Contemporary Western Ethics. Contemporary ethics. Ethics in modern times

As the complexity of the world increases, the interdependence of people in society increases, the role and importance of moral values, including such as solidarity, responsibility, honesty, trust, the ability to cooperate, mutual assistance, and communitarianism (a modern synonym for collectivism), increase.

It is moral values ​​(the need for meaning, for social recognition and respect from others, for creative self-realization and socially useful activities) increasingly act as the most important needs and motives of social activity modern man(scientist, manager, entrepreneur, doctor or teacher).

Already in the 70s. XX century In the countries of the prosperous West, a very high standard of living was achieved, the quality of life of the population improved, which led to a value shift towards post-material needs: many people in the West felt, for example, the need to benefit people, to feel the approval of others. This qualitative shift was perceived as a postmodern value shift.

This cultural shift of postmodernity is associated with the actualization of the role of ethics in the life of a person and society, an awareness of the need to develop social capital and ensure social and economic order (not only within the framework of individual communities, but also for humanity as a whole). These trends have intensified even more in our time.

At the beginning of the XXI century. in connection with the processes of globalization, interconnections, contacts are increasing and interdependence of people is increasing, as well as new dangers, threats and risks appear, therefore the relevance of ethics is increasing many times over. The world is changing, the subject of ethics is changing and expanding.

The focus on the development of individual self-awareness is also fundamental for modern ethics in all its forms (social, applied, professional, environmental).

In different cultures, in the course of their historical development, due to distinctive traditions and customs, their own systems of values ​​and norms, myths and legends were formed. Moral and religious values ​​of different cultures do not coincide, which is the cause of contradictions and conflicts. These contradictions can take on a global character, but the main arena of the struggle remains the inner world of a person.

Theoretical, applied, professional ethics

Traditional ethics existed in two forms - religious and philosophical. Religious ethics, for example, the ethics of Christianity, contains a significant normative context in the form of commandments, prohibitions and practical norms of behavior, including ritual (observance of fasts, holidays, performance of various kinds of rituals and rituals - calendar, wedding, etc.). Religious ethics also contains theoretical a part consisting of dogmas, teachings, myths, symbols and traditions, the teaching of which forms the basis of religious education and education. Religious ethics considers the same problems as philosophical, but in the context of faith.

Actually theoretical ethics arose in ancient society along with philosophy as a sphere of rational thinking about the world and man. The specificity of ethics as a science is in what it says about due, those. how should what a person should do (about moral values ​​as goals of being), what society should be, what should be the rules of behavior (norms).

Already Aristotle understood that ethics is significantly different from physics or mathematics. Ethics is knowledge of a special kind. He identified three types of knowledge: theoretical, practical and ethical.

Theoretical knowledge (episteme, or the form of "contemplation of eternal ideas") characterizes such sciences as mathematics, physics, biology.

Practical knowledge (techne) appears as skills (a builder knows how to build a house, an artist knows how to paint, an artist knows how to portray different feelings, a craftsman knows how to make goods, a shoemaker knows how to sew boots, etc.).

Ethical knowledge (fronesis) is knowledge of a very special kind, which consists not so much in reasoning or skills, but in correct behavior, performing virtuous deeds, a moral attitude towards another person, including mercy and benevolence. For example, a lawyer, when passing a sentence, is guided not only by knowledge of the crime committed, but also by an understanding of the situation, the ability to put oneself in the shoes of another person (both the perpetrator and the victim, and other people), feelings of justice, mercy, empathy and compassion. He knows how to do the right thing, i.e. he possesses not only knowledge of facts, but also ethical knowledge and understanding of the situation.

The subject of traditional ethics is a person as a moral individual, the problem of the struggle between good and evil, virtues and vices in his soul. The main goal of traditional philosophical ethics is the development of self-awareness of an individual, the formation of his ability to moral and spiritual self-improvement. According to the legend, even Confucius said that a person, if he does not develop as a cultural, moral being, becomes worse than an animal; in relation to such people, the state has the right to apply the most severe punishments. Thus, already Confucian ethics set the space for the formation of life-meaning guidelines and spiritual development: the lower bar is an inevitable cruel punishment, the upper bar is respect, honor, and the high social status of a noble husband.

Traditional ethics was not only theoretical, but primarily normative (prescriptive), since the theoretical substantiation of the values ​​of human existence was simultaneously a prescription, a moral requirement, a norm, for example, the theoretical definition of virtue assumed its spread, theories of good deeds contribute to the spread of charity. The value of good is to become kind, happiness - to become happy, love - to learn to love and be loved, justice - in its practical implementation.

The main achievements of traditional ethics are expressed in its normative programs. There are such programs as the ethics of pleasure (hedonism), the ethics of happiness (eudemonism), the ethics of simplification (cynism), the ethics of contemplation, the ethics of duty (Stoics, Kant), the ethics of love and mercy, the ethics of compassion (A. Schopenhauer), the ethics of benefit ( utilitarianism), the ethics of heroism, the ethics of rational egoism (utilitarianism), the ethics of nonviolence (L. Tolstoy, M. Gandhi), the ethics of reverence for life (A. Schweitzer), etc.

It is no coincidence that ethics as a special kind of knowledge received the name of Kant practical philosophy. If theoretical reason gets entangled in contradictions and antinomies (which, according to Kant, is evidence of its imperfection), then practical reason quite easily resolves these antinomies, namely: it recognizes the need for free will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as necessary conditions for the existence of morality.

Nevertheless, traditional ethics contains a significant theoretical part, including reasoning about the origin and nature of morality, its historical forms and essence, consideration of the specifics of morality, its role in the life of society and the individual, the structure of moral consciousness, the categories of good and evil, happiness, duty, fidelity , honor, justice, meaning of life. The specificity of ethics is that it has never been a pure theory, but always contained theoretical and practical (normative) parts in equal proportions.

In areas and countries with a harsh climate, a person is not able to work alone. Therefore, in such countries, the collectivist IDO dominates. These include tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and post-communist Russia. However, we have adopted an individualistic model, typical for countries with a mild climate (Western Europe, USA).

In a mild climate, a person can survive alone, which means that the individual dominates. IDO.

The all-Russian problem is that there are only 5% of people capable of building capitalist relations in the American manner, and all the rest are opponents of this. Therefore, Russian capitalism will develop along a different path.

Currently, it is optimal to stick to the collection. and individual. ethics in the following ratio - 90 to 10. Only then can the maximum result be achieved.

Part of the population of our country professes Woland's ethics, but most of them are Christian.

We will consider primarily collectivist ethics.

Any civilization - collective, institution, etc. - arises, develops (at the beginning progressively, and then regressively) and eventually ceases to exist.

At the first stage (progress) collectivism prevails. For example: a platoon of soldiers will always beat a crowd of insurgents, mowing, butchering, scientific activity, capitalist production, a military council, the work of a design bureau.

As the progress progresses, the initial dullness of each is replaced by the individuality of each, therefore the level of mutual understanding, the effectiveness of mutual actions decreases. Everyone begins to understand what is happening worse and worse, to describe and explain everything worse. A bright personality always acts according to the principle “to drag - not to drag”, i.e. thoughts, words, actions of each individual of the collective coincide with a really beneficial direction of movement. A swan - cancer - pike situation arises. Everyone wants the best, but due to the lack of horizons, any decision will be either stupid or harmful for everyone.

At the second stage (regression), each person, without suspecting it, unmistakably chooses the worst option for explaining actions (harmful to himself and to society). For example: drug addict, alcoholic, gossip. The gossip, spreading information, causes distrust in himself and in the team. The predominance of individualism leads to an increasing disunity of actions, hence: the efficiency of society falls, then it goes bankrupt and dies.

The collectivists understood each other and therefore help was provided in their actions. Individualists understood each other worse and worse, and therefore the realization of the best intentions leads to hell.

In modern conditions, when everyone becomes more and more vivid individuality, the importance of ensuring normal DO is inevitably growing. At the moment, only 1 option has been implemented - repeated questioning and clarification.



To establish normal DOs, you need to eat well and get enough sleep. Many neglect this. Civilized people live in an artificial world where instincts atrophy. Or the values ​​of the gender (sexual) instinct are exaggerated in consideration of the rest. In addition, excessive food will inevitably lead to a drop in labor productivity. The increase in the number of owls, which are "supposedly" genetically disposed to stay up late, is alarming. Therefore, from an owl at 8 in the morning, no employee. It can be assumed that people with impaired breathing get sick a lot and are not very productive.

The beginning of the century was marked by a surge of ethical thought. Never in the history of Russian culture has there been such a variety of ethical ideas and directions, and never has ethics been so close to becoming a socially significant and worldview effective component of a new social consciousness, exerting a real impact on the spiritual life and social institutions of society. This ethical wave subsided only by the beginning of World War I and finally subsided by the mid-1920s, which, naturally, was associated with the expulsion of Russian philosophers and the "split" of ethical thought.

