the exchange.

The classification of transaction costs by E. Furubotn and R. Richter is built depending on the area in which these costs arise:

Market transaction costs, which include the costs of searching for information, the costs of negotiating and decision-making, control and monitoring;

Management transaction costs arising in the management process;

Political transaction costs associated with the legal and political environment.

It must be said that in the economic literature there are many classifications of transaction costs, including those of domestic authors. But for the most part they "fit" into the above systems of views on this problem.

Perhaps the only classification in which all the types of transaction costs identified today are summarized is Eggertsson's classification Tr. ... In addition, it is distinguished by its simplicity and tangibility, since it is built on the principle of analogy with the external signs of activity that generates the corresponding costs. According to Eggertsson Tr., Transaction costs are:

Information retrieval costs. Within this group, the author highlights the costs associated with finding an acceptable price, high-quality information: about the available goods and services; about sellers and buyers;

Negotiation costs. Negotiation leads to the clarification of the so-called. "True position", which in the economic sense is a marginal indifference curve or marginal isoquant (in the case of a firm);

Costs of contracting. These are the costs of predicting the future behavior of the subjects participating in the contracts, and what is stipulated in them, for example, in the form of some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. In other words, contracts “reserve” a certain contingency position. The size of these costs is the highest among all the others, it is about 5-10% of the transaction volume when investing in specific assets;

Monitoring costs. Monitoring costs arise after the conclusion of the contract and are associated with the monitoring of the performance of the contract by each of the entities that concluded it;

Coercion costs. Since each entity seeks to act in its own interests, and the information, by definition, is incomplete, situations of incomplete or partial fulfillment of the contract often arise. And in the institutional environment, a system is being formed that forces partners to comply with the terms of the contract. These are state bodies, professional, public self-regulatory organizations. In a weak state, there is a so-called alternative system of coercion - private - various kinds of criminal structures. The costs of enforcing contracts in developed economies are mostly low for economic agents, since economies of scale are manifested;

Costs for the protection of property rights. They arise as in the process of protection from offenders - then this is a function of the state, but they can also take place in the development of a system of actions related to precaution against the state, which is most typical for the Russian economy (instability in the observance of the principle of succession in power, high politicization of the economy, lack of development of the legislative system, decision-making at the level of state legislative bodies, sometimes contradicting previously adopted and received the status of fundamental norms and institutions, a tendency to revise formal norms in relation to a changing market situation, finally, persistent distrust of the values declared by the state machine, etc. .).

Table 16 shows the systematization of the most famous in modern science and classifications of transaction costs recognized in the scientific community. However, the actual statement of the existence of transaction costs in the process of interaction between subjects does not yet solve the problem. It is important to identify possible ways to save them. Let's take a look at some of them.

Table 16

Different classifications of transaction costs


Menard Cl.	isolation costs; Information costs; Costs of scale; Costs of opportunistic behavior
Milgrom P., Roberts J.	1 . Coordination costs: The costs of defining the details of the contract; The costs of identifying partners; Direct coordination costs. 2. Motivational costs: Incomplete information costs; The costs of opportunism
Furubotn E., Richter R.	market transaction costs; Management transaction costs; Political transaction costs
Wallis J., North D.	Arising before the exchange; Arising in the exchange process; Arising after the exchange.
Eggertsson Tr.	information search costs; Negotiation costs; The costs of concluding contracts; Monitoring costs; Coercion costs; Costs for the protection of property rights.

It was emphasized earlier that the cost of measurement has two parts. One part is attributed to the category of transaction costs, while the other is due to the characteristics production process- production costs. In this regard, measurement costs are most often associated with quality measurement. At the same time, the subject, as a rule, does not bear all the costs in full - neither production nor transactional. In an attempt to obtain more complete information about quality, he pays an increasing price for it, up to a certain limit. That is, until the moment when his costs of acquiring more accurate information are equal to the expected increase in value from owning this product. Naturally, the subject, entering into a transaction, is interested in minimizing the costs of measurement. Allow him to do this by several established institutions in society, which provide a situation of measurement on trust. First of all, these are different standards.