Trends in ethics at the end of the 19th century continue to develop in the 20th century. The development of scientific and rationalistic directions in ethics (pragmatism, positivism) continues, originating from German classical philosophy and striving to focus on questions of the methodology of natural science directly related to technical progress, which, as it were, takes ethics beyond the framework of science itself. New systems of irrationalistic ethics are emerging: psychoanalysis, existentialism, personalism, etc. Already existing religious and ethical trends are being improved taking into account the progress in science and technology: neo-Protestantism, neo-Thomism. Let us consider sequentially the most essential of them.

Emrich Seligmann Fromm (March 23, 1900, Frankfurt am Main - March 18, 1980, Locarno) - German sociologist, philosopher, social psychologist, psychoanalyst, representative of the Frankfurt School, one of the founders of neo-Freudianism and Freudomarxism.

In the works "To have or to be?", "Man for oneself", "Escape from freedom" and others, the "collective unconscious" can be reduced to two fundamental attitudes: primary - "biophilic" (Eros), aimed at self-realization, the desire " to be ", to realize their creative inclinations, and the secondary -" necrophilic "(Thanatos), striving to" have ", to appropriate the surrounding reality - therefore, to destroy it and self-destruct. These tendencies in different periods of human history alternately occupy a dominant position in culture, or exist in one or another combination. They leave their imprint on the moral structure of the individual, determine the prevailing moral relations in society.

Jean-Paul Charles Emamre Sartre (June 21, 1905, Paris - April 15, 1980, ibid.) - French philosopher, representative of atheistic existentialism (in 1952-1954 Sartre held positions close to Marxism), writer, playwright and essayist, teacher. Laureate of the 1964 Nobel Prize in Literature (declined the prize).

One of the central concepts for the entire philosophy of Sartre is the concept of freedom. In Sartre, freedom was presented as something absolute, given once and for all ("a person is condemned to be free"). It precedes the essence of man. The concept of "alienation" is associated with the concept of freedom. Sartre understands the modern individual as an alienated being: his individuality is standardized (as a waiter with a professional smile and precisely calculated movements is standardized); is subordinated to various social institutions, which, as it were, "stand" above the person, and do not originate from him (for example, the state, which is an alienated phenomenon - alienation of the individual's ability to take part in joint management of affairs), and, therefore, is deprived of the most important thing - - the ability to create your own history.

The essence of dialectics lies in synthetic unification into a whole ("totalization"), since only within the whole do dialectical laws make sense. The individual “totalizes” material circumstances and relationships with other people and makes history himself, to the same extent as it does his.

Moral problems of our time:

Female alcoholism

Recently, the problem of female alcoholism has become more and more urgent. The number of women drinking has exceeded 50%.

From a medical point of view, female alcoholism is a type of drug addiction. Addiction is a disease caused by genetic disorders and, as a consequence, disruption of the work of certain parts of the brain - the so-called satisfaction system.

Causes of female alcoholism:

A feature of female alcoholism is a greater psychological background than that of men. Most often, in women, the addiction to alcohol develops due to loneliness (family breakdown, loss of loved ones, death of relatives). Housewives who sacrifice their careers and work for the sake of family happiness are prone to stress. Children grow up, the husband disappears at work, begins to cheat on his wife. On this basis, loneliness, a feeling of disappointment in life, resentment arise. Women react more emotionally to stressful situations, “plunge into themselves”, seek immediate resolution, a way out of the situation, and wait for support. In the absence of support, alcohol comes to the rescue, which initial stages the use brings relief and gives a feeling of "ecstasy". In addition, the factor of the availability of alcohol plays a role.

Alcohol addiction in women forms faster than in men.

For relatives, this often goes unnoticed, because due to the condemnation and rejection of the society of drinking women, they try to hide the abuse of alcohol, often drink alone or in the company of friends.

The woman who drinks alcohol looks much older than her years.

The voice becomes rough and harsh. Doesn't care about his appearance. Characterized by alcoholic personality changes: aggressiveness, rudeness, deceit. A woman neglects family responsibilities, becomes sexually promiscuous.

Typically, alcohol consumption in women starts with weaker drinks and is sporadic for a long time. Most often, women drink secretly and alone. Sometimes there are binges lasting 1-2 months, which are replaced by sober periods.

In general, alcoholism develops faster in women than in men. The duration of the first stage from the beginning to systematic use until the appearance of physical dependence is from one to three years.

An analysis of statistical and sociological data reflecting the peculiarities of the spread of drunkenness and alcoholism among women indicates that the problem is poorly developed and that there are no substantiated recommendations to prevent and eradicate this negative phenomenon. The measures applied in practice do not always take into account the peculiarities of female drunkenness and alcoholism.

Topic 10: Ethical Theories in Contemporary Western Philosophy


Introduction

2. Ethics in the philosophy of existentialism

3. Humanistic ethics of E. Fromm

4. "Ethics of reverence for life" by A. Schweitzer

Conclusion


Introduction

The twentieth century has become a century of rapid development of science and technology, qualitative changes in production and, at the same time, a century of global problems such as the threat of nuclear war, environmental and demographic problems. On the one hand, we can talk about the crisis of the ideas of rationalism in our days, on the other, about the excessive and one-sided rationalization and technization of consciousness. The general crisis of culture and the desire to harmonize and improve the world and soul of individuals were reflected in ethical searches.

This paper highlights the provisions of some modern ethical theories that took place in the twentieth century. This topic is important because the development of history is largely determined by the views and ideologies prevailing in society. Ethics is one of the components that has a direct impact on their development. You need to know the basic ethical principles, according to which the history of the past developed in order to make their own ethical choices in the future.

The aim of this work is to study the ethical and philosophical views of the outstanding thinkers of the twentieth century.


1. Ethical concept of F. Nietzsche

The course of history in the 19th-20th centuries seemed to completely refute the foundations of humanistic classical philosophy, and reason and science, although they confirmed their triumph in the knowledge and subordination of the forces of nature, also revealed their powerlessness in the structure of human life. The claims of classical philosophy, proceeding from the belief in the natural structure of the world and its movement in the direction of progressive ideals, in the rationality of man and the world of civilization and culture created by him, in the humanistic orientation of the historical process itself, turned out to be unconfirmed. Therefore, it took either the indication of new ways and means for the realization of these claims, or the exposure of their illusory nature and the deliverance of humanity from vain expectations and hopes.

Philosophy of life F. Nietzsche marked the final "reassessment of all values" of the previous philosophy, culture and morality.

Nietzsche saw his task precisely in waking up humanity, dispelling its illusions, in which it plunged deeper and deeper into a state of crisis and degeneration. This required potent drugs that could shock, excite the audience. Therefore, Nietzsche does not skimp on biting statements, harsh assessments, philosophical paradoxes and scandals. He considered his works a real "school of courage and audacity", and himself - a true philosopher of "unpleasant", "terrible truths", overthrowing "idols", by which he understood traditional values ​​and ideals, and a debunker of delusions rooted not even in the weakness of knowledge , and above all in human cowardice!

Many times he calls himself "the first immoralist", a real "atheist", "antichrist", "world-historical monster", "dynamite", designed to blow up the swamp of established ideas.

Nietzsche strives for the everyday ideas of cultural consciousness, for the "values" of civilization and culture - religion, morality, science, to comprehend the true essence of being - the instinctive striving of life for self-affirmation. He understands life as a disordered and chaotic deployment of the energy of chaos inherent in being, a flow that is not outputted and directed nowhere, subject to the madness of the orgiastic principle and completely free from any moral characteristics and evaluations. In ancient culture, the symbol of such an understanding of life, Nietzsche considered the ecstasy of the god of wine, the daring revelry and fun of Dionysus, symbolizing for a person a sense of strength and power, the bliss of delight and horror from his liberation and complete merger with nature.

However, the energy of life is inherent in its development to go through periods of rise and fall, the creation and destruction of life forms, the strengthening and weakening of the instinctive desire for self-realization. On the whole, this is a harsh and merciless struggle between various manifestations of life, distinguished by the presence in them of the “will to live” and “the will to power” over its other manifestations.

Therefore, according to Nietzsche, "life itself is essentially appropriation, harm, overcoming the alien and the weaker, oppression, severity, forcible imposition of its own forms, annexation and ... exploitation."

Exploitation, oppression, violence are therefore not belonging to some imperfect, unreasonable society, but a necessary manifestation of living life, a consequence of the will to power, which is precisely the will to live.

A stronger will to live and to rule overwhelms a weakened will and dominates it. This is the law of life, but it can be distorted in human society.

Man is one of the imperfect manifestations of life, which, although surpassing other animals in cunning and foresight, in his ingenuity, is immeasurably inferior to them in another respect. He is unable to live a completely immediate instinctive life, obeying its cruel laws, because under the influence of consciousness and its illusory ideas about its "goals" and "destiny", his vital instincts are weakened, and he himself turns into a failed, sick animal.

Consciousness, reason strive to order the vital energy of being, to form and direct the life stream in a certain channel and to subordinate it to a rational principle, the symbol of which in antiquity was the god Apollo, and if this succeeds, then life weakens and strives to self-destruction.

Social life is the struggle between the Dionysian and Apollo principles in culture, the first of which symbolized the triumph of healthy life instincts, and the second - the decadence experienced by Europe, i.e. the weakening of the will to power taken to the extreme, leading to the dominance in European culture of unnatural values ​​that undermine the very sources of life.

The decay and degradation of European culture is due, according to Nietzsche, to its cornerstone foundations - the Christian morality of humanity, the exorbitant ambitions of reason and science, which “derive” from the historical necessity the ideas of social equality, democracy, socialism and, in general, the ideals of the optimal organization of society on the basis of justice and rationality. Nietzsche attacks these values ​​of traditional humanism with all his force, showing their unnatural orientation and nihilistic character. Following them weakens humanity and directs the will to live to Nothing, to self-destruction.

It was in the values ​​of Christian morality, the ideals of reason and science that Nietzsche discerned "a fraud of a higher order", which he tirelessly engaged in denouncing all his life, putting forward the slogan "revaluation of all values."

Christianity is a "monstrous disease of the will" and arises out of fear and want, among the weakest and wretched carriers of the weakened will to live. It is therefore permeated with hatred and disgust for healthy life masked by a belief in "perfect heavenly life" which was invented only to better slander this earthly one. All Christian fantasies are a sign of deep exhaustion and impoverishment of the present life, its illness and fatigue, so that Christianity itself lives on the drug addiction of human misfortunes.

However, remaining a manifestation, albeit sick, but still the will to live, Christianity, in order to survive among the strong and cruel, invents a bridle for the strong and fearless through the most unbridled moralizing, identifying itself with morality. Through the cultivation of the moral values ​​of Christianity, a sick life catches a healthy one and destroys it, and the more true, the deeper the ideals of self-denial, self-sacrifice, mercy and love for one's neighbor are spread.

Such a traditional philanthropic morality is interpreted by Nietzsche as "the will to deny life", "the hidden instinct of destruction, the principle of decline, humiliation." Christian morality is initially permeated with sacrifice, it grows out of a slave state and seeks to extend it to its enslavers, inventing God for this. Faith in God requires a conscious sacrifice to him of his freedom, pride, dignity, open self-abasement of man, promising in return for heavenly bliss.

Nietzsche very subtly plays up the main provisions of Christian morality, revealing its hypocritical and deceitful nature. “He who humbles himself wants to be exalted,” he corrects the preaching of Christ.

He deciphers the demand for selflessness and unselfishness, “not to seek benefits” as a moral fig leaf for expressing powerlessness - “I no longer know how to find my own use ...”.

The consciousness, unbearable for a weak will, that "I am worthless," takes on in Christian morality the form "everything is worthless, and this life is also worthless." The ascetic ideal of holiness, the cultivation of dispassion and suffering is for him an attempt to give a meaning to the meaninglessness of suffering, when it is impossible to get rid of it because of one's own weakness, for any meaning is better than complete meaninglessness. Dispassion is only a spiritual castration of a person and, by undermining the root of human passions, one can only destroy life itself.

Compassion and love for one's neighbor is only the flip side of painful self-hatred, for these and other virtues are clearly harmful to their owner, but useful and therefore hypocritically praised by his competitors, who seek to bind their owner with their help. Therefore, concludes Nietzsche, "if you have virtue, then you are its victim!"

In addition, through mercy and compassion, Christian morality artificially supports too much of that which should have perished and made way for the more powerful manifestations of life.

Essential in morality is, according to Nietzsche, one thing - that it is always a "long oppression" and the manifestation of the herd instinct in an individual.

And although religion and the morality it preaches are necessary and useful for the overwhelming masses, for the herd, for people strong and independent, representing the dominant race, all this becomes superfluous. Nevertheless, they can use this superfluous means of their domination over the herd in order to better compel it to obedience, without becoming themselves prisoners of poor morality. For along with this wretched morality, which requires the sacrifice of man to God, there are other higher "morals" in which God himself is sacrificed!

"We must free ourselves from morality in order to be able to live morally!" - exclaims Nietzsche, proclaiming the need to reassess "eternal values", abandon the morality of slaves and restore the rights of life. This is available only for overlords, strong and free minds, holders of an unbreakable will, possessing their own measure of values ​​and assigning themselves a measure of respect and contempt for others. They are true aristocrats of the spirit who do not seek harmony with others, retain the “pathos of distance” and the habit of “looking down”. They retain their independence from the dogmas of everyday morality, are free from its fetters and are disgusted with all moral chatter about duty, selflessness, holiness, for they themselves impose their own laws.

This "morality of masters" is the morality of strength and selfishness, which "is the most essential property of a noble soul," by which Nietzsche understood "an unshakable belief that a being" like us "should naturally obey and sacrifice other beings" ...

This morality also has certain obligations, but only in relation to their own kind and equal, while in relation to beings of a lower rank, "you can act according to your own discretion ... being on the other side of good and evil." "In every deed of a superior man," Nietzsche contemptuously casts at the side of an ordinary man in the street, "your moral law has been violated a hundredfold."

Nietzsche easily and in an original way deals with the problem of "free will", which tormented the previous ethics. Any will is a manifestation of the instincts of life, and in this sense it is not free and not reasonable. We need to talk not about free and unfree will, but about a strong will that rules and commands and takes responsibility, and a weak will, which only obeys and fulfills. The first is free to the extent that it is strong, and the second is not free in the same sense.

Therefore, the morality of freedom and dignity exists only for the highest people, and for others, only the slavish morality of self-denial and asceticism is available, in which the weakened instincts of life are discharged not outside, but inside the human soul by the aggression of self-destruction.

From the same positions Nietzsche dealt with the "scientific" humanism of the socialists and democrats. "Fanatics of brotherhood", as he called them, just like Christian morality, ignore the laws of nature, seeking to eliminate exploitation, overcome the natural inequality of people and impose on them "the common herd happiness of green pastures." This will inevitably lead to the same result - the weakening and degradation of humanity, for a person always develops in struggle and rivalry, and inequality and exploitation are necessary condition life.

In the morality of a socialist society, the will of God is replaced by the social benefit derived from history and the common good, which is guarded by the state. At the same time, the interests of an individual do not mean anything, why Nietzsche considers socialism as the younger brother of despotism, in which the state seeks to transform a person from an individual into an organ of a collective. A person, naturally, tries to resist this, and then state terrorism becomes an obligatory means of implanting loyal feelings, consciousness and obedience to actions.

In such a morality, everything that distinguishes and elevates an individual above the general level frightens everyone, is condemned by everyone and is subject to punishment. The state pursues an equalizing policy, leveling everyone, naturally, at the lowest level, as a result of which the democratic form of government is, according to Nietzsche, a form of grinding and devaluing a person and relegating him to the level of mediocrity.

Thus, Nietzsche's philosophy was a kind of revelation and a tub of cold water for traditional classical ethics, focused on humanistic ideals and the progress of reason. His idea that "there is no pre-established harmony between the advancement of truth and the good of mankind" became one of the central values ​​in philosophy in the 20th century.

With his “philosophy of life”, he passionately sought to destroy the idea of ​​man as a “creature”, as an object and a means to achieve goals alien to him, and to help self-creation in him as a “creator”, a free agent. Nietzsche tried to overcome the idea of ​​morality as an objective system of constraints, norms and prohibitions that do not depend on a person, alienated from him and suppress him, and present it as a sphere of freedom.

With his work, he defended the vitality and value of individualism, with which he associated a new understanding of humanism, but inevitably coming along this path to the absolutization of subjectivism and the relativity of moral values, to the opposition of aristocratic morality ("everything is allowed") and the morality of lower beings.

Nietzsche was able to theoretically foresee and express the essential characteristics of the moral practice of the socialist reorganization of society, but he did not see the inner kinship of his "new order" with totalitarian social systems. For the rights and freedoms of morality of the elect in Nietzsche were compensated by the powerlessness and ruthless suppression of the plebeians. The morality of "supermen" turned out to be superhuman morality, free from moral obligations to humanity and permeated with contempt for universal values.


Either one of the characteristics of these relations, he leaves aside others, considering them to be derived from it, and at the same time creates rather complex philosophical constructions. 5. Modern religious philosophy. During the years of dogmatization of Marxism, any religious philosophy in connection with militant atheism was viewed as reactionary. Of course, criticism of Marxism from the representatives of this ...

Old and New Testaments) found their expression only in Christianity. In the future, Christianity and the moral values ​​of the Bible will be accepted as synonyms. This abstract does not consider the further history of Christianity and the Christian Church. 2. Western philosophy of the XX century By the middle of the XIX century. Western European philosophical thought found itself in a deep crisis. ...