Examples of measurement on trust can be associated not only with state standards, but also with some business practice, for example, with the creation and operation of self-regulatory organizations in the market, including the ISK market. The savings in transaction costs associated with measurement problems are indirect in the latter case. But this is the only way, since replacing it with direct measurement is practically impossible, since it is impossible for each specific subject to carry out the process of change in each of the specific contracts himself.

Information costs, or the costs of seeking information (costs of searching and monitoring, as well as partly costs of negotiation and costs of coercion) partially overlap with the costs of measurement. The emergence of information costs is due to the incompleteness of information and the asymmetry of its distribution between interacting agents. Saving this type of costs is also possible in the direction of the formation of standards, but mainly corporate ones, which include the standards of conduct of members of professional communities, associations that self-regulate activities in the market by taking on increased requirements in terms of providing comprehensive and reliable information, business ethics, etc. .d.

The costs of property rights (including the costs of coercion, partly the costs of negotiating) are generated by the imperfection of both the mechanism for protecting property rights and the mechanism for granting these rights. The latter is especially important for Russia due to the very period of its development, its qualitative characteristics. And in this case, the direction of their saving can be the previously mentioned standards of professional communities, which, among other things, can include a number of functions of regulating market activities delegated by the state. For example, licensing of activities, if you specify what is specified in relation to the subjects of ISK, which is so actively discussed today in this professional environment.

Search costs are associated with the acquisition of background economic information, i.e. information not directly related to a particular transaction. Background information is not included in property rights transaction costs, but is included in transaction information costs. Background economic information is not related to a specific exchange of property rights, to a specific transaction, but forms the institutional background of the subject's relationship to the transaction. Its significance is essential for making a specific decision. Here, the direction of cost reduction can be the voluntary assumption by self-regulatory organizations of the functions of providing this kind of information about the institutional background, as well as consulting members of this professional community.

Coercion costs, which include the costs of economic agents to protect their property rights and their contracts. Professional communities and, in particular, self-regulatory organizations in the ISK are quite capable of representing the interests of their members in the relevant bodies state power, thereby, ensuring a reduction in this type of costs for all participants in general.

Control costs are especially high when opportunities and incentives exist for opportunistic behavior. For example, in the case of the production of a unique product; a dynamic market with uncertain demand and unpredictable price movements; asymmetries of information on the market, which makes contracts external to the subject ineffective.

The rise in transaction costs due to the inefficiency of external contracts limits the scope of the market. However, with the growth of the company, the number of employed workers and the dismemberment of the production process grows. As a result, the direct connection between labor and its result is lost. Self-control of employees of the intensity of their own labor ceases to serve as a way to increase production efficiency, and a supervisory authority is forced to take its place. The costs of control over the degree of labor intensity of each production link appear and grow. The larger the firm becomes, the higher these control costs are. Eventually, the costs of enforcing internal contracts exceed transaction costs, the attractiveness of market contracts over internal contracts increases, and internal contracts are replaced by external ones. In this case, the self-regulatory organization carries through it the characteristics of both an external and an internal entity. As an external subject, it independently carries out the activities prescribed by the participants, as an internal subject, a self-regulatory organization aims to express the interests of members of the professional community, thereby reducing their transaction costs of controlling external and internal contracts.

Agency costs here have a slightly different meaning than described in the literature. According to most publications, one subject delegates his rights to another chosen by him, concluding an agreement with him, due to the fact that he himself is not able to dispose of the entire volume of his property. As a result, the latter acts on the market on behalf of the former. Here, transaction agency costs include wages the second subject, if he receives it for property management activities. But, first of all, these include the losses incurred by the first subject, firstly, because of the incomplete coincidence of his interests with the interests of the subject-agent; and, secondly, because of the asymmetry of information between them. The second knows about his capabilities and the specifics of his behavior more than the first, because the latter, having hired the second, cannot control him all the time. Asymmetry is manifested in the realization by the second subject of his interests to the detriment of the interests of the first subject. But in the case of professional communities that are self-regulating public organizations, associations, the second component of agency costs (the difference in goals and interests) is leveled by the very principle of their creation, since they are formed precisely to meet the interests of community members.

The classification of transaction costs by possible areas of savings is presented in table 17.

Thus, there is no unity in the concept of transaction costs and in their classification presentation today in science. There are also more complex definitions of transaction costs and their classification [for example, 92, 105, 106, 140, 154, etc.]. But in most modern research in the field of institutional economic theory, the term "transaction costs" is used in the sense proposed by O. Williamson. This is all the costs in all transactions that occur both within the firm and in the market. To prove the right to the existence of the basic provisions of neoinstitutional economic theory, of which he is rightfully considered the founder, this is enough. But in order to adapt what is stated in the paragraph to the practice of activities of subjects of ISK, the term "transaction costs" requires clarification. As noted by Demsetz X., "... with such a rather inappropriate use of words, one has to resort to textual explanations in order to draw a distinction where this can be done by means of one word-label."

Based on the last statement in the monograph, transaction costs are understood as costs (explicit and implicit) associated with ensuring the functioning of institutional interactions of ISC subjects as an economic system, the costs of coordination and motivation.

Such costs are associated with the search for information about a product or service, finding a partner in a transaction, negotiations, organizing the conclusion of contracts and monitoring their implementation, the formation of a system of corporate standards, the process of self-regulation of the activities of ISK subjects in the market as a whole.

Within the boundaries of the methodological principles of the theory of activity, neoinstitutional economic theory and the theory of transaction costs set forth in this chapter, it is further necessary to consider the investment and construction complex as a system.

Table 17

Classification of transaction costs by content and possible areas of savings

Cost type		Possible directions of savings
To search for information	Search costs: Most favorable price; More favorable terms of the contract; And selection of potential contractors	Open electronic trading platforms; Corporate electronic trading systems; Business reputation
Negotiating and contracting	1 . The cost of resources and time for: Conclusion of a contract; Necessary negotiations. 2. Losses due to poorly negotiated, poorly executed and insecurely secured agreements	The use of the state as an organization with comparative advantages in the implementation of violence, which through the judicial system allows you to resolve controversial issues; Arbitration courts; Industry associations
On measurement	Consists of the cost of measuring equipment, as well as the cost of resources and time for the measurement process	Warranty repair; Branded labels; Purchase of consignments of goods based on samples; Money as a common means; Standards
Specification and proprietary protection	1. Cost of time and resources required for: Property rights specifications; Protection of property rights; Restoration of violated property rights. 2. Losses from inadequate specification and inadequate protection of property rights. 3. Costs for the maintenance of courts, arbitration and others government agencies with similar functions	Use of law enforcement agencies; Education.
Opportunistic behavior	Consists of the losses in efficiency associated with opportunistic behavior, as well as the costs required to limit it	Tightening the supervision of agents' activities; Introduction of an incentive scheme that would minimize the deviation of the agent's interests from the interests of the principal
Monitoring	Costs of supervising contract partners to verify that they are complying with its terms	Using an incentive system for the proper performance of a contract and a system of penalties otherwise

The role of transaction costs in economics is often compared to the role of friction in physics: “Just as friction interferes with the movement of physical objects, dispersing energy in the form of heat, so transaction costs prevent the movement of resources to the users for whom they are most valuable, by“ dispersing ” the usefulness of these resources along the way economic process... Just as every known physical object is given a form that contributes to either minimizing friction or obtaining through it some useful effect (a wheel, for example, serves both), so in fact, any institution known to us arises as reaction to the presence of transaction costs and in order, apparently, to minimize their impact, thereby increasing the benefits of the exchange. ... An economist who ignores the existence of transaction costs will have the same difficulty in explaining economic behavior, with which a physicist would have to face, ignoring the fact of friction when describing the motion of physical objects. "

Classification of transaction costs.

T. Eggertsson's classification.

This list of costs is one of the most popular, although it is not divided into blocks, like the classifications described below.

1. Costs of searching for information about prices and quality of goods, as well as about potential buyers or sellers.

This type of cost is divided into four types associated with the search for a) a favorable price, b) adequate information about existing goods, c) adequate information about sellers, d) adequate information about buyers.

2. Costs of identifying reserve positions at endogenous prices.

It is also customary to associate this type of costs with negotiations, since the goal of negotiations is to maximize the approach to the partner's reserve price. The reserve price is the marginal price that the partner can agree to, that is, the bid price for the buyer (the highest price for him) and the bid price for the seller (the minimum price for him).