Not in Mexico without receiving the appropriate vocational training and even, to be honest, without deeply studying a single book on these subjects? By the way, adherents of structuralism often even defined structuralism at once as “method and philosophy”. So, the main book of a prominent representative of this trend in France N. Muloud "Les structures, la recherche et le savoir" (the name of the Russian ...

That and the other culture and a certain detachment from both12. * * * Concluding the conversation about the two great intellectual traditions of the East, let us draw the main conclusions that are essential for the purpose of this book. Turning its face to Chinese philosophical thought, modern philosophy can find in it a completely different model of the development of philosophical speculation, which gave rise to a discourse that retained the original model ...


The article examines the historical forms of morality. The specificity of the ancient ethics of virtues is shown, it is investigated what tasks were solved in medieval ethics and in what new perspective the ethics of the New Age began to consider the morality. The disadvantages of the universalist approach to ethics are shown. Based on a comparison of the features of ethical thought in different historical epochs, the author concludes that the development of ethical codes, the convergence of morality with law do not exclude the significance of the ethics of virtues. On the contrary, virtue ethics and institutional morality are complementary components. The most important feature of solving applied issues is the development of a decision-making mechanism, which means an increase in the role of subjective motivation. The methodology used is the historical consideration of morality, the method of systems research, the principle of complementarity.

Keywords: morality, ethics, motivation, institutions, virtue, decisions, responsibility, discourse.

The article considers the historical forms of morality. It shows the specific features of ancient virtue ethics, examines which tasks were solved by the medieval ethics and what new perspective was disclosed in the Ethics of New Time. The limitations of the universalist approach in Ethics are also revealed. On the base of comparative studies of different Ethical paradigms the author concludes that the development of ethical codes and a partial unification between moral and law does not mean the lowering of virtue ethics. On the contrary, the virtue ethics and institutional moral are complementary components. The main feature of the solutions of applied tasks is the elaboration of decision-making procedure. This implies an increasing role of subjective motivation. The methodology is based on historical consideration of morality, involves the method of system research, and complementary principle.

Keywords: moral, Ethics, motivation, institutes, virtue, solutions, responsibility, discurs.

Ancient ethics mainly developed as a theory of virtues. Virtue is a moral concept that characterizes the qualities of a person that allow her to consciously follow good. Unlike the norms and principles of morality, which characterize the transpersonal obligatory side of morality, virtue represents morality at the personal level, reflects the unique uniqueness of various social and moral qualities of a person. In this sense, it is more subjective compared to norms and principles.

Virtue is a character trait that reflects a person's ability to perform some kind of social meaningful activities, the development of his ability to live together with other people and the ability to reasonably organize his own life. The term itself gets its meaning from the category of good, which in Antiquity meant any perfection, the correspondence of a thing to its purpose. This means that virtue is a conscious striving for good, the desire to realize it in one's activity and at the same time achieve perfection (including in one's profession).

Virtue presupposes a steady orientation of character. This means that moral behavior for a virtuous person becomes familiar to a certain extent, his moral choice is facilitated due to the fact that the very nature of his character shows how to act in a particular case.

In deciding to be virtuous, a person always makes for himself some kind of cultivation program. It presupposes the management of one's own affects, the rejection of some desires, considered as lower, in favor of others - higher. This means that a person consciously works to transform his own nature in accordance with some moral and social ideal, that he does not want to remain who he is, but always strives for more, for what he can in principle achieve.

But it is not some abstract person who is being improved, but a person who acts as an active being participating in the affairs of society. Therefore, in the ethics of virtues, a certain goal is attached to morality, which can be considered not only in its own moral, but also in a general social meaning. I. Kant considered the doctrine of virtues precisely in connection with the idea of ​​a person about goals.

When considering the problem of virtues, Kant poses the question as follows: since there are free actions, there must also be goals for which they are directed. But are there any goals that are at the same time a duty? If not, then ethics becomes meaningless, since any doctrine of morality is a doctrine of what should be done (that is, first of all, a doctrine of responsibilities).

Kant names two such goals: his own perfection and someone else's happiness. Own happiness, from the point of view of Kant, cannot be a duty, since everyone strives for it by nature, but someone else's can. Personal perfection can also be a duty, because no one naturally strives for it. Perfection, from Kant's point of view, is a culture of natural inclinations, but at the same time a culture of will based on a moral way of thinking. Therefore, it is: “1. Man's duty by his own efforts to get out of the [state] of the primitiveness of his nature, from the [state of] animality (quoad actum), and higher and higher to rise to the human [state], only thanks to which he is able to set goals, make up for the lack of his knowledge and correct mistakes ... 2. Raise your culture will to the purest virtuous mindset when law also becomes the motive of his actions consistent with duty, and obey the law out of a sense of duty ... ”[Kant 1994: 428].

Virtue, therefore, is associated with duty in the sense that it requires effort (will), and is not associated with it in the sense that it is the result of a free choice of purpose. It also involves the development of natural inclinations, and, consequently, the determination of their predispositions, their abilities. Thus, the sphere of virtue is not only the sphere of action of universal imperatives, but also the ability to subordinate yourself to what you are disposed to. The latter still needs to be defined, and the universal imperatives here, in fact, cannot give anything.

A controversial issue is the question of the so-called "proper moral" emotions that can induce and accompany moral action. There were philosophers who allowed such emotions. For example, A. Shaftesbury wrote: “Not a single soul has done good deeds - so as not to do them with even greater readiness - and with great pleasure. And the deeds of love, mercy or generosity have never been performed otherwise than with an increasing joy of heart, so that the one who does them would not feel more and more love for these noble deeds ”[Shaftesbury 1975: 113]. But I believe that moral emotions are not the motivators of virtuous action. Their nature (in the case of admitting such emotions) is incomprehensible, since morality orients us to what is due, and if some basic emotion were an incentive in morality, it would be necessary to recognize a moral need.

By the way, D. Hume directly writes about this, comparing moral feelings with feelings generated by the process of satisfying other needs.

In his work "A Study on the Principles of Morality," Hume proceeds from the fact that everyone has some kind of universal human feeling that makes it possible to distinguish between good and evil. He calls this feeling humanity.

“The concept of morality implies some feeling common to all of humanity, which recommends the same object as deserving of general approval and makes each person or most people agree with each other, coming to the same opinion or decision about it. This concept also implies some feeling, so universal and all-encompassing that it extends to all of humanity and makes the actions and behavior of even the most distant persons the object of approval or condemnation in accordance with whether they are consistent or not consistent with the established rules of the right. These two necessary circumstances are connected only with the feeling of philanthropy, on which we insisted here ”[Hume 1996: 269].

In conclusion of the work, Hume definitely connects this feeling with a need, essentially analogous to other human needs, only with greater universality.

“Don't be any needs(emphasis mine .- A.R.), which precedes self-love, this tendency could hardly ever have an effect, for in this case we would experience slight and weak pain or pleasure and know little grief or happiness to be avoided or sought. Further, is it difficult to imagine that the same could be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that, thanks to the original disposition of our character, we can wish another person happiness or good, which, thanks to this affect, becomes our own good, and then becomes an object of aspirations, based on a combination of the motives of benevolence and self-satisfaction? " [Ibid: 296].

But then morality as such would not be needed at all, because a need, if it already exists (or even if it is gradually formed), does not need an additional motive of duty. She herself arouses behavior aimed at her satisfaction. Another thing is the formation of personality traits that would allow her to participate in complex types of social activities. They, as well as the desire for these types of activities themselves, are not given to man by nature. In indicating the need to perform strenuous activities as a public service and in the formation of the necessary social qualities morality can certainly play a role. It really affects the process of the formation of the highest social needs of the individual and those social qualities of a person (his abilities) that are necessary to satisfy them. Emotions are included in moral action from the side of the process of satisfying all the highest social needs of a person. Indirectly, they have moral significance, since in the recognition of his merits by society, a person sees the criteria for his own achievements and confirmation of his own dignity. At the same time, the moral component of a complex action increases the tension of emotions from the very process of satisfying higher needs, because the awareness of the degree of uniqueness of the activity being performed, the complexity of the tasks being solved, undoubtedly receives an appropriate emotional coloring. The result always arouses the greater emotions, the more difficult it is to achieve it.

As for moral emotions proper, they can only accompany moral action in the sense of the consciousness of a fulfilled duty; a state of calm conscience, satisfaction from the consciousness of one's own dignity, caused by the fact that a person was able to overcome himself; or to stimulate moral action in the sense of the anticipatory role of negative emotions (to prevent a state of remorse, disrespect for oneself, etc.).

In connection with the above, the development of personality in the ethics of virtues cannot be represented as a process different from its holistic social formation, that is, it is impossible to imagine a person who is incapable of specific types of social activity, who has not achieved perfection in them, but nevertheless is highly moral in that sense that he does not deceive anyone, does not cause physical harm to others, does not encroach on someone else's property, etc.

For ancient society, virtue was unambiguously associated with the dignity of the individual, especially in heroic morality.

But then, in philosophy and religion, this idea began to be repressed. A person was required to be virtuous, but at the same time not to determine through this the measure of his dignity, since in ethics focused on submission to the absolute, to God, dignity is the same for everyone.

Hence, in Stoicism, and then in Christianity, a steady tendency was manifested to separate moral qualities proper from other social abilities of the individual. Even earlier, you can see this tendency in Plato (in his ethics of moral perfection, which was a simultaneous movement towards truth and beauty).

For ancient ethics, the division of morality and other aspects of human life, however, was not as sharp as for the ethics of modern times. The moral development of a person was constantly comprehended in terms of practical skills, compared with the development of other human abilities, and sometimes was considered as a single process with the formation of other social qualities. So, Protagoras says that the kypharists, teaching young people their art, for their part, take care of the prudence of young people, in addition, in the very process of learning, there is an acquaintance with the works of good poets-songwriters, in which there are instructive instructions [Plato. Prot. 326b].

The idea of ​​the need to separate the moral qualities of the individual and his other social abilities increases as the society grows larger, the connection with the group becomes not as direct as before, and selfish motives associated with the acquisition of wealth begin to manifest themselves more and more in the motivation of activity.

Until the era of Hellenism, man was not faced with the question of why he should act for the benefit of the polis. It was part of his life, in line with his idea of ​​true good.

Only in Seneca do the so-called philistine virtues appear, which indicate the need for a person to participate in public affairs, to such an attitude towards himself that does not allow one to relax, indulge in idleness. But in itself the problem of philistine virtues can develop only in those conditions when a person has a real choice to live one way or another.

For a huge mass of people in medieval society, the possibility of such a choice simply disappears. This society was class-based and hierarchical. The estates reflected the inevitability of fulfilling their social functions. Hierarchy implied the division of estates into higher and lower classes. The possibility of at least some choice of lifestyle, along with the struggle to establish their social status, was inherent only in the upper classes. Therefore, the knights participated in tournaments or wars, representatives of the spiritual class delved into the study of sacred books and theological discourses. Kings asserted their dignity by conquest. As for the peasants and artisans, they meekly carried their cross.

Nevertheless, medieval ethics reflected a higher appreciation of human sensibility compared to Antiquity, a higher appreciation of labor, including simple labor associated with craft production and agriculture... From the XII-XIII centuries. labor even began to be seen not as a punishment of the Lord, but as a means of salvation, as a test that a person must endure, demonstrating his devotion to God. Separate types labor was associated with a significant variety of life and with different virtues. But these virtues themselves, as certain social skills, even containing signs of perfection, have ceased to be a measure of expression of personal dignity. This was even more clearly manifested in Protestantism, which equated different types of labor in moral dignity, and in fact deprived them of such dignity altogether. Perfection began to correlate only with the idea of ​​being chosen by God. What were the social preconditions for this turn?

During this period, society faced two tasks: 1) to preserve the already existing social inequality; 2) to ensure a variety of labor functions, without linking their performance with a claim for change, an increase in individual social status. This meant that the bearing of one's cross had to be taken for granted, without any hint that this was associated with the assertion of some dignity.

In the Middle Ages, the divine absolute was opposed to the huge range of moral decisions characteristic of Antiquity as a single authoritative source of moral good. In Christianity, God performs punitive functions and at the same time sets the ideal of moral perfection. He is supposed to be all-good, all-seeing, omnipresent. Christian ethics, in contrast to ancient Greek and ancient Roman, basically became the ethics of duty. It formulated other criteria for moral goodness. Qualities such as courage and military valor faded into the background. They were opposed to tolerance, mercy, charity, concern for one's neighbor. Faith, Hope, Love became the main virtues. All people began to be regarded as equitable. In the classical ethics of virtues, the dignity of people looked different, depending on their achievements, the degree of development of virtues.

However, it cannot be said that in the Middle Ages there was a leveling of personality, that the goals of personal life were simplified, reduced to self-limitation of their own sensuality and a benevolent attitude towards their neighbor, that a person abandoned an independent search for moral truth and began to rely on God's mercy in everything.

In the Old Testament, you can find numerous examples of violations of traditional norms of behavior. But all this is done for reasons of the realization of some higher values ​​and receives the approval of the highest authority, that is, God. These are well-known stories connected with the appropriation of the birthright by Jacob, the use of a magical means to divide property (with his father-in-law) in his favor, Joseph, etc. Each time after such actions, biblical heroes in a dream meet with God and actually receive his approval.

The ethics of the modern era had a complex history of origin. From the very beginning, it was based on various, even contradictory principles, which received their special combination in the concepts of individual thinkers. It is based on the humanistic ideas developed during the Renaissance, the principle of personal responsibility introduced through Protestant ideology, the liberal principle that placed the individual with his desires at the center of reasoning and assumes the main functions of the state in protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual.

In the XVII century. moral theories reflect the complexities of the process of the emergence of capitalist society, the uncertainty of a person in his destiny, and at the same time encourage the initiative aimed at practical achievements. In ethics, this leads to a combination of two opposite approaches: striving for personal happiness, pleasure, joy at the lowest empirical level of the subject's being and striving for gaining stoic calmness at a different, higher level of being. Higher moral being is comprehended through purely rational constructions associated with the assertion of intellectual intuition, innate knowledge. In them, the sensory aspects of the subject's being are practically completely overcome. An emotionally colored attitude to reality is viewed as meaningless, because nothing can be changed in a causally determined world. Therefore, you can only accept this world and calmly relate to your fate. So mechanics as the leading scientific idea of ​​the 17th century. used to argue moral ideas.

What has been said is well supported by Descartes's rules for practically operating morality (morality that a person can accept for himself even when the theory has not yet developed final moral concepts):

1) “to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering to the relentless religion in which, by the grace of God, I was brought up from childhood, and being guided in all other respects by the opinions of the most moderate, alien to extremes and generally accepted among the noblest people in the circle of whom I will have live";

2) “to remain the most firm and decisive in my actions, as far as it was in my power, and, once having accepted any opinion, even if it was even dubious, follow it as if it were completely correct”;

3) “always strive to conquer ourselves rather than fate, changing our desires, not the order of the world, and generally get used to the idea that only our opinions are in our complete power and that after we have done everything possible with the objects around us , what we failed should be considered as something absolutely impossible ”[Descartes 1953: 26-28].

The first two theses indicate that a person is forced to live in conditions of a lack of knowledge about the world. He can adapt to it only practically, focusing on moderate opinions, since since the time of Aristotle it has been known that the moderate is farther from extremes and thus farther from vice, farther from wrong. Being firm in decisions gives confidence in life, so opinions should not be changed. The third rule obviously demonstrates the stoic attitude of moral consciousness, which follows from the thesis that essentially nothing can be changed in the world.

XVIII-XIX centuries associated with a relatively calm period in the development of capitalism. Moral theories are more guided here by the sensory aspects of human being. But feelings are understood not only in the eudemonistic sense, as conditions for achieving happiness, as positive emotions that contribute to the joy of life. In a number of concepts, they begin to acquire a purely moral significance, appear as attitudes expressing a humane attitude towards another, support for his existence, which contributes to the harmonization of social life. Along with moral theories that appeal to proper moral feelings, primarily a sense of compassion, a sensual understanding of morality also contains calls for a radical transformation of society, the creation of such social organization, in which all the sensory aspects of human existence can receive an adequate, consistent expression. This is often expressed in the well-known concept of intelligent egoism.

As a reaction to the sensual and eudemonistic understanding of morality, an approach arises in which morality appears as a rational construction derived from pure reason. Kant tries to formulate an autonomous approach to the substantiation of morality, to consider the moral motive as not associated with any pragmatic motives of being. The Kantian categorical imperative, based on the procedure of mental universalization of one's behavior as a means of its control by the autonomous moral will, is still used in various versions in the construction of ethical systems.

Nevertheless, basically all these systems appealed to the individual consciousness of the individual, to reasoning on the moral themes of a single individual.

The idea of ​​history finds expression in the ethics of modern times. In the concepts of the enlighteners, G.V.F. Hegel, K. Marx, morality is understood as relative, specific for each specific stage in the development of society, in Kantian philosophy, the historical consideration of morality, on the contrary, is subordinated to the study of those conditions under which absolute moral principles can become effective practically doable. Hegel's historical approach develops on the basis of the thesis that the autonomous moral will is powerless, cannot find the desired connection with the whole. It becomes effective only because it relies on the institutions of the family, civil society and the state. Therefore, as a result of historical development, Hegel conceives morality as coinciding with a perfect tradition.

Historicity is already embedded in Christian moral doctrine. The idea of ​​history is expressed by the genesis described in the Bible itself. This is not just a change of events, but a change in the person himself, his acquisition of moral qualities, his preparation for accepting the divine commandments, and then rethinking them in the light of a new stage in understanding divine truth, which only a new Testament person who has already changed is able to perceive.