3. Costs of drafting contracts.

The main goal in drawing up a contract is to determine what circumstances may occur in the future and what should be the reaction to them on both sides. In addition, there is usually some kind of structure that will have to deal with the settlement of disputes.

4. Costs of control over the fulfillment of the terms of the contract.

Due to the divergence of interests of the parties to the contract, each of them may have an incentive, to one degree or another, to act contrary to the contractual agreement. As a result, it becomes necessary to control each other. In addition, each side can control itself in order to preserve its reputation. An example here is a manufacturer's recall of their products from the market when they receive information about their inadequate quality.

5. Costs of enforcing contract terms.

This kind costs, first of all, are borne by the state, in particular, the judicial and law enforcement systems, and then taxes are included in these costs. If the state is ineffective in protecting contracts, its functions are performed by alternative structures, for example, private security firms or criminal gangs.

6. Costs of protecting property rights from third party encroachments.

The purpose of any transaction is to obtain certain benefits for both parties. However, these benefits can also be claimed by individuals or groups not participating in the contractual agreement, such as the state, criminal gangs, or rogues. Thus, it becomes necessary to protect newly emerging property rights. These costs may include taxes, bribes to officials, roofs, etc.

Classification by P. Milgrom and J. Robberts.

This classification has a deeper theoretical content, since it is not only a list of costs, but also their division into groups based on certain criteria. One of these criteria here can be considered the objectivity of costs, that is, they are either associated with external conditions for counterparties, or are determined by their behavior.

In the first case, the lack of coordination between individuals acts as a source of costs, in the second - the shortcomings of their rationality and / or morality. As another criterion for this differentiation of transaction costs in this case, we can offer the object of matching, with which they are associated. Accordingly, coordination costs are carried out to ensure alignment of plans, and motivational costs - for alignment of incentives. Specific examples one and the other varieties are presented in table. 7.1.

Table 7.1. Coordination and motivational transaction costs.

O. Williamson's classification.

O. Williamson's classification identifies such a side of transactions as their contractual nature, so that all transaction costs are considered in connection with the contractual process. The main criterion for this classification is the moment of concluding the contract, and, accordingly, transaction costs are divided into costs before (ex ante) and after (ex post).

Ex ante transaction costs are associated with efforts to conclude the most profitable contract, ex post transaction costs reflect the desire to fulfill and economically implement the already concluded contractual agreement. The types of costs included in these two main types of transaction costs are presented in table. 7.2.

Table 7.2. Ex ante and ex post transaction costs.

As already indicated at the beginning of this topic, transaction costs are of interest to us primarily in connection with the study of the theory of organizations, which is designated here as transactional, since in it economic basis organizations are seen in the need to save transaction costs. Consider the conditions for the existence of transaction costs, as they are understood in the framework of this theory. These conditions are limited rationality, opportunism, and transaction specificity of assets.

Table 7.3. The economic meaning of contracts as a way of organizing transactions, depending on the assumptions made about the behavior and specificity of assets.

Tab. 7.3. shows what would be the economic meaning of contracts as a method of organizing transactions both in the presence of all three specified conditions, and in the absence of any one of them.

In the second case, the implementation of contract transactions should not involve any significant costs.

Planning: in the absence of the condition of bounded rationality, it will be necessary to admit complete rationality, that is, the completeness of knowledge, not associated with any costs. In this case, the contract will be nothing more than a plan of action, the preparation and implementation of which will be free of charge.

Promise: in the absence of the condition of opportunism, it would be necessary to admit the absence of deception in the world and, accordingly, the fulfillment of promises made would take place without coercion, that is, free of charge. Then the contract would be only a self-fulfilling promise, the presence of which would completely replace the self-fulfilling plan.

Competition: when transactions are devoid of such characteristic as asset specificity, the contract will only be a means of competition. In this case, we could talk about the classical market, the most important property of which is the absence of mutual dependence between counterparties, due to which any agreement can be broken off at any time and replaced by another in the absence of costs.

Transaction management structure: in the presence of all three limiting conditions, the contract acts as a demanding large costs transaction management structures.

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