K. Marx and mainly his followers tried in a clever way to combine the Hegelian and Kantian approaches. Hence, on the one hand, morality turned out to be class, historically relational, on the other, it was presented as the only means of regulating behavior in a communist society, when, according to the classics of Marxism, all social circumstances distorting the purity of morals would disappear, all social antagonisms would be overcome.

Medieval morality gives us a significant range of ideas of different strata about the tasks of moral life, virtues. The higher nobility lived according to one morality, the clergy according to the other, special moral ideas serving the purposes of expressing their mission, formulated numerous orders of knighthood, merchants were divided into guilds, artisans - according to workshops. Even the beggars had their own morals. Compared to Antiquity, this in no way looks like a simplification.

But the morality of the 17th century. demonstrates much more uniformity. Why? The answer is, in general, clear. The development of universal ties that correspond to the material form of the relationship between people in a capitalist society requires the unification of their relationship. As for those moral concepts that determined the goals of human activity, they largely lose their moral foundations. This is very well shown by W. Sombart, who notes the following historical trend: “In those days when efficient and loyal business people praised the young generation of diligence as the highest virtue of a successful entrepreneur, they had to try, as it were, to drive a firm the foundation of duties, were to try to evoke in each individual, by exhortation, a personal direction of will. And if the admonition bore fruit, then the diligent business man worked out his lesson through strong self-restraint. Modern economic man reaches his frenzy in completely different ways: he is drawn into the whirlpool of economic forces and carried away by them. He no longer cultivates virtue, but is under the influence of compulsion. The pace of business determines its own pace ”[Sombart 2009: 142]. Consequently, the task of improving a person in the sense of cultivating the so-called philistine virtues has ceased to be relevant. His "virtue" began to be determined by the pace of production, and not by his subjective volitional efforts.

However, for modern society, such an assessment is not suitable. Now human labor in production is becoming more and more creative, and creative labor does not lend itself well to external control, its rhythm is not set by external factors of the systemic organization of production, at least, it is not set as rigidly as these factors can set specific work associated with performing individual production operations.

Hence, in ethics, attention to virtues again increases, including in the field of public morality, in applied and professional ethics.

Modern morality

The following are named as specific features of the moral life of modern society, about which most researchers agree:

1. Moral pluralism, development of systems of professional and corporate codes, reflection of the diversity of cultures, division of morality along ethnic lines.

2. Rapprochement of morality and law, institutionalization of morality (formalization of requirements and toughening of sanctions).

3. Orientation ethical rules to the standard, contrasting this with the call for unlimited improvement in the Christian sense (be perfect as your heavenly father).

4. Collective decisions and collective responsibility.

5. A utilitarian approach that presupposes decision-making based on the logic of lesser evil (which is not always perfect, since it involves the use of some groups of people or individuals as a means).

In the Russian ethics of the 1970s. morality has traditionally been viewed as a "non-institutional" regulator of personality behavior. Sometimes, however, it was noted that morality can be associated with the activities of some non-state institutions, for example, with the church, but this was considered historically transient, not consistent with its nature. Traditional moral imperatives were directed to the consciousness of the individual. Such distinctive features of morality as freedom of choice (voluntary acceptance of moral obligations) were associated with characteristics dependent on the capabilities of the individual; a virtuous way of life (conscious striving for good); readiness for self-sacrifice (the principled affirmation of the interest of society as the highest in relation to the interest of the individual); equality between people (the willingness to treat another in the same way as to oneself, hence the universality of the expression of moral requirements); the idea of ​​self-improvement (hence the conflict between the ought and the being).

The state of modern society in many respects refutes a number of the provisions noted above. So, in development professional ethics began a massive process of codification of moral standards. Certain organizations monitor the implementation of the norms: ethics or appeal committees at universities; professional meetings of doctors, which have taken on additional functions of moral assessment; parliamentary ethics committees that assess the permissibility or inadmissibility of MPs' behavior from a moral point of view, professional organizations of business communicators or organizations of public relations workers, councils on journalistic ethics, which somehow ensure that society receives truthful information about the state of affairs in individual corporations and public life in general. It is clear from this that morality becomes partly institutional. At the same time, the norms of professional ethics turn out to be addressed not to all people of the Earth or not to all beings endowed with reason, as Kant believed, but to representatives of this profession.

Along with the division of morality on a professional basis, its division arose on the basis of corporate affiliation. Many modern corporations have developed their own codes of ethics, proclaimed their own moral missions, which reflect how the activities of a given corporation contribute to an increase in the public good as a whole, how given view business contributes to meeting the needs of people.

To this it must be added that those moral requirements that traditionally turned to each individual person, for example, concern for one's neighbor, in modern society often become the subject of the activity of special government agencies... People who work in such bodies, in fact, perform special moral functions that serve the entire society.

All of the above really gives grounds for the assertion that morality, to a certain extent, has ceased to be what it was. RG Apresyan calls modern society postmodern. He notes that moral pluralism is characteristic feature of the given society.

Analyzing the existing literature, which in one way or another reflects the problem of public morality, R. G. Apresyan comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to distinguish between the individual ethics of improvement and public, or public, morality. In Western sources, slightly different solutions are proposed: public morality and individual morality (T. Nagel), social and individual ethics (A. Rich), institutional ethics and institutional design (R. Hardin).

The term "public morality" seems to us more accurate, since all morality is inherently public. In individual morality, a person most of all pays attention to such personal qualities that can make existence without conflict with a close circle of people, with their neighbors, as well as provide reasonable mutual assistance with those with whom one has to come into personal contact in one way or another. In public morality, a person deals with large groups of people, impersonal connections, with the performance of various public functions. The imperatives of public morality cannot be as universal as the well-known requirements of Christian ethics, because public functions are different and their fulfillment often involves a selective attitude towards different people.

The imperatives of individual morality may look like a way of solving questions about what should be properly organized sexual relations, how to treat family members, how to live in order to be happy, etc. In public morality, groups of people are identified as having a certain specificity. different from other groups. Therefore, the principle “treat another as you would like to be treated yourself” is not fully applicable here. The imperatives of public morality can be provisions such as "do not be racist", "take part in elections", if you fulfill any common public function, then carry out your duties honestly, do not give advantages to anyone in accordance with your personal likes and dislikes, etc.

It is clear that in the performance of many public functions it turns out to be simply impossible to relate to another in the same way as to oneself. A person is, of necessity, forced to act against another. In his work Ethics for Opponents, A. Appelbaum notes: “Professionals and politicians play roles that often force them to act on the basis of opposite intentions, strive to achieve incompatible goals, and destroy the plans of others. Prosecution and defense attorneys, Democrats and Republicans, secretaries of state and national security advisers, industry and environmentalists, investigative journalists and official sources, doctors and insurance companies are often faced with one another as a result of their mission, work and agitation ". It is clear that this requires the development of special ethics, which are based on the rules of fair play, respect for the enemy, and taking into account the public interest. It is also necessary to take into account the relations of subordination that inevitably arise in the performance of public functions, which imposes special moral obligations, and in some cases also gives the right to dispose of the fate of other people.

For example, an officer can decide who to send on a deadly mission and who to keep in reserve. These decisions will be based on the logic of choosing the lesser evil in order to eliminate the greater. They also admit what traditional ethics strongly forbade, that is, saving the lives of some at the expense of others. Here, however, it is necessary to make a reservation that such decisions can be morally justified only in an emergency period that is officially recognized (officially declared war, natural disaster, global ecological catastrophe, etc.).

As modern morality again becomes pluralistic, an era is passing when philosophers tried to formulate universal imperatives, to subordinate behavior to uniform rules that do not allow any exceptions.

The very logic of these imperatives is being questioned. G. Simmel was one of the first to see this turn in modern ethics. He criticizes Kant's categorical imperative precisely because he does not take into account the individual person, his conflicting feelings, conflict situations, etc.

“The irresistible strictness of Kant's morality is connected with his logical fanaticism, which seeks to give all life a mathematically precise form. Great teachers of morality, whose source of teaching was solely the assessment of the moral, were by no means distinguished by such rigorism - neither Buddha, nor Jesus, nor Marcus Aurelius, nor Saint Francis ... , poses before itself the problems of only the most everyday and, as it were, gross events of moral life. Everything that is accessible to general concepts in moral data, he considers with unprecedented grandeur and poignancy. However, ever deeper and more subtle questions of ethics, the exacerbation of conflicts, the complexity of feelings, dark forces in us, in the moral assessment of which we are often so helpless - all this seems to be unknown to him - to him, who penetrated into the deepest, subtle and refined functions mental human activities. Lack of fantasy and primitiveness in posing moral problems, on the one hand, sophistication and scope of flight in theoretical ones, on the other, prove that he introduces into his philosophical thinking only that which allows penetration by logical thinking ”[Simmel 1996: 12–13].

Simmel believes that Kant and other philosophers of the Enlightenment, in principle, proceeded from the fact that all people are the same in their essence. Hence, universal rules can be applied to them, and the society itself must be such in which the application of these universal rules will become possible, that is, in the future - by a society of universal equality. This gave rise to revolutions that were themselves based on a false idea.

“... Estates, guild and church ties created countless manifestations of inequality between people, the injustice of which was very acutely felt; therefore, it was concluded that with the elimination of these institutions, along with which this unequal distribution of rights would disappear, there would be no more inequality in the world at all. There was a confusion of existing meaningless differences with inequality in general, and the view was established that freedom that would destroy them would lead to general and permanent equality. And this was combined with the rationalism of the 18th century, for which the subject of interest was not a special person, incomparable in his originality, but a person as such, a person in general ”[Simmel 1996: 149].

It is possible to discuss how correct such an assessment of education as a whole is, but there is no doubt that general imperatives can govern people's lives only if all motives that differ from the motives of maintaining society at the level of general rules are taken out of the bounds of morality. As applied to the ethics of virtue and as applied to modern society, this, I think, is wrong.

And Simmel, I think, is right when he writes about the continuity of life and those rules that follow not from general laws, but from this very continuity. “Everything that is changeable and, in its sense, the only one, fluid in the continuity of life without precise boundaries, does not obey a pre-existing law, as well as abstract sublimation into a universal law - all this now receives a duty over itself, for this is life itself and preserves its continuous form ”[His 2006: 60].

Despite the considerable subjectivity presented in this reasoning, there is also a rational kernel. A person is prompted to action not only by an abstract universal duty, but also by his own choice, choice of goals, life program, which corresponds to the ethics of virtues. This corresponds to the individualization of moral actions and moral evaluations in virtue ethics.

XIX century. - This is also a period causing a powerful surge in the utilitarian understanding of morality. Utilitarianism regards as morally positive such behavior that leads to an increase in the amount of happiness of as many people as possible. This theory arises along with the development of capitalist society, which has abruptly increased the total amount of material goods produced, which has raised consumption to a new qualitative level. Material goods considered in utilitarianism as one of the basic conditions for happiness. Utilitarianism differs from traditional hedonistic theories in that it speaks about the public good, including how social institutions should work to increase it, while classical hedonism mainly considered the path to happiness in terms of lifestyle preferences.

One important criticism of utilitarianism is that the happiness of the majority can be more effectively secured at the expense of the minority. Even if we take into account all the restrictions that have been formulated in connection with this objection, for example, that along with the utilitarian principle, other rules must be fulfilled, that all proposed norms of behavior must go through the universalization procedure in the sense that everyone must agree with them. accept (utilitarianism of the rule), this remark is not completely removed. Not all social life can fit into the rules. In addition, when they are accepted, everyone does not expect to be in such a critical situation when it is his interests that will need to be sacrificed.

In modern ethical discussions, the utilitarian approach is often seen as acceptable for solving problems of public morality. in contrast to traditional ethics, which are often characterized as the ethics of individual improvement. The utilitarian approach provides for solving issues in the interests of the majority and assumes that such decisions, in principle, allow for some kind of minimal evil.

Of course, the task, for example, politics, is precisely to help increase the public good. At the same time, the interests of all cannot be taken into account to the same extent. For example, the modernization of the economy often requires the destruction of the traditional way of life of some social groups. However, in the long term, this turns out to be justified for the members of these groups themselves, although they, most likely, will not support such a policy.

Nevertheless, the utilitarian theory cannot be applied to all aspects of the organization of life and in the public sphere. Most people have an understanding that some basic human rights must be understood in an absolute sense, as values ​​that are not directly related to the question of the public good. They must be respected even when it does not lead to an increase in public goods.

However, despite some obvious principles that follow from common sense, our moral intuitions, the long-term practice of the existence of society in the sense of the survival of those groups that adhered to these principles, in theoretical terms, it always remains topical issue when exactly we can adhere to utilitarian principles, and when not.

The big question of modern ethics is whether morality itself is not destroyed if behavior focuses on a certain standard, expressed in, say, a professional code of conduct.

Investigating the problem modern morality A. A. Guseinov notes that it has undergone significant changes in comparison with traditional morality. The essence of these changes is formulated in a short thesis that the relations between morality and civilization seem to change places. If earlier civilization was criticized from the point of view of morality, now, on the contrary, civilization acts as a critic. Indeed, changes in the understanding of what is moral and what is not, what is acceptable in our behavior, and what is considered reprehensible, are happening with incredible speed. Many researchers of morality pay attention to this. In this case, the question arises: is there anything stable in morality at all, what moral concept can we accept to confirm the truth of our moral judgments?

A. A. Guseinov notes that the specificity of modern morality has become the expansion of the morally neutral zone, the desire to free oneself from ideological grounds and, in many respects, from the complex associated with developed motivation, the search for individual solutions. Instead, institutional ethics is being developed, that is, the ethics of rules developed for certain social systems. “Each of ... social practices turns out to be the more effective, the less it depends on personal connections and, which seems especially paradoxical, on individual moral motivation” [Huseynov 2002: 119]. This does not mean that morality as such loses its meaning. Simply “morality moves from the level of motives of behavior to the level of consciously set and collectively developed general frameworks and rules according to which the corresponding activity proceeds” [Huseynov 2002: 121]. This process also expresses the development of institutional ethics that characterizes post-traditional society. A.A. Guseinov does not say that institutional morality completely supplants the ethics of virtues associated with developed individual motivation and focus on individual improvement. He only draws attention to the fact that the ratio of the two components present in morality and earlier components noticeably changes in the sense of the role they play in modern society. “The ethics of virtues, associated mainly with the motives of behavior, retains an important (perhaps even increasing) importance in the field of personal relationships and in all situations that have a pronounced personal, individualized character, that is, speaking generally, in the zones of personal presence. In systemic (socially functional, professionally rigid) behavior, it is complemented by institutional ethics ”[Ibid: 123].

It can be agreed that the changes noted are associated with a change in the share of moral components allocated by A. A. Guseinov. The expansion of the significance of the public life of society and the complication of the very nature of public relations undoubtedly leads to the need for codification of morality and the creation of special institutions that monitor the implementation of codes in a formal sense.

However, I do not think that the sphere of the morally neutral in modern society is expanding. For example, even in the economy, traditionally considered as a sphere far from morality, where the desire to assert private interest dominates (this is how A. Smith considered economic relations), the morality of modern society is gaining ground more and more.

In his study on trust issues, F. Fukuyama showed that large corporations historically emerged precisely in societies with a high level of trust, that is, in the United States, Japan and Germany. Later they were joined by South Korea, where large corporations arose largely due to state intervention in the economy, but were also associated with the peculiarities of national identity. However, not only the development of large corporations, in which the trust of people, which manifests itself in production relations between individual links, leads to a decrease in the costs of legalizing contractual relations, but also the development of those responsible information society network structures are also based on trust. “It is no coincidence that it was the Americans, with their inclination to social behavior, who first came to the creation of a modern corporation in the late 19th - early 20th centuries, and the Japanese to create a network organization in the 20th century” [Fukuyama 2006: 55]. How, then, can you deny the role of morality in economics?

Numerous professional and corporate codes do not eliminate individual motivation. If this were the case, man would simply act like a moral machine. Many norms of corporate ethics are formulated in the form of positive and recommendatory requirements. But then their implementation necessarily requires the activity of the individual.

Take, for example, the following group of norms of the PR-activity code formulated by A. Page: “Perform your duty as a public relations specialist as if the well-being of your entire company depends on it. Corporate relations are a management function. No corporate strategy can be implemented without considering its possible impact on the public. The public relations professional is the creator of company policy, able to carry out a wide range of activities related to corporate communications ”[cit. from: Scott et al. 2001: 204].

It is clear that norms formulated in this form require professionalism, and professionalism cannot be achieved without subjective motivation, without virtue, which just shows a person's path to a certain standard of excellence.

In the public sphere, we are constantly faced with situations when a person is responsible not only for the fact that he did something bad, morally condemnable, but also for the fact that he did not fulfill what is stipulated by his professional duties. Therefore, the requirements of professional competence, official compliance become the most important requirements of public morality.

Thus, the development of institutional ethics does not limit the necessity of existence and does not narrow the scope of virtue ethics. In my opinion, the ethics of virtues itself penetrates into institutional morality. Their interaction is carried out according to the principle of complementarity, not mutual exclusion. I believe that the significance of the ethics of virtues in modern society is expanding precisely in connection with the increase in the variety of moral relations, their extension to such relationships of people that were previously considered morally neutral. This makes many researchers (E. Enscom, F. Foote, A. McIntyre) talk about the need to revive the ethics of virtues.

In business communications, such personal qualities as the ability to work with other people, to understand their characteristics and even the emotional states of the moment, acquire a fundamental importance. This turns out to be important both for relationships with colleagues and for communication between professionals belonging to different organizations.

Investigating the issue of the manifestation of human emotional abilities in business communications, D. Goleman, referring to P. Drucker, notes: then market analysts, theorists, or computer programmers. Peter Drucker, the renowned business connoisseur who coined the term “knowledge processor”, points out that the experience of such workers is limited. narrow specialization and that their productivity depends on the extent to which their efforts, as part of the organizational team, are coordinated with the work of others: theorists have nothing to do with publishing, and computer programmers do not disseminate software... Although people have always worked together, Drucker notes, in processing the team's knowledge, not individual person become a working unit ”[Goleman 2009: 253].

Despite the fact that in modern ethics, of course, obedience to the standard acquires importance and the institutionalization of morality takes place, informal relations do not lose their importance. They necessarily accompany network interactions, because network communication presupposes the free association of people, the free choice of who you want to communicate with, the search for like-minded people, including in solving business problems.

“Informal networks are especially important for solving unexpected problems. A formal organization is being created to easily deal with anticipated difficulties, according to a report on one study of such networks. “But when unforeseen problems arise, an unofficial organization steps in. Its complex web of social connections is formed in each case of communication between colleagues and over time becomes stronger, turning into surprisingly strong networks ”[Ibid: 257–258].

Without such strong networks, it is difficult to imagine the development of science and business, because despite the fact that business organizations strive to preserve their know-how, they are still interested in learning about new fundamental discoveries of science, about the possibilities of new technologies. The modern world, by the way, suffers from the fact that many in it seek to hide knowledge. In the first half of the XX century. more fundamental practical discoveries were made than in the first half of the 21st century. But if anything can resist the tendency to conceal knowledge in the modern world, it is informal ties.

“... There are at least three types of communication networks - who talks to whom, expert networks that unite those people who are asked for advice, and trust networks” [Ibid: 258]. Expert networks are of fundamental importance for the development of business, science, decision-making in politics. Experts are professionals in their field who constantly communicate with each other and, therefore, have a level of development modern science or are specialists in specific areas of economics, regional studies, ethnography, etc. It is not so important how they will do their job, for money or not, it is important that such people exist. And they would not exist if they evaluated every step they took only from the point of view of the possibility of making a profit, if they never communicated with their colleagues just like that, without a second thought about some kind of benefit. Otherwise, they would simply not be communicated with and they would be excluded from the informal community that is being formed in this area of ​​knowledge or other areas of culture. Hence, there is inevitably an ethical attitude, and this is precisely the attitude that belongs to the realm of virtue ethics.

A standard is a requirement for professional qualifications, a requirement for a degree of personal excellence corresponding to this standard. But the path to such perfection itself has its own characteristics for each person, it is associated with the efforts of his will, with overcoming everything that distracts him from the corresponding professional development, and morality can in no way be removed from this process. In a number of cases, submission of one's behavior to the standard also requires special motivation aimed at limiting excessive manifestations of one's own individuality, especially when this leads to arrogance, borders on violation of job descriptions, traffic rules, etc.

Modern ethics is certainly faced with a rather difficult situation in which many traditional moral values ​​have been revised. Traditions that had previously seen much of the foundation of the original moral principles have often been destroyed. They have lost their significance due to the global processes developing in society and the rapid pace of changes in production, its reorientation towards mass consumption. As a result of this, a situation arose in which opposing moral principles appeared as equally valid, equally deducible from reason. This, according to A. McIntyre, led to the fact that rational arguments in morality began to be mainly used to prove those theses that the person who cited them previously already had. The category of the good, traditional for ethics, turned out to be, as it were, taken out of the bounds of morality, and the latter began to develop mainly as an ethics of rules, moreover, such that can be accepted, despite the different life ideas of each individual person. This made the topic of human rights extremely popular, led to new attempts to construct ethics as a theory of justice. One of such attempts is presented in the well-known book by J. Rawls "The Theory of Justice".

Another important step, representing a reaction to the modern situation, was an attempt to understand morality in a constructive way, to present it as an endless discourse in its continuation (communication and communicating, taken in an indissoluble unity), aimed at developing solutions acceptable to all its participants. This is being developed in the works of KO Apel, Y. Habermas, R. Aleksi, and others. The fundamental position of discourse ethics is the rejection of the strategy of encouragement and punishment as a means of controlling some people by others. Instead, it is proposed to search for agreement, justification and approval in public life of such principles that all parties interested in communication are ready to accept. The same applies to the strategy of making political decisions. A distinctive feature of discourse ethics is also the assertion that the foundations of morality cannot be inferred from the reasoning of an individual. The interests of others do not need to be guessed. They are openly presented and discussed in discourse together with a rational justification of the necessary forms of communication and other acceptable for all conditions of social life.

In modern ethics, the difference between different principles is clearly revealed, for example, such as the principles of liberalism and communitarianism.

Liberalism proceeds from the idea of ​​protecting human rights, leaving it with the right to determine the path to one's happiness, taking this problem out of the bounds of theoretical ethics. From a liberal point of view, there is no reason to say that one lifestyle brings more happiness than another. When defining basic human rights, they proceed from obvious values: to live better than to die, to live in abundance is better than in poverty, each person strives for recognition of his merits from others, the desire for self-affirmation is natural for a person, etc.

The communitarian point of view, opposite to liberalism, proceeds from the fact that a person's life without ties with a certain community is impossible. On this basis, the ideas of the ancient ethics of virtues are being revived in modern society.

Classical liberal concepts consider the functions of the state in a very limited way, reducing them mainly to the protection of human rights, the protection of his property, taking questions about life preferences, normative programs, and happiness beyond the bounds of morality. In them, accordingly, the task of searching for the ideal of moral development of the individual is denied, in fact, the problem of the goals of a person's spiritual activity is not considered. If all this is recognized as a significant fact of life, then it is not considered as an area of ​​influence of morality on human behavior. On the contrary, communitarian ethics says that the highest moral manifestations cannot be understood without a person's connection with the life of a certain community.

The position of liberalism is attractive because it allows the adoption of common moral rules without striving for the unification of cultural life. different nations, allowing all the diversity of individual differences. However, with the ultimate expansion of the concept of human rights, theoretical thought encounters some barriers. For example, if there is no reason to prefer one way of life to another, if a person chooses how to build his own life, his right to be recognized, to assert his dignity in the eyes of other people is essentially devoid of meaning. It is clear that the achievements are always evaluated by a certain community that has specific goals of activity, confirmed by accepted values. But then communitarian, not liberal principles work, and they turn out to be embedded in the very values ​​of liberalism. The liberal point of view is faced with problems in solving such moral issues as the question of the permissibility of prostitution, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, because if a person is the owner of his body, logically he can do anything with it.

In my opinion, in order to resolve the noted contradictions, modern ethics needs to expand the basis of its reasoning. She can no longer rely on the ideas of an individual about his moral life, on those operations that he can perform with his mind. Integration with all the baggage of human knowledge is required, with the natural sciences, modern views about the brain, the process of the formation of human consciousness.

Here one can reason as follows. It is generally accepted that human consciousness is formed gradually, in the process of its development in childhood. In the course of this formation, a person masters a language that is fixed in the culture of a given society. He uses a variety of cultural symbols that constitute his personality. It is no coincidence that P. Florensky said that culture is an environment that nourishes a person. But then the consciousness of the individual cannot be recognized exclusively as his personal property? Accordingly, the human body, which is unique carrier socially conditioned consciousness cannot be recognized as personal property. Thus, liberal approaches to this problem may well be adjusted from the standpoint of communitarianism.

Modern society also needs to take a fresh look at the problem of human dignity. Only on the basis of ideas of personal dignity can a responsive modern production the degree of trust, because creative work, as already mentioned, does not lend itself well to external control. The system of traditional morality, still operating in some societies (for example, the work ethic based on Confucianism in Japan), is gradually losing its significance in connection with the development of a person's individuality, the destruction of his ties with local communities. This can only be opposed by a sense of personal dignity and a desire for recognition at the human level of communication (real, virtual, or even just ideally placed in a possibility).

But this requires a new understanding of the problem of solidarity. By and large, solidarity is a way of uniting various strata of society into a whole and uniting these strata themselves with the whole. This does not mean that society should be solidary in the sense that some should live at the expense of others, that someone can count on constant help from society. But this means that society should represent a single organism that is able to assess the contribution of its members to the common good, not only in terms of their remuneration, but primarily in terms of the criteria for determining and affirming their dignity.

In conclusion, we can say that the variety of positions presented in modern ethics is not its drawback, but only means that when deciding on the issue of moral motivation, moral obligations, it is necessary to combine various principles. How to do this is a matter of social practice. This is already mainly a sphere of politics, a sphere social management... As for ethics, its task is to show the advantages and disadvantages of reasoning built on the basis of one or another principle, to determine the possible scope of its application and the necessary restrictions when transferred to some other area.

